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Abstract 
It has been argued, in the bioethics literature, that traditional forms of moral instruction and development are 
no longer adequate in equipping humanity to address the urgent nature of the ethical problems facing 
contemporary societies.  Rather than continuing to rely upon these supposedly ineffective methods, we 
should explore the possibility of biologically enhancing our morality.  This would entail both decreasing the 
likelihood that we would wish to cause harm to others as well as increasing our motivation to do good.  The 
proponents of moral bioenhancement argue that the best way of achieving this would be to isolate which 
affective dispositions, that are associated with moral traits, are susceptible to biological modification and to 
biologically enhance these dispositions.  However, despite the presence of strong consequentialist arguments 
in favour of moral bioenhancement, it has elicited a variety of ethical concerns as well as conceptual and 
practical problems that would have to be addressed for it to become a coherent possibility.   
 
An ethical concern that has been raised in the literature is the concern that moral bioenhancement is wrong, 
in principle, and regardless of any benefits it could produce, because it risks negatively impacting phenomena 
that are regarded as intrinsically valuable.  In particular, the concern is that moral bioenhancement could 
impact our moral autonomy, and thus, threaten human morality as such.  This concern is based upon the 
view that the conditions for the exercise of autonomous moral behaviour, and thus morality itself, lie in the 
deliberation and choice that must be freely made in the face of competing demands.  In other words, if it 
became possible to biologically increase our motivation to do good, thereby increasing the likelihood that 
we act in a way that is regarded as morally desirable, could our resultant behaviour still be regarded as 
morally autonomous; or, is morality solely a product of our given, unaltered biological predispositions, 
working in conjunction with traditional mechanisms of moral education?  Will morality as we know it 
disappear if moral bioenhancement becomes a possibility?   
 
This dissertation contributes towards the literature through a comprehensive review in which particular 
conceptual, philosophical and empirical problems are addressed, as well as by providing a structured 
discussion of the practical and theoretical ethical concerns regarding moral bioenhancement.  The 
dissertation includes a substantive definition of moral bioenhancement and makes further independent 
contributions through the analysis and application of a coherence theory of autonomy to ascertain the status 
for moral autonomy of various outcomes of moral bioenhancement interventions.  From this analysis, a 
checklist of interventions that could be potentially inimical to autonomy, in terms of their outcomes, is 
constructed.  The conclusion is that in certain cases, moral bioenhancement could produce an increase, rather 
than a decrease, in the level of autonomy experienced by individuals.   
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Opsomming 
Dit is al meermale in die bio-etiek literatuur beredeneer dat tradisionele vorme van morele onderrig en 
ontwikkeling nie meer voldoende is om die dringende morele probleme wat teenswoordige samelewings 
moet aanspreek, die hoof te bied nie. Eerder as om voort te gaan om op hierdie skynbare oneffektiewe 
metodes peil te trek, moet ons liewer die moontlikheid ondersoek om ons morele sensitiwiteit biologies te 
verbeter. Dit sal behels dat sowel die waarskynlikheid om kwaad aan ander te doen as die toename van ons 
motivering om goed te doen, aan die orde moet kom. Die apologete van morele bio-verbetering argumenteer 
dat die beste manier om laasgenoemde te bereik, sou wees om dié affektiewe disposisies wat geassosieer is 
met morele kenmerke, te isoleer, te bepaal hoe vatbaar hulle is vir biologiese modifikasie, en om dan hierdie 
disposisies biologies te verbeter. Ten spyte van sterk konsekwensialistiese argumente ten gunste van morele 
bio-verbetering, het laasgenoemde moontlikheid ‘n verskeidenheid van etiese vraagstukke sowel as 
konseptuele en praktiese probleme opgelewer wat aangespreek sal moet word alvorens sodanige 
verbeteringe ŉ koherente moontlikheid kan word. 
 
ŉ Etiese probleem wat in die literatuur vermeld word, is die vraag of morele bio-verbetering nie miskien as 
sodanig (in beginsel) verkeerd is nie - ongeag enige voordele wat dit kan oplewer - bloot op grond van die 
feit dat dit negatief sal impakteer op verskynsels wat inherent waardevol is. Hierdie besorgdheid is veral die 
vraag of morele bio-verbetering ŉ beduidende effek sou kon hê op ons morele outonomie, en dus ŉ 
bedreiging vir menslike moraliteit as sodanig sou kon inhou. Hierdie vraagstelling is gebaseer op die 
beskouing dat die voorwaardes vir die uitoefening van outonome morele gedrag, en dus van moraliteit as 
sodanig, geleë is in die deliberasie en keuses wat vryelik gemaak moet kan word ten aansien van 
kompeterende eise. Met ander woorde: indien dit moontlik is om ons motivering om goed te doen, biologies 
te verbeter, en om daardeur die waarskynlikheid dat ons op ‘n manier sal optree wat moreel wenslik is, te 
verhoog, is die vraag of ons resulterende gedrag steeds as moreel outonoom beskou sal kan word. Of, moet 
ons in so ŉ geval, argumenteer dat moraliteit suiwer ŉ produk is van ons gegewe, onveranderde biologiese 
disposisies wat slegs saamwerk met die tradisionele meganismes van ons morele opvoeding? Kortom: sal 
moraliteit, soos ons dit ken, verdwyn indien morele bio-verbetering ŉ moontlikheid word? 
 
In hierdie verhandeling is die gevolgtrekking dat die vlak van bedreiging vir morele outonomie wat morele 
bio-verbetering inhou, afhang van ŉ aantal faktore, wat die aard van die intervensie en die interpretasie van 
die betekenis van outonomie, insluit. Die argument word verder ontwikkel dat, in sekere gevalle, morele 
bio-verbetering ŉ toename, eerder as ‘n afname, in die vlak van outonomie wat individue ervaar, kan 
meebring. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1 Introduction and overview 
The desire to mould the self and improve upon the given is a task with which humanity has occupied 
itself since the recording of human activities commenced.  This drive to improve the human 
condition has given rise to the creation and development of technological capabilities that enable 
the innumerable advantages that characterise life in the contemporary milieu.  In addition, the 
development of technology has enabled not only the transformation of the physical world in 
accordance with human needs, but has also afforded a greater degree of control over human 
physiology itself.  This is reflected in the ever-increasing advancements made in the field of 
medical science, particularly in the treatment of illness and disease.  The successes of medical 
science have also introduced the possibility of moving beyond the treatment of disease to 
improving upon the perceived flaws in human physiology.  We are now faced with the possibility 
of extricating human evolution from the contingencies of natural selection and being able to take 
control of the process ourselves, through biologically improving our cognitive, affective and 
physical functioning; perhaps even our moral functioning.  The possibility of human 
bioenhancement is, however, fraught with ethical problems and concerns.  Whilst there are 
relatively uniform concerns that may be directed at proposed bioenhancements in all three of these 
areas of human functioning, possible bioenhancements of affective or moral functioning invoke 
their own unique set of concerns.  It is in this latter area that my research focus is situated; namely, 
the ethical and philosophical concerns associated with the biological enhancement of morality, 
which will be referred to from hereon as moral bioenhancement.   
 
The possibility of moral bioenhancement has been suggested as a way of making ourselves morally 
better; not only in terms of decreasing the likelihood that we would wish to cause harm to others, 
but also in terms of increasing our desire to do good.  In other words, the goal would be to make 
us care more about, not only other human beings, but also about the world in general.  The 
proponents of moral bioenhancement argue that the best way of achieving the above goals would 
be to isolate which affective dispositions, that are associated with moral traits, are susceptible to 
biological modification and to biologically enhance these dispositions.   
 
The idea of moral bioenhancement was first introduced in 2008 in two seminal articles in the 
Journal of Applied Philosophy.  These articles established Thomas Douglas and his colleagues 
from Oxford University, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, as the dominant proponents of 
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moral bioenhancement.  As is frequently the case with any novel idea or proposal, those who initiate 
the debate also set its parameters to a certain extent.  This has also been the case with the moral 
bioenhancement problematic in that virtually all subsequent publications have responded directly 
or indirectly to the arguments of either Douglas or Persson and Savulescu.  Much of the discussion 
in my dissertation will therefore engage with the claims of these thinkers, and in particular, with 
the arguments of Persson and Savulescu.  In this introductory chapter, I will thus commence with 
a brief description of Persson and Savulescu’s argument regarding moral bioenhancement in 
section 1.2.  In section 1.3 I will then provide a motivation for the research area that I have chosen 
to focus on in my dissertation, which will be followed by an explanation, in section 1.4, of the 
approach that I will take, as well as what my aims are in conducting this research.  In section 1.5 I 
will outline my problem statement and research questions, after which I will conclude the chapter, 
in section 1.6, with a brief overview of what will be discussed in each chapter.   
 
1.2 Persson and Savulescu’s argument in support of moral bioenhancement  
Persson and Savulescu commence their argument by observing that for most of human history, 
individuals cohabited in groups and social cooperatives that were diminutive in comparison with 
the vast, diverse and pluralistic societies that now characterise life in the twenty-first century1.  
Furthermore, the technology utilised throughout most of human history was relatively rudimentary, 
in terms of its potential to negatively impact the environment and other human beings.  It is only 
since the industrial revolution, and in particular, in the previous century, that technology has 
reached the level of advancement that it is now capable of producing major harm on a global scale, 
or even worse, existential harm.  In this regard, Persson and Savulescu’s concern is that we are 
increasingly faced with the realisation that technological capabilities are such, that individuals and 
small groups with nefarious intentions are now able to effect great harm upon vast numbers of 
individuals in a relatively easy manner2.  This potential for catastrophe lies not only in the use of 
nuclear weapons of mass destruction, or the misuse of life sciences research for the creation and 
                                                 
1 The overview provided in this section is an amalgamation of Persson and Savulescu’s many publications in which 
they present their justification for moral bioenhancement (2008; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2015a; 2015b) 
2 In fact, the claim that it is easier to inflict harm than it is to benefit is an integral part of Persson and Savulescu’s 
argument for moral bioenhancement (2008; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2015a; 2015b).  For example, a lone individual 
is able to create a bomb that will kill thousands, or drive a vehicle through a crowd resulting in maximum casualties 
with relative ease.  Being in a position to save lives is seemingly more difficult as individuals must already be placed 
at risk of being harmed in order for one to be in a position to save them.  In addition, Persson and Savulescu argue that 
there are more options available in terms of ways in which one can perpetrate harm than ways in which one can benefit.  
In this regard, they argue that it is easier to negatively impact a system that is operating efficiently or optimally than it 
is to enhance such a system. 
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mobilisation of biological weapons, but also in the failure to forestall the potentially devastating 
effects of climate change by implementing necessary changes at an individual and collective level.   
 
Persson and Savulescu’s general concern is that an increase in the risk of potential catastrophe and 
existential harm is proportional to advancements made in the field of science and technology.  On 
the one hand, scientific and technological advancement cannot, of course, be halted, as it is a source 
of untold benefit and progress.  On the other hand, due to the existential risk posed by the misuse 
of technology, coupled with the relative ease of perpetrating widespread harm, Persson and 
Savulescu posit that the matter cannot simply be ignored.  A more specific concern that they voice, 
and one which lies at the heart of their argument, is that human moral psychology evolved in 
response to extremely different needs and pressures in comparison to what is now required of it.  
In other words, for most of human history, human moral psychology has been required to address 
relatively simple moral issues that were characteristic of life in small societal groupings, rather than 
the complex, seemingly intractable problems and dilemmas that characterise life in twenty-first 
century societies.  In this regard, Persson and Savulescu attribute many of the societal and global 
problems facing humanity to individual behaviours and the general inadequacies of human moral 
psychology.   
 
Furthermore, desirable codes of moral behaviour have traditionally been transmitted through 
various mechanisms such as parental instruction, education, socialisation with peers, or through 
the inculcation of a moral code in a specific religious or cultural setting.  Persson and Savulescu 
argue, however, that these traditional methods of moral development are no longer adequate in 
equipping humanity to address the distinct nature of the problems faced by contemporary societies, 
nor are they able to motivate the sacrifices required of individuals to bring about general 
improvements in different areas.  Thus, the argument is that both our existing moral psychology, 
in general, and traditional forms of moral development are simply no longer up to the task required 
of them.  Furthermore, Persson and Savulescu posit that existing political forms of organisation are 
not equipped to address the consequences produced by the failings of human moral psychology.    
 
One of the most interesting – and I would argue, valuable – parts of Persson and Savulescu’s 
argument is their analysis of the specific aspects of human moral psychology, or common-sense 
morality, that they regard as lacking.  Firstly, they point out that human beings are biased in terms 
of their tendency to pay more cognisance to the concerns of the immediate future.  Thus, they are 
unlikely to make the requisite changes to their behaviour that would suffice in addressing events 
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that will only occur in the more distant future.  An area in which this is particularly concerning, 
pertains to the behavioural changes that all individuals would be required to make in order to 
prevent the consequences associated with environmental problems such as climate change and 
general environmental degradation.  Furthermore, this issue is compounded by the fact that given 
the enormity of human populations, and thus, the perceived dilution of responsibility, there is very 
little impetus for individuals to adjust their behaviour and display the altruism and sacrifice that 
would be required to ameliorate the consequences of environmental degradation that we now face.   
 
Secondly, Persson and Savulescu draw attention to the fact that the vast majority of the world’s 
population live in conditions of extreme hardship and dire poverty.  Despite the fact that it would 
require minimal involvement and sacrifice on the part of individuals living in relative affluence, to 
ameliorate such suffering, help in this regard is mostly absent.  Persson and Savulescu give a 
number of reasons for this general lack of aid-giving to the needy, and, in particular, to the 
developing world.  Firstly, most individuals are predisposed to kin-altruism.  This refers to the 
tendency to experience empathy for, and display altruism towards, only those with whom one is 
directly connected: one’s family, friends, acquaintances or general in-group.  In other words, we 
only truly care, in terms of the extent to which caring motivates us to act, for those who bear some 
connection or relation to us.  This also manifests as a tendency to become overwhelmed by, and 
desensitised to, the suffering of large groups, particularly those located at a considerable distance 
from us.  This tendency is further exacerbated by the dilution of responsibility: the fact that we feel 
that our individual efforts in beneficence, particularly regarding the issue of poverty, will be 
negligible.  A further complication is the underlying human tendency known as the act-omission 
doctrine.  This refers to the intuition that in weighing our sense of moral responsibility, we place a 
larger weight on the avoidance of harm than on the provision of benefit.  In other words, we feel 
that it is wrong to harm others but we don’t necessarily view it as wrong to not benefit.  Persson 
and Savulescu argue in contradistinction to this view, that in terms of the consequences, failure to 
benefit, in some cases, ought to be considered as equivalent to direct harm.   
 
It is the combination of all of the above intuitions, dispositions and tendencies, coupled with the 
growing powers of technology to equip individuals to exact immense harms across vast distances 
and time, that is so concerning to Persson and Savulescu, and, which motivates their argument for 
moral bioenhancement.  What is needed, Persson and Savulescu posit, is to intensify and accelerate 
the process of moral improvement by taking matters directly into our own hands.  In other words, 
rather than relying solely on traditional mechanisms of moral enhancement, which they regard as 
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inadequate to be able to address the urgent nature of the problems we face, we must complement 
these traditional approaches with other possibilities.  The possibility that they regard as offering a 
promising solution to the above-mentioned shortcomings in human moral psychology would be to 
make physiological improvements to our morality.  This, they argue, will be most effectively 
achieved through isolating which psychological dispositions, that are associated with moral traits, 
are able to be biologically modified.  Whilst neuroscientific research pertaining to moral 
bioenhancement is still in its nascent stages, scientific research has already identified two moral 
dispositions with a biological or genetic basis: altruism and our sense of justice, or fairness.  
Strengthening these two dispositions, Persson and Savulescu argue, will increase the motivation of 
individuals to act in a way that they know, in most cases, is good, and will, therefore, address the 
problems mentioned above in a way that traditional methods of moral development cannot.   
 
1.3 Motivation for the research focus  
On a practical level, the possibility of the kinds of moral bioenhancement interventions envisaged 
in the literature would, of course, be dependent upon the relevant scientific advances being made, 
and the likelihood of ethical consensus being reached regarding their implementation.  However, 
the exponential rate of progress of scientific and technological capabilities is such that the gap 
between such aspirations and the development of the means that would enable their fruition is 
rapidly diminishing.  In addition, many of the ‘soft’ forms of moral bioenhancement suggested in 
the literature, such as the manipulation of neurotransmitters by means of pharmacological 
interventions, are already available and are utilised to treat affective disorders.  This, therefore, 
raises the possibility of using these same interventions for enhancement purposes.  Due to the fact 
that moral bioenhancement is a relatively new area of focus, it is vital to clarify and establish an 
adequate foundation for mediating the ethical issues that are raised by such possibilities, before the 
more ‘hard’ forms of moral bioenhancement come to fruition.  While it is unlikely that many would 
agree to undergo moral bioenhancement, for reasons that will be discussed in this dissertation, 
research in this area could have more applicability for the treatment of mental disorders and 
behaviour associated with criminal tendencies.  This matter will be addressed in the course of my 
dissertation.   
 
On a theoretical and philosophical level, the moral bioenhancement debate offers many valuable 
insights.  Firstly, the possibility of moral bioenhancement raises important meta-ethical questions 
regarding the nature of morality itself.  Some of the questions elicited by an investigation of moral 
bioenhancement are: what does it mean to act in a moral manner, rather than simply acting in a 
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way that has morally relevant consequences; what is the relationship between cognition and 
emotion in morality; and, is the way in which one becomes and acts morally, something that is, 
itself, morally relevant?  In addition, there are other fascinating questions regarding the relationship 
between autonomy and morality, such as: to what extent does morality depend upon the possibility 
of being able to act in an immoral manner, and therefore, to what extent, if any, would moral 
bioenhancement erode moral autonomy, and thus, morality?  This latter question will be the 
predominant area of investigation in the second half of my dissertation.  The moral bioenhancement 
debate, therefore, enables us to re-examine these age-old areas of philosophical investigation from 
an entirely different paradigm, and thus, it has reinvigorated important concerns that are deeply 
indicative of the human condition.   
 
1.4 Research approach and aims  
As an area of ethical and philosophical research, there are numerous ways in which one may 
approach an investigation of the problems associated with moral bioenhancement.  It is important 
to briefly mention some of these possible approaches for various reasons.  Firstly, specifying the 
different ways in which an explication of the problem could be approached will assist in 
circumscribing the scope of my dissertation.  In other words, by pointing out the different ways in 
which the problem could be approached, or framed, my aim is partly to ensure clarity regarding the 
approaches, or lines of investigation that I will not be taking.  Secondly, by pointing out the 
existence of other ways of approaching the problem, I am wishing to indicate that I am, in fact, 
very much aware that these different approaches to the problem can be taken, and therefore, that 
certain important aspects of the problem have not been omitted accidentally, or without 
consideration.  Thirdly, by drawing attention to the existence of alternative ways of approaching 
the problem, I also wish to indicate that there are other important areas that could be open for 
further investigation.   
 
In my dissertation, I have aimed to provide an exploratory and comprehensive overview of the 
problem of moral bioenhancement through a detailed and systematic engagement with the 
literature.  While I have chosen to focus on the ethical and philosophical status of a concern that is 
prevalent in the literature, namely, the argument that claims moral bioenhancement will impact 
upon moral autonomy in same way, I have also discussed other practical concerns regarding moral 
bioenhancement that I take to be relevant to an engagement with the problem.  As mentioned above, 
Persson and Savulescu, have provided a comprehensive argument as to why the possibilities that 
moral bioenhancement offers, warrant further research.  In addition, they have suggested specific 
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psychological dispositions that they regard as the best potential targets for moral bioenhancement; 
namely, altruism and a sense of justice.  Therefore, one possible approach to an investigation of 
moral bioenhancement would be to focus extensively on the nature of these dispositions, drawing 
upon insights from fields such as evolutionary biology and moral psychology in order to ascertain 
whether or not these dispositions have a genetic basis, as well as their role in morality.  Another 
approach would be to reject the specific dispositions that Persson and Savulescu suggest in favour 
of other dispositions, or ways of enhancing our morality.  One would then be required to provide 
an argument for why these alternative dispositions would be preferable targets of moral 
bioenhancement to the ones suggested by Persson and Savulescu.  I am not choosing to take either 
of these approaches, for various reasons.   
 
Firstly, an assessment of the suggested dispositions from an evolutionary biological perspective is 
an approach that is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  Secondly, I am in agreement with Persson 
and Savulescu that the specific dispositions they have suggested are the most plausible potential 
candidates for moral bioenhancement.  This is not only due to the fact that research indicates that 
these dispositions may have a genetic basis, and thus, that they may be susceptible to biomedical 
enhancement, but also, because the nature of these particular dispositions is congruent with a 
respect for moral pluralism.  In other words, if by possessing a sense of justice, what is meant is a 
respect for the value of fairness in practice, as founded on the notion of the equal moral worth of 
all human beings, this seems to be a quality that is uncontroversially regarded as good on most 
accounts of morality.  Similarly, altruism or empathy, understood as the ability to regard the welfare 
of others as morally important, seems to also to enjoy appreciation in most moral codes.   
 
Of course, different accounts of morality would provide different content regarding what would be 
considered a just or altruistic action.  What the nature of this substantive content should be, is, in 
my opinion, the source of many of the disagreements in the literature.  However, this difficulty 
aside, I believe that the selection of these two dispositions captures something that I take to be an 
important component of a practical, or non-idealized, morality.  In other words, actions that are 
regarded as just and altruistic are both characterised by the common requirement that in order to 
be just or altruistic, one must have the ability to take into account the perspective of the other.  In 
a sense, it is impossible to be altruistic or act in a just way if one is unable, or unwilling, to consider 
an act from the perspective of another.  In terms of the specific argument that Persson and Savulescu 
provide for why we need moral bioenhancement in the first place, I believe that the enhancement 
of our ability to assume and act upon the perspective of the other is the best starting point for the 
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discussion.  I also believe that this ability is something that comes close to enjoying universal 
appreciation in most accounts of morality.   
 
Whether the modification of these dispositions, in the way that the proponents envisage, will ever 
be scientifically feasible, is, of course, a different matter.  Furthermore, even if the enhancement 
of these dispositions becomes scientifically possible, it is not necessarily the case that this would 
constitute an improvement of our morality.  In other words, while a strong sense of justice and 
altruism may be relevant, or sufficient to compel moral action, it is not necessarily the case that 
their presence alone is sufficient to compel moral action.  Morality is a complex phenomenon that 
requires interaction between various internal components, such as affective and cognitive 
mechanisms, as well as the ability to interpret and apply relevant contextual information.  This 
latter issue is important for the concern for moral autonomy and will therefore be addressed in my 
dissertation.  While I will briefly address the way in which the issue regarding the scientific 
feasibility of moral bioenhancement is discussed in the literature in chapter 2, I will make certain 
idealising assumptions regarding this matter.  For the purposes of my investigation, which is ethical 
and philosophical in nature, I will assume that safe moral bioenhancement could be a scientific 
possibility in the future, given that certain biomedical, and specifically neuroscientific 
advancements, are made.  I am aware, however, that an investigation of the scientific feasibility of 
moral bioenhancement is a second possible approach that could be taken as a focus for an 
investigation of moral bioenhancement, and, that the assumption I am making regarding its 
possibility is a substantial one.  I have not chosen to focus on this matter in depth as it does not lie 
within the ambit of my expertise but is rather an area requiring extensive neuroscientific 
knowledge.   
 
Regarding the main focus of my dissertation, the concern for the impact that moral bioenhancement 
may have on moral autonomy, there are also different ways in which this matter may be 
approached.  Once again, one may approach this concern from a neuroscientific paradigm and deny 
that this is, in fact, a problem, due to evidence that contests the extent to which we possess the kind 
of autonomy portrayed in the literature, to begin with.  Given that this line of argumentation would 
take my dissertation in an entirely different direction, and not require engagement with my chosen 
topic, I will not pursue such an investigation.  Secondly, one could engage with the problem in an 
immanent manner by investigating it in detail, and on its own terms, in order to ascertain the 
legitimacy of the concerns that have been voiced by opponents.  In other words, one may assess 
the concern by using a conception of autonomy that would be regarded as legitimate by the 
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opponents of moral bioenhancement, and analyse their arguments from within, or, in accordance 
with this conception.  A third possible approach could be to reject the concern outright, on the 
grounds that these arguments overemphasise the importance of moral autonomy, and autonomy in 
general.   
 
This third approach leaves little room for engagement with the ethical status of moral 
bioenhancement itself, as it distils down to a dispute between values.  Furthermore, in the case of 
moral bioenhancement, such an approach is characteristic of a clash between consequentialist 
arguments that support moral bioenhancement on the grounds of some worthwhile benefit that it 
will produce, and arguments that are non-consequentialist in nature, and regard our moral 
autonomy as absolute in value, regardless of any benefits associated with any impacts upon it.  
Other than noting that this approach can be taken, and briefly discussing it in chapter 4, I will not 
attempt to provide a solution, as it is an ongoing meta-ethical dispute that I take to be irresolvable.  
Rather, I will take the second approach – mentioned above – in my investigation and engage 
directly with the concerns voiced in the literature regarding the potential impact that moral 
bioenhancement may have on moral autonomy.  This approach will require that I investigate and 
discuss the literature in a detailed manner so as to then synthesize the various arguments and claims, 
in order to be able to adequately engage with them and offer an independent interpretation and 
assessment of the problem.   
 
1.5 Research questions and problem statement  
The research problem that I will focus on in my dissertation is the concern for human moral 
autonomy that is posed by moral bioenhancement.  In other words, if it became possible to increase 
our motivation to do good, thereby increasing the likelihood that we act in a way that is regarded 
as morally desirable, could our resultant behaviour still be regarded as moral; or, is morality solely 
a product of our given, unaltered biological predispositions, working in conjunction with traditional 
mechanisms of moral education?   
 
In my dissertation, I will firstly investigate this concern in terms of how it has been elucidated in 
the literature.  Here, the concern is framed and approached in terms of the extent to which morality 
is dependent upon the possibility of doing wrong.  In other words, the prevalent intuition in the 
literature is that the conditions for the exercise of moral behaviour lie in deliberation and choices 
that must be freely made in the face of competing demands.  Therefore, the concern is that if we 
have been biologically influenced to make better choices, may these subsequent choices and the 
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behaviours that they support, still be regarded as moral?  Would morality as we know it disappear 
if moral bioenhancement became a possibility?   
 
I will then utilise the insights of influential theories of personal autonomy to approach the research 
problem in a different manner.  Here, I will conduct an independent analysis of the possible 
outcomes of moral bioenhancement interventions in terms of their impact upon autonomy.  This 
will require me to elucidate the nature of autonomy, itself, in order to coherently assess whether 
moral bioenhancement interventions would, in fact, impact upon the former.  The research questions 
that I will, therefore, attempt to answer are:  1) what kind of autonomy is at stake in the moral 
bioenhancement debate; 2) if moral bioenhancement were to impact autonomy, how would it do 
so; and, 3) are there any differences between various types of interventions in terms of their possible 
impact upon autonomy?   
 
1.6 Overview of chapters  
In chapters 2, 3 and 4 I will focus on the way in which moral bioenhancement has been discussed 
in the literature.  In chapter 2, I will investigate three interconnected areas that I have identified 
from a survey of the literature as relevant for my research focus.  These areas pertain to how moral 
bioenhancement is – and should be – defined; what the target/s of moral bioenhancement should 
be; and, whether or not moral bioenhancement could be a scientific possibility.  In chapters 3 and 
4, I will then discuss the different arguments that have been made in the literature in opposition to 
moral bioenhancement.  In chapter 3 I will focus specifically on arguments that posit that moral 
bioenhancement is morally problematic on a practical level, due to potentially negative 
consequences it will produce at both individual and societal levels.  Some of the problems that I 
will investigate here, range from potential safety risks and implementation and administrative 
concerns, to concerns for distributive justice and egalitarianism.   
 
I have divided chapter 4 into two parts that I take to be related to each another.  These sections 
address concerns that moral bioenhancement is wrong, in principle, and regardless of any benefits 
it could produce, because it risks negatively impacting phenomena that are regarded as intrinsically 
valuable.  Here, I will investigate the concern for the way in which both personal qualitative identity 
and moral autonomy could be affected by moral bioenhancement, and why this would be 
considered a negative outcome.  I have also divided chapter 5 into two parts.  In the first part I will 
present the theoretical component that will inform my analysis in the second part.  Theories that 
will be discussed include hierarchical accounts of autonomy as well as Ekstrom’s coherence theory 
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of autonomy.  My aim in this regard is to provide an account of autonomy that is sufficiently 
rigorous to adequately address the concern for moral autonomy that is posed by moral 
bioenhancement.  I will conclude my dissertation in chapter 6 by synthesising the insights in the 
afore-mentioned chapters, and by suggesting the areas that warrant further research and ethical 
discussion.  Regarding the level of threat posed to moral autonomy by moral bioenhancement, my 
conclusion will be that this will depend upon a number of factors, including the nature of the 
intervention and the interpretation of autonomy.  Furthermore, I will argue that in certain cases, 
moral bioenhancement could produce an increase, rather than a decrease, in the level of autonomy 
experienced by individuals.   
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Chapter 2 –Definitions, moral content and scientific feasibility  
 
2.1 Introduction and overview of chapter 
In this chapter, I will explore several interconnected and overlapping themes – relevant to the focus 
of this dissertation – that I have identified in the literature on moral bioenhancement.  The 
discussion is based on a review of approximately 120 publications that have directly addressed the 
moral bioenhancement problematic since 2008 when the area was first identified in two seminal 
articles in the Journal of Applied Philosophy.  These articles established Thomas Douglas and his 
colleagues from Oxford University, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, as the dominant 
proponents of moral bioenhancement.  Virtually all subsequent publications addressing the moral 
bioenhancement problematic have responded directly or indirectly to the arguments of either 
Douglas or Persson and Savulescu.  The focus of this chapter is primarily on conceptual issues 
related to the identified themes, and the way in which these matters have been addressed by various 
thinkers in the literature.  The various arguments against moral bioenhancement, and some of the 
responses to these arguments, will be presented in chapters 3 and 4.   
 
In section 2.2 I will investigate one of the most prevalently addressed areas in the literature, namely, 
definitional issues regarding the term moral bioenhancement itself.  This area may be understood 
as The problem of competing definitions as it involves disagreements regarding a topic of 
fundamental importance, namely, how moral bioenhancement should be defined, and, whether 
agreement regarding a functional definition is even possible.  In section 2.2.1 I will present 
definitions that characterise moral bioenhancement in terms of its outcomes, as well as more neutral 
definitions that attempt to avoid notions of improvement or betterment.  In section 2.2.2 I will then 
examine definitions that presuppose that moral bioenhancement will result in moral improvements.  
The definitions discussed in this section are also more normative in character, due to their 
specification of the target/s of moral bioenhancement.  In this section, I will also discuss the 
relevance of the distinction between traditional moral enhancement, through non-biological means, 
and moral biological enhancement, for the ethical status of moral bioenhancement.   
 
In section 2.2.3 I will discuss definitions that utilise notions of species-typical or ‘normal’ levels 
of moral functioning.  This approach distinguishes between treatment (of pathological levels of 
moral psychological functioning) and enhancement (above species-typical levels of moral 
psychological functioning).  Finally, in section 2.2.4 I will briefly mention other ways in which 
definitions may be categorised.  These definitions distinguish between broad versus specific and 
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passive versus active interventions; both distinctions loosely correlate with the distinction between 
traditional moral enhancement and biological moral enhancement.   
 
In section 2.3 I will discuss the second area of focus which I have termed The problem of moral 
content.  This area is the primary source of the problem of competing definitions.  The fundamental 
area of dispute pertains to the question of what makes a person moral.  Does morality lie in the 
actions or behaviour of individuals?  In other words, is morality something discernible that can be 
observed, the kind of person someone is?  This seems to be important as morality should be linked 
to real world outcomes to be meaningful.  However, it cannot be all there is to morality as someone 
may act in a seemingly moral manner due to external manipulation.  We can ask then if morality is 
rather characterised by an internal state.  Does morality entail particular attitudes, capacities, 
intentions or feeling the ‘correct’ emotions or morally salient motives that compel us to act in a 
particular way; or, does it lie in the process of cognition or reasoning that we employ to reach 
particular moral conclusions?  Or, is morality informed by a complex conglomeration of all of the 
above-mentioned factors?  It seems likely that this latter possibility would be closest to the truth.  
This area is not only of theoretical interest, but also, more importantly, it has major implications 
for practical issues regarding moral enhancement.  In other words, these discussions are aiming at 
answering the question of what we should enhance.   
 
In section 2.3.1 I will discuss the view of the proponents: Persson and Savulescu, as well as 
Douglas, who have argued that the appropriate target of moral bioenhancement should be moral 
motivation.  In other words, they argue that moral bioenhancement should make us more likely to 
act in a morally desirable way by strengthening our reasons or feelings for doing so.  Due to the 
emphasis of affective components on our motivation by the supporters, there has been a tendency 
to frame the debate as one between the role of emotions versus reasoning in morality3.  This matter, 
which may be traced back to disputes, in this regard, between Hume and Kant, will therefore be 
addressed in section 2.3.2.  In section 2.3.3 I will then discuss the ‘problem’ of moral pluralism 
and the implications that this has for identifying a suitable target for moral bioenhancement.  In 
section 2.3.4 I will briefly discuss John Harris’ response to the problem of moral content while in 
section 2.3.5 I will present interpretations offered by some thinkers who argue that morality is more 
complex than the emotion/reason dichotomy would imply.  I will conclude this discussion of the 
second problem in section 2.3.6, by briefly discussing the possibility of utilising insights from 
virtue ethics in order to address the problem of moral content.  This approach has been suggested 
                                                 
3 I will refer to this from hereon as the emotion/reason dichotomy  
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by several thinkers in the literature as a possible way of overcoming the seeming irreconcilabilities 
of the above-mentioned approaches.   
 
As mentioned above, the problem of moral content has practical relevance because for moral 
bioenhancement to be scientifically feasible we would have to know what it is we should attempt 
to enhance.  Furthermore, it would have to be established that the identified target/s are, in fact, 
susceptible to biological enhancement.  The third area of focus that I will therefore address in 
section 2.4 is The problem of the science of moral bioenhancement.  The proponents of moral 
bioenhancement are, not surprisingly, more optimistic regarding the scientific possibility of moral 
bioenhancement.  In section 2.4.1 I will therefore discuss the arguments presented by those who 
regard moral bioenhancement as a scientifically feasible prospect in the future.  This will also 
include a discussion of the potential targets of moral bioenhancement that have been suggested, as 
well as some of the interventions that have been proposed.  The arguments here draw upon insights, 
studies and research from a variety of fields in support of their claims.   
 
In section 2.4.2 I will investigate the responses to these claims.  Certain thinkers have argued that 
while there may be a partly biological basis to our morality, moral bioenhancement will not – or 
may not – be a possibility due to the complexity of our moral psychology.  In other words, it either 
won’t work, or safety concerns will make it too risky.  Some argue that the role that physiological 
– and more specifically, genetic – factors play in influencing our morality has been exaggerated 
and that the environment exerts a far stronger influence in this regard.  According to this view, it 
is likely that moral bioenhancement is a scientific impossibility.  I will address this matter further 
in section 3.2 of chapter 3 as it is relevant for the concern that moral bioenhancement is wrong in 
practice due to potential harms and risks that it poses to individuals.   
 
The fourth relevant area of focus in the moral bioenhancement literature addresses Why we should 
or shouldn’t morally bioenhance ourselves. This area includes a variety of arguments that have 
been given by proponents in support of moral bioenhancement and the responses to these claims 
lodged by opponents.  I will discuss these arguments in chapters 3 and 4.     
 
2.2 The problem of competing definitions 
A number of thinkers have explicitly drawn attention to the lack of consensus regarding a definition 
of moral bioenhancement (Douglas, 2008; Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Beck, 2015; Crutchfield, 
2016; Focquaert & Schermer, 2015a; Hauskeller, 2015; Pacholczyk, 2011; Raus et al, 2014; Shook, 
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2012; Walker, 2009; Jotterand, 2011; Bruni, 2011; Schaefer, 2011; Baertschi, 2014; Lechner, 2014; 
Chan & Harris, 2011, Verkiel, 2017).  As mentioned above, this may be directly attributed to the 
fact that definitions regarding what would constitute an enhancement of morality are directly 
informed by deeper meta-ethical disputes regarding the content and nature of morality itself.  As 
argued by Raus et al., these deeper meta-ethical disagreements have resulted in most definitions of 
moral bioenhancement being “significantly less descriptive and more normative than they are 
regularly portrayed to be” (2014:263).  In other words, definitions are generally not content-neutral 
but reflect a particular interpretation of what morality should consist of.   
 
Such meta-ethical disputes are a long-standing phenomenon with no obvious or imminent solution.  
Therefore, as pointed out by Raus et al, it is not likely that there will be – or should be, for that 
matter – a “single and universally agreed upon definition” (2014:272) for moral bioenhancement 
in the foreseeable future.  In light of this, they suggest that it would be completely acceptable for 
the term, moral bioenhancement, to be used as an umbrella term, under which a variety of possible 
definitions could be grouped (ibid.).  Agar also argues that “we can endorse a conceptual pluralism 
that acknowledges the need for more than one concept of human enhancement to address the hugely 
varied ways in which technology may alter humans” (2014:369).  An important requirement of this 
approach would be to ensure that one specifies the underlying normative stance that informs the 
definition one is offering, rather than presenting a definition that contains implicit normative 
underpinnings as neutral.  This will also assist with clarity and ensure that interlocutors are able to 
avoid talking past one another and engage coherently.  
 
Before I discuss the various definitions that have been offered, it is necessary to provide a definition 
of biological enhancement in general.  Buchanan’s definition, which is, in all likelihood, the most 
extensively cited definition in the enhancement literature, refers to biological enhancement as “a 
deliberate intervention, applying biomedical science, which aims to improve an existing capacity 
that most or all normal human beings typically have, or to create a new capacity, by acting directly 
on the body or brain” (2011:23).  The Nuffield Council also provides a good working definition of 
general enhancement, defining it as “the directed use of biotechnical power to alter, by direct 
intervention, not disease processes but the ‘normal’ workings of the human body and psyche, to 
augment or improve their native capacities and performances, and in that sense, is taken to be 
beyond therapy” (2013:164).  Beauchamp’s further specification of the term enhancement is also 
useful.  He posits that in the context of the moral bioenhancement debate, “by the word 
‘enhancement’ the authors seem to mean an intervention – a human initiated improvement in traits, 
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dispositions, characteristics, or capacities intended to take persons beyond normal levels of human 
functioning” (2015:346).  These three definitions are seemingly similar but can be distinguished 
somewhat due to their different emphases.  All three definitions explicitly use the interpretation of 
enhancement as improvement.  However, Beauchamp and the Nuffield Council’s definitions 
explicitly refer to improvement above normal functioning, a contested approach due to the 
difficulty in identifying what would constitute normal functioning.  This approach is nevertheless 
utilised by a number of thinkers and will be discussed further below.   
 
2.2.1 Outcomes-based definitions versus neutral definitions  
In terms of defining moral bioenhancement, however, it is not only the above-mentioned lack of 
consensus regarding definitions that is striking, but also the dearth of thinkers who actually offer 
definitions to begin with, that is noticeable when reviewing the literature.  Whilst there are an 
abundance of publications addressing the moral bioenhancement problematic, there are only a 
handful of substantive definitions offered.  The broadest definitions define moral bioenhancement 
in terms of the outcomes it will produce.  In a collaborative article, Savulescu, Douglas and Persson 
offer this type of definition of moral bioenhancement, defining it as “an intervention that makes it 
more likely that you will act morally, in some future period, than would have been the case if it 
were not used.  One acts morally when one does the right thing, and for the right reason(s)” 
(2014:95).  Savulescu, Douglas and Persson do, however, draw attention to the fact that providing 
content regarding what it means to act more morally will depend on one’s account of morality and 
will thus be open to dispute.  Pacholczyk offers a similar definition of moral enhancement as 
involving “a change in some aspect of morality that results in a morally better person” (2011:252).  
She argues that becoming morally better could, of course, involve a variety of possibilities such as 
“making people more likely to act on their moral beliefs, improving their reflective and reasoning 
abilities as applied to moral issues, increasing their ability to be compassionate and so on” 
(Pacholczyk, 2011:252).   
 
Pacholczyk points out that describing moral bioenhancement in terms of using notions of moral 
betterment, or improvement, for that matter, is, of course, a normative claim.  It would remain to 
be seen whether an intervention does, in fact, result in moral betterment; and, whether this is the 
case would depend upon one’s conception of what moral betterment consists in (Pacholczyk, 
2011:253).  Simkulet offers a definition which implies a similar view.  He defines moral 
enhancement as “any enhancement that improves the likelihood that a moral agent will achieve his 
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or her moral goals, where moral goals can be either praiseworthy or blameworthy depending on 
their intentional content and epistemic character” (Simkulet, 2012:18).   
 
Due to the recognition of this problem, some thinkers attempt to provide definitions or use 
terminology that explicitly excludes the idea of improvement.  Baertschi uses the term 
neuromodulation (2014), whereas Murphy refers to biomoral modification rather than moral 
bioenhancement, thus avoiding the issue “of whether the modification actually amounts to an 
enhancement” (2015:370).  Zarpentine attempts to provide a similarly neutral definition, describing 
moral bioenhancement as involving “direct pharmacological or surgical manipulation of the brain 
or selection of genetic material conducive to the aims of moral enhancement” (2013:142).  Sparrow 
defines moral bioenhancement as a “deliberate modification…[via ‘drug therapies, neural implants, 
or (perhaps) genetic engineering] in order to make [people] ‘more moral’” (2014b:20).  While his 
definition contains an implicit idea of improvement, Sparrow places the phrase ‘more moral’ in 
scare quotes in order to emphasise his position that moral bioenhancement, as envisaged by its 
proponents, would not, in fact, make us more moral.  By using terms such as modification, 
alteration, manipulation or change, the above definitions are indicative of obvious attempts to steer 
clear of the normative implications associated with notions of improvement.  Such terms may also 
signify that a thinker contests the view that moral bioenhancement would, in fact, be an 
improvement or enhancement, as is the case with Sparrow. 
 
2.2.2 Target-based, normative definitions  
A more common approach in the moral bioenhancement literature is to sidestep the issue of whether 
or not interventions would result in definitive improvements in morality, and, to simply assume 
that they would.  Any intervention named a moral bioenhancement under this interpretation would 
therefore, be an improvement, by definition.  This approach is characterised by a focus on the target 
of enhancement.  In other words, it defines moral bioenhancement by what it would aim to enhance, 
or work on.  In this regard, such definitions are normative as they provide specific, substantive 
content in terms of what should be enhanced, and thus, they are offering a particular perspective 
on what constitutes morality or the nature of morality in general.  In terms of this approach, De 
Melo-Martin and Salles have argued that despite the differences in what they would purport to be 
the targets of moral bioenhancement, these approaches all have in common the fact that moral 
bioenhancement is seen “as one more means in a continuum of practices whose goal is moral 
improvement, that is, as means of creating morally better people” (2015:3). 
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There are a variety of target-based definitions that have been offered, including both broad and 
more specific definitions.  In terms of wider definitions, Jebari defines moral bioenhancement as 
altering “a person’s dispositions, emotions or behaviour in order to make that person more moral” 
(2014:253); whereas Crutchfield defines it as “the enhancement of a person’s moral attitudes, 
motivations, or behaviour through biological means” (2016:389).  Crutchfield admits that his 
definition is problematic in that it isn’t clear what enhancements in these areas would entail (ibid.).  
Furthermore, he points out that while his definition could be amended to include “dispositions and 
emotions…[it is] general enough to capture the notion of moral bioenhancement and specific 
enough to be useful” (ibid.).  Shook also alludes to the variety of possible contenders for 
enhancement, pointing out that what could be considered “‘moral’ enhancement ranges from 
feeling empathic concern to increasing personal responsibility all the way to heightening respect 
for global fairness” (2012:3).  He posits that “moral intuitions, virtues, and rules are not identical 
around the world” (ibid.) alluding to the fact that what may be regarded as morally positive in one 
location could be regarded in a less positive light elsewhere.  However, he argues that despite the 
presence of plural conceptions of morality and the complexity of identifying the content/s of 
morality, there are areas of overlap that can be used to devise a list of potential targets for moral 
bioenhancement (Shook, 2012:4).  Shook posits that moral bioenhancement can be defined as 
improving functioning in five areas: moral appreciation, moral decision-making, moral 
judgements, moral intentions and moral will power (2012:5-6) 
 
There are also thinkers who provide definitions that attempt to narrow down the target/s of moral 
bioenhancement.  Christen and Narvaez define moral bioenhancement as “the endeavour to 
improve moral behaviour in a neuroscientifically informed way” (own emphasis, 2012:25).  As 
mentioned above, Sparrow has argued that in the literature, moral bioenhancement has been 
described as aiming at modifying “individuals’ behaviour and dispositions in order to make them 
‘more moral’” (own emphasis, 2014b:20).  However, elsewhere he contests whether such 
interventions would in fact achieve their purported aims; arguing that whilst it is feasible that 
certain interventions could change: 
behaviour and emotions in ways that we may be inclined to morally evaluate positively, 
describing this as a moral enhancement presupposes a particular contested, account of what it 
is to act morally, and also implies that entirely familiar drugs such as alcohol, ecstasy, and 
marijuana [which alter behaviour and emotions in a similar manner] are also capable of making 
people ‘more moral’ (Sparrow, 2014a:24).  
 
Barilan discusses the traditional understanding of enhancement, arguing that if “enhancement 
means betterment…[then] in this sense, moral enhancement may count as an increase in kind, 
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charitable, and just judgements and actions” (own emphasis, 2015:75).  In terms of this inclusion 
of moral judgement and the actions it leads to, this definition identifies three important, and much-
discussed components of morality; namely, dispositions or virtues (the terms kind, charitable and 
just), reasoning (the term judgements) and behaviour (the term actions).  A similarly astute 
definition provided by Focquaert and Schermer purports moral enhancement to refer “to 
interventions that aim to improve moral decision-making and behaviour” (2015a:141).  This 
definition supports their argument that the means one takes to ensure moral behaviour, are morally 
relevant.  In other words, the inclusion of the term moral decision-making implies that moral 
behaviour has a cognitive component, or, at least, that to be considered moral, it should be the 
product of some process of reasoning that leads to morally improved behaviour.  However, they 
admit that this interpretation of moral bioenhancement requires an accompanying “account of how 
moral decision-making and moral behaviour work” (Focquaert & Schermer, 201a5:141).  If one 
delves further below the surface of Focquaert and Schermer’s definition, it becomes apparent that 
their definition alludes to the schism in views regarding the content of morality as informed either 
by Humean emotions or Kantian reasoning – the emotion/reason dichotomy – as well as the concern 
that for moral bioenhancement to be meaningful it would have to result in some discernible 
difference in behaviour.  These points will be discussed in the next section as well as in subsequent 
chapters.   
 
Moving to even narrower definitions, Douglas emphasises motives, defining moral 
bioenhancement as resulting in an individual having “morally better motives…[where motives refer 
to] psychological – mental or neural – states or processes that will, given the absence of opposing 
motives, cause a person to act” (own emphasis, 2008:229).  Later, Douglas defines moral 
bioenhancement as “interventions that will expectably leave an individual with more moral motives 
or behaviour than [he or she] would otherwise have had” (Douglas, 2013:162).  His addition of 
behaviour implies the relatively uncontroversial assumption that to be considered as a moral 
bioenhancement, an intervention must produce sufficient motivational force to result in an actual 
change in behaviour.  In addition, the inclusion of behaviour alludes to the possibility of moral 
bioenhancement that could result in improvements to behaviour without any change in motives.  
Of course, behavioural improvement in the absence of accompanying changes in moral motivation 
or reasoning would generally be viewed as problematic as it could be regarded as a possible form 
of behavioural control4.  Douglas also defines moral enhancement as aiming at “the attenuation of 
                                                 
4 This is a major concern of certain opponents of moral bioenhancement (for example: Morioka, 2014; Bublitz, 2016; 
Simkulet, 2012; Jotterand, 2011; Harris, 2014; Sparrow, 2014b).  Harris, for example, argues that, contrary to Douglas 
and Persson and Savulescu’s interpretation, enhancements should not be “define[d]…in terms of the intention or the 
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counter-moral emotions: emotions that interfere with moral reasoning, sympathy and all other 
plausible candidates for ‘morally good motives’” (2013:161).  Examples of counter-moral 
emotions that are extensively discussed by Douglas include “racial aversion and impulses to violent 
aggression” (2013:161). 
 
Persson and Savulescu define the concept in terms of enhancing primary moral dispositions that 
are argued to have a biological or genetic base.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the two 
dispositions that they have identified as having the greatest impact upon the problems facing 21st 
century humanity as well as the threat of ultimate harm, are altruism and our sense of justice 
(Persson & Savulescu: 2012:107).  Thus, for Persson and Savulescu, moral bioenhancement, 
broadly defined, would involve the attenuation of any dispositions that could impinge upon “the 
central moral dispositions of altruism and a sense of justice” (2015a:348), or, the boosting of these 
dispositions themselves.   
 
While Douglas focuses on motives and attenuation of counter-moral emotions, and Persson and 
Savulescu focus on morally relevant psychological dispositions, David DeGrazia, another 
proponent of moral bioenhancement, focuses on capacities.  DeGrazia sets out to define moral 
bioenhancement without reference to concepts of normal functioning.  He defines general 
enhancement as “any deliberate intervention that aims to improve an existing capacity, select for a 
desired capacity, or create a new capacity in a human being” (DeGrazia, 2014:361) and moral 
enhancement, more specifically, as “interventions that are intended to improve our moral capacities 
such as our capacities for sympathy or fairness” (ibid.).  Both definitions are worded in such a way 
that they could include both non-biological and biological moral enhancements.  This is a very 
important point that warrants a brief diversion as it alludes to the distinction between traditional 
moral enhancement, through non-biological means, and moral biological enhancement.   
 
Traditional moral enhancement refers, of course, to the inculcation of desirable codes of moral 
behaviour through various mechanisms such as parental instruction, education, socialisation with 
peers, religious instruction or the internalisation of particular cultural tenets.  Those who support 
moral bioenhancement, such as DeGrazia and Persson and Savulescu, often argue that there is 
essentially no morally relevant difference between traditional moral enhancement and moral 
                                                 
motivation of those who produce them but rather in terms of their effect” (2014:372).  Defining moral bioenhancement 
in terms of effects or outcomes will ensure that mere behaviour modification cannot be considered to be an 
enhancement.  This issue is related to the concern for the impact of moral bioenhancement on moral autonomy and 
will therefore be discussed further in chapters 4 and 5 
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bioenhancement; they both aim at the same end result and have an equally enduring influence on 
the individual in question (DeGrazia, 2014; Persson and Savulescu, 2012).  Thus, by providing a 
definition that collapses the difference between the two forms of moral enhancement and presents 
moral enhancement as occurring on a continuum of sorts with traditional enhancement at one end 
and moral bioenhancement at the other end, DeGrazia is clearly attempting to provide legitimacy 
to the project of moral bioenhancement.  In other words, the argument is that if we accept traditional 
moral enhancement then we ought to accept moral bioenhancement. 
 
In fact, the project of moral bioenhancement is deeply informed by the implications of this 
distinction.  The reason why moral bioenhancement is presented as something that requires urgent 
consideration is due to the underlying belief that traditional moral enhancement is simply not 
effective enough, on its own, to address what is required of it (Persson & Savulescu, 2012).  The 
argument is that we need something more effective to complement traditional moral enhancement.  
Those who argue against moral bioenhancement respond in a variety of ways, ranging from claims 
that traditional moral enhancement is sufficient, to arguments that the means we take to improve 
ourselves morally, matter.  In other words, moral worth lies not only in the end-goal of morality, 
namely, moral actions, but also in how one arrives at this end-goal.  According to this view, a moral 
outcome that is the product of traditional moral enhancement or education by way of deliberation 
is of more moral worth than one that is the product of a biological intervention.  I will return to this 
important matter in subsequent sections and chapters.   
 
2.2.3 Moral bioenhancement versus moral treatment  
Returning to DeGrazia’s definition of moral bioenhancement, he provides further content to his 
understanding of moral enhancement, arguing that it would encompass improvements in motives 
and insight which would lead to improved behaviour (2014:263).  Furthermore, he provides an 
extensive list of moral defects that impact upon motives and insight, arguing, in a similar manner 
to Douglas, that the attenuation of such defects would also rightly be considered a moral 
bioenhancement (DeGrazia, 2014:364).  While DeGrazia defines moral enhancement as directed 
at what he describes as existing capacities, in order to avoid reference to notions of moral normalcy, 
and the problems associated with such accounts, there are some thinkers who take the opposite 
approach.  As mentioned above, enhancement may also be defined as referring to any improvement 
above normal or species-typical (human) levels of functioning.  Defining enhancement in this way 
is associated with the somewhat contested distinction between treatment and enhancement that has 
been discussed at length in the general enhancement literature (Buchanan et al, 2009; Bostrom & 
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Roache, 2008; Daniels, 2000; Harris, 2007; Holtug, 1998; Juengst, 1998; Savulescu et al., 2011).  
According to this view any intervention that targets human functioning, dispositions or capabilities 
that are below species-typical levels in order to elevate them to ‘normal’ levels, would be regarded 
as the treatment of an impaired condition; whereas any elevations above species-typical levels, 
would be regarded as enhancements.  This distinction is a useful one; but, as mentioned above, the 
problem of defining what would constitute normal species functioning is not a straightforward 
endeavour, particularly in the case of moral functioning.  This is because functioning tends to occur 
on a spectrum, thus, there is no clear division between when treatment of impaired functioning 
would become enhancement of normal functioning.   
 
This approach is nevertheless useful in responding to arguments such as those of Persson and 
Savulescu who argue for moral bioenhancement as a means of improvement or correction of the 
flaws in human moral psychology (2012).  This would amount to the view that what is required to 
secure the future of humanity from ultimate harm would be a collective treatment of humanity’s 
moral shortcomings.  However, as mentioned above, to take this approach as a means of justifying 
a programme of moral bioenhancement, it would be necessary to establish a level of moral 
functioning taken as optimal.  It would also have to be established that this level of moral 
functioning would be high enough to safeguard against the kinds of risks of ultimate harm that 
Persson and Savulescu are concerned about.  Beauchamp makes a similar point in arguing that 
“establishing threshold levels seems critical for a project of bioenhancement that starts from the 
premise of existing moral deficiencies” (2015:346).   
 
These problems aside, reframing the debate as one that requires moral treatment rather than 
enhancement would be an interesting, and perhaps preferable approach for those who support the 
argument put forward by Persson and Savulescu.  Firstly, there would potentially be more 
acceptance of a programme of treatment or therapy of deficiencies in moral functioning. This is 
evidenced by the fact that we currently have a variety of interventions, both biological and non-
biological, that are used to treat psychological pathologies, such as personality disorders, which 
directly influence moral behaviour.  Most of these interventions and treatments are accepted 
without controversy.  Secondly, as pointed out by Casal, reframing the problem as one that requires 
treatment could assuage the fears of those who view the project of moral bioenhancement as posing 
a “risk of changing human nature beyond recognition and losing our moral compass” (2015:341).   
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Wiseman who defines moral enhancement in terms of hard and soft forms, which loosely correlates 
with the treatment/enhancement distinction, has also argued that a soft kind of moral enhancement 
used to bring individuals up to normal levels of functioning could be argued for more easily than 
the hard form (2014:48).  As pointed out by Kahane and Savulescu, by enhancement, the supporters 
of moral bioenhancement are generally referring to normal range human enhancement (2015:133).  
While there are a number of supporters of radical transformation of human capabilities, particularly 
those who wish to create super-intelligent posthumans and radically extend human life, Kahane 
and Savulescu argue that “this focus on…supranormal enhancement can be an obstacle to clear 
thinking about the forms of biomedical enhancement that are almost certainly feasible, and in fact 
likely to be available soon” (2015:133).  Discussions of radical enhancement taking place 
elsewhere in the enhancement literature suggest the idea that supporters of moral bioenhancement 
wish to introduce a “radical new element to our mental life” (Kahane & Savulescu, 2015:134), 
when in actual fact they are wishing to “modulate naturally existing substances and processes” 
(ibid.). 
 
In terms of using the treatment/enhancement distinction to define moral bioenhancement, the 
foremost exponent of this approach is Nicholas Agar.  He posits that moral therapy would be 
focused on “measures designed to boost responsiveness to ethical or moral reasons to levels 
properly considered normal for humans.  Moral enhancement…[on the other hand, would have] 
the purpose of boosting responsiveness to ethical or moral reasons to levels beyond that considered 
normal for human beings” (Agar, 2010:73).  Whilst Agar regards moral treatment as relatively 
unproblematic, he is not a supporter of moral bioenhancement which he regards as dangerous 
(2015a:343).  Agar provides a number of arguments against moral bioenhancement – which will 
be discussed further in this chapter and chapter 3 – which he defines as: “the use of biomedical 
means, including pharmacological and genetic methods, to increase the moral value of our actions 
or characters” (2015b:37).   
 
As mentioned above, DeGrazia specifically uses the notion of “enhancement as improvement” of 
capacities in his definition of moral enhancement, choosing to avoid references to “enhancement 
beyond moral norms” (2014:369). While Agar endorses a “conceptual pluralism” (2014:369) 
regarding the existence of a variety of ways of defining moral bioenhancement, he criticises 
DeGrazia’s interpretation in this context due to the implications it has for obfuscating particular 
arguments against moral bioenhancements.  When what is described as moral bioenhancement is 
defined in terms of taking human moral capacities beyond moral norms then certain problems, such 
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as the impact upon human freedom of such enhancements, emerge that are able to be more easily 
side-stepped when it is defined in terms of improvement.  Agar argues that DeGrazia is possibly 
aware of this and it may be why he chooses to define moral bioenhancement simply in terms of 
improvement.  According to Agar, it is also why DeGrazia’s argument that moral bioenhancement 
would not compromise freedom succeeds.  If Agar is correct then this would be an example of the 
claim that the way in which moral bioenhancement is defined is reflective of an underlying agenda 
and is thus, not a neutral endeavour.   
 
2.2.4 Other definitional distinctions   
Before concluding this section, some of the useful insights from the clarificatory taxonomy 
provided by Raus et al must be mentioned.  Raus et al.’s taxonomy is aimed at organising and 
categorising the various definitions of moral bioenhancement (2014).  One of the ways in which 
definitions may be categorised is in terms of broad or specific interventions (Raus et al., 2014:265).  
Under this understanding, broad interventions would simply refer to defining enhancement in such 
a way that it could refer to both more invasive biological enhancements that act on the body in 
some way, as well as more traditional mechanisms of enhancement, such as moral education and 
socialisation.  Specific interventions would refer to the former only, and would be associated with 
stronger ethical concerns.  This is a similar point to the one that I made above regarding DeGrazia’s 
definition of moral bioenhancement.  In other words, utilising a broad definition would serve to 
minimise the appearance of differences between traditional and biological enhancement and thus 
garner support for the latter based upon acceptance of the former.   
 
Another interesting way in which one may define moral bioenhancement would be to distinguish 
between active and passive enhancements (Raus et al. 2014:270).  This point is related to the 
argument, mentioned above, made by Focquaert and Schermer (2015a) regarding the ethical 
relevance of the means that one utilises to achieve enhancement.  The legitimacy of this distinction 
has major implications for attempts to conflate the distinction between traditional and biological 
moral enhancement.  According to this distinction, moral bioenhancements would be regarded as 
passive enhancements in that they require minimal effort on the part of the individual and would 
therefore be regarded as more easily able to bypass the reasoning faculties of individuals.  In this 
light, moral bioenhancements could be regarded as a form of behaviour control, and, would thus 
be regarded as controversial.  Traditional moral enhancement, on the other hand, would be viewed 
as an active enhancement as the argument would be that the individual is integrally involved in 
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directing, contributing and questioning the process of moral education (Raus et al. 2014:270). I 
will discuss this important distinction in more detail in chapter 4 
 
2.3 The problem of moral content  
As mentioned above, the second area of focus that is relevant for the research focus of this 
dissertation is the primary source of the problem of competing definitions.  This problem is one 
that is as old as the philosophical endeavour that seeks to answer the question regarding what makes 
a person moral, or what can be considered a morally good life.  The problem of moral content is 
thus concerned, on one level, with the question of what should be the target of moral 
bioenhancement – should it target behaviour; motives, emotions or feelings; the reasoning 
processes that bring us to moral conclusions or a combination of all of these?  In other words, which 
of the targets, or combinations of targets discussed in section 2.2.2 should be the legitimate focus 
of moral bioenhancement?  Furthermore, there is the deeper issue regarding how the answer given 
to this question is justified.   
 
This area of investigation is not only conceptually or theoretically interesting; it also has practical 
implications regarding the scientific feasibility of moral bioenhancement.  For moral 
bioenhancement to be viable, consensus must be reached regarding what it is we should enhance 
and it must, of course, be scientifically feasible.  In other words, regarding the latter point, it must 
be shown that the target of moral bioenhancement has biological origins or is susceptible to 
biological moderation.  The issue of justification is a more challenging one as it requires addressing 
seemingly insoluble meta-ethical disputes. Furthermore, moral pluralism – the view that there are 
a variety of distinct and equally legitimate values or perspectives regarding ‘the good’ which cannot 
be conflated and which may conflict with one another – is such, that reaching consensus here may 
not be possible.  As mentioned above, a vast proportion of the disagreements regarding what should 
be the target of moral bioenhancement are informed by the dispute between Hume and Kant 
regarding the basis of morality.  This dispute, that I have coined the emotion/reason dichotomy, 
investigates questions such as the extent to which morality is an emotionally driven phenomenon, 
or, a product of our ability to utilise our reasoning to transcend our emotions.  In addition, other 
normative disputes between moral theories inform what is taken as the target of moral 
bioenhancement and its justification.  The moral bioenhancement debate, comprises supporters 
such as Persson and Savulescu, Douglas, Walker and DeGrazia and opponents such as Harris, and 
a variety of other thinkers, is essentially one between a consequentialist justification of moral 
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bioenhancement and a non-consequentialist response5.  It is difficult to see how such a debate could 
be resolved.   
 
2.3.1 Moral motivation – the view of the supporters 
As mentioned in the first chapter, Persson & Savulescu launch their argument for moral 
bioenhancement on the basis that there is a lag between human moral psychology and the urgent 
and existence-threatening challenges humanity faces in the 21st century.  They argue that our moral 
psychology evolved in very different circumstances to deal with existence in small communities 
and is therefore ill-equipped to address the variety of challenges we now face living in vast 
societies.  The solution to the various flaws in our moral psychology, that Persson & Savulescu 
discuss at length, is to biologically enhance our altruism and sense of justice (2012).  The biological 
basis of these dispositions and the way in which they could be enhanced will be discussed in the 
following section.   
 
Persson & Savulescu argue that while moral progress has been made in terms of humanity acquiring 
greater knowledge of what is good6; they do not agree with the commonly accepted Socratic posit 
that simply knowing the good implies doing the good (2008:168)7.  They argue that there is a gap 
between the two that is the territory of moral motivation or “moral will” (Persson & Savulescu, 
2010:666).  It is this “motivational insufficiency” (Persson & Savulescu, 2013:129) that must be 
strengthened and enhanced.  Thus, Persson & Savulescu suggest targeting particular moral 
dispositions – altruism and our sense of justice – because they believe that enhancing these 
dispositions will be the best means of strengthening our moral motivation and of closing the gap 
between knowing the good and acting upon it.   
 
                                                 
5 These arguments are non-consequentialist or Kantian in nature due to the fact that they emphasise the intrinsic value 
of phenomena that they argue would be threatened by moral bioenhancement.  In particular, such arguments emphasis 
the value of moral autonomy as the foundation of morality, and the primacy of the means taken to reach moral 
conclusions or outcomes.   
6 An example of moral progress that Persson & Savulescu mention is “the doctrine of equal worth of all human beings” 
(2010:667) that is now espoused by most democratic nations.  However, they argue that this doctrine has not been 
internalised sufficiently for it to compel us to address pressing issues such as global inequality (ibid.).   
7 To illustrate this point, Persson & Savulescu discuss the phenomenon of prejudices such as racism, xenophobia and 
homophobia (2013:129).  Harris has argued that such prejudices are “likely to be based upon false beliefs about those 
racial or sexual groups; and, or, an inability to see why it might be a problem to generalize recklessly from particular 
cases” (2011:105).  In other words, he argues that such prejudices have “cognitive content” and could therefore be 
dispelled through “a combination of rationality and education” (Harris, 2011:105).  In response, Persson and Savulescu 
argue that this approach would only address part of the problem: “the mere realization that racism is false is not enough 
to wash away all xenophobic reactions in our nature” (2008:168).  They argue that racism is part of a host of xenophobic 
reactions “that evolved to detect coalitional alliances” and seems to be the product of “computational processes that 
appear to be both automatic and mandatory” (Persson & Savulescu, 2008:168).   
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It must be noted that Persson and Savulescu do not deny that individuals may possess a strong 
sense of justice and altruism; rather, what concerns them is that these dispositions are primarily 
displayed towards in-groups – those we consider to be connected to us in some way - rather than 
out-groups – those perceived as strangers (2013:129).  They argue that “to be morally good 
involves not just knowing what is good, but being so strongly motivated to do it that this 
overpowers selfish, nepotistic, xenophobic, etc. biases and impulses” (Persson & Savulescu, 
2013:130).  Furthermore, their aim in this regard is not radical moral bioenhancement, rather it is 
that “the moral motivation of those of us who are less morally motivated be increased so that it 
becomes as strong as the moral motivation of those of us who are by nature mostly morally 
motivated” (Persson & Savulescu, 2012:113).  As discussed in section 2.2.2, Douglas also regards 
motives as the target of moral bioenhancement.  Thus, he concurs with Persson and Savulescu that 
morality lies in closing the gap between knowing what is right and doing what is right (Douglas, 
2013:162).  Whilst he isn’t necessarily a supporter of moral bioenhancement due to its potential 
freedom-subverting consequences, Rakić argues that “the discrepancy between what we do and 
what we believe it right to do might be the greatest predicament of our existence as moral beings” 
(2012:120)8.  Thus, he concurs with Persson & Savulescu that it is “motivation rather than cognition 
that is at the heart of the matter” (Rakić, 2014:248).  
 
Of course, defining moral bioenhancement simply in terms of moral motivation or increasing the 
likelihood of doing “the right thing and for the right reason(s)” (Savulescu, Douglas & Persson, 
2014:95) glosses over the fact that there isn’t consensus regarding “what accounts of right action 
and right motivation are correct” (ibid.).  In other words, depending upon the moral theory one 
supports, conceptions will differ in this regard.  For a Kantian, it is not simply having good motives 
in a general sense that confers moral worth upon one’s actions; rather, it is acting from the motive 
of duty (Kant, 2002), where one utilises the dictates of reasoning to work out the nature of one’s 
duty in accordance with the categorical imperative.  One could state this in an even stronger manner 
by positing that, according to a Kantian, truly employing one’s rational capacities requires that one 
must transcend emotional interference as “emotions lie outside of the boundaries of the will” 
(Douglas, 2008:232).   
 
Consequentialists, and in particular, Utilitarians, on the other hand, would see the correct motives 
as those which ensure the best outcome, all things considered.  Furthermore, for a Humean, we are 
                                                 
8It is interesting to note that this intuition is a long-standing one.  In the Christian bible St Paul makes a similar posit 
when he argues that there is a continual conflict within ‘man’ who despite wanting to do what is good, is seemingly 
compelled to rather do what he knows is bad (Romans, 7:18-20). 
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constituted by our passions, therefore viewing motives – and morality in general – in purely rational 
terms, devoid of emotional content, is flawed. Hume states that: 
Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they 
cannot be deriv’d from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov’d, can 
never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason 
of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not 
conclusions of our reason (Hume, 1978:239). 
 
2.3.2 The emotion/ reason dichotomy  
Due to the afore-mentioned disputes, the debate between Persson & Savulescu and Douglas, on the 
one hand, and thinkers such as Harris, Agar and Sparrow, on the other hand, is often framed as one 
between the role of emotions versus reasoning in morality9.  The reason for this is twofold.  Firstly, 
there is the view that enhancing the dispositions of altruism and our sense of justice, as a means of 
strengthening our moral motivation, can be interpreted as intensifying an emotion or feeling that 
compels us to act in particular manner.  Thus, altruism and a sense of justice are viewed as 
decidedly affective or emotional in content.  In addition, moral bioenhancement, according to 
Douglas, should consist of biomedical interventions that ameliorate counter-moral emotions that 
interfere with moral motivation.  He explicitly states that morality can be enhanced cognitively or 
non-cognitively with the latter referring to moral enhancement “achieved through (a) modulating 
emotions, and (b) doing so directly, that is, not by improving (increasing the accuracy of) 
cognition” (Douglas, 2013:162).  It is this direct modulation of emotions that is seen as problematic 
by thinkers such as Harris who argue that such modulations would bypass our reasoning, and thus, 
that they would not constitute an enhancement but would simply be a form of behaviour 
modification or control (2016:99).   
 
The second reason that the debate can be framed as one between enhancing or attenuating emotions 
versus moral reasoning is due to Persson and Savulescu’s argument regarding cognitive 
enhancement.  Persson & Savulescu have argued extensively against the dangers of cognitive 
enhancement, if it is not accompanied by moral bioenhancement, implying that the two domains 
are distinct from each other (2008)10.  Carter and Gordon disagree with this view and provide an 
                                                 
9 Baertschi, argues that in this regard the moral bioenhancement debate is at heart a meta-ethical one (2014:66).  This 
is perhaps why it is such a fascinating area of discussion, but also the reason why it is seemingly irreconcilable.  
Baertschi argues that Douglas and Persson and Savulescu are sentimentalists and utilitarians, thus, they focus on 
results; whereas Harris and many other opponents of moral bioenhancement are rationalists and for them “intentionality 
and consciousness are at the core of morality” (2014:64).  
10 They argue that cognitive enhancement in the power of an immoral individual, or groups of individuals, may 
intensify the risk of ultimate harm as the knowledge required to create both biological and nuclear weapons of mass 
destruction will be easier to acquire for someone with heightened intellectual abilities.   
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argument for their claim that “just as there is a moral dimension to cognitive flourishing, there is a 
cognitive dimension to moral flourishing” (2013:158).  Therefore, they argue that a true programme 
of moral bioenhancement cannot disregard the important cognitive component.  Harris, being a 
rationalist, on the other hand, is a supporter of cognitive enhancement, but not moral 
bioenhancement – as construed by Persson and Savulescu.   
 
Persson and Savulescu do not, however, disregard the importance of processes of reasoning in 
addressing incorrect moral beliefs.  While they have specifically opted for a narrow interpretation 
of moral bioenhancement, they do clearly state that it may be defined in a wider sense, as moral 
enhancement, which would include cognitive enhancement, either through traditional or 
biomedical mechanisms (2015a:349).  Their argument, however, is that cognitive enhancement, in 
whichever form, will not be sufficient alone to enhance moral motivation to the extent that it will 
be able to address the threats to existence they outline.  They explicitly state that: 
although moral bioenhancement of the powers of reason and intellect is not part of what we 
mean by moral bioenhancement, this doesn’t imply that these powers can be bypassed or 
rendered superfluous if we want to achieve moral improvement.  It only implies that being 
moral isn’t solely or exclusively a matter of the operation of intellectual or rational powers, but 
this is something that few would deny (Persson & Savulescu, 2015a:350). 
 
As mentioned above, another distinction that is often made in the literature, which closely 
resembles the emotion/reason dichotomy, is between moral bioenhancement as behavioural control 
and what is framed as ‘true’ moral enhancement which would be akin to acting morally for the 
right reasons.  Those who view moral bioenhancement as behaviour modification generally hold 
this view because they interpret the supporters of moral bioenhancement as targeting emotions11.  
Simkulet argues that framing moral bioenhancement in terms of behaviour or “detectable 
modifications of one’s moral conduct…fails to distinguish moral enhancement from moral 
compulsion” (2012:17).  Jotterand argues that interventions can produce “changes in mood, affect 
and behaviour.  However these techniques do not focus on morality…[rather, they are altering] 
how people react to situations that implicate a particular moral stance” (2014:2).   
 
Persson & Savulescu’s conception of moral bioenhancement is often criticised on these grounds.  
This may be due to the emphasis they place on the enhancement of motivation as the best means 
of closing the gap between knowing and doing the good.  In other words, they focus on 
                                                 
11 Jebari, however, makes the point that emotional enhancement is not one and the same thing as behavioural 
‘enhancement’ (2014:255).  Rather, emotional enhancements alter how we perceive particular behaviours.  For 
example, after being emotionally enhanced I may be repulsed by aggressive or violent behaviour which disinclines me 
to act in such a manner (Jebari, 2014:255).  This would accord with Douglas’ view of moral bioenhancement as the 
attenuation of counter-moral emotions.   
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enhancements that would compel us to act, or make it more likely that we will behave in a particular 
way.  Their view is that while reasons and moral knowledge are important, in the absence of 
changes in action or behaviour, they do not constitute moral improvement.  However, they take 
exception to the portrayal of their moral bioenhancement aims as targeting only emotions and 
behaviour.  Sparrow, in particular, makes this charge and argues that for Persson & Savulescu, 
modifying behaviour and feelings amount to moral enhancement (2014a:24).  However, Persson 
and Savulescu point out that they are not targeting feelings in general.  Rather, their target is the 
specific dispositions of altruism and a sense of justice.  Individuals would still, presumably, act 
according to particular reasons, however, their motivation to act upon these reasons would be 
strengthened.  Nevertheless, the conception of moral bioenhancement as behaviour modification 
fuels the argument that moral bioenhancement will somehow impact upon, or destroy, our moral 
autonomy.  Harris is the primary proponent of this view, arguing that morality presupposes our 
“freedom to fall” (2011:104).  In other words, an act can only be truly moral if it is made in the 
face of competing possibilities to have acted otherwise; even wrongfully.  This concern is, of 
course, the main focus of my dissertation and will thus be discussed extensively in chapters 4 and 
5.   
 
2.3.3 The ‘problem’ of moral pluralism 
Regarding the issue of competing moral justifications, Sparrow has, for example, argued that 
Persson and Savulescu’s programme of moral bioenhancement attempts to impose a particular 
interpretation of ‘the good’ and is thus at odds with “an egalitarian commitment to liberal 
neutrality” (Persson & Savulescu, 2014b:41) which respects an ethos of moral pluralism (Sparrow, 
2014b:22).  Brooks has similar concerns regarding the possibility that moral bioenhancement will 
undermine moral pluralism (2012:29).  However, to this, Persson and Savulescu respond that while 
liberal neutrality recognises that individuals possess the freedom to conduct themselves as they see 
fit, this freedom is not absolute.  It has restrictions regarding its impact upon others.  Liberal 
neutrality should also not be confused with moral relativism, they argue.  In other words, a respect 
for a diversity of moral perspectives does not imply that moral perspectives are simply a product 
of social or cultural context and that all of them are, therefore, correct in their own way.  There are 
some moral perspectives that are regarded as more universally held than others.  The move towards 
the recognition of the doctrine of equal moral worth of all human beings and the way in which 
research ethics is standardised and regulated by internationally recognised agreements, is evidence 
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that there is far more consensus regarding ethics, and ‘the good’ than is sometimes implied in moral 
bioenhancement discussions (Persson & Savulescu, 2014b:41)12.   
 
Whilst a number of thinkers argue that moral bioenhancement will not, or may not, be feasible due 
to a lack of consensus regarding the content of morality (Beck, 2015; De-Melo Martin & Salles, 
2015, Schaeffer, 2011), Savulescu, Douglas and Persson argue that despite moral pluralism, there 
are acts that are almost universally regarded as right and wrong.  The belief that “it is wrong to kill 
an innocent person in non-extra-ordinary circumstances” (Savulescu, Douglas, & Persson, 
2014:95), is one such act that is endorsed by virtually all moral theories13.  Pacholczyk also makes 
this point and argues that killing indiscriminately for pleasure, lying and breaking promises, 
without legitimate reasons for doing so, are generally viewed as wrong; whereas “concern and 
respect for other moral agents” (2011:174) are viewed favourably.  DeGrazia suggests that in 
seeking to establish what would be considered an enhancement we should “stick to improvements 
that represent points of overlapping consensus among competing, reasonable moral perspectives” 
(2014:364).  He posits that: 
leading contemporary progressive and conservative visions – ranging from socialism to 
welfare-state capitalism to moral conservatism to libertarianism – count as reasonable whereas 
neo-Nazism, apartheid and the Taliban’s worldview (at least as regards women’s status) do 
not.  Consequentialist, deontological, virtue-based and feminist views that accord persons 
some sort of moral equality qualify as reasonable; Nietzschean elitism according to which only 
the most powerful and creative are worthy does not (DeGrazia, 2014:364). 
 
DeGrazia also provides an extensive list of “moral defects” that most reasonable individuals would 
concur with.  DeGrazia views moral improvement as characterised by improvements in motivation, 
insight and behaviour.  Thus, his list of specific examples of moral defects consists of various 
failures in moral motivation and insight (DeGrazia, 2014:364).  Regarding the problem of moral 
pluralism, DeGrazia points out that it is not only the project of moral bioenhancement that must 
address this difficulty; any form of moral education or socialization must take a particular stance 
on the content of moral norms (2014:363).  Persson & Savulescu also address this issue and argue 
that the view that there is a level of ethical consensus is supported by the fact that there is 
considerable overlap in the way in which children are socialised and morally educated (2015a:349).  
                                                 
12 Harris supports this view and argues for “the generic character of the good” (2016:16) at length in his book: How to 
be Good (2016).  Pacholczyk also discusses this point and posits that disagreements regarding moral content are often 
exaggerated and prevalently used to refute moral realism and support a thesis of “the metaphysics of morals” 
(2011:174).   
13 Of course, the immediate response to this could be that while this may be true, the differences lie in conceptions of 
innocence.  For example, in some societies, killing a woman who has committed adultery would not be regarded as 
killing an innocent person. 
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In this regard, Kahane and Savulescu argue that “it is hardly controversial that some minimal level 
of altruism is desirable within any morality, deontological, utilitarian or other” (2015:142).   
 
In terms of the moral theory they espouse, Persson and Savulescu’s argument for moral 
bioenhancement is justified in terms of the good it will achieve, and is thus, distinctly 
consequentialist, and, more specifically, utilitarian.  Altruism and a sense of justice are not offered 
as candidates for moral bioenhancement due to their purported intrinsic value; rather, they are 
supported by consequentialist justifications.  Persson and Savulescu posit that utilitarianism 
espouses the view that “the fundamental moral motivation is nothing but universal altruism or 
benevolence” (2015a:348).  However, because utilitarianism is uniformly criticised as leading to 
outcomes that may be at odds with the requirements of justice; Persson and Savulescu modify their 
form of utilitarianism into a “two principle moral theory” (2015a:349) with the inclusion of the 
moral disposition of a sense of justice.  They regard the flaws of our common-sense morality, 
described in the first chapter, as characterised by “deontological features” (Persson & Savulescu, 
2015a:349).  As most individuals struggle to abide by even this flawed common-sense morality, 
the argument is that moral bioenhancement is necessary in order to adhere to the more demanding 
“proposed consequentialist extension or revision of it” (Persson & Savulescu, 2015a:349). 
 
2.3.4 Harris’ position 
There are a number of thinkers who oppose moral bioenhancement on the grounds that it will either 
circumvent or overshadow the cognitive component of morality (Agar, 2015a, 2015b; Harris, 2011, 
2016; Sparrow, 2014a, 2014b).  Harris, for example, has always supported bioenhancement, 
therefore, his opposition to moral bioenhancement is interesting.  However, he is not opposed to 
moral bioenhancement tout court.  He supports moral enhancement via cognitive enhancement, 
where the latter may include traditional mechanisms such as socialisation and moral education or 
cognitive bioenhancement (Harris, 2011:102).  This is because, for Harris, “ethical expertise is not 
‘being better at being good’, rather it is being better at knowing the good and understanding what 
is likely to conduce to the good” (2011:104).  Harris argues that a moral bioenhancement that 
targets emotions amounts to doing “ethics with [one’s] gut” (2013a:288).  Implying that emotional 
responses are adequate in addressing complex moral problems “is like believing the gut is an organ 
of thought” (Harris, 2013a:288).  Drawing upon the work of Ronald Dworkin, Harris argues that 
moral judgements are respected due to the fact that they are a product of deliberation and 
consideration (Dworkin, 1977).  Furthermore, moral judgements are subject to particular 
requirements, they cannot include disqualifying features such as “gut reactions, and instinctive or 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
33 
 
automatic responses…[and must] be distinguishable from prejudices, arbitrary preferences, 
personal tastes, arguments or conclusions based on manifest self-interest or partiality, or arising 
from a personal emotional response” (Harris, 2013a:289).   
 
While Harris admits that emotions play some part in moral decisions, he argues that “it must be 
reasoning that pulls in the direction of morality” (Chan & Harris, 2011:130).  Our reason must act 
as a watchdog on the emotions because we cannot always know whether our feelings are informed 
by the above-mentioned disqualifying features.  In other words, Harris argues that if we define 
what we take to be ‘the good’ to involve “feeling the right way, how do we know that we are feeling 
the right way” (2016:113).  Furthermore, the problem with viewing morality as consisting of 
feelings alone is that the test for ascertaining the legitimacy of one’s feelings will generally involve 
“a second consultation of one’s feelings” (ibid).  This, Harris argues, is akin to Wittgenstein’s 
example of purchasing an additional, but identical, copy of a newspaper to validate what one has 
read in the first newspaper (Wittgenstein, 2001:79).  As Wittgenstein argues, “justification consists 
in appealing to something independent” (in Harris, 2016: 126).  This independent contribution is 
the role played by moral reasoning and judgment.  For Harris, if a moral enhancement results in a 
change in behaviour without the input of cognition then this is not a true moral enhancement 
(2013b:172)14.   
 
Implicit in this respect for a rationalist account of morality is the view that acts that are the product 
of deliberation have more moral worth.  Thus, improvements in moral conduct which are a product 
of moral bioenhancement would be seen as less morally worthy due to the perception that the 
individual in question has not made an active contribution.  In other words, as Baertschi points out, 
“morality is like climbing.  Climbing a mountain is not the same as reaching its top.  It depends on 
the means used” (2014:64).  Reaching the top of a mountain via helicopter would not be viewed in 
the same light as having climbed it.  Jebari points out that this view is very similar to the Aristotelian 
view that virtues are manifested through habitual action (2014:259).  Individuals become virtuous 
through the effort of acting in a virtuous manner.  Supporters of such a view would argue that moral 
bioenhancement is akin to using blood doping to win a race and thus amounts to cheating because 
it isn’t accompanied by any effort on the part of the individual.  However, Jebari argues that the 
analogy doesn’t hold.  A race is subject to particular rules and ways of winning that are either 
                                                 
14 As will be discussed further in section 2.4, Agar opposes moral bioenhancement for similar reasons to Harris, 
arguing that moral bioenhancement will threaten the balance between “cognitive, emotional and motivational 
subcapacities” (Agar, 2015:343), as it will involve the “bypassing of reason” (ibid.:345).   
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viewed as legitimate or not; whereas morality is not a game or a competition.  If I am more moral 
it doesn’t disadvantage others; quite the contrary, in fact (Jebari, 2014:259).   
 
The connection between moral worth and effort is an extremely interesting one.  On the one hand, 
morally worthy acts made in the face of temptations to have done otherwise are greatly respected, 
as pointed out by Harris (2011).  On the other hand, Sorensen has correctly pointed out that we are 
equally impressed by morally worthy acts that are easily and readily performed without question 
on the part of the individual performing them (2014:282).  In other words, we value, and view as 
morally worthy, both acts that require effort, and those that occur in a seemingly effortless manner.  
This matter will be discussed further in chapter 4. 
 
2.3.5 The complexity of morality  
Of course, it could be pointed out that viewing the moral bioenhancement debate in such polarized 
terms is an oversimplification of morality.  Many thinkers posit that morality is not purely emotive 
or rational; rather, both play an equal role (Baertschi, 2014, Bublitz, 2016; Focquaert & Schermer, 
2015a, Pacholczyk, 2011, Jotterand, 2014)15.  In this regard, there are more nuanced understandings 
of morality in the literature.  Focquaert and Schermer – drawing upon Fischer and Ravizza (1998) 
– interpret morality or being moral as being characterised by moral responsibility where having 
the “capacity for moral responsibility implies that an individual has the ability for reason-
responsive behaviour, comprising both a ‘receptivity to reasons’ and a ‘reactivity to reasons’” 
(2015a:141).  Whilst receptivity to reasons tracks cognition and reactivity to reasons tracks 
emotions, this interpretation emphasises the interplay between the two.  Pacholczyk also describes 
the complexity of the moral sphere, referring to the multiple components that comprise it; namely, 
“the ability to make moral judgements, to be motivated by moral reasons, acting according to our 
moral beliefs, the ability to reflect on and critically analyse moral beliefs, and so on…[and the fact 
that these capacities rest on both] affective and cognitive capacities” (2011:170).  Another 
important point she makes is that “moral behaviour encompasses a range of behaviours and 
includes refraining from doing what is wrong, doing what one ought to and doing good things 
beyond one’s obligations” (Pacholczyk, 2011:170).  The last behaviour is an important one as it 
captures the ethos of morality; namely that it involves doing what one ought to do even when it 
isn’t personally beneficial; simply because it is the right thing to do.   
                                                 
15 While the primary proponents and opponents in the debate (Persson & Savulescu, Douglas and Harris) would agree 
that that morality is constitutive of both elements, their arguments imply that they, nevertheless, regard one component 
as having primacy over the other.   




However, it is not only the issue of moral content, regarding the affective and cognitive content of 
morality, that is prevalent in the literature.  The other issue, mentioned above, is described by Chan 
and Harris as “one of the perennial problems of moral philosophy: how we measure morality, 
whether it is about ends and the ultimate outcomes of action or about means and reasons to act, the 
drivers underlying the action” (2011:131).  Referring to Persson & Savulescu’s explicit justification 
of moral bioenhancement with the utilitarian aim of the avoidance of ultimate harm, Harris argues 
that “to prioritise the avoidance of so-called direct harms is neither the action of a good conscience, 
nor of a good consequentialist” (2013c:119).  Elsewhere, he reiterates that morality is not simply 
about the avoidance of harm (Chan & Harris, 2011:131).   
 
Agar also discusses the problem, arguing that while there is consensus between different ethical 
theories that it would be good to reduce phenomena such as murder or famine, their reasons as to 
why this would be good to do, and how it should be done, differ (2010:74).  These differences 
manifest themselves keenly in the moral bioenhancement debate as it is founded upon the aim to 
improve the world in some way.  Furthermore, the ethical theories draw their views of morality 
from different interpretations of human ontology: utilitarians give primacy to the “capacity for 
suffering and enjoyment…[while] Kantians prize practical rationality” (Agar, 2010:75).   
 
Hauskeller makes an interesting point regarding disagreements among moral theories.  He argues 
that supporters of moral bioenhancement, such as Persson and Savulescu, are not arguing for moral 
bioenhancement on the basis that making people more moral is an intrinsic good, “morality [for 
them] is not the end.  It is the means” (Hauskeller, 2015:290).  In other words, Persson and 
Savulescu have opted for moral bioenhancement purely because they see it as the most effective 
means of addressing urgent global problems.  He argues that recognising this vital difference 
“between morality being pursued as an end and as a means is likely to deflate the heated debate on 
whether or not people can, and should, be morally enhanced, and make the idea more palatable to 
critics” (Hauskeller, 2015:290).  One could then engage with Persson and Savulescu’s argument 
on a different level and assess it in terms of speculations regarding its effectiveness in achieving 
its aims, rather than in terms of whether or not their conception of moral bioenhancement represents 




Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
36 
 
2.3.5 Virtue ethics as an alternative 
Whilst the debate is primarily dominated by utilitarian justifications for moral bioenhancement and 
non-consequentialist or deontological responses, virtue ethics has also been utilised by a number 
of thinkers in the moral bioenhancement debate as an alternative theory (Jotterand, 2011; Hughes, 
2013, 2015; Fröding, 2011; Walker, 2009).  In this regard, both Hughes and Jotterand argue that 
the moral bioenhancement debate is excessively dominated by the Kantian/Humean polarization 
between reason versus emotions as the basis of morality, whereas virtue ethics offers a more 
integrative framework (Hughes, 2015:86; Jotterand, 2011:6).   
 
Jotterand posits that both reason and emotions are indispensable to morality; however, he argues 
that even if we are able to modify emotions, thereby influencing behaviour, we will still be in need 
of moral content “for example, norms or values to guide one’s behavioural response” (2011:6).  
Jotterand distinguishes between “character traits and having character” (2011:8), where the 
former is behavioural and not necessarily moral in nature.  Having character, on the other hand, 
consists of “agency (reasons, motives, intentions) and action” (Jotterand, 2011:8).  Jotterand argues 
that moral bioenhancement, as presented by its supporters, would modify character traits but not 
character itself.  Virtue ethics could therefore be helpful as Jotterand posits that “it takes into 
account the fullness of human experience, i.e., emotional motivational and rational dimensions” 
(2011:6).  The gist of his argument is that using a virtue ethics framework to improve human 
morality would require enhancement of both rationality (cognition) and the relevant emotional 
dispositions.  Fröding, on the other hand, argues that cognitive bioenhancement in conjunction with 
the insights of virtue ethics could be justified on the grounds that it would lead to a good life 
characterised by flourishing (2011:223). 
 
Hughes uses virtue ethics in a more concrete manner than Jotterand.  He draws upon empirical 
research in the fields of psychiatry, neuroscience and moral psychology to identify four potential 
candidates for biomedical virtue enhancement: self-control, niceness, intelligence and positivity 
which are all neurobiologically mediated (Hughes, 2015:89).  Hughes posits that these virtues he 
has identified correspond roughly with “the four cardinal virtues of Plato and Aquinas – 
temperance, justice, prudence and courage” (2015:29).  Elsewhere, Hughes has discussed the 
connection between Buddhist ethics and virtue ethics, arguing that the former may assist in 
providing candidates for virtue enhancement (2013:28).  Walker, a staunch advocate of moral 
bioenhancement, also utilises a virtue ethics framework to identify personality traits that are 
genetically influenced as potential candidates for enhancement. In his description of a hypothetical 
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inter-disciplinary Genetic Virtue Programme, He focuses on “truthfulness, justice and caring for 
others” (2009:15) as plausible candidates for bioenhancement and argues that they would be “the 
best mechanisms not to make persons virtuous but to make them better equipped to learn how to 
be virtuous” (Walker, 2009:28)16.  
 
2.4 The problem of the science of moral bioenhancement 
As mentioned above, an investigation of the scientific feasibility of moral bioenhancement is, of 
course, related to the first two problems that I have identified and discussed.  This is because, as 
mentioned in section 2.1, biological enhancement of our morality presupposes that we have 
pinpointed and reached consensus regarding what it is we are actually aiming to enhance.  Whilst 
the moral bioenhancement debate is, at this point, primarily theoretical, there has nevertheless been 
discussion of the biomedical interventions that could be utilised.  The arguments provided by the 
proponents of moral bioenhancement tend to be more optimistic regarding the possibilities offered 
by biomedical science, whereas the contributions from a number of biologists and neuroscientists 
are somewhat more cautious.   
 
Scientific discussions can therefore be categorised according to, on the one hand, those who are 
enthusiastic regarding the scientific possibilities of moral bioenhancement (Walker, 2009; 
DeGrazia, 2014) and those who are optimistic, but cautious (Persson & Savulescu, 2012; Douglas, 
2008; Spence, 2008; Pacholczyk, 2011).  On the other hand, there are those who, for various 
reasons, see moral bioenhancement as unfeasible.  This group would include those who definitively 
think it will not be possible (De Melo-Martin & Salles, 2015) and those who think it will most 
likely not be possible (Crockett, 2014; Sparrow, 2014).  One of the reasons given by members of 
this second group is that it would be impossible – or inadvisable, even if possible - due to the 
complexity of human moral psychology (Zarpentine, 2013; Young & Duncan, 2012; Lechner, 
2014; Bronstein, 2010; Andreadis, 2010; Arnhart, 2010; 2013; Sprinkle, 2010)  Those who hold 
this view tend to argue that the side effects, risks or negative consequences will be too great (Harris, 
2011; Clausen, 2010; Barilan, 2015; Jones), or, that moral bioenhancement will morally worsen us 
(Agar, 2015a; Chan & Harris, 2011, Hubbeling, 2009).   
                                                 
16 There are a number of criticisms of such virtue ethics approaches and addressing this matter is beyond the scope of 
my dissertation; however, it is interesting to note that this approach has been criticised by Harris (2013c).  With its 
focus on the character and dispositions of individuals, as well as the way in which virtues are manifested in habitual 
action, Harris seems to agree with the long-held belief that the virtues, and thus virtue ethics itself, are affective in 
content.  Harris is not a utilitarian thinker; however, he posits that a focus exclusively on virtues – which he seems in 
this instance to equate with “moral emotions, or states of mind, or intentions” (2013c:119) – without consideration of 
consequences is dangerous.   




2.4.1 Supporters of the scientific feasibility of moral bioenhancement  
As most of the discussion in the moral bioenhancement debate has engaged with the various 
arguments made by Persson and Savulescu (2008; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a; 
2015b), it seems appropriate to commence with their interpretation of the scientific considerations.  
As mentioned above, and discussed in chapter 1, Persson and Savulescu provide a substantial 
account of the failings of human moral psychology, which equipped us, through evolution, to deal 
with vastly different concerns to those faced in contemporary society.  In this regard, they argue 
that human moral psychology is not up to the task of addressing the urgent global problems that 
characterise life in the twenty first century, particularly the danger of ultimate harm.  To address 
these problems, they argue that what is needed is to enhance particular moral dispositions, namely 
altruism and our sense of justice.  These dispositions, they argue, are “malleable by biomedical and 
genetic means” (2008:168) and are “central moral dispositions because they motivate us to act in 
accordance with plausible basic moral principles” (Persson & Savulescu, 2015a:348).  They see 
altruism as associated with both empathy “in the sense of a capacity to imagine from the inside 
what it would be like to be another conscious subject, and…[benevolence in terms of a] 
sympathetic concern about the well-being of this subject for its own sake” (Persson & 
Savulescu,2015a:348].   
 
They admit that justice is difficult to define clearly as a philosophical concept, and, that one cannot 
offer substantive claims regarding its nature without providing protracted supporting arguments 
(Persson & Savulescu, 2015a:348).  Therefore, they explain their understanding of this notion 
through descriptions of its evolutionary origins.  Their evidence for the biological origins of both 
suggested dispositions is drawn from the field of evolutionary biology and the research indicating 
that we find similar dispositions in animals with whom we share evolutionary origins.  Persson and 
Savulescu argue that these dispositions played a role in human survival and evolution.  The more 
sophisticated sense of justice that is characteristic of contemporary human psychology is argued 
by evolutionary biologists to have originated in the role that reciprocity would have played in 
survival.  In other words, if an individual granted another individual a favour, the receiver would 
reciprocate out of gratitude; whereas if a favour wasn’t returned then the common response would 
be anger and the tendency to not grant favours to that individual again in the future.  A group or 
society in which such patterns of reciprocity and cooperation were established would be more 
cohesive and well-functioning, and therefore, more likely to prosper and survive.  Persson and 
Savulescu posit that out of these primitive emotions, higher order dispositions, such as “remorse 
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and feelings of guilt…shame…pride...admiration and contempt…and forgiveness” (2008:169), 
arose.  Altruism and this early sense of justice or “tit-for-tat” (Persson & Savulescu, 2008:169) 
response were interconnected in that this sense of justice would inform responses of anger to 
inappropriate reciprocity of altruistic acts, thereby encouraging future altruism and discouraging 
selfish behaviour.   
 
Persson and Savulescu cite extensive sources, based on animal studies, that have documented the 
genetic foundations of altruism and the above-mentioned sense of justice (Sober & Sloan, 1998; 
De Waal, 2006).  Their hypothesis of the biological foundations of these dispositions is also 
supported by twin studies in which remarkably similar responses to the ultimatum game occur with 
identical twins (Baron-Cohen, 2003:114; Wallace et al. 2007:15631-4)17.  In ultimatum games that 
test the responses of identical twins, there are “striking correlation[s] between the average division 
with respect to both what they propose and what they are ready to accept as responders” (Persson 
& Savulescu, 2012:111).  Fraternal twin studies do not deliver the same results (Wallace et al. 
2007:15631-4).   
 
In addition, Persson and Savulescu discuss the fact that, in general, it is accepted that a greater 
tendency for empathy, which they associate with altruism, is displayed by women (Baron-Cohen, 
2003).  Thus “if this psychological difference tracks gender, this is surely good evidence that it is 
biologically based” (Persson & Savulescu, 2013:13).  Furthermore, if higher levels of empathy and 
altruism mitigate aggression and track gender then, in theory, Persson and Savulescu argue that 
“we could make men in general more moral by making them more like women by biomedical 
methods, or rather, more like the men who are more like women in respect of empathy and 
aggression” (Persson & Savulescu, 2013:130; Baron-Cohen, 2003:35).  Persson & Savulescu point 
out that they are not arguing that socialisation and environmental influences do not play a 
significant role in the manifestation of such dispositions, just that a sizeable influence is 
biologically informed (2012:109).  However, to those that deny any biological influences on our 
morality they argue that: 
 
                                                 
17 Ultimatum games are an effective way of measuring the degree of strength of an individual’s conception of justice.  
They generally involve two participants, a proposer who suggests a particular distribution of benefits and a responder 
who must either accept or reject the proposer’s offer.  If the offer is rejected then neither party receives anything.  With 
human participants, the tendency is for offers that are unfair or disproportionately unequal, to be rejected, even if this 
means foregoing some benefits or receiving nothing.  The view here would be that it is better to sacrifice some benefits 
than to support a situation in which another party acts in an unjust manner and unfairly benefits (Persson & Savulescu, 
2012:35).  
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every human behaviour, whatever its cause, is mediated by the final common pathway of the 
brain.  Brain activity is just a series of electrical signals mediated by chemical reactions in the 
brain.  One can modify any behaviour by modifying activity in the brain.  That is basic 
neurobiology.  So even if all moral behaviour were social in origin, one could still improve 
moral behaviour by moral bioenhancement just because the brain is the source of moral 
behaviour18 (Persson & Savulescu, 2014b:42).  
 
Of course, providing compelling argumentation and evidence for the biological basis, and thus, the 
potential malleability of what they take to be central moral dispositions is not sufficient.  What 
remains to be seen is how, if at all, these dispositions could be biologically altered or enhanced.  
Persson and Savulescu admit that the science that would be required for this is currently in its 
infancy (Persson & Savulescu, 2008:172; 2010:667; 2013:130).  However, there are currently a 
few rudimentary ways in which this could be done.  One such way is through the administration of 
oxytocin, the hormone associated with “maternal care, pair bonding and other pro-social attitudes, 
like trust, sympathy and generosity” (Persson & Savulescu, 2012:118).  Oxytocin is currently 
administered through a nasal spray but is also influenced by certain drugs of which oral 
contraceptive pills and glucocorticoids, used for the alleviation of asthma, are just two examples 
(ibid.).  The effects of oxytocin administration on trust have been positively tested in cooperation 
games (Kosfeld at al., 2015).  However, its effects on trust have been shown to “be limited to in-
group members and exclude out-groups” (de Dreu et al., 2011 in Persson & Savulescu, 2012:119).  
In other words, oxytocin acts to strengthen trust, and thus, cooperation between individuals that 
share a perception of group-based similarities, and not between individuals who view themselves 
as having no commonly shared group characteristics.   
 
In addition, Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) – medications that are associated with 
blocking the reabsorption of the neurotransmitter serotonin in the brain – are associated with the 
tendency to cooperate and a decline in aggressive behaviour (Persson & Savulescu, 2008:172).  
These medications are generally prescribed and commonly taken for depression and anxiety.  The 
effects of SSRIs have been measured in dictator games which involve the participation of a 
‘dictator’ who has the freedom to decide how a particular sum of money shall be split between 
herself and another individual.  It was found that when the SSRI, citalopram, was taken, it led to 
more fair divisions between participants than it did in the case of control groups (Tse & Bond, 
2002).  However, with increased levels of trust associated with the administration of SSRIs comes 
the concern that such individuals will be easier to manipulate.  This concern is based on Crockett’s 
                                                 
18 Here they give an interesting example.  It could be argued that something like the ability to read could be a wholly 
learned skill.  But even if it has no biological basis, this does not mean that it cannot be improved through biomedical 
interventions, such as through the use of cognitive enhancers (Persson & Savulescu, 2014b:42). 
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findings that individuals are more likely to reject unfair offers in ultimatum games if they are low 
on tryptophan, a precursor of serotonin, which indicates that “SSRIs may make subjects easier to 
exploit by modulating their assessment of what counts as (unacceptably) unfair” (Crockett in 
Persson & Savulescu, 2012:120).   
 
Despite the afore-mentioned concerns regarding oxytocin and serotonin, the important point that 
Persson & Savulescu are trying to make is that these experiments show that the brain modifications 
produced by the afore-mentioned drugs produce “moral consequences” (2012:121)19.  Persson and 
Savulescu also discuss the possible biological basis of certain personality disorders such as 
antisocial personality disorder which is characterised by, among other things, a lack of cooperation 
and tendency to aggression.  In addition, they mention research linking mutations on the X 
chromosomes which are connected to criminality, particularly when this mutation occurs in the 
context of particular environmental factors such as “social deprivation” (Persson & Savulescu, 
2012:121). 
 
Regarding the strength of Persson and Savulescu’s argument for moral bioenhancement, they point 
out that their proposal is a cautious one which must be distinguished from more confident proposals 
regarding the likelihood of moral bioenhancement (2014b:39).  They explain that a confident 
proposal would posit that “there are effective and safe biomedical means of moral enhancement 
waiting to be discovered, while a cautious proposal merely asserts that it’s possible that there be 
such means” (own emphasis, Persson & Savulescu, 2014b:39).  In addition, Persson and Savulescu 
draw attention to the fact that there is great variation in the distribution and levels of dispositions 
such as altruism and a sense of justice amongst individuals.  They question why this “natural range” 
or “status quo” of distribution should be left unaltered.  As mentioned in the previous section, they 
are not arguing for a radical form of moral bioenhancement (Persson & Savulescu, 2015a:349).  
There are many individuals in society who possess the kind of moral motivation required to address 
the type of problems facing humanity that Persson and Savulescu discuss.  Thus, they believe that 
even modest bioenhancements would make a difference.  Whilst the required scientific knowledge 
and technology may not yet be a possibility, they argue that it would be a good idea to address what 
they describe as “low hanging fruit, like the removal of tendencies to break the law and 
strengthening tendencies to commit acts of charity” (Persson & Savulescu, 2015a:349).  
                                                 
19 Of course, Harris would respond to this by pointing out that this is evidence that what Persson and Savulescu call 
moral bioenhancement is, in fact, not true moral enhancement.  Harris argues specifically that behaviour that has moral 
consequences is not necessarily “moral behaviour, any more than all behaviour that affects political outcomes is 
political behaviour” (2016:36). 




DeGrazia is an enthusiastic supporter of the prospect of moral bioenhancement who has argued 
that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with moral bioenhancement.  Furthermore, if it could be 
shown to be “safe, effective and universally available” (DeGrazia, 2014:361), he argues that it is 
something that we should go ahead with.  While DeGrazia does not provide a detailed account of 
the scientific foundations of moral bioenhancement aims, he does provide an interesting list of 
current interventions that could be used for this end, as well as some future possibilities.  He 
mentions research that has shown that the use of SSRIs reduces aggression (Crockett et al., 2010a), 
administering glucose assists in impulse control (Gaillot et al., 2007) and the beta-blocker 
Propranolol has been shown to reduce “unconscious racial bias” (DeGrazia, 2014:361, Terbeck et 
al. 2012.).  More invasive inventions would include deep brain stimulation (DBS) to control 
aggression and neurofeedback to treat personality disorders associated with a lack of empathy and 
to boost exiting levels of empathy in general (DeGrazia, 2014:362).  Genetic interventions would 
range from selecting embryos that possess a particular gene associated with a morally relevant trait 
such as altruism (Reuter et al., 2011), to avoiding selection of those embryos possessing genes 
associated with counter-moral traits20 (Eley et al, 1999).  This possibility is decidedly speculative, 
however, as it has not yet been established that there are genes associated with morally relevant 
traits such as altruism.  DeGrazia also discusses an entirely speculative possibility which would 
entail developing an “artificial chromosome that includes multiple genes coding for stronger 
dispositions to a variety of moral virtues” (2014:362).  
 
Walker, another supporter of moral bioenhancement, does not delve too far below the surface 
regarding scientific considerations.  He posits that for moral bioenhancement to be achievable, it 
would require interdisciplinary involvement.  Psychologists, could identify ‘virtuous’ personality 
traits, whereas behavioural geneticists could track the extent to which such traits are genetically 
influenced (Walker, 2009:31).  If such traits are identified, there would either be the option of pre-
implantation selection of embryos displaying the requisite moral traits or genetic interventions 
could be performed to ‘switch off’ genes associated with negative moral traits.  Walker also 
considers the possibility of inserting artificial genes, mentioned by DeGrazia.  In terms of the 
foundations that would have to be established for a project of moral bioenhancement to be feasible, 
                                                 
20 The genetic basis of counter-moral traits is based upon identical twin studies research.  Twin studies indicate that 
“antisocial and aggressive behaviour has a considerable genetic basis…[the level attributable to genetics is placed] at 
between 40-60%” (Glen & Raine, 2013:54).  However, it is most likely that a number of “gene variants” are involved 
with a genetic predisposition to aggressive behaviour rather than a single gene (ibid.).  Further support for the biological 
basis of morally relevant dispositions or emotions is provided by Van Goozen and Fairchild who have also explored 
“the biological correlates of antisocial behaviour in children” (2008:942).   
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Walker outlines the three propositions that would have to be empirically verified.  Firstly, it would 
have to be shown that there are in fact definitive “character traits…[that include] virtues (or vices)” 
(Walker, 2009:31).  Secondly, it would have to be ascertained that “at least some virtues (or vices) 
have a heritable component” (ibid.) and thirdly, that we are able to then “detect and control the 
genes responsible for this heritable component” (ibid.).   
 
Walker argues that the first and third propositions would not be easily settled as this would require 
resolving disagreements between situations and personality theorists (2009:31).  Situationists are 
of the view that behaviour is wholly, or at least substantially, influenced or determined by 
environmental factors; whereas personality theorists argue that personality, a product of genetic 
processes, is the foundation of behaviour (Walker, 2009:31-32).  In common parlance, this debate 
is often referred to as the nature vs nurture debate.  For moral bioenhancement to be feasible, 
Walker argues that personality theorists would have to conclusively establish their position as 
correct (2009:32).  In this regard, Walker discusses research, including the identification of a gene 
associated with “novelty-seeking” (ibid.) that provides tentative grounds for support of the 
personality theorist view (Ebstein et al., 1995; Benjamin et al., 1996).  Based on animal studies 
(Menzel, 1974; De Waal, 1996; Hamilton, 1964; Trivers, 1971), virtues with genetic components 
that Walker examines as a potential basis for a project of moral bioenhancement are: truthfulness, 
justice and caring (2009:32-34).  However, Walker, is careful to avoid a charge of genetic 
determinism and points out that “genes influence but do not determine personality” (2009:38).  
Therefore, possessing a gene associated with any one of the above virtues will not ensure that this 
virtue is manifested in the individual’s behaviour.   
 
Spence is a more indirect supporter of the aims of moral bioenhancement in that he published an 
article that predates the first 2008 Persson and Savulescu and Douglas articles that discuss moral 
bioenhancement.  Spence posits that, in a certain sense, the field of psychiatry is already engaged 
with a form of pharmacological, and thus biological, “moral assistance” (2008:179).  In other 
words, the treatment of pathological psychological functioning generally results in behavioural 
improvements that have moral implications.  Akin to the point made by Harris and mentioned in 
footnote 19, the prima facie response to this could be to dismiss such interventions as aimed at 
bringing about behaviour that has moral consequences rather than moral behaviour itself, or, to 
dismiss such interventions as artificial in nature, and thus, as not constituting true moral 
enhancement (Spence, 2008:179).  This would be congruent with the line of argumentation that 
regards morality as inhering in the means taken and the effort made to achieve moral ends.  
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However, Spence is of the view that whether or not an intervention can be classified as a moral 
enhancement “depends crucially upon the goals of the patient concerned, i.e. what are the ‘ends’ 
that he is pursuing?” (2008:179).  Patients with pathological psychological conditions, often take 
medication to improve their behaviour and conduct not only to assist in their own well-being but 
also to lessen the negative impact of their behaviour on loved ones.  Generally, if an individual is 
motivated by such a goal, and in the process, acts in such a way as to ameliorate or improve his 
behaviour, we would unequivocally view this as a form of altruism and thus as moral behaviour 
(Spence, 2008:180).   
 
Like Spence, Pacholczyk is not an explicit supporter of moral bioenhancement as construed by its 
major proponents.  However, she argues that the negativity regarding the possibility of moral 
bioenhancement can be attributed to the fact that expectations for what it could achieve are 
unrealistically high (Pacholczyk, 2011:160).  Pacholczyk does not think moral bioenhancement 
will be able to avert ultimate harm or address the kinds of problems that Persson & Savulescu 
expect of it (2011:168).  She points out that we currently treat a number of minor and more serious 
psychological conditions with pharmacological interventions.  Furthermore, we have realistic 
expectations of the efficacy of such treatments.  If we view the potential efficacy of moral 
bioenhancement in a more realistic manner, akin to how we view pharmacological interventions, 
then moral enhancement may be possible (Pacholczyk, 2011:170).  Pacholczyk discusses the use 
of oxytocin as a mechanism of moral bioenhancement that warrants further research (2011:173).  
 
As mentioned in section 2.2, Douglas associates moral bioenhancement with the reduction of 
interference in good motives and argues that despite moral pluralism there are certain “counter-
moral emotions” (2008:231) that would be unanimously viewed in a negative light.  In this regard, 
he identifies “a strong aversion to other racial groups…[and] the impulse towards violent 
aggression” (2008:231), as the two primary counter-moral emotions that could be candidates for 
moral bioenhancement.  Whilst he agrees with the view that our moral psychology is of such a 
complex nature that it may never be possible to biologically modify certain aspects of it, he doesn’t 
believe that this is necessarily the case with two above-mentioned counter-moral emotions 
(Douglas, 2008:233).  Research in the fields of neuroscience and behavioural genetics indicate that 
aggression has a genetic basis (Crowe, 1974; Cadoret, 1978; Grove et al., 1990; Brunner et al., 
1993; Caspi & McClay, 2002; De Almeida et al., 2005) and fMRI scans have shown that certain 
brain activities play a role in racial aversion (Hart et al., 2000; Phelps et al., 2000; Cunningham et 
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al., 2004).  He argues that given the fact that we have tentatively identified these biological 
associations, this should give us hope that future progress will be made in this regard.   
 
2.4.2 The response of the sceptics  
As mentioned above, there are a number of thinkers who address the scientific feasibility of moral 
bioenhancement.  De Melo-Martin and Salles provide one of the strongest claims against the 
scientific plausibility of moral bioenhancement.  They argue that the supposed scientific evidence 
discussed by supporters of moral bioenhancement is actually “highly contested…[and] grounded 
on problematic presuppositions” (De Melo-Martin & Salles, 2015:229).  They see most of the 
supposed scientific evidence as having been affected in this way; however, they only discuss the 
phenomenon of racial bias which is alleged by supporters of moral bioenhancement to be 
biologically mediated.  Douglas, in particular, has cited studies indicating that the amygdala is 
activated when feeling the ‘emotion’ of racial aversion.  However, De Melo-Martin and Salles 
argue that in order to posit that it is possible to attenuate this counter-moral emotion, one has to 
make a number of presuppositions which amount to question-begging.  One has to assume “that 
racial aversion is indeed an identifiable emotion that can be manipulated, that the amygdala’s 
activation constitutes a response to an aversive emotion, and that the amygdala regulates in 
particular the affective component of the emotions” (De Melo-Martin & Salles, 2015:230).  While 
the onus is on Douglas to present an argument for the above three assumptions, De Melo-Martin 
& Salles see him as simply assuming their validity in order to lend support to the scientific 
feasibility of moral bioenhancement.   
 
A second group of thinkers provide arguments that can be loosely categorised as stating that the 
scientific claims made in the moral bioenhancement debate are, at this point, overstated.  In other 
words, thinkers advancing such arguments are of the view that given our current level of scientific 
ability, as well as certain other constraints, it is more likely that moral bioenhancement will never 
be a safe or effective possibility.  One of the most frequently cited proponents of this view is the 
neuroscientist Molly Crockett.  To be fair, however, Crockett’s view regarding the scientific 
feasibility of moral bioenhancement may be viewed as more neutral than her inclusion in this 
section would imply.  Crockett firstly points out that research in the field of genomics does not 
provide support for the likelihood that particular moral dispositions, such as altruism for example, 
have single gene origins (2014:370).  She then discusses how her work regarding the effects of 
SSRIs as a means of countering aggression has been cited by a number of supporters of moral 
bioenhancement such as DeGrazia (2014:361).  Crockett points out, however, that research into 
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moral bioenhancement is extremely new and that her results are more complex than DeGrazia’s 
use of them seems to imply (2014:370).  Her research indicates that the SSRI Citalopram seems to 
decrease an individual’s tendency to cause harm; however, this research was conducted using 
hypothetical situations, it has not yet been replicated “in the laboratory in healthy volunteers” 
(Crockett, 2014:370).  Therefore, whilst her findings provide tentative ‘proof’ regarding the ability 
of SSRIs to mitigate aggression, more research is needed.   
 
Furthermore, even if the effects of SSRIs on aggressive behaviour could be established, it would 
be necessary to fully understand their effects on other physiological functions.  Crockett argues 
that serotonin affects not only “social behaviour…[but also] plays a role in a variety of other 
processes, including (but not limited to) learning, emotion, vision, sexual behaviour, appetite, sleep, 
pain and memory, and there are at least 17 different types of serotonin receptors that produce 
distinct effects on neurotransmission” (2014:370).  Jones has also discussed the fact that serotonin 
influences a number of other areas such as “cardiovascular regulation, respiration, sleep-wake 
cycles, and reward learning” (2013:3).   Therefore, there is concern that adjustments aiming to 
target moral behaviour may negatively affect these areas (ibid.).  This indicates that risks and side-
effects must be afforded considerable attention when considering the possibility of moral 
bioenhancement via the use of SSRIs.  Of course, as Crockett points out, scientific progress will 
presumably address such side-effects (2014:370).  In terms of the different targets of moral 
bioenhancement that have been proposed in the literature, Crockett argues that “from a 
neuroscientific perspective, the evidence so far suggests that targeting moral motivation may the 
most promising avenue for promoting moral behaviour” (2014:370).  This view is supported by 
research conducted on psychopaths indicating that their pathology does not lie in their inability to 
recognise that certain actions are morally problematic; but rather in their possessing inadequate 
moral motivation (ibid.).  
 
Of course, it could be pointed out that we already make extensive use of SSRIs to treat conditions 
ranging from mild to severe depression, and, that we are therefore already engaged in a form of 
treatment that has moral implications.  Sparrow however disagrees with the claim made by 
supporters of moral bioenhancement that softer forms of moral bioenhancement, such as “drug 
therapies”, are already available.  He doesn’t see this as a form of moral enhancement as it is not 
self-evident to him that the effects of drugs can be equated with being “more moral” (2014:20).  In 
a similar manner to Agar and Harris, Sparrow argues that being more moral requires “means-end 
reasoning” (2014:22).  Here, he is, of course, alluding to the point that has already been discussed, 
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namely, the view that morality is akin to a verb rather than a noun.  In other words, it inheres in a 
process rather than in a goal, and reasoning is integral to this process.  In addition, Sparrow sees 
some of the arguments in the moral bioenhancement debate as guilty of utilising shonky science 
that is based on outdated and controversial sociobiological claims (2014:27).  The overall 
assumption that individual morality “is a function of [a] person’s neurochemistry and/or that 
person’s genetics” is for him problematic (Sparrow, 2014:27).  Sparrow argues that this assumption 
supports the interpretation that those “who are immoral, are incorrigibly so, while those who are 
most moral are good by nature” (2014:27)21.   
 
There are a number of thinkers, including scientists, who argue that moral bioenhancement will, 
most likely, not be possible – or would be inadvisable, even if possible – due to the complexity of 
human moral psychology.  Young and Duncan argue that in the past it was posited that moral 
cognition is domain-specific, referring to the view that specific areas of cognition and particular 
neural processes could be pinpointed as responsible for moral decision making (2012:1).  However, 
the view is now that moral cognition is domain-general.  In other words, moral decision-making is 
the product of complex processes diffused throughout the brain.  Therefore, if we ask the question: 
“where in the brain is morality” (Young & Duncan, 2012:1); the answer is both 
“everywhere…[and] nowhere” (ibid.:7).   
 
Zarpentine argues that for moral bioenhancement to effectively achieve its aims, it must be able to 
target specific areas without negative side-effects (2013:145).  However, due to the “ontogenetic 
and neuropsychological complexity exhibited by human moral psychology” (2013:145), 
Zarpentine doesn’t see this as possible in the immediate future, although he does not state that it 
may not be possible in the future (ibid.:150)22.  Lecher argues that, in their claim that “a 
neurochemical substance can bring about a motive in the human mind, and that this motive suffices 
to push the individual into action” (2014:31), supporters of moral bioenhancement are providing a 
reductionist argument.  Consciousness leads to action along a chain which includes: 
 
                                                 
21 It must, however, be noted that Sparrow is rather unfair here as supporters of moral bioenhancement, such as Persson 
and Savulescu, have explicitly stated that they are of the view that morality is in part or is at least “significantly…[rather 
than solely] a function” of our biology (Persson & Savulescu, 2014b:42).  They frequently state that moral 
bioenhancement should be complemented by traditional forms of moral enhancement or education (Persson & 
Savulescu, 2012:11).   
22 Zarpentine interprets ontogenetic complexity as indicative of “complexity in moral psychological 
development…[referring specifically to] complex interactions between genetic inheritance and environment in moral 
development” (2013:145). 
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brain states, mental states (thoughts), intentions (beliefs, desires, fears), propositions 
(statements), actions [and] settled dispositions to act (character traits).  The farther an element 
is located from the chain’s origin, the more complex the account of this element becomes.  
Exponents of moral bioenhancement, [like Douglas and Persson and Savulescu] want to tell a 
story about the middle part of the chain, about (moral) motivation, and sometimes about the 
end of the chain, about (moral dispositions), but their explanans are drawn from the origin 
(from the category of brain states), leading them into the trap of reductionism (Zarpentine, 
2014:31-32) 
 
Bronstein argues that even if it could be definitively shown that moral dispositions or virtues are 
biologically influenced, specific moral traits are almost certainly not informed by single genes; 
rather, what is far more likely is that such traits are polygenetic (2010:85).  In other words – this is 
the point also mentioned by Crockett – genes associated with specific moral traits may also be 
associated with other physiological, non-moral processes and such moral traits may, in turn, be 
associated with multiple genes.  Therefore, altering such “polygenes may threaten many systems 
within an organism” (Bronstein, 2010:85) and result in devastating side-effects.  Sprinkle (2010), 
Andreadis (2010) and Arnhart (2010) critique Walker’s argument in support of moral 
bioenhancement on similar grounds.  Andreadis argues that there is no evidence shwing that the 
kind of moral behaviour discussed in the literature is the product of single genes (2010:76).  Rather, 
the prevailing view is to recognise that genes produce “pleiotropic (i.e. multiple) effects” (ibid.).  
In order to safely alter such genes, one would need extensive knowledge regarding the way in 
which they interact, which we do not currently, or even approximately, possess (Andreadis, 
2010:76).   
 
While Andreadis argues that, within the field of biology, the important influencing role of genes 
on behaviour is now accepted as definitive; the view is that we have moved beyond the former 
polarity of the nature/nurture debate.  The prevailing view is now a “gene/environment (G x E) 
interplay model” (Andreadis, 2010:76) which makes the task of linking specific moral dispositions 
to genes an outdated one.  Furthermore, regarding the implications for moral bioenhancement, due 
to this above-mentioned complexity, the view is that “it is far more feasible to correct an error than 
to ‘enhance’ an already functioning brain” (ibid.).  Arnhart also mentions the complexity of 
environmental and genetic interaction as well as the view that the risks of intervening in genetic 
processes are such that it may never be safe, or worthwhile, to do so (2010:80).  Sprinkle supports 
a similar conclusion by arguing that given problems related to the polygenetic influences on moral 
dispositions, moral bioenhancement will never be feasible; and on the off chance it would be, it 
wouldn’t be morally justifiable (2010:88).   
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Other thinkers focus more on arguing against moral bioenhancement due to the conviction that side 
effects, risks or negative consequences in general will be too great.  While there is much focus on 
the possibly negative side effects of genetic intervention, Clausen discusses the identity altering 
nature of deep brain stimulation (DBS) which has been mentioned as one of the possible 
mechanisms of moral bioenhancement.  DBS is currently utilised for therapeutic interventions.  
However, due to the possibility that DBS may result in personality changes, as well as other risks, 
Clausen sees it as an option that is ethically unjustifiable, for enhancement purposes, at present 
(2010:1159).  This concern will be discussed in detail in chapter 4a.   
 
Neuroscience has identified certain morally relevant traits which “include sympathetic feelings, a 
primitive sense of right and wrong, a general sense of rules, highly self-conscious shame reactions, 
and effective self-control (ie power of will)” (Barilan, 2015:79).  However, Barilan argues that 
these morally relevant traits must be flexible enough to ensure that they are able to be balanced by 
“culture and self-reflection [which] integrate all relevant factors and produce a morally desired 
behaviour” (2015:79).  An emphasis on the enhancement of particular traits may “come at the 
expense of complementary ones…[as well as] at the expense of a psychological flexibility that is 
a moral sub-capacity in its own right” (Barilan, 2015:83).   
 
Connected with a focus on the complexity of human moral psychology and the concern for risks 
and side-effects, are arguments that posit that moral bioenhancement will morally worsen us.  Agar 
argues that moral bioenhancement is dangerous for similar reasons to Barilan (2015a).  He argues 
that our moral judgement is founded upon “cognitive, emotional and motivational sub-capacities” 
(Agar, 2015a:343) and that isolating and strengthening just one area or sub-capacity will result in 
imbalances.  In other words, “with respect to moral sub-capacities, excesses are as bad as 
deficiencies.  The unbalanced strengthening of a moral sub-capacity can lead to the endorsement 
of moral ideas that we rightly reject” (Agar, 2015a:344).  In particular, Agar argues that 
strengthening certain emotions, such as empathy, could make it more likely that our reasoning 
capacities are bypassed, and this, he speculates, will result in a stronger tendency to make morally 
problematic consequentialist judgements (2015a:345).  Drake has responded to Agar’s argument 
in this regard.  He points out that because Persson and Savulescu have explicitly stated that they 
are only aiming to increase moral motivation to the highest existing levels within the population – 
i.e. they are not aiming at radical enhancement – Agar’s fears are exaggerated (Persson & 
Savulescu, 2012:113; Drake, 2016:5).  Drake points out that if we look at individuals who are 
considered to be morally exemplary, such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who is described as 
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having extremely high levels of empathy, we can see this has most certainly not resulted in him 
having “dangerous moral judgement” (ibid.); in fact, the opposite seems to be the case.  
 
Harris has also argued that moral bioenhancement, as construed by its supporters, could negatively 
impact our morality.  I refer here not only to his concern for the subversion of moral autonomy, 
which will be discussed in detail in chapter 4b, but more specifically, to his discussion of the 
connection between serotonin and moral behaviour. Similarly to Agar, Chan and Harris argue that 
contrary to what is argued by supporters of moral bioenhancement, serotonin could play a negative 
role in moral behaviour in that they see it as heightening emotional, rather than rational, responses 
to morally relevant situations (2011:130)23.  Chan and Harris discuss how serotonin purportedly 
increases an aversion to violence, thus reducing the likelihood of an aggressive response in any 
given situation.  However, they argue that in certain situations the morally right course of action 
may require an aggressive response.  Here they mention Jasper Schuringa who used violence to 
overpower an attempted plane-hijacking, thereby saving the lives of all on board.  Chan and Harris 
argue that if Schuringa had been morally bioenhanced against aggression he may not have 
attempted such a heroic feat (2011:131).   
 
Another example that has been given of a context in which proposed enhancements would be at 
odds with the requirements of specific situations is that of a judge who, it is argued, would not be 
able to fulfil her job appropriately if her empathy levels were boosted.  Wasserman argues that for 
those “in positions of power and authority” (2014:374) in general, an enhanced sense of empathy 
may be at odds with the requirement to act in a way that, while morally problematic, is for the 
greater good, all things considered.  Casal also discusses this issue and points out that viewing 
moral bioenhancement as a means of boosting the motivation of individuals to do what they know 
is right, could backfire momentously (2015:340).  For example, a terrorist considering a suicide 
bombing may acquire the ‘courage’ to undertake such an act if his sense of altruism and empathy 
for those in whose name he undertakes such an act is intensified.  Casal argues that it is dangerous 
                                                 
23 Of course, as Bublitz points out, it is correct that serotonin plays a role in emotional regulation, as evidenced by its 
association with various disorders of affect (2016:91).  This is, however, inferred on the basis of indirect evidence, 
namely, through neurobiological changes in areas of the brain that are associated with emotion.  Nevertheless, it is 
likely that using serotonin as a means of moral bioenhancement would work in two possible ways.  It could intensify 
certain “emotion[s] at the expense of another” emotion (ibid), such as intensifying empathy for another individual at 
the expense of emotions associated with a regard for the self.  In this way, there could be minimal impact to cognition 
and deliberative processes.  On the other hand, it could intensify certain emotions with the effect that the strength of 
such increases could overwhelm cognition and deliberation.  In this way, as Bublitz points out, “the reasons in favour 
of action A…[would] no longer outweigh the emotions striving for action B” (2016:91-92).  It is the second outcome 
that Harris fears will be produced by moral bioenhancement. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
51 
 
to assume that enhancing our levels of altruism and sense of justice “in the absence of just 
institutions” (2015:340) will not bring potentially great risks.   
 
However, Kahane and Savulescu have responded to Harris’s argument by arguing that his argument 
against serotonin as a moral enhancer is not an argument against moral bioenhancement; “it is an 
argument against raising serotonin” (2015:135).  If it could be shown that the administration of 
serotonin did not produce the requisite moral effects or behaviour, then, of course, other methods 
of moral bioenhancement would be preferable.  However, this remains to be seen.  The issue that 
is problematic in the Chan Harris line of argumentation is their claim that increases in empathy, 
and thereby emotions, will automatically bypass reasoning or lead or morally problematic 
consequentialist-type judgements.  In this regard, ground-breaking scientific research utilising 
functional magnetic resonance imagining (fMRI) to investigate the neurobiological influences of 
moral judgements has indicated evidence to the contrary (Greene, et al., 2001).   
 
This research entails using fMRI to analyse what occurs in the brain when individuals are presented 
with moral dilemmas, such as trolley problems.  In trolley problems, an individual must imagine a 
train headed towards five individuals who are tied to the track with no means of escape.  The only 
way to save these individuals is to pull a lever, thereby diverting the train to an alternate track upon 
which a single individual is restrained.  When faced with the decision of whether or not to pull the 
lever, most individuals answer that they would pull the lever as it is preferable to save more lives 
where possible, even if one life is ‘sacrificed’ to do so.  This is a decidedly utilitarian judgement 
as it judges the correct course of action to be that which produces the best consequences in terms 
of the maximisation of overall utility or social well-being.  The second part of the trolley problem 
entails imagining a single train track with five individuals, once again, tied to the track.  In this 
version, one is standing on a bridge overlooking the track and has the option of pushing a large 
stranger, who is also standing on the bridge, onto the track, thereby halting the progress of the train 
and saving the lives of the five.  Generally, most individuals react with great discomfort when faced 
with this second dilemma and opt to not push the stranger onto the track, despite the identical 
rationale of saving more lives being present.   
 
Responses to the second dilemma are associated with deontological judgements; namely, the 
wrongness of using an individual as a direct means to achieve a particular end, even if this end is 
positive in that more lives will be saved.  Greene et al argue that the difference between the two 
dilemmas is that the second, deontological judgement, elicits a strong emotional response whereas 
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the first, utilitarian, and thus consequentialist, judgement, is a more calculative or rational response 
(2001:2106).  Their hypothesis was affirmed by experiments indicating that brain areas associated 
with emotion were far more active when making deontological judgements than consequentialist 
or utilitarian ones.  However, as discussed in the previous section, this dispute between supporters 
of moral bioenhancement, such as Persson and Savulescu et al., and their opponents, is indicative 
of the deeper meta-ethical dispute regarding the extent to which morality should be a product of 
emotions or rationality; and which moral theory better serves these ends: consequentialism or 
theories that emphasise means/end considerations.  This matter is of great relevance to the question 
of whether moral bioenhancement will subvert moral autonomy and will be therefore be addressed 
further in chapter 4.   
 
2.5 Concluding remarks  
In this chapter, I presented three interconnected areas that I identified from a survey of the literature, 
and take to be integral to the coherence of the moral bioenhancement project.  I framed the three 
areas as problems due to the fact that they are characterised by disagreements that would have to 
be resolved for moral bioenhancement to become a coherent possibility.  In terms of the first 
problem, various definitional disagreements regarding moral bioenhancement are related to the 
underlying challenges and disagreements pertaining to the second problem, namely, the 
identification of the content of morality itself.  In other words, to define moral bioenhancement one 
must be able to stipulate what the target/s would be, and, this latter stipulation is dependent upon 
one’s conception of what is salient regarding morality itself.  In addition, the problem of science 
also requires clarity and consensus regarding the target/s of enhancement for moral 
bioenhancement to be a scientifically viable possibility. 
 
The problem of the science of moral bioenhancement also introduces its own novel concern; 
namely, the fact that whatever target/s of morality we have identified must be susceptible to safe 
biological modification.  The debate here has been dominated by Persson and Savulescu’s 
identification of altruism and a sense of justice as two morally relevant dispositions that are 
potentially susceptible to biomedical interventions.  However, there are a variety of arguments 
provided by those who are decidedly sceptical regarding the scientific feasibility and risks posed 
by moral bioenhancement due to the complexity of human moral psychology, and thus, the possible 
side-effects.  The various arguments in this section do not provide conclusive ‘evidence’ for or 
against the claims that moral bioenhancement will be a scientific possibility, as such evidence is 
impossible to ascertain, due to the fact that the science behind moral bioenhancement is 
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predominantly a speculative matter.  However, in this dissertation, I will operate with the idealising 
assumption that moral bioenhancement could be safe and effective at some point, in order to 
investigate the deeper ethical and philosophical concerns that it elicits  
 
In terms of the related problem of moral content, much attention is focused upon what the broader 
target of moral bioenhancement should be: affective or cognitive capacities.  I would argue, 
however, that this dichotomy is a false one as morality is far more complex in character than this 
polarisation would imply; both do, and should, play a vital role in moral behaviour.  This view is 
supported by neuroscientific research, as discussed at the end of section 2.4.2.  Thus, I would argue 
that any attempts to define morality or moral bioenhancement, must include some reference to both 
affective and cognitive components, even if this is implicit.  In addition, I would argue that the 
Socratic posit that knowing the good implies doing the good represents an idealised account of 
human nature which is at odds with an abundance of empirical evidence to the contrary.  I do not 
regard the primary moral problem of the twenty-first century to be confusion regarding what is 
moral and what is not.  Rather, I concur with Persson and Savulescu that the primary weakness of 
existent human morality is a lack of motivation, or insufficient desire, to carry what is known to be 
good into action.  I would argue that this ‘problem’ is deeply connected with a general lack of 
willingness to consider the perspective of others as a morally relevant factor in determining one’s 
behaviour, particularly where doing so would require any form of sacrifice.  Thus, I take motivation 
to be an appropriate target for moral bioenhancement.   
 
To conclude this chapter, I will now provide a working definition of moral bioenhancement that 
will inform my investigation in this dissertation.  Whilst, as observed in the literature, definitions 
of moral bioenhancement do tend to be more normative than descriptive, I would argue that this is 
unavoidable.  Morality is, by definition, a normative matter, and in this regard, moral 
bioenhancement, which signifies the attempt to improve morality, is also a thoroughly normative 
endeavour.  In terms of nomenclature, I will purposely utilise the term moral bioenhancement in 
this dissertation, rather than neutral terms such as biomoral modulation, modification, alteration, 
manipulation or change, in order to emphasise that I am referring to moral improvement, by 
definition.  This signifies that an intervention could only be referred to as a moral bioenhancement 
if it resulted in a discernible, and stipulated, improvement in conduct or behaviour. 
 
The definition that I will offer is, therefore, one that I posit would constitute a definitive moral 
improvement, if it were to be realised.  Whether or not the aims described in the definition are 
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scientifically possible is, of course, another matter.  I would also argue that a definition of moral 
bioenhancement must take a position regarding what should be the target of interventions.  
Different targets that have been discussed in the literature are: (i) moral behaviour or action; ii) 
motives, will or intentions; (iii) moral dispositions, capacities or attitudes, such as a capacity for 
altruism or empathy and a sense of justice, as well as those counter-moral emotions that may 
interfere with our motivation to act in a moral manner; and, (iv) moral decision-making, judgement 
or reasoning  I regard all these targets as relevant to morality, and thus, to a definition of moral 
bioenhancement. 
 
The use of the term bioenhancement implicitly distinguishes biological moral enhancement from 
traditional moral enhancement, and is thus, a narrow or more specific definition.  I agree with 
arguments claiming that the long-term influence exerted by both biological and traditional moral 
enhancement could be comparable, however, while some thinkers claim that there is no morally 
relevant difference between the two as they are both aiming at ‘the good’, I would posit that they 
are different in kind, due to the means that they employ to achieve their ends.  Here, the distinction 
between active and passive enhancements is of great relevance and will therefore be discussed 
further in chapter 4.  In addition, whilst I would opt for a definition that avoids explicit reference 
to the treatment/enhancement distinction, due to various problems associated with it, I would argue 
that there is merit in including a reference to some maximum level of moral functioning that would 
be desirable.  In other words, if the aim of moral bioenhancement is simply to raise the level of 
moral functioning to the height displayed by those members of society regarded as moral 
exemplars, this would allay fears regarding radical enhancement.  In this regard, a definition should 
make it clear that the aim would not be to boost moral functioning to unspecified levels, but rather, 
to elevate it to a level that is already present in the human population.   
 
With all of the above in mind, I define moral bioenhancement as: 
A biomedical intervention that results in a discernible improvement in considered moral 
conduct to levels displayed by moral exemplars within society, where this improvement is 
achieved by way of increasing the motivation of individuals to act in a morally desirable 
manner, by either raising low levels of morally relevant dispositions or mitigating high levels 
of counter-moral dispositions.  The primary target would be the disposition of reflective 
empathy, where this would entail improving an individual’s ability to consider the perspective 
of others as a morally relevant factor in determining their actions.   
 
This will be the definition that informs my discussion and investigation in this dissertation.  It is 
clearly informed by aspects of both Persson and Savulescu and Douglas’ interpretation of moral 
bioenhancement, however it differs regarding the stipulated levels of improvement, as well as the 
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notion that moral conduct must be considered and empathy must be reflective.  This implies that 
improvements must be accompanied by the ability to provide authentic reasons for changes in 
behaviour.  I have included empathy in my definition, as I posit that it would be a suitable 
disposition to focus on as a target for enhancement.  This is firstly, because there is evidence that 
it is susceptible to biomedical mediation.  However, whether this will ever be scientifically 
possible, in the way that is hoped is, of course, far from certain.  Secondly, as Persson and 
Savulescu have pointed out, empathy, or altruism, is a disposition that has a place in most moral 
theories (2012:403).  Where empathy is associated with the ability to consider the perspective of 
others as a morally relevant factor in determining action, this disposition is closely associated with 
a sense of altruism or selflessness.  Utilitarianism requires one to set aside one’s own interests in 
order to consider the wellbeing of others, which is why it is often regarded as an overly demanding 
moral theory.  In addition, acting from duty, and in accordance with the moral law, as espoused by 
deontology, would also require that one disregards one’s personal preferences or feelings, in favour 
of doing what is right, simply because it is the right thing to do.  Thus, in both utilitarian and 
deontological moral theories – generally viewed as polar-opposites – it can be argued that a sense 
of selflessness is required.  However, the difference between the two theories lies in the justification 
for why this should be the case.  I will utilise this proposed understanding of moral bioenhancement 
in subsequent chapters.    
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Chapter 3 – In-practice objections to moral bioenhancement  
 
3.1 Introduction and overview of chapter 
Arguments that are given in support of moral bioenhancement are generally consequentialist in 
nature.  In other words, they provide reasons for support of moral bioenhancement as a means to 
some beneficial end or the avoidance of some harm.  As outlined in chapter 1, examples of harm 
avoidance would be the implementation of moral bioenhancement to mitigate against global 
catastrophe, termed ultimate harm by Persson and Savulescu, or to simply make us ‘better’, and 
thus more willing, and able, to address various global problems that are viewed as inextricably 
connected to deficiencies in human moral psychology.  As discussed in the previous chapter, most 
supporters of moral bioenhancement make a fundamental distinction between traditional – non-
biological – moral enhancement and biological moral enhancement and argue that the former is 
inadequate, alone, as a means of addressing the variety of urgent problems facing humanity.  A 
stronger argument could also be made that the problems and risks faced by twenty first century 
humanity are such that we have a moral duty, or obligation, to make ourselves morally better 
through moral bioenhancement.  The main argument provided in support of moral bioenhancement 
by Persson and Savulescu was presented in chapter 1 and will therefore not be discussed in detail 
in this chapter which will primarily address arguments that have been lodged against moral 
bioenhancement – and the responses to these arguments – in the literature.  
 
The arguments against moral bioenhancement are, not surprisingly, rather extensive and varied.  A 
useful way of categorising arguments, in this regard, is to distinguish between those that are in-
practice objections and those that are in-principle objections24.  In-practice objections admonish 
us to take cognisance of the practical negative impact that moral bioenhancement may have on, 
and within, the real world (Agar, 2015: 38).  In other words, such objections do not focus on the 
moral status of moral bioenhancement itself, but argue that the project may fail to realise its 
intended, positive aims, and, in this way, will leave us worse off.  In-practice objections are thus 
consequentialist in nature.  Whilst, in the context of moral bioenhancement, such concerns are 
                                                 
24 This is a helpful distinction suggested by Agar (2015:38) that avoids some of the problems associated with 
distinguishing between instrumental versus intrinsic concerns against moral bioenhancement.  Instrumental concerns 
are related to in-practice objections, in terms of their shared focus on the possible negative effects of moral 
bioenhancement, whereas arguments that focus on the intrinsic wrongness of moral bioenhancement would claim that 
the practice is wrong, in and of itself, for various reasons, regardless of any benefits it may produce.  While this 
distinction may also be helpful, it disregards the areas and concerns where there may be overlap.  For example, the 
concern that moral bioenhancement will impact negatively upon morality is both an instrumental concern, due to the 
potentially negative consequences this may produce, and a concern for the intrinsic wrongness of impacting upon 
something that is viewed as having absolute value.   
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speculative in nature, they are nevertheless crucially important in terms of the potentially serious 
harms that they draw attention to.  In-principle objections, on the other hand, make the claim that 
moral bioenhancement is wrong, in and of itself, – for some reason – regardless of any alleged 
good or avoidance of harms that it may produce.  Many of these arguments draw upon insights 
from non-consequentialist theories. 
 
Whilst I have grouped the arguments against moral bioenhancement into either in-practice or in-
principle objections, these categories are, of course, not mutually exclusive.  The different areas of 
focus are interconnected in that assumptions made in certain areas will impact upon how other 
areas are interpreted.  In-principle objections have in-practice implications and vice versa.  In 
addition, when looking at the claims against moral bioenhancement, it must be noted that the 
various arguments are predicated upon the way in which moral bioenhancement is defined; which, 
in turn, is influenced both by the moral theory that is subscribed to and other meta-ethical 
perspectives, such as what is viewed as constituting morality or moral content.  These 
interpretations, in turn, will influence matters such as whether or not moral bioenhancement is 
regarded as feasible, and if so, what is targeted for moral bioenhancement.  In this chapter, I will 
focus on explicating the most prevalent in-practice objections to moral bioenhancement.  The 
primary in-principle objections to moral bioenhancement, which are the main focus of my 
dissertation, will be discussed in chapter 4.   
 
In section 3.2 I will address some of the safety and risk concerns, for individuals, that moral 
bioenhancement poses, and, in particular, I will discuss concerns regarding possible negative side 
effects or harms that could result from ‘tampering’ with the biological foundations of our moral 
psychology.  One such concern is that moral bioenhancement could negatively impact upon our 
morality, making it worse rather than improving it, and thus, could have the opposite effect of its 
intentions.  In section 3.3 I will address other arguments that claim moral bioenhancement is 
unfeasible for various reasons.  These concerns range from implementation and administration 
issues to logistical problems.  Implementation issues generally discuss whether or not moral 
bioenhancement should be voluntary or non-voluntary, and thus, universally implemented, and the 
problems associated with both.  This matter will be discussed in section 3.3.1.  In section 3.3.2 I 
will discuss various administration problems such as: who will decide what should be enhanced, 
who will oversee this process and how the project could be protected from abuse, exploitation or 
nefarious intentions, such as the furthering of moral eugenics agendas.  This concern can be termed 
The problem of who will guard the guardians.  A related concern, discussed prevalently in the 
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literature, is The bootstrapping problem.  This refers to the problem that it is morally deficient 
human beings, the targets of moral bioenhancement, who would oversee the process of moral 
bioenhancement and ensure that it occurs in an ethical manner (Persson & Savulescu, 2012:2-3).  
Other thinkers argue that moral bioenhancement implemented at the individual level will be 
ineffective in dealing with the potential catastrophes, such as the avoidance of ultimate harm, that 
are given as the reason for why we need it in the first place.  Finally, in section 3.4 I will discuss 
distributive justice and egalitarian concerns related to who will have access to moral 
bioenhancement technologies and whether issues of access will exacerbate existing inequalities.   
 
3.2 Concerns regarding potential harms, safety and risk to individuals 
Concerns for potential harms regarding the safety, and thus, the risk, involved in moral 
bioenhancement interventions, are, of course, the most obvious point of contention between 
supporters and opponents of moral bioenhancement.  These concerns focus on the possible negative 
side-effects that could result from ‘tampering’ with the biological foundations of our moral 
psychology.  In other words, the concern is that in our attempts to morally improve ourselves, we 
will potentially achieve the opposite.  This concern for the negative impact of moral 
bioenhancement on our morality has both instrumental and intrinsic components.  I will deal 
relatively briefly here with the former as this area was addressed in section 2.4.2 of the previous 
chapter.  The concern for the intrinsic wrongness of moral bioenhancement is predominantly 
reflected in arguments that address the issue of the impact that moral bioenhancement could have 
on human moral agency or autonomy, and thus, morality in general.  This will be addressed in 
chapter 4 
 
In their literature review, Specker et al. present areas of the moral bioenhancement debate that they 
regard as having been neglected (2015).  They argue that whilst psychopharmacological 
interventions are frequently discussed as potential mechanisms of moral bioenhancement, “it is 
particularly worrisome that surprisingly little attention is given to side-effects, risks and safety-
issues” (Specker et al., 2015:14), and, in particular, the risks associated with brain interventions.  
They emphasise that this neglect should be addressed and become a key issue in the moral 
bioenhancement debate.  However, it must be pointed out that whilst they are the primary 
proponents of moral bioenhancement, Persson and Savulescu have explicitly included a caveat that 
it should only take place if its safety and efficacy has been established (2008:174).  Furthermore, 
the lack of focus on such matters is not surprising given the fact that the investigation of moral 
bioenhancement has predominantly taken place in the philosophical and ethical realm, whereas the 
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matter of risk and potential side effects is a concern requiring scientific expertise.  Nevertheless, a 
number of thinkers have expressed the concern that issues of safety and risk are glossed over by 
the proponents of moral bioenhancement.   
 
Beauchamp has argued that Persson and Savulescu do not pay sufficient attention to problems of 
safety and risk possibly due to the fact that concrete reassurance in this regard would be speculative 
(2015:347).  Persson and Savulescu discuss, at length, the “highly destructive, uncontrollable 
processes…and catastrophic risk” (Beauchamp, 2015:347) that could be unleashed in the wake of 
general scientific and technological progress as part of their argument necessitating moral 
bioenhancement.  But, as pointed out by Beauchamp, this catastrophic risk could be taken to 
include moral bioenhancement itself.  Beauchamp posits that Persson and Savulescu’s 
downplaying of safety issues could also be attributed to the fact that they don’t regard moral 
bioenhancement technologies as posing any novel risks over and above the risks that are shared 
with “all new forms of powerful innovation” (ibid.).  Rather, they see the most pressing safety risks 
as lying in the problem of “how to secure wise and proper applications” (ibid.).  Beauchamp 
disagrees with this position and points out that altering human genetic structure could create 
unanticipated effects that could only become apparent after the fact; and could achieve the opposite 
of what was intended.  However, Persson and Savulescu respond to this concern by emphasising 
the cautious nature of their proposal and point out that their project of moral bioenhancement is a 
way of providing a solution to the problems they outline “which though risky in the beginning, gets 
more secure the longer we succeed in walking it” (2015:351). 
 
As discussed in section 2.4.2, a prevalently mentioned safety concern is that the biological basis of 
our moral psychology is sufficiently complex that safe and successful moral bioenhancement 
would be highly unlikely or impossible (Young & Duncan 2012; Zarpentine, 2013; Lechner, 2014; 
Bronstein, 2010; Andreadis, 2010; Arnhart, 2010; Sprinkle 2010; Barilan, 2015; Agar, 2010; 
Blackford, 2010).  In response to such concerns, Casal has argued that due to our lack of 
information regarding the “effectiveness, distribution or risks [of moral bioenhancement] – we 
cannot decide on its desirability…All we can currently say is that some biotherapies may be 
permissible and worth discussing” (2015:342).  Jebari acknowledges the risks involved with 
attempting to alter “our evolved psychology” (2014:254) but nevertheless posits that any risks 
should be assessed by weighing up the advantages that could be secured – and presumably the 
harms avoided – through doing so.  The Nuffield report holds a similar position that “the risks and 
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benefits of each particular means of enhancement must be assessed on the basis of empirical 
evidence where possible” (2013:165).    
 
Several thinkers have given substantive content to the above concern regarding the safety of 
intervening in our complex moral psychology.  The prevalent view here is that moral 
bioenhancement could negatively impact upon our morality, making it worse rather than improving 
it; and thus, could have the opposite effect of its intentions.  Harris and Agar are the most noted 
proponents of this view.  At this point in time, the debate has largely focused on the potentially 
negative effects of pharmacological interventions, and in particular, on the effects they have on 
neurotransmitters, as these are the most rudimentary forms of moral bioenhancement currently 
available.  As discussed in section 2.4.2, Agar argues that “moral bioenhancement is considerably 
more dangerous than Persson and Savulescu suppose” (2015a:343).  However, Agar does not claim 
that moral bioenhancement is wrong in-principle or that it is “intrinsically mistaken...[he argues 
that] biomedical means to this end violate no physical laws.  Rather…[he] reject[s] the practical 
agenda of Persson and Savulescu” (Agar, 2015a:343).  In other words, he thinks that in their 
attempts to improve us morally we will actually end up being morally worse-off.  He argues that 
in the same way that fitting a more powerful and stronger bionic leg to an individual would have a 
major effect on her biomechanics in the absence of adaptations, so too will strengthening an 
isolated component of human moral psychology (ibid.).   
 
Agar does not, however, oppose biological interventions in cases of pathological psychological 
functioning – moral therapy in other words – as he argues that in such cases, the moral judgement 
of such individuals is impaired due to a particular dysfunction, which, if corrected, would be far 
more likely to lead to improvement in overall functioning (2015a:343).  To illustrate this point, he 
gives the example of how the moral judgement of a psychopath, affected by low levels of empathy, 
could be successfully treated and raised to levels of ‘normalcy’ (Agar, 2015a:343).  However, in 
individuals who operate within the parameters of “moral normalcy” Agar is sceptical of the 
potential efficacy of moral bioenhancement due to the fact that “all of the cognitive, emotional and 
motivational sub-capacities that feed into moral thinking are working according to biological and 
psychological norms” (ibid.).  It is the balancing of the above capacities that has produced what is 
viewed as “moral normalcy” which Agar points out, whilst not always correct, is nevertheless the 
“reference point for the [understanding], justification [and implementation] of ethical principles” 
(ibid.) regarded as morally defensible.   
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To illustrate this point, Agar discusses the bioenhancement of empathy.  A claim made by Persson 
and Savulescu is that one of the deficits of human moral psychology is the existence of low levels 
of empathy for high levels of suffering experienced by large groups of individuals not in our 
immediate vicinity (2012:29).  The supposed inability of those in developed nations to empathise 
with the suffering of the poor in developing nations would be an obvious example here.  Persson 
and Savulescu argue that by administering oxytocin, “pro-social behaviour[s]” (2012:119), such as 
empathy, would be broadened and strengthened.  Agar responds to this by pointing out that 
increases in empathy could occur either through intensifying the emotion experienced for one’s 
immediate circle, one’s in-group, or through extending it to include out-groups (2015a:344).  There 
are, however, problems associated with both of these outcomes.  Strengthening the experience of 
empathy for out-groups, or those removed from one’s immediate vicinity, could occur at the 
expense of in-group empathy.  In other words, it could result in what is often presented as one of 
the critiques of utilitarianism, namely, that it disrupts personal relationships, or, as the criticism is 
generally formulated, that it does not make provision for special obligations.  Extending or 
strengthening our empathy, or pursuit of the good, for a general other could thwart an adequate 
observance of empathy for one’s children or family, for example.  In general, however, research 
has indicated that the administration of oxytocin produces the former result: a strengthening of 
existing feelings of empathy towards members of one’s in-group.   
 
Persson and Savulescu do acknowledge this and state that research has shown that “the pro-social 
effects of oxytocin are more accurately characterised as ‘pro-in-group’ effects” (2012:120).  This 
is problematic because it is the enhancement of out-group pro-social effects that is posited as the 
solution to the problems that Persson and Savulescu present.  They therefore admit that the 
administering of oxytocin to promote pro-social attitudes such as empathy would have to occur 
congruently with “reasoning which undercuts race, sex etc. as ground for moral differentiation” 
(Persson & Savulescu, 2012:120).  However, they point out that the fact that a hormone such as 
oxytocin requires supplementation is not grounds for rejecting it altogether; it can still be extremely 
useful (ibid.).  However, Agar argues that emphasising the role of reasoning in mitigating the 
strengthening of in-group empathy would not necessarily ‘solve’ the problem as our ability to arrive 
at morally desirable conclusions could still be at risk.  Strengthening already existing empathy for 
our loved ones could lead to outcomes where we are no longer able to adequately weigh up 
competing options and come to sensible conclusions in the way that we currently do, by way of 
our existing moral capacities.  It may lead to outcomes such as being more willing to impose 
suffering on out-groups, in order to protect, and thus favour, our loved ones from minor or trivial 
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suffering.  In other words, the supplementation of oxytocin by reasoning that Persson and 
Savulescu discuss may achieve the opposite effect if the process of reasoning is influenced or 
overridden by the excessive strengthening of emotions such as empathy.   
 
The example given by Agar to illustrate his argument is of a parent whose wish is to provide her 
child with the opportunity of an optimal education and considers breaking into a hospital and 
stealing a dialysis machine to sell on the internet to the highest bidder (2015a:344).  Operating 
under the conditions of “moral normalcy”, or the unhampered ability to weigh up competing harms 
and benefits, would lead the mother to realise that, as much as she loves her child and would wish 
to secure personal advantage for him, this course of action would be wrong due to its depriving 
countless individuals of the potentially life-saving benefits of the machine.  Agar’s point is that it 
is not evident that an individual with levels of empathy that have been boosted above normal levels 
would retain the ability to make such a judgement.  Elsewhere, Agar articulates this concern slightly 
differently, arguing that moral bioenhancement could result in “a reduced sensitivity to moral 
reasons rejected by his or her enhancer” (2010:75).   
 
Consequentialist theories, such as utilitarianism, place a high premium on happiness and the 
avoidance of suffering, whereas non-consequentialist theories, such as deontology, focus on the 
importance of the means taken to achieve a particular end, and the prioritisation of the role of acting 
in accordance with the dictates of rationality and the will.  These different emphases can result in 
solutions to moral problems that are diametrically opposed to one another.  Agar is of the view that 
an unenhanced utilitarian would at least consider deontological concerns in assessing a course of 
action; whereas it isn’t clear that this would be the case if the bioenhancement of empathy had 
taken place (2010:75).  In other words, Agar clearly envisages that a strengthening of empathy will 
lead to an over-heightened focus on reducing the suffering or increasing the happiness of loved 
ones, which will occur at the expense of our ability to employ moral judgement or cognition which 
enables us to weigh up competing harms and benefits and ensure means-end reasoning.  In 
particular, his concern is that a strengthening of empathy could, in actual fact, result in a distorted 
utilitarian perspective in which an individual uses utilitarian reasoning but only applies it to his in-
group rather than considering how his action could impact upon the utility of all individuals 
affected by it.   
 
This is also the point that Harris makes when he interprets moral agency as requiring that one be 
able to make a judgement on what is the good or right action, “all things considered” (2016:28).  
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Furthermore, Harris argues that considering all things, “doesn’t imply endless cost-benefit analysis, 
rather the assessment of the best course of action in most circumstances calls for the careful 
balancing of different sorts of harms, often to different groups of people” (2016:14).  However, the 
obvious response to the above concern is to point out, once again, that Persson and Savulescu are 
not advocating radical enhancement of empathy.  Rather, their argument is that elevating general 
levels of empathy in line with the levels displayed by the most empathetic members of society 
would constitute major moral improvement and alleviate some of the problems they outline.  If the 
distribution of empathy in the population occurs in a bell curve shape then the aim would be to 
elevate the general population to the highest part of the bell curve; not above this.  The point made 
by Drake, and mentioned in section 2.4.2, is also relevant here.  If we look at members of society 
who display extremely high levels of empathy – the example he gives is Arch-Bishop Desmond 
Tutu – we would not argue that his ability to acutely empathise occurs at the expense of his moral 
reasoning (Drake, 2016:5).  Rather, as Drake argues, his empathy “seems to facilitate exceptional 
moral judgement” (ibid.).   
 
The concerns regarding the administration of serotonin to reduce aggression were also addressed 
in both section 2.4.1 and section 2.4.2, and will therefore not be repeated here in detail.  The 
important point for the purposes of this section on side-effects and risks is to emphasise that while 
serotonin is currently extensively administered globally to treat cases of depression and anxiety, its 
effects on healthy individuals are not clear.  As mentioned by Crockett, a neurotransmitter such as 
serotonin influences multiple brain processes, over and above its effects on reducing aggression.  
Therefore, an intervention that specifically targets a morally relevant behaviour such as aggression 
“by globally altering neurotransmitter function, may have undesirable side effects, and these should 
be considered when weighing the costs and benefits of the intervention” (Crockett, 2014:370).  
Furthermore, if a reduction in aggression may be equated with an increase in pro-social emotions, 
it is not evident, according to certain thinkers, that this is true moral enhancement.  Rather, Harris 
argues that the use of a neurotransmitter such as serotonin is nothing more than “a policy of harm 
reduction by non-moral means by the administration of a molecule that reduces aggressiveness 
indiscriminately” (2016:83).   
 
Harris, who equates ‘moral goodness’ with being able to make all things considered judgements, 
does not see the avoidance of harms, nor the elevation of pro-social behaviour, as constituent 
components of morality.  Whilst reducing harmful behaviour through pharmacological 
interventions may give the appearance of moral improvement, “it is unlikely to change people’s 
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moral outlook or judgements, although what happens certainly changes what they are able to do, 
or more modestly, what they are likely to do” (Harris, 2016:83).  It is not only that pro-sociality is 
context specific and that pro-social behaviour exhibited towards other individuals may have 
negative effects for larger groups25, but also, that Harris is of the view that pro-sociality is simply 
not “the stuff of which moral judgements are made” (2016:101).  Harris argues that “there is reason 
to believe that increases in pro-sociality may not produce a morally better outcome ‘all things 
considered’ precisely because they reduce the ability of agents to consider all things” (2016:84).   
 
In contradistinction to Harris’ argument, however, Crockett et al cite their own research and 
evidence on the effects of serotonin to “promote pro-social behaviour by enhancing harm aversion, 
a prosocial sentiment that directly affects both moral judgment and moral behaviour” (own 
emphasis, 2010, Crockett et al.:2010a:17433).  Elsewhere, in direct response to the challenges of 
Harris and Chan regarding their above claim, Crockett et al. charge Harris and Chan with a “narrow 
definition of moral judgment, one that is out of touch with empirical research” (2010:E184).  They 
argue that Harris’ account of moral judgement overemphasises the role of rational deliberation and 
fails to take into account the vital role played by “intuitive and emotional processes” (ibid.).  Their 
claims are supported not only by experimental research26 but also by the empirical observation that 
individuals frequently make moral judgements without being able to provide reasons to substantiate 
their conclusions.   
 
3.3 Concerns regarding potential harms and risks to society  
3.3.1 Implementation – compulsory or voluntary  
The potential problems regarding the implementation and administration of moral bioenhancement 
address real-world practicalities, and thus, represent the most concrete sphere of the debate.  The 
major issue in this area is the question of how a programme of moral bioenhancement could be 
                                                 
25 What he means here is that in certain contexts, non-pro-social behaviours such as aggression or a lack of empathy 
are often the morally desirable and requisite behaviours.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, Harris and Chan’s 
example of the need for Jasper Schuringa to use aggression and force to overcome the hijackers of flight 253, thereby 
saving the lives of the 290 passengers on board, is one such example (2010:183).  In this case, if Schuringa had 
refrained from aggressive engagement on an individual level, it would have resulted in decidedly negative effects for 
the individuals on board flight 253.  Wasserman gives some other examples such as the requirement that certain 
professionals such as judges, and neurosurgeons, whilst operating, must neutralise their empathy, and, the need for 
ruthlessness, or lack of emotion, in certain highly pressured authoritative positions where decisions taken have major 
repercussions (2014:374).  
26 Research indicates that when individuals who have suffered from ventromedial prefrontal damage, with subsequent 
damage to “socio-emotional processes” (Crockett et al., 2010b:E184, Koenigs et al. 2007) are tested by being presented 
with moral dilemmas, their mechanisms of rationality remain functional whilst the afore-mentioned damage results in 
their displaying defective moral judgment. 
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implemented, thereby ensuring its success.  The main questions here are: should moral 
bioenhancement be voluntary or non-voluntary, and thus universally implemented, and what are 
the problems associated with both?   
 
Persson and Savulescu’s argument for moral bioenhancement is predicated on the fact that the 
problems faced by twenty first century humanity are serious enough to warrant such a drastic 
solution.  In other words, the avoidance of ultimate harm is deemed worthy enough to justify a 
programme of moral bioenhancement.  In their earliest works on the subject, Persson and Savulescu 
argue that “if safe moral enhancements are ever developed, there are strong reasons to believe that 
their use should be obligatory, like education or fluoride in the water, since those who should take 
them are least likely to be inclined to use them.  That is, safe, effective moral enhancement would 
be compulsory” (2008:174).  Their conclusion here is inevitable, given their argument that 
humanity faces a grave risk of ultimate harm which could be perpetrated at the hands of a small 
group of individuals with nefarious intentions.  If malevolent acts with destructive intentions can 
be exacted by such lone individuals or groups, with such catastrophic consequences, then clearly it 
will not do to make moral bioenhancement optional; such individuals would never volunteer to 
undergo such a procedure.  Presumably those who would seek to undergo voluntary morally 
bioenhancement for themselves, or their children, would pose a minimal risk as perpetrators of 
ultimate harm.  Thus, for moral bioenhancement to be an adequate solution to the risk of ultimate 
harm, it is an obvious conclusion that it must be mandatory, despite the unpalatable nature of such 
an enterprise.   
 
Regarding the less immediate harms faced by humanity that are tied up with deficiencies in human 
moral psychology, there is also a strong argument in favour of compulsory moral bioenhancement.  
This is due to the fact that adequately addressing the global problems presented by Persson and 
Savulescu would require extensive, population-level ‘correction’ of these deficiencies.  
Furthermore, it seems unlikely that many would freely opt for moral bioenhancement without clear 
incentives to do so.  This is a point alluded to by Douglas (2013:161) and Bronstein (2010:87).  
However, given the above discussion, whilst it may be evident how Persson and Savulescu come 
to the conclusion that moral bioenhancement would have to be mandatory to achieve its overall 
aims; their argument for compulsory moral bioenhancement represents the most obvious point of 
contention with critics and thus deflects adequate engagement with other important concerns.  This 
could be the reason as to why, in a later publication, they retract the claim for compulsory moral 
bioenhancement.  In their book on the subject, Persson and Savulescu argue that it “is [their] view 
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that some children should be subjected to moral bioenhancement, just as they are now subjected to 
traditional moral education” (2012:113).  This is the sole allusion in the book to the issue of how 
moral bioenhancement could be implemented and appears to be a severe dilution of their earlier 
claim, and thus, seems to be a less efficacious solution to the problems faced by humanity that they 
have outlined.   
 
Some have taken this omission to be evidence that Persson and Savulescu have changed their stance 
regarding the compulsory implementation of moral bioenhancement.  In this regard, Rakić observes 
that “Persson and Savulescu diverge from their earlier position in no longer insisting on making 
moral enhancement compulsory” (2014:247).  However, this omission clearly does not signify a 
change of heart on the part of Persson and Savulescu on the matter.  When questioned regarding 
this seeming change in their position, Persson and Savulescu respond that they do not explicitly 
address the issue of whether or not moral bioenhancement should be compulsory, due to the fact 
that the technology that would enable moral bioenhancement is still in its earliest stages.  Thus, 
they surmise that the issue does not require urgent attention until technological progress, in this 
regard, has been made (Persson & Savulescu, 2014:251).   
 
However, in another article, published the following year, they seem to once again take a firm 
stance regarding the implementation of moral bioenhancement.  Here, Persson and Savulescu 
explicitly argue that they “do not propose that moral bioenhancement should only be applied to 
those who voluntarily choose to undergo it, but that children should undergo it just as they have to 
undergo traditional moral education” (2015:350).  They use an analogy regarding the current way 
in which we treat children for conditions such as attention deficit disorder by administering 
medications such as Ritalin in support of this proposal.  They also provide examples of other 
conditions – such as the use of chemical castration for paedophiles – to argue for the permissibility 
of such a suggestion. This argument is weak, however, because the analogy between treating 
existing pathological conditions and the enhancement of species-typical levels of moral behaviour 
does not hold.  It is also clear from other publications and comments made by Persson and 
Savulescu that their original view regarding compulsory implementation remains.  In a later 
publication, Persson and Savulescu provide some support – at least in certain cases – for their 
earlier view.  They argue that: 
the risk of humans causing ultimate harm if they do not undergo moral bioenhancement might 
not be so great that it is justified to make moral bioenhancement compulsory…However, in 
certain situations, the loss of freedom involved in making moral bioenhancement compulsory 
might be morally justified.  Freedom is only one value and not the sole value; safety is another 
(Persson and Savulescu, 2014:251). 




In a published debate with John Harris, when questioned on the matter of whether or not moral 
bioenhancement should be compulsory, Savulescu responds that whilst it would be far more 
straightforward to introduce the adoption of moral bioenhancement, or any new technology for that 
matter, as voluntary; “if the intervention is very effective and safe, and uncontroversially good, we 
should do it compulsorily” (2015:11).  He adds that this would be akin to the general consensus 
that mandatory education for all children is correct due to the view that education “is clearly good 
for people and good for society” (ibid.).  Later, in the same debate, it is pointed out to Savulescu 
that it seems that for the efficacy of his argument, moral bioenhancement would have to be 
implemented universally.  Savulescu responds to this by arguing that this would be impossible, 
given the size of the world’s population (2015:21).  Rather, the most we could hope for would be 
to “change probabilities” (ibid.) regarding the risk of ultimate harm.   
 
A number of thinkers have also addressed this point.  Harris, in particular, has argued that to achieve 
the aims of prevention of ultimate harm, moral bioenhancement would have to “universal and 
exceptionless” (2016:137).  However, it is most likely that in the same way that it is impossible to 
enforce the universal compliance of vaccinations, so too, would attempts at the universal 
administration of moral bioenhancement be impossible.  Harris posits that this would be the case 
regardless of how easy and safe the process of moral bioenhancement could be made.  Furthermore, 
the analogy is imperfect as vaccinations at least confer “herd immunity” (Harris, 2016:137), 
whereas the same would not be the case with the bioenhancement of morality.  In this regard, Harris 
concludes that, regardless of the ethical problems associated with its aims, moral bioenhancement 
will not succeed (ibid.).   
 
Trivino concurs that universal moral bioenhancement would be impossible due to technical 
constraints (2013:266).  Furthermore, in the absence of universal adherence, we would be faced 
with situations akin to a prisoner’s dilemma where unenhanced individuals could secure advantage 
at the expense of the enhanced (Trivino, 2013:267).  This risk of exploitation would be a possibility 
not only between enhanced and non-enhanced individuals but also between enhanced and 
unenhanced groups or nations depending on the adoption of moral bioenhancement.  Morioka 
concurs with the above thesis of the impossibility of universal implementation and discusses the 
possibility that affluent individuals would be more likely to have the means to avoid compulsory 
moral bioenhancement, and thus, compliance would be overrepresented by less affluent sectors of 
the population (2014:122).  The potential for abuse and exploitation related to the non-universal 
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application of moral bioenhancement is a concern that will be discussed further below in section 
3.4.  
 
Of course, the most obvious concern with universal or compulsory moral bioenhancement is that 
enforcing it would amount to an infringement of individual freedom.  In the moral bioenhancement 
debate there are two realms of potential threat to freedom.  Firstly, freedom of choice or action may 
be lost if individuals are forced to comply with a programme of moral bioenhancement.  Secondly, 
some thinkers argue that freedom, in the sense of moral autonomy, may be compromised or lost on 
a deeper level, even in cases of voluntary moral bioenhancement, due to how moral 
bioenhancement would work.  This latter concern will be addressed in chapters 4 and 5.  Regarding 
the concern for freedom of choice, one can respond in several ways.  Firstly, one may provide a 
utilitarian response and argue that the benefits outweigh the harms, and that therefore, even if 
compulsory moral bioenhancement is enforced, with a resulting loss of freedom of choice, this 
compromise to freedom will be validated by the gains, namely, the improvements to human life in 
general, including the survival of the human species.  This is the response of proponents of moral 
bioenhancement such as Persson and Savulescu.  They firstly point out that human beings possess 
relative power rather than absolute power with regard to their freedom to perform any action 
imaginable.  In this regard, “our power to act of our own free will is [already] a matter of degree” 
(Persson & Savulescu, 2014:251).  We are bound by natural laws, and therefore, there are an infinite 
number of things that we simply cannot do, such as flying unaided, lifting a building from its 
foundations with our own strength or breathing underwater without diving apparatus of some kind.  
Secondly, they argue that even if a compulsory programme of moral bioenhancement is a definitive 
violation of our freedom of choice, it is not a self-evident conclusion that limiting our freedom of 
choice is always an entirely undesirable endeavour (ibid.).  Our freedom of choice, regarding the 
range of possible actions we can perform, is impinged upon not only by natural laws, but also by 
societal laws, and to a certain extent by cultural norms – if the sanctions for their violation are 
sufficiently punitive so as to dissuade us from performing them.  They therefore conclude that 
given a compelling enough justification, compulsory moral bioenhancement could be morally 
defensible.   
 
The second potential response to concerns regarding freedom of choice would be to argue that if 
moral bioenhancement is voluntary then all freedom-related concerns, both freedom of choice and 
moral autonomy, are nullified.  Thirdly, one could argue that even in the case of voluntary moral 
bioenhancement, freedom is at risk in some way.  The risk to freedom that concerns the third 
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response could either be associated with a threat to moral autonomy, mentioned above, or, it could 
be associated with covert threats to freedom of choice produced by a number of other factors.  
Regarding covert threats to freedom of choice, a number of thinkers have discussed how 
incentivising moral bioenhancement could assist in persuading individuals to undergo it.  Rakić 
argues that whilst state enforcement of moral bioenhancement would constitute a clear violation of 
freedom of choice, the state could provide “a variety of incentives in favour of morally enhanced 
citizens: tax reductions, schooling allowances for their children, retirement benefits and affirmative 
action policies that favour them” (2014:249)27.  In other words, various social advantages could be 
used as a supposedly non-freedom subverting mechanism of persuasion.   
 
However, to Rakić’s claim that a lack of coercion implies freedom of choice, Selgelid argues that 
“[f]reely chosen moral enhancement would…not necessarily make moral enhancement compatible 
with freedom” (2014:215).  This is because freedom of choice is more complex than it appears to 
be.  Firstly, there are situations in which an initial freely-made choice can lead to impacts upon 
freedom.  One such example is that of a drug-user who freely opts to utilise drugs, thereby 
becoming addicted and experiencing a loss of freedom to stop his drug use.  As pointed out by 
Selgelid, one would generally not view drug addiction, or any addiction for that matter, as 
indicative of a state of freedom, regardless of whether or not the decision to take drugs was based 
upon an initial freely made choice (2014:215).  This is a matter that will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 5.  There is also a less obvious way in which freedom of choice could be impacted upon.  
In the case of providing incentives for moral bioenhancement, Selgelid points out that the 
persuasive pressure on individuals of not wishing to lose out on such incentives could be regarded 
as coercive.  He posits that “the greater the costs of not doing something, the less free we are to do 
otherwise.  [In the case of incentivising moral bioenhancement], foregone rewards count as costs” 
(Selgelid, 2014:216).   
 
A potential application of moral bioenhancement, that supports the point that Selgelid makes, is 
the possibility of utilising compulsory – or voluntary - moral bioenhancement to ‘treat’ criminals.  
This possibility is receiving growing attention in the literature (Shook, 2012; Selgelid, 2014; 
Douglas, 2014; Curtis, 2012; Wiseman, 2014; Beck, 2015, Caouette, 2015).  If aberrant behaviour 
                                                 
27 Of course, it must be pointed out that if moral bioenhancement is justified on instrumental grounds, such as it being 
a plausible solution to the risk of ultimate harm, then such incentives will still not suffice as a means of encouraging 
universal adherence.  Individuals with nefarious intentions will presumably not be swayed by such incentives and thus 
the threat will remain.  Therefore, the moral justification for a project of moral bioenhancement would have to be 
supplemented by other compelling arguments such as the premise that it aims at enhancing an intrinsic good, of which 
the moral improvement of humanity in general would be one such example.   
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could be linked to an underlying pathology such as anti-social personality disorder, for example, 
then this would, strictly speaking, be a form of treatment rather than enhancement.  Shook suggests 
the use of “restorative moral enhancers” as a possibility for “repeat offender[s]” (2012:10) and 
equates it with the way in which we currently treat individuals suffering from mental illness in 
order to enable them to function as members of society.  He argues that the use of such enhancers 
to raise “conduct to minimally expected levels of civility” (Shook, 2012:10.) would, in all 
likelihood, receive public support.  Shook posits that such a project could be justified on the basis 
of an appeal to a “model of intercultural objectivism” (ibid.).  In other words, the use of moral 
enhancers could not simply be used to enforce specific cultural idiosyncrasies, but could only be 
justified if used to address behaviours and actions deemed universally problematic or pathological.   
 
Selgelid suggests that in certain contexts, compulsory moral bioenhancement could result in “net 
gain[s] of freedom for those coerced” (2014:215).  In the cases of addicts and criminals, their 
freedom is already compromised in some way: the former by the physical nature of their addictions 
and the latter by the fact that their behaviour has a strong likelihood of leading to their being 
apprehended and incarcerated.  In this regard, Selgelid argues that “the freedom enabled by law-
abiding life might thus outweigh the freedom costs of mandatory intervention” (2014:215).  With 
regard to the threat to the freedom of criminals subjected to moral ‘treatment’, Douglas argues that 
“committing a crime might render one morally liable to certain forms of medical intervention” 
(2014:101).  Chemical castration is one such intervention that is commonly practiced in the case 
of individuals found guilty of paedophilia.  In such cases, freedom of choice regarding whether or 
not to undergo such a treatment is upheld, to a certain extent, as the offender must agree – or not – 
to the administration of a “medical corrective” (2014:103) as a requirement of early release or 
parole.  Whilst this appears to better uphold freedom of choice the presence of coercion 
nevertheless remains, for similar reasons raised by Selgelid above.  
 
There is yet another concern regarding the implementation of moral bioenhancement that has been 
explored by Crutchfield.  He argues that moral bioenhancement is at risk of problems related to 
implementation due to “epistemological difficulties” (Crutchfield, 2016:390).  While moral 
bioenhancement could be administered voluntarily or in a compulsory manner, where everyone is 
aware that it is taking place, Crutchfield explores a third possibility and develops an interesting 
argument to illustrate why the efficacy of any moral bioenhancement programme will only be 
ensured if it is implemented uniformly, but without public awareness.  As discussed in the previous 
chapters, there are different targets of moral bioenhancement.  Crutchfield posits that the two most 
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obvious targets of a moral bioenhancement programme would be either the “representational 
mental states” (2016:390) of individuals – with the most likely target being their beliefs – or, their 
“non-representational states” which includes their “affective states…[with the most likely target 
being their] motivations” (Crutchfield, 2016:390).  The former, representational states have 
cognitive content whilst the latter do not.  One could then ‘change’ the moral beliefs of an 
individual by administering, for example, oxytocin, which would then increase her empathy levels, 
thus resulting in her coming to have a belief that one should help those who are less fortunate.  
(Crutchfield, 2016:391).   
 
The problem that Crutchfield foresees, however, is that people would realise that there had been a 
change in their beliefs, as they would remember their previous beliefs.  What’s more, he argues 
that they would realise that the change could be attributed to the administration of oxytocin rather 
than being the product of their own deliberation, which would, he posits, make them less likely to 
act upon these new beliefs.  Crutchfield also foresees an additional problem that could make an 
individual less likely to act upon new beliefs.  If an individual knew that he had been subjected to 
moral bioenhancement, and, in any way, doubted the ethical expertise of those enforcing such a 
programme, this doubt could take the form of “an epistemic virus that infects a person’s moral 
psychology” (Crutchfield, 2016:396).  This lack of trust could then have the result of persuading 
the individual to explicitly resist what he feels compelled to do.  In order to ensure that individuals 
would assimilate and act upon their new beliefs, moral bioenhancement would therefore, 
Crutchfield argues, have to be administered in a covert manner.  As suggested by Persson and 
Savulescu elsewhere, this could be achieved in the same way that fluoride is administered in 
drinking water (2008:174).  Here, Crutchfield is suggesting that people would be more likely to 
assimilate new beliefs as legitimate motives for decision-making if they believe these beliefs have 
originated from their own volitions, even in the absence of a justification that can explain why their 
beliefs have changed.   
 
Selgelid, however, has argued that focusing the debate on whether or not moral bioenhancement 
should be compulsory or voluntary obfuscates the issue to a certain extent in that it implies that we 
are left with one of only two choices (2014:216).  This opposition is difficult to resolve and thus 
leads to a stagnation of the debate.  Rather, it may be helpful if we look at the issue of 
implementation in terms of “degrees of encouragement…[and] degrees of discouragement” (ibid.).  
The degree of encouragement refers to the persuasiveness of the rewards for partaking in moral 
bioenhancement, whereas the degree of discouragement could refer to the persuasiveness of the 
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negative implications associated with not partaking in moral bioenhancement.  For example, there 
could be various reward mechanisms associated with opting to morally bioenhance as opposed to 
a variety of punitive mechanisms associated with not doing so.  Reframing the debate in this way 
would assist in transforming our view of freedom from an absolutist view – either we fully have it 
or we don’t – to perceiving it as something that occurs on a continuum, and, which is thus possessed 
in degrees (Selgelid, 2014:216).  In terms of this conception, Selgelid points out that at the far ends 
of both sides of the spectrum, freedom would risk being compromised.  In other words, both 
strength of encouragement and strength of discouragement are linked to the perception of 
disadvantage of refusal.  Put another way, the more compelling the encouragement to partake in 
moral bioenhancement, and thus, the more individuals feel they will be disadvantaged by missing 
out on incentives through not partaking, the more their freedom will be compromised.  At the other 
end of the spectrum, the more compelling the discouragement of failing to partake in moral 
bioenhancement, and thus, the more individuals feel they will be disadvantaged by punitive 
measures, the more their freedom will be compromised.  Reconceiving the issue of implementation 
in these terms rather than in absolute terms may be useful in moving beyond the deadlock that 
currently characterises the debate.    
 
3.3.2 Administration problems 
In addition to concerns regarding implementation, there are other concerns that pertain to the 
administration of moral bioenhancement.  One such concern, that can be understood as The 
problem of who will guard the guardians, is encapsulated by a collection of related questions that 
would come to the fore if the science of moral bioenhancement became a possibility and the ethical 
concerns associated with it were resolved in favour of embarking upon such an endeavour.  
Questions that must be addressed in this regard are: who will decide what are suitable targets for 
moral bioenhancement; who will oversee this process and how may the project be protected from 
abuse, exploitation or nefarious intentions such as the furthering of moral eugenics agendas or 
behaviour control?  This concern is strongly connected with what Persson and Savulescu describe 
as The bootstrapping problem (2012:2).  This refers to the problem that it is morally deficient, or, 
at least, morally unenhanced human beings, the targets of moral bioenhancement, who must 
oversee the process of moral bioenhancement and ensure that it occurs in an ethical manner 
(Persson & Savulescu, 2012:2-3).  Such concerns have received scant attention in the literature for 
a number of possible reasons.  The moral bioenhancement debate is a relatively new one given that 
the relevant science is still at a rudimentary level.  As a result, most discussions are still focused 
upon the ethical status of moral bioenhancement – namely, whether or not it is morally justifiable 
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– rather than on logistical problems and ethical concerns regarding how it would be administered.  
Due to the fact that most commentators in the debate are opposed to moral bioenhancement, it is 
understandable that less attention has been paid to administrative issues – or in-practice objections 
– than to in-principle objections.  To a certain extent, a discussion of how moral bioenhancement 
would be administered may be seen as premature, as it presupposes that all the scientific and ethical 
concerns would have been resolved, so as to have arrived at a point where practicalities would need 
to be addressed.  Nevertheless, it remains an ethical concern that warrants attention in the literature, 
particularly by the advocates of moral bioenhancement.   
 
Persson and Savulescu provide various arguments in support of mandatory moral bioenhancement 
as an accompaniment to cognitive enhancement (2012:2).  Their concern is that cognitive 
enhancement will enable individuals to acquire more extensive knowledge of dangerous 
technologies that could place humanity at risk for ultimate harm.  All that is required to produce 
such catastrophic harm is the presence of ill-intentions, sufficient motivation to act upon these 
intentions, and, of course, the technological ability to carry these intentions through.  Due to the 
fact that cognitive enhancement would vastly increase the cohort of individuals who possess the 
relevant technological abilities in this regard, Persson and Savulescu argue that “only beings who 
are morally enlightened, and adequately informed about the relevant facts, should be entrusted with 
such formidable technological powers as we now possess” (2012:2).   
 
There are a few thinkers who have discussed the above-mentioned concerns, albeit, in a somewhat 
perfunctory manner.  Murphy has pointed out that Persson and Savulescu, with the above-
mentioned statement, imply that as technological ability increases, so too should positions of power 
be occupied by morally enhanced individuals (2015:375).  However, the bootstrapping problem is 
particularly apparent here, regarding how this could actually happen.  Namely, who, or which 
parties, would ensure that the individuals occupying such positions of authority abided by such a 
requirement?  Beck has reframed the problem of who will guard the guardians by asking the 
question in terms of “who is likely to profit from moral enhancement and has an interest in its 
implementation?” (2015:238).  Beck is, however, asking these questions with a different focus to 
the one I have in mind.  She argues that the practical benefits of moral bioenhancement for 
individuals would have to be explicit enough to warrant undergoing such an intervention.  While 
Persson and Savulescu emphasise the existence of an urgent need for moral bioenhancement, there 
has to be public agreement with them that is sufficiently persuasive.  For the focus of this section, 
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however, Beck’s question would require answering should a programme of moral bioenhancement 
ever become a possibility.   
 
Arnhart has also posed the question of “who would be responsible for setting and enforcing the 
standards for [any] virtues and vices” (2010:80) that are taken as the goals of moral 
bioenhancement.  He argues that the most obvious candidate would be the state.  However, there 
would presumably be little public support for state-driven moral bioenhancement due to previous 
atrocities associated with state-controlled eugenics agendas and general fears of a Huxleyan type 
outcome28.  Another option that Arnhart explores would be to have a variety of possible moral 
bioenhancements available, from which individuals could then choose.  This could include 
permitting parents to choose particular virtues for their children through genetic interventions, a 
possibility that would, of course, elicit a host of ethical concerns that would require resolution29.   
 
In a debate between Savulescu and Harris, the above issue is directly addressed (2015).  In answer 
to the question of who will guard the guardians, Savulescu points out that we are already in a 
situation where we have guardians who have tremendous power.  For example, decisions such as 
which actions are punished and how greatly these punitive measures will impact upon personal 
freedom are legislated and enforced by all democracies through public consent.  In other words, 
the public who elect governments through the process of democracy are the guards of the guardians.  
Therefore, they argue that there is no reason to suppose that this would change with a programme 
of moral bioenhancement (Savulescu, 2015:18).  In addition, parents are given the freedom to 
decide how best to morally educate their offspring and the sum total of these freely made decisions 
bears a large contribution to how the moral standards that characterise a society are produced.  
Furthermore, regarding who will decide upon the nature or targets of moral bioenhancement, 
Savulescu posits that the obvious candidates would be those values and qualities for which there is 
                                                 
28 Here I refer to Aldous Huxley’s dystopic novel Brave New World (1932) in which the world state is led by ten world 
controllers who oversee the administration of the drug Soma that produces an effect of happiness, well-being and 
contentment, thus ensuring population wide acquiescence through keeping problematic emotions at bay.   
29
 A number of thinkers have discussed the issue of moral bioenhancement via genetic selection, a process that would 
entail parents having more control over the genomes of their offspring (Walker, 2009, 2010; Murphy, 2015; Persson 
and Savulescu, 2015a; Faust, 2008, Arnhart, 2010; Blackford, 2010).  At its most rudimentary level, this would entail 
a form of preimplantation genetic diagnosis whereby if it became possible to pinpoint particular genes that are 
associated with pathologies in psychological functioning, such as anti-social personality disorder, then only embryos 
that do not possess such genes would be implanted.  This would not entail enhancement as such, because no changes 
would be made to selected embryos.  At the more advanced stages, moral bioenhancement of embryos would entail 
modifying the genome of embryos to select for morally desirable dispositions.  The ethical implications of parents 
being able to select the dispositions and abilities of their offspring has been discussed at length in the bioenhancement 
literature and is often framed as the ‘designer baby’ debate.  It is, however, beyond the scope of this chapter, and this 
dissertation, to address this vast area of debate.  For the purposes of this dissertation, I will narrow the focus to the 
ethical implications of freely chosen or universal moral bioenhancement for individuals themselves.  
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some form of universal consensus regarding their good.  In particular, he argues that “we should 
aim for an ethic that promotes the values of justice, tolerance, respect for human equality, a sense 
of altruism, and willingness to cooperate and make small self-sacrifices for the benefit of others” 
(Savulescu, 2015:19).  However, Harris responds to this by arguing that values should be 
“constantly revisable” (2015:19).  In other words, whilst these may seem to be uncontroversially 
good values to choose, once they are biologically entrenched, or genetically selected, this puts their 
‘revisablity’ at risk.   
 
If Savulescu is correct, and the best answer to the question of who will decide upon the moral 
standards or values that could inform a project of moral bioenhancement is public agreement, then 
a project of moral bioenhancement would, of course, depend upon whether there are ethical 
standards that are universally recognised.  If there is no consensus regarding the claim that there 
are certain values and standards that are interculturally objective or universal, then agreement 
regarding how moral bioenhancement could proceed would be impossible.  In other words, one 
would have to give more credence to ethical objectivism as opposed to ethical relativism30 to 
believe that moral bioenhancement is feasible.  However, even if one were to subscribe to the 
former view, as Shook points out, there are, of course, competing theories within the ethical 
objectivist camp.  Shook does not view this as signifying that consensus is unattainable, he posits 
that there is the possibility of an “overlapping consensus about some moral matters” (Shook, 
2012:4).  The fact that terms such as “‘morality’ and ‘moral’…[are] meaningful to people, albeit 
in diverse ways” (ibid.) is evidence of this.   
 
Regarding the bootstrapping problem, Sparrow argues that beyond simply identifying that it exists, 
Persson and Savulescu, pay it no further attention (2014a:28).  All they say on the matter is that 
there has to be sufficient desire for moral improvement, which has to translate into ensuring that 
the requisite research is able to take place; and furthermore, if this research comes to fruition, it 
must be administered in an ethical manner (Persson & Savulescu, 2012:124).  The problem arises 
due to the fact that it is morally deficient individuals – humans in general, according to Persson 
and Savulescu – who must guide this entire process.  Whilst they argue that caution is required, 
                                                 
30 Shook has discussed this matter, and, in the context of its use in the moral bioenhancement debate, he defines ethical 
objectivism as the view that “the moral norms to apply should be the justifiably correct moral standards 
regardless of what any culture or individual happens to endorse” (2012:10).  This view is contrasted with ethical 
relativism which posits that there are no universal ethical standards.  Rather, conceptions of the good or bad are relative 
to different cultures or contexts.  
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they also imply that pessimism in this regard should not lead us to a blanket rejection of moral 
bioenhancement.  
 
Sparrow, however, seems unconvinced and voices concerns regarding the risk for potential abuse 
that techniques of moral bioenhancement could introduce.  The main concern that he has with moral 
bioenhancement is that “it implies that those people directing it know what being more moral 
consists in” (Sparrow, 2014a:29), and, in this regard, he views it as guilty of moral elitism.  This is 
inevitable, given the fact that a decision regarding the nature of morality would have to be made in 
order to know what to morally bioenhance, and this would require selecting a particular account of 
morality.  Furthermore, even if this decision was made through democratic procedures and reflected 
majority consensus, it is highly unlikely that there would be uniform consensus; and thus, those 
holding different views would be subject to the view of the majority.  On the other hand, the nature 
of the bootstrapping problem is such that it is more likely that techniques of moral bioenhancement 
would be used by minority regimes, with nefarious agendas, to make populations more pliable 
(Sparrow, 2014b:28).  Avoiding such a concern would require ballasting democracy and the 
presence of international regulation of such technologies which wouldn’t address the former issue.  
This concern will be discussed further below.   
 
3.4 Other possible social effects of moral bioenhancement 
Similarly to the above-mentioned concerns, the concerns in this section, are also speculative in 
character as they are addressing possible practical implications of moral bioenhancement.  
Nevertheless, they warrant investigation in any discussion of the ethical status of moral 
bioenhancement that aims to be thorough.  I will firstly examine the concern regarding distributive 
justice.  This includes two opposing perspectives that are present in the literature.  On the one hand, 
if moral bioenhancement, in terms of making individuals ‘more moral’, is viewed as beneficial, 
how may we ensure equitable access to the advantages that it may secure?  On the other hand, if 
moral bioenhancement is viewed as burdensome, how do we ensure that this burden is not unfairly 
shouldered by the enhanced?  Both perspectives seek to elucidate whether access or adherence to 
moral bioenhancement would exacerbate existing inequalities or create novel ones.   
 
Secondly, I will examine the concern regarding the threat to egalitarianism that moral 
bioenhancement may pose.  Egalitarianism is, of course, a multifarious term.  However, it is 
generally predicated on the view that individuals have equal moral worth; and therefore, that this 
should be reflected in specified contexts.  In its most basic or general sense it refers to the view that 
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individuals should have equality of access to rights, liberties and opportunities, of which political 
equality would be one such right.  As Wilson succinctly points out, in the moral bioenhancement 
literature, the primary conception of egalitarianism is the view that “relations of fundamental 
political equality are good in themselves” (2014:35).  The concern here is that moral 
bioenhancement will undermine this fundamental political equality in some way.  The most likely 
threat seems to be the view that if moral bioenhancement results in some individuals who are of a 
higher moral calibre, then they may have reason to consider themselves more suited to positions as 
political decision-makers than the unenhanced.  Not only would they have a stronger claim to such 
positions, but it would also be in the interests of the unenhanced to grant them this claim.  In this 
way, moral bioenhancement could undermine egalitarianism.   
 
3.4.1 Distributive justice concerns  
A small number of thinkers have commented on the potential implications for distributive justice 
of moral bioenhancement.  Distributive justice concerns are typically associated with 
bioenhancement in general, where the enhancements in question are viewed as beneficial for the 
individuals who undergo them.  Any intervention, positive state of affairs, or ‘good’ that is deemed 
to be advantageous for an individual is generally unanimously desired.  When only certain 
individuals have access to such advantages, then we are faced with a distributive justice issue.  
Distributive justice concerns are, therefore, not specific to enhancement; they pertain to most 
institutional benefits and to resources in general.  Thus, in the case of distributive justice concerns 
regarding bioenhancement, one could regard such concerns as symptomatic of deeper societal and 
global problems that require addressing in an arena that is distinct from that of bioenhancement.  
Nevertheless, it is useful to investigate how these concerns are addressed in the literature due to 
the fact that they may shed further light on moral bioenhancement itself.  In the case of moral 
bioenhancement, the concern for distributive justice is of a unique nature.  
 
As mentioned above, most bioenhancements – providing their safety has been established, and any 
potential ethical concerns have been resolved – would be regarded as unequivocally good for the 
individual receiving them.  Some enhancements are viewed as positional goods in that the 
advantages they secure are dependent upon others not possessing this ability.  Athletic abilities are 
an example of a positional good, because in order to win a race one must be faster than one’s 
competitors.  Tallness, which in particular societies is viewed as physically attractive or 
commanding, is also often discussed as an example of a positional good.  This is because tallness 
is a relative notion; an individual only appears tall in comparison to others who are not as tall.  
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Thus, if the possibility arose of somehow genetically selecting for tall offspring, their ensuing 
tallness would cease to be advantageous if everyone were able to select for this characteristic in 
their offspring.   
 
Some enhancements may be considered to be both positional and non-positional goods.  Cognitive 
enhancement is one such example.  Improving one’s cognition will, on the one hand, confer 
personal, positional advantages in competitive environments.  On the other hand, if cognitive 
improvements are utilised to increase one’s performance in positions that are beneficial to the 
public in some way, then this would be an example of a non-positional good.  For example, if a 
cognitive enhancement enables a scientist to discover a cure for cancer then this enhancement will 
be beneficial for everyone, rather than simply for the scientist who discovers it.  In the case of a 
non-positional good, its goodness is not lessened the more extensively it is shared or held, whereas 
this is the case with positional goods, to a certain extent.  General bioenhancements, such as 
improvements in human physical and mental functioning, are vulnerable to the criticism that 
because they are mostly positional goods that will benefit only the individual, possibly at the 
expense of others, they represent selfish or greedy aspirations.   
 
Most forms of general bioenhancement are therefore subject to distributive justice concerns due to 
the fact that if access to the benefits they confer is impeded in any way then this constitutes an 
injustice.  Moral bioenhancement is, however, clearly not a positional good, and is furthermore 
unique in that the benefits it will confer are primarily public benefits.  As Douglas points out, rather 
than placing others who are not morally enhanced at a disadvantage, the opposite will be the case 
with morally bioenhanced individuals (2008:230).  For some, this is regarded as problematic.  
Bronstein, for example, remarks that the kinds of interventions discussed in the moral 
bioenhancement debate are aimed at securing societal benefits rather than individual benefits 
(2010:85).  Murphy makes a similar point.  However, he posits that whilst it may be true that the 
most obvious benefits associated with moral bioenhancement are public rather than personal, the 
types of enhancements that Persson and Savulescu are suggesting will not be detrimental to 
individuals (Murphy, 2015:271).  It is difficult to see how an enhancement of empathy, for 
example, would lead to “inherent…[or] intrinsic disadvantage” (ibid.) for the individual in 
question.  In other words, an individual would not necessarily incur personal psychological harm 
or be put at a “social disadvantage” (ibid.) by caring more about the welfare of others.   
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This is, however, not to say that there are no potential advantages for the individual that may be 
associated with moral bioenhancement.  An Aristotelian view, for example, equates the acquisition 
of virtues with human flourishing (Aristotle, 2004).  In other words, to lead a ‘good’ life in which 
one flourishes as a human being and achieves a state of eudaimonia31, one must constantly 
‘practise’ being good.  Thus, undergoing moral bioenhancement could be associated with personal 
benefits for the individual if it enables her to lead a happier, more fulfilled life than she otherwise 
would have.  The claim is not that moral bioenhancement would create an artificial happiness, but 
rather, that one is more likely to experience happiness and fulfilment from being morally upright 
than morally deficient.   
 
Focquaert and Schermer have also remarked that moral bioenhancement is viewed as problematic 
for a number of reasons, one of which is that “the advantages of moral enhancement may fall upon 
society rather than on those who are enhanced” (2015a:140).  To the extent that moral 
bioenhancement is able to attenuate behaviours that impact negatively upon society, such as 
criminality, this is true.  However, in such cases, it would be odd to argue that individuals who no 
longer desire to take part in criminal activities are being personally disadvantaged in some way.  
Focquaert and Schermer’s claims are perhaps more relevant in cases where moral bioenhancement 
encourages selfless or supererogatory behaviour.  For example, if an individual’s altruism and sense 
of justice are enhanced, thereby producing distress at the suffering of others, which in turn compels 
him to make personal sacrifices or to take action at his own expense, then this could be a case of 
an enhancement that would be beneficial for others but not for the individual in question.  However, 
if more individuals were sufficiently compelled to take action to secure the welfare of others less 
fortunate than themselves, at acceptable levels, this would be an argument in favour of moral 
bioenhancement as a means of serving the ends of distributive justice.   
 
Casal examines the above concern and argues that if we could establish “an appropriate threshold 
of compliance...to moral norms” (2015:341) and then utilise moral bioenhancement to elevate 
individual behaviour that falls below this threshold, then this could provide a legitimate argument 
for moral bioenhancement as increasing justice.  In other words, behaviour that falls below this 
threshold – which would include criminality, free-riding, or generally selfish behaviours that have 
a negative impact upon society – places an unfair burden on those whose behaviour falls above the 
threshold and is therefore unjust.  However, as Casal observes, regardless of whether or not one 
                                                 
31 This Greek term is not easily translatable.  It is sometimes simplified to signify happiness; however, most argue that 
its meaning is more akin to a state of flourishing or the sense of well-being that comes with fulfilling one’s purpose as 
a human being.   
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views “compliance with morality to be a burden or a benefit” (2015:342), there are justice based 
arguments that can be made from both perspectives.  If one holds the view that one is disadvantaged 
by respecting moral norms, as well as the law in general, if there are others who do not reciprocate, 
then moral bioenhancement could be viewed as a means of addressing this disadvantage or burden 
(ibid.).  If, on the other hand, one sees moral acuity as advantageous and moral deficits or criminal 
tendencies as disadvantageous, then preventing treatment which may correct these deficits could 
be viewed as unjust for those who are morally less than exemplary.   
 
Morioka also looks at the distribution of benefits and burdens regarding moral bioenhancement and 
argues that if mandatory moral bioenhancement were somehow implemented, immoral individuals 
and those with financial and social resources would be more likely to evade it (2014:122).  In this 
way, it is likely that moral bioenhancement could result in two distinct classes of individuals.  
Furthermore, there is a strong possibility that morally bioenhanced individuals would be vulnerable 
to abuse and exploitation at the hands of the unenhanced group.  The nature of the moral 
bioenhancements that are considered by Persson and Savulescu, such as those that increase trust 
and altruism, are such, that this abuse and exploitation may be met with little resistance.   
 
Beauchamp considers the opposite possibility, namely, that moral bioenhancement could 
“exacerbate, rather than diminish existing social prejudices and distributive unfairness” (2015:347) 
due to initially only being available to the affluent.  In the same way that the affluent are able to 
secure the best education and resources for their children, so too, could they ensure that their 
children are not afflicted with “negative dispositions” (Beauchamp, 2015:348).  In this way, those 
who do not have “access to bioenhancement techniques will likely be rendered worse off, relative 
to the more advantaged, than they now are” (ibid.).  Implicit in Beauchamp’s argument here is the 
above-mentioned view that moral acuity equates with leading a flourishing life and can thus be 
seen as beneficial.  If this is correct, then, in the interests of distributive justice, moral 
bioenhancement would have to be available to all.  However, as Beauchamp points out, human 
moral deficiencies, as outlined by Persson and Savulescu, give us cause for concern regarding the 
likelihood of this (ibid.).  Furthermore, it is likely that inequalities in access will be experienced 
not just within nations and amongst individuals, but predominantly between affluent and less 
affluent nations  
 
It is interesting to the note the diversity in responses to the issue of whether the enhancement of 
morality would be regarded as beneficial or burdensome for individuals.  The view that being more 
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moral would place one at a personal disadvantage is highly concerning and is perhaps evidence in 
support of Persson and Savulescu’s claims that human beings in their current state are morally 
deficient.  This view seems to originate in the perception that moral decency, or at least attributes 
such as altruism, fairness and trust, may render one more easily exploitable.  However, this is also 
possibly based on a misconstrual of how moral bioenhancement would work.  As Walker points 
out, it seems to imply that “the virtuous are meek or compliant” (2009:42), a view which is 
unsubstantiated.  To support his claim, Walker discusses various examples of moral heroes, such 
as Gandhi, who sought political transformation through peaceful mechanisms but could never be 
viewed as docile or subservient (2009:43) 
 
3.4.2 Egalitarianism versus moral perfectionism  
The issue of the implications for egalitarianism of moral bioenhancement elicited spirited ethical 
debate in a particular special edition of the American Journal of Bioethics.  This edition presented 
a target article by Sparrow and a number of responses to his claims (Sparrow, 2014; Wiseman, 
2014; Robichaud, 2014; Jotterand, 2014; Lechner, 2014; Ram-Tikten, 2014; Rakić, 2014; 
Marshall, 2014; Wilson, 2014; Persson & Savulescu, 2014b).  This set of articles is useful as most 
of the relevant concerns for egalitarianism are identified and addressed.   
 
Sparrow is not a supporter of moral bioenhancement and expresses scepticism firstly, as to whether 
the project, as envisaged by supporters such as Persson and Savulescu, would actually constitute 
an enhancement of morality and secondly, whether it would succeed in its stated aims (2014:20).  
However, for the purposes of his discussion, he assumes it could be successful and investigates 
what the consequences could be for egalitarianism.  His main focus in this regard is the implications 
for egalitarianism that could arise due to the existence of a “class of citizens [that] might be, as a 
matter of biological constitution, morally better than another class of citizens” (Sparrow, 2014:22).  
Some of Sparrow’s concerns for the impact of moral bioenhancement are connected with the 
problems discussed in the above sections, namely: on whose account of morality will a project of 
moral bioenhancement be based and how could it be implemented.  Furthermore, the question is: 
if the project of moral bioenhancement did result in a class of morally superior individuals, should 
these individuals not have a greater contribution and impact upon public decision making (Sparrow, 
2014:24)?  This could lead to a society similar to Plato’s Republic, in which a special class of 
citizens, the guardians, are granted ruling power based upon their superior intellectual and moral 
abilities (1985).  However, this would only seem to be problematic if access to moral 
bioenhancement was not freely available to all.  If the ability to become morally and intellectually 
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‘superior’, and thus, to be deemed suitable for public office, is freely available then any charge of 
elitism is severely weakened   
 
The above concerns are associated with a successful project of moral bioenhancement; however, 
Sparrow’s deeper concerns are directed towards another possible outcome: its failure (2014:26).  
Firstly, moral bioenhancement could fail in a way that its failure is obvious.  Secondly, and of more 
concern, it could fail without us realising.  In other words, we could erroneously think it had been 
successful.  Regarding the second concern, as mentioned above, if there was a means of identifying 
whether or not moral bioenhancement had been successful this could lead to the biological 
categorisation of human beings into two groups with the successfully morally enhanced occupying 
positions associated with greater political privileges.  There are good consequentialist arguments 
as to why this would be beneficial, all things considered.  However, if the project failed in some 
way and its failure was not established, this could lead to the mistaken conferral of political 
privileges with potentially negative consequences.  Furthermore, a scenario that Sparrow considers 
to be of far more concern, is the possibility of a small group of elites acquiring political power, 
with the support of the majority, on the basis of their purported successful moral enhancement, 
when in actual fact they are fully aware of the failure of their enhancement.  In this regard, it could 
be an additional means of facilitating the illegitimate authority and tyranny of a small group.   
 
Sparrow concludes his discussion by pointing out that while much of the moral bioenhancement 
debate is purely speculative and philosophical at this point; it may have serious practical 
implications (Sparrow, 2014:26).  The most problematic outcome is that the continued debate 
concerning the possibility of biologically manipulating our morality could serve as a means of 
disseminating the notion that “some people…[are] naturally better people than others” (Sparrow, 
2014:27).  As mentioned in section 2.4.2, implicit in such a view, Sparrow argues, is the belief that 
whether one is moral or immoral, is a product of one’s biology and therefore that then there is very 
little that can be done in this regard: “those who are immoral are incorrigibly so, while those who 
are most moral are good by nature” (ibid.) 
 
Sparrow’s concerns have elicited a number of responses.  Persson and Savulescu point out that 
moral bioenhancement can be presented as either “a confident…[or] cautious proposal” (2014:39).  
They argue that most of the concerns raised by Sparrow are associated with the former type of 
proposal, whereas they posit that their argument should be viewed as an example of the latter.  
Their argument for moral bioenhancement asserts that it is a possible solution to the problems they 
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outline, that cognisance of risks and safety is paramount, but that it nevertheless merits further 
research.  To Sparrow’s claim that moral bioenhancement supports an agenda of “moral 
perfectionism” (2014:40), by virtue of the fact that it picks a particular account of morality, despite 
the presence of different interpretations of the good, Persson and Savulescu, once again, argue that 
we already do this when we educate our children morally through traditional mechanisms.  They 
point out that their suggested potential targets for moral bioenhancement – the moral dispositions 
of reciprocity, or a sense of fairness, and compassion – are already viewed as uncontroversial goals 
of traditional moral education.  Furthermore, their desire to target these dispositions as a means of 
addressing “free riding and criminal behaviour” (Persson and Savulescu, 2014:40) is a goal shared 
by most societies.  Thus, they argue that if Sparrow is to argue that moral bioenhancement is 
problematic, due to the fact that it presupposes a specific interpretation of moral goodness, then he 
must explain why it does this to a greater degree than traditional mechanisms of moral enhancement  
 
To Sparrow’s concern that moral bioenhancement could lead to two morally differentiated classes 
of human beings, Persson and Savulescu point out that it is already the case that there are clear 
differences between individuals regarding their moral behaviour (2014:41).  Other thinkers have 
also emphasised this point (Marshall, 2014; Jotterand, 2014; Robichaud, 2014).  However, this has 
not led to the formation of distinct classes based upon the moral predilections of individuals.  In 
fact, as they argue, the biological components of human abilities are, in general, characterised by 
great inequalities regarding how they are distributed.  Therefore, a clear argument could be made 
that moral bioenhancement, and bioenhancement in general, would reduce inequalities rather than 
exacerbate them.  In this regard, it could be viewed as supportive of egalitarianism.   
 
Marshall also addresses this concern (2014).  She separates Sparrow’s claims and addresses each 
one in turn.  Sparrow argues that society is characterised by a diversity of moral responses; there 
are some individuals who are clearly more moral than others.  He posits further that it is unlikely 
that moral bioenhancement would produce the same effects for all individuals.  In the same way 
that individuals react differently to the same medications or medical procedures, moral 
bioenhancement could further boost those who are already morally praiseworthy and possibly have 
minimal effects on less moral individuals.  If political privileges are then awarded on the basis of 
optimal morality, then this could be unfair as the more moral will then secure further benefits at 
the expense of the lesser moral.   
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In response to this set of claims, Marshall argues that it is “plausible but not inevitable” (2014:29) 
that moral bioenhancement would further boost existing moral preclusions further.  However, 
similarly to Persson and Savulescu, she posits that it is equally as likely that it could produce the 
opposite effect.  It could give rise to the most acute improvements in the morality of those whose 
moral attributes are weaker, thereby raising average levels of morality and lessening the gap that 
concerns Sparrow (Marshall, 2014:29).  Sparrow’s concerns regarding negative outcomes are, of 
course, speculative claims that would have to be settled by empirical means.  Furthermore, as 
Marshall points out, even if Sparrow’s concern were to be realised, it is still not evident that ‘more 
moral’ individuals would be the only ones to enjoy the ensuing advantages (ibid.).  Presumably the 
benefits reaped by morally competent individuals who possess the political power to successfully 
address the problems that concern Savulescu and Persson would be enjoyed by all, regardless of 
political office.  The only personal benefit exclusive to those who would be part of the political 
process would be “some small benefit that comes from enjoying being part of the collaborative 
process itself” (Marshall, 2014:29).  However, regarding Sparrow’s general concern pertaining to 
the development of two separate moral classes of individuals, Marshall argues that this could 
produce unanticipated “social and political problems” (2014:30) and therefore we should pay 
adequate attention not only to the purported advantages that moral bioenhancement may produce, 
but also to the potential problems that may ensue.  
 
Regarding the above potential threat to egalitarianism posed by a class of distinctly morally 
enhanced individuals who could then be regarded as potentially more deserving of certain political 
privileges, Robichaud argues that Sparrow’s concern in this regard is misdirected (2014:33).  He 
argues that even if we grant to Sparrow the possibility that this could occur, the danger for 
egalitarianism would be posed not by moral bioenhancement itself, but rather, by “the ability 
reliably to pick out agents who are more sensitive and reactive to moral reasons” (Robichaud, 
2014:33).  Robichaud argues that Sparrow mistakenly attributes this ability to moral 
bioenhancement.  In democratic societies, it is generally viewed as preferable, to vote into office – 
thereby conferring certain benefits and powers – individuals who are perceived to possess moral 
integrity.  This is based upon the view that such individuals are believed to be more likely to act in 
the best interests of the public than individuals of dubious moral integrity.  Of course, there are 
other capabilities that are also regarded as paramount, such as possessing the requisite knowledge, 
training and competency for such positions.  In general, decisions regarding the moral integrity of 
potential candidates for office are made through various inferences and calculations, personal 
interpretations of behaviour and various other forms of evidence, such as how candidates are 
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presented in the media, and so forth.  Robichaud’s argument implies that it is the validity of this 
process of decision-making, and the information that supports or thwarts it, that produces the threat 
to egalitarianism that concerns Robichaud.  If certain fields of research, such as neuroscience for 
example, were able to provide us with more sophisticated, and, most importantly, more reliable 
means of accurately discerning between the moral integrity of individuals, then it would be more 
appropriate to question the threat posed to egalitarianism by this mechanism than by the actual 
process that increases moral integrity (Robichaud, 2014:34). 
 
Wilson takes a different approach to Sparrow’s concern for egalitarianism.  He points out that if 
moral bioenhancement were truly successful, these fears would be unfounded (Wilson, 2014).  The 
specific fear that he is referring to here is that the morally enhanced – due to their possessing greater 
moral competence – would desire to exclude the non-enhanced from public decision-making 
arenas.  However, if a project of moral bioenhancement included improving capacities of fairness 
or sense of justice and altruism, as envisaged by Persson and Savulescu, it is difficult to imagine 
that this would be so.  The desire to exclude others from such areas is more likely to be evident in 
individuals seeking to further their own interests and power – in other words in the morally 
unenhanced – than in those who have been morally enhanced.  More specifically, as Wilson points 
out, “we can expect the morally enhanced to possess a particular motivational set that is 
incompatible with harmful exclusion” (2014:35).  Furthermore, if, as Sparrow argues, “the aim of 
democratic decision-making is to increase the probability of reaching the right answer” (2014:25), 
then it is not clear that morally enhanced individuals would have a justified monopoly in this regard.  
Such decision making would require moral as well as cognitive components and while morally 
enhanced individuals would possess the former, without having received cognitive enhancement 
they would be no more likely to arrive at “the right answer” than a morally unenhanced individual.  
Wilson posits that “competence in leadership and moral competence are two different things” 
(2014:36)32 
 
A slightly different problem raised by Sparrow, that was mentioned above, is that moral 
bioenhancement discussions tend to reinforce the idea that goodness and badness are inherent to 
individuals, and thus, that there is very little one can do to change this (2014:27).  A number of 
thinkers have responded to this claim.  Firstly, Persson and Savulescu respond to this by arguing 
that they have never claimed, as Sparrow implies, that morality is entirely biologically determined.  
                                                 
32 This then introduces the question of how effective moral bioenhancement would be in the absence of cognitive 
enhancement.   
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Rather, their argument, based upon research conducted on identical twins, is that the split between 
biological and environmental influences is roughly even (Persson and Savulescu, 2014:42).   
 
Robichaud also responds to this claim.  He argues that when making an assessment regarding the 
moral character of an individual, we generally take a number of factors into consideration.  Such 
assessments are not only informed by our perception of their moral attributes and behaviour but 
also by the amount of effort they display in this regard and other important contextual factors such 
as their “personal history, or social roles” (Robichaud, 2014:34).  Robichaud provides some 
examples here.  Let us imagine an individual who is in prison, and appears to have suboptimal 
moral attributes or functioning.  If this individual were to then come to the realisation that he has 
moral deficiencies and desires to address this; and then, through great effort, is able to change his 
behaviour, this would be regarded as morally virtuous.  In addition, we regularly make concessions 
for those individuals whose moral development has been thwarted by factors in their personal 
histories.  In such situations, we understand that certain undesirable patterns of behaviour are a 
product of the life experiences of the individual in question, rather than viewing them as indicative 
of inherent ‘badness’.  This indicates that there is an awareness of the: 
distance [that] exists between an agent’s neurochemical and genetic endowment…[and that] 
there is no necessary conceptual link between the claim that moral capacities are biologically 
based and the highly dubious and elitist claim that the quality of an agent’s character rests 
solely on her (enhanced or not) biological constitution” (Robichaud, 2014:34).  
 
Sparrow does not explicitly state this, but perhaps the tacit concern is that if the impression is given 
that individuals are ‘naturally’ good or bad, this could then support an interpretation that the more 
moral amongst us are, in some way, more valuable, or possess greater moral worth.  Therefore, 
enhancement, whether voluntary or not, could lead to a class of individuals who are considered to 
be of a higher “moral status”, more valuable or worthy by way of their enhancement, than those 
who have chosen to remain unenhanced.  This would then have implications for Sparrow’s concern 
regarding the development of two distinct moral classes of individuals, if classes came to be viewed 
not only as distinct in kind, but also distinct in terms of their moral status or worth.  In response to 
this, Jotterand argues that it does not follow from the fact that an individual acts in a more morally 
worthy manner, that he or she then has more moral worth than an individual who is less morally 
praiseworthy (2014:2).  He argues that Sparrow commits a category error in his confusing 
“difference in kind (moral status)…[with] difference in degree (moral behaviour)” (Jotterand, 
2014:2).  We are already faced with a reality in which there is great diversity in the distribution of 
moral attributes; some individuals are clearly morally ‘better’ than others.  However, this has not 
led us to utilise this state of affairs as a means of supporting a more extensive set of rights or 
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benefits for such individuals.  Individuals are generally viewed as possessing equal moral worth on 
the basis of the intrinsic value associated with having personhood.  It seems uncontroversial to state 
that – over and above the specific attributes and capacities viewed as appropriate and desirable to 
specific contexts – most individuals would prefer their personal interactions to be with individuals 
who are honest, compassionate and fair.  However, it would be absurd to generalise from the basis 
that because it is more pleasant to be in the company of such individuals, they are therefore of a 
higher status or possess more intrinsic worth as human beings.   
 
Many of the responses to Sparrow’s concerns regarding the threat to egalitarianism argue that most 
of his concerns pertain primarily to compulsory moral bioenhancement.  As discussed in section 
3.3.1, most thinkers in the debate seem to hold the view that compulsory moral bioenhancement 
would be morally abhorrent.  Thus, in terms of Sparrow’s concern that moral bioenhancement 
would lead to a state-driven ethos of “controversial moral perfectionism” (2014:20), Rakić 
responds by pointing out that this would be circumvented if moral bioenhancement were voluntary 
(2014:37).  If the decision of whether or not to morally bioenhance oneself is autonomously made 
by the individual, then the state cannot be charged with furthering such an agenda.   
 
Ram-Tikten also responds to Sparrow’s concern that in deciding upon what moral qualities would 
be targets of moral bioenhancement, the state, or whoever is part of this decision-making process, 
would be guilty of a form of “moral perfectionism” (2014:27) which would be at odds with the 
recognition of moral pluralism and egalitarian principles in general.  However, Ram-Tikten argues 
that it is not “mere pluralism but reasonable pluralism” (2014:43), as espoused by Rawls, that could 
be our guide in this decision-making process.  When deciding upon which values should inform 
the legislation of a society characterised by diverse views regarding the nature of ‘the good’, it is 
not the case that simply because a specific moral conviction or perspective exists, it therefore merits 
consideration.  Rather, it is only “reasonable” opinions, or those that can be mutually agreed upon 
by a group characterised by different and possibly competing moral beliefs, that are considered.  In 
other words, we could adapt Rawlsian political ideals for use in the moral sphere by only 
considering the moral attributes for which there is “overlapping consensus” (Ram-Tikten, 2014:43) 
as suitable candidates for moral bioenhancement.  In this way, Sparrow’s egalitarian concerns could 
be allayed.  Brooks also explores the way in which reasonable pluralism could be helpful in 
identifying the targets of moral bioenhancement.  He argues that only if moral bioenhancement 
alters behaviour in such a way that individuals are less likely to be able to consider the arguments 
for various reasonable doctrines will it pose a threat to egalitarianism (Brooks, 2012:29).  




3.5 Concluding remarks  
In this chapter, I have addressed the most prevalent in-practice objections to moral bioenhancement 
that appear in the literature.  In-practice objections engage with the potential real-world risks, harms 
and benefits of moral bioenhancement, and are therefore, invariably consequentialist in nature.  In 
the moral bioenhancement literature, such objections are typically provided in response to 
arguments given in support of moral bioenhancement and aim to show why the purported benefits 
will either not be realised or, more specifically, why moral bioenhancement will result in individual 
or general harms with practical implications.  Furthermore, in-practice objections are either 
directed towards potential harms that may occur at an individual level, or, at societal level.  The 
two areas of concern are entirely different in substance.  At the individual level, risks are more 
concerned with potential physiological harms, whereas at the societal level, potential harm would 
be socio-political in nature.   
  
Thus, the concern for risks and potential harms that could affect individuals is primarily an issue 
that would have to be resolved through scientific research, as no biomedical intervention would 
receive approval if it were not known to be safe.  This would be even more true regarding the 
bioenhancement of ‘normal’ moral functioning.  Whilst the safety and risk concerns for individuals 
of such interventions are inconclusive, the matter remains relatively ethically simple at this point, 
as the avoidance of harm is a cornerstone of biomedical ethics.  In other words, safety concerns 
should be primary, and until it could be established that proposed interventions, as they develop 
and become possible, are safe for individuals, moral bioenhancement should be a matter of 
theoretical discussion only.  Whilst addressing this concern is predominantly a scientific matter, 
ethicists will play a continuing role in elucidating why moral bioenhancement does or doesn’t 
warrant the requisite research.   
 
As mentioned above, the concern regarding potential harms and risks that could occur at societal 
or global level is of an entirely different nature, and therefore, there is much that the field of ethics 
can contribute here.  In terms of the issue of how moral bioenhancement could be implemented, 
the matter seems irresolvable.  To achieve what Persson and Savulescu demand of it – among other 
things, the aversion of ultimate harm – moral bioenhancement would have to be administered 
universally and possibly covertly.  However, universal implementation would clearly be both 
practically impossible and ethically impermissible.  Administering moral bioenhancement on a 
voluntary basis would avoid many of these problems but would be ineffectual in achieving 
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significant benefits.  What the discussion of implementation illustrates, therefore, is that what is at 
stake are two freedoms: freedom of choice or action and the deeper freedom that is interpreted as 
moral autonomy.  Violating freedom of choice would be impermissible, thus, the focus then turns 
to whether voluntary moral bioenhancement would violate moral autonomy.   
 
The primary problem regarding the administration of moral bioenhancement would be related to 
resolving the problem of moral content in a way that respects moral pluralism and protects the 
public from any ill-intentions of those who would implement and oversee this process.  Regarding 
the latter problem, this concern bears similarity to the trust we are currently required to place in 
leaders in the political arena who make decisions with far-reaching impacts upon our lives.  
Through the process of democracy, we elect the leaders who we believe will best serve and protect 
the public interest.  In the case of the administration of moral bioenhancement there is no reason 
we would, and should not, continue to utilise the process of democracy.  Concerning the problem 
of moral pluralism, the fact that there is already an overlapping consensus regarding what it means 
to morally educate our children in a desirable manner, is evidence that this problem may be 
overstated.  Furthermore, I would argue that the moral dispositions of reciprocity, or a sense of 
fairness, and empathy for others, that have been selected by Persson and Savulescu as targets for 
moral bioenhancement come close to enjoying universal respect as morally exemplary qualities.  
Thus, it is not self-evident, as some thinkers claim, that moral bioenhancement is implicated in a 
form of moral elitism where the views of a minority regarding ‘the good’, will be foisted upon an 
unwilling and beleaguered majority.   
 
Moral bioenhancement is unique in comparison with other forms of bioenhancement of human 
abilities as it would confer predominantly societal or group benefits, rather than individual benefits.  
Thus, while there is merit in the concern that those who are morally bioenhanced could be 
vulnerable to the unenhanced who could seek to exploit them, I would argue that this concern is 
overstated.  This is because it implies that being moral makes one compliant, possibly naïve, and 
thus, easily exploitable; a view that isn’t substantiated by empirical evidence.  In other words, this 
concern seems to disregard the fact that moral bioenhancement would aim to bring individuals up 
to the levels of those who are regarded as moral exemplars within society, and not to a radical, 
never-before-witnessed level.  Thus, to resolve this concern, we simply need to examine whether 
those that we regard as moral exemplars have been historically more vulnerable to exploitation.   
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Conversely, I would argue that the concern that the morally bioenhanced would demand greater 
political privileges at the expense of the unenhanced is misguided as it is founded upon a belief 
that morally bioenhanced individuals would desire to act in a harmful manner by excluding the 
enhanced which is incongruent with the aims of successful moral bioenhancement.  If such a case 
arose, it would imply that moral bioenhancement had failed.  Finally, an argument that requires 
more attention is the claim that if it could be shown that there are distinct personal advantages 
associated with possessing moral virtue, then withholding it from those who would wish to use it 
could be regarded as an injustice.   
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Chapter 4a – In-principle objections to moral bioenhancement: the concern for 
personal identity 
 
4.1 Introduction and overview of chapter  
As discussed in chapter 3, objections against moral bioenhancement can be made not only on the 
grounds that it has the potential to produce negative practical consequences – in other words that it 
is wrong in practice – but also on the grounds that it is morally objectionable in principle.  The two 
types of objections are disparate to a certain extent, as something may be permissible in principle, 
or in theory, but not in practice; and vice versa33.  As mentioned in chapter 3, in-practice objections 
generally deal with purported risks, benefits and harms, and are therefore primarily consequentialist 
in nature.  In the case of moral bioenhancement, due to the fact that many of the proposed 
interventions are not yet possible, such objections rely largely on extrapolation from similar 
interventions or events, and are thus, predominantly speculative.  Despite their speculative nature, 
however, their explication can be greatly assisted by drawing upon relevant empirical information 
where it is available.  For example, physiological safety concerns regarding moral bioenhancement 
require input from scientific or medical fields in which similar procedures and interventions have 
been used for therapeutic purposes and may thus provide valuable information regarding the likely 
outcomes of such interventions when used for enhancement purposes.  Political or social concerns 
regarding the potential impact of moral bioenhancement on a practical level could be investigated 
by drawing upon insights from a wide variety of disciplines within the social sciences.  Explicating 
the status of in-principle objections, on the other hand, requires a different approach.   
 
Due to the fact that in-principle objections are primarily philosophical in nature, their explication 
requires the tools of philosophy, namely, critical analysis, as well as rational deliberation and 
                                                 
33 Uncontroversial examples of such situations are not easy to provide, as certain practices that would be regarded as 
permissible in principle by some, would be viewed as impermissible by others.  Thus, these distinctions rely upon 
interpretation to a large extent.  These difficulties aside, an example of an activity or practice that could be regarded as 
wrong in principle but permissible in practice would be torture.  I can be opposed to torture, in principle, because I 
believe it to be intrinsically wrong to do such a thing to another human being, but condone it in practice.  For example, 
in a situation in which an individual who has hidden a bomb – that will detonate imminently, resulting in widespread 
loss of life – refuses to reveal the whereabouts of the bomb, I may support the use of torture to force him to reveal the 
whereabouts of the bomb.  Examples of situations in which something is permissible in principle but wrong in practice 
are easier to provide.  War situations, in particular, provide such examples.  In principle, if one is in the military and 
in a situation of combat, or war, it is generally viewed as permissible to kill one’s opponents.  This is particularly the 
case in situations of self-defence.  While this may be permissible in principle, killing someone in practice could be a 
very different matter.  A combatant could possess all the relevant facts such as the permissibility of killing in war, but 
the practical act of taking another life could be impossible for him.  Another, more straightforward example, of the 
above would be a medical procedure that is ethically uncontroversial, but is impermissible in practice due to the 
magnitude of the risks involved.   
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argumentation.  In the context of moral bioenhancement, opposing in-principle arguments 
generally claim that moral bioenhancement is intrinsically wrong, despite any positive outcomes it 
may produce.  In other words, for various reasons, it is argued to be wrong, in and of itself.  As in-
principle objections to moral bioenhancement engage with notions of intrinsic or absolute 
wrongness, they are generally extremely difficult to reconcile with the kinds of – generally 
consequentialist – arguments provided in support of moral bioenhancement, such as Persson and 
Savulescu’s argument.  However, this impasse is characteristic of the gulf between consequentialist 
and non-consequentialist moral theories in general, and in particular, between the former and moral 
realism, and is therefore not specific to moral bioenhancement34.   
 
There is, however, some overlap between in-principle objections and in-practice objections.  This 
is because whilst an in-principle objection may be predicated upon the claim that a proposed 
endeavour or intervention is wrong regardless of any positive effects it may produce, it is very 
seldom the case that this purported wrongness is not also connected to some real-world impact that 
the endeavour or intervention may produce.  In this regard, other disciplines, such as the sciences, 
may be of assistance in clarifying in-principle objections.  This is especially true of the most 
pervasive in-principle objection found in the literature, namely, the concern that moral 
bioenhancement will impact upon human moral autonomy and will therefore impair or eradicate 
morality itself.  John Harris, and a number of other thinkers, are of the view that morality, and more 
specifically our moral autonomy or agency, is of absolute value; therefore, any interventions that 
threaten this, regardless of the benefits involved, are impermissible.  His argument is, of course, 
informed by his view of what constitutes moral autonomy, and in this regard, such an objection 
may be explicated with information from empirical fields such as neuroscience and moral 
psychology in which the physiological and psychological underpinnings of such phenomena have 
been studied.  This concern would be an example of the way in which empirical information would 
be of assistance in supporting or dispelling some of the assumptions that are being made by 
supporters and opponents of moral bioenhancement regarding in-principle objections.   
 
This chapter is divided into two sections, with both addressing in-principle objections to moral 
bioenhancement that have appeared in the literature.  In the first part, I will discuss one of the more 
neglected areas of the debate; the concern that moral bioenhancement may impact upon personal 
identity.  The sense in which personal identity is interpreted in the context of the moral 
                                                 
34 Moral realism is a meta-ethical perspective that argues that moral facts have objective, and thus, independent truth.  
A moral realist would argue that acts that are right or wrong, are right or wrong in a universal or absolute sense; that 
is, their rightness or wrongness is independent of any contextual facts or outcomes that they may produce.   
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bioenhancement debate will, or course, be discussed throughout this chapter as well as in chapter 
5.  It is important, however, to point out, at the outset of this chapter, that in the moral 
bioenhancement debate, personal identity is not being interpreted in a metaphysical sense35.  
Rather, the sense in which it is being interpreted here, is more qualitative or phenomenological in 
nature.  What is at stake in the moral bioenhancement debate, in terms of the concern for personal 
identity, is captured by concern for what I take to be unique to myself; my sense of selfhood.  This 
would refer to the nature of the structural relationship between my thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, 
desires and preferences that make me recognisable to myself, and to others, as a specific character 
or personality.  In other words, my particularity.  One may concede that there is a first-person 
experience of some core of the self that endures and is recognisable through time without being 
required to make further concessions, of a metaphysical nature, regarding the nature of this self.   
 
In the second part of this chapter, I will then investigate the most pervasive in-principle objection 
to moral bioenhancement, the argument that moral bioenhancement will compromise moral 
autonomy, or agency, and thus, morality in general.  I have kept these two objections in the same 
chapter, rather than presenting them in separate chapters, as I will argue in chapter 5 that the two 
concerns are related.  If by personal identity, what is meant is our sense of selfhood or self-
conception – those characteristics of the self that we believe constitute who we are, and, most 
importantly, that we identify positively with – then major unanticipated impacts produced by moral 
bioenhancement in this regard, could be viewed as compromising our autonomy, where the latter 
is understood as our sense of self-determination and authenticity.  Of course, whether this would 
be the case would depend upon how attached we are to the self we perceive ourselves to be.  
Individuals are inured to constant changes to what they would regard as their self-conception.  
Generally, this is accepted as an aspect of life that is unavoidable, and perhaps even rewarding for 
some individuals.  What I take to be morally salient regarding the concern for personal identity is 
the intensity and source of such changes, as well as the attitude of the individual in question towards 
such changes.  Major, rapid or unwanted identity changes that arise due to biomedical interventions 
and those changes that produce a sense of inauthenticity regarding one’s selfhood would be the 
kind of identity impact that would warrant caution.   
 
                                                 
35 In this regard, a further caveat is necessary.  I am, of course, aware that in terms of certain philosophical debates, 
identity is a highly contested notion that is interpreted in a variety of different ways.  There is, for example, a rich 
history of debate regarding the nature of identity within the philosophy of mind.  In addition, identity is also a notion 
that lends itself to utilisation in the service of a variety of aims and agendas, some of which are political or ideological 
in nature.  While I take note of this, I will not be engaging with identity in these above-mentioned terms.   
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Of course, whether or not one regards moral bioenhancement as posing a risk to personal identity 
will depend largely on the conception of identity that one holds.  Throughout section 4.2 I will 
therefore investigate a variety of interpretations of identity that have been discussed in the 
literature.  The discussion will be informed by insights from the fields of neuroscience and 
psychopharmacology.  In particular, the discussion will include examples of impacts on personal 
identity produced by therapeutic interventions utilised in these fields.  Discussion in this regard is 
useful because some of these interventions have been proposed as mechanisms of moral 
bioenhancement in the literature.   
 
In section 4.2.1 I will discuss an initial distinction made by Douglas in his seminal article on moral 
bioenhancement.  Douglas explores possible objections to moral bioenhancement on the grounds 
that it could impact personal identity.  However, he avoids providing an account of which 
conception of identity would be vulnerable to moral bioenhancement, opting to rather approach the 
matter by distinguishing between strong and weak changes to personal identity.  He posits that only 
the former would pose unacceptable ethical challenges to moral bioenhancement.   
 
The distinctions between different conceptions of identity that have been explored by both Parfit 
and DeGrazia, deemed relevant to the issue at hand, will be discussed in section 4.2.2.  In sections 
4.2.3 and 4.2.4 I will then address specific concerns regarding the impact that moral 
bioenhancement may have on personal identity that have appeared in the literature.  These concerns 
include: the threat to self-conception, the inauthenticity of any potential identity changes, the threat 
to ‘inviolable core characteristics’ and the threat to moral identity.  In section 4.2.5 I will then 
discuss an important distinction made by Focquaert and Schermer that also has relevance for the 
concern for moral autonomy.  Focquaert and Schermer argue that interventions that are passive, 
such as deep brain stimulation (DBS) – which has been suggested as a possible mechanism of moral 
bioenhancement – pose more of a risk to personal identity than those that are active, such as 
traditional moral education.  In particular, they argue that such interventions would be particularly 
problematic if they resulted in hidden changes to personal identity.  This matter has particular 
relevance for the concern for moral autonomy and will therefore be discussed in detail.  In section 
4.2.6 I will then conclude with further discussion of DBS, in order to investigate how such an 
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4.2 The concern for personal identity  
The quest to pinpoint what qualities, capacities or components constitute personal identity is an 
ongoing and vast subfield within philosophy, with relatively scant consensus having been achieved.  
There are a variety of competing contenders and interpretations and this is reflected in the limited 
discussions of personal identity within the moral bioenhancement literature36.  In general, 
throughout their lives, individuals are subject to events that impact upon, and, to a certain extent, 
alter their identity.  This may occur rather rapidly, due to a traumatic event, or over a protracted 
length of time where an individual perceives herself to have become a different person to who she 
once was.  However, despite ‘feeling’ different, there is nevertheless a continuation of something 
that is sufficient for her to know that she is the same person, and for others to similarly identify her 
as the same person.  Even in cases where a major or instantaneous transformation of personality 
has taken place, it is very seldom the case that one would posit that this has produced an entirely 
different person.  Generally, it is only in cases of neurological damage or disease that this occurs 
and even then, the notion of ‘entirely different’ may be used in a metaphorical manner.   
 
Despite there being little consensus regarding what, precisely, constitutes identity, there seems to 
be agreement that one’s personal identity is inextricably linked with who one is – one’s selfhood – 
and in this regard, it seems to have intrinsic personal value.  In other words, if one’s personal 
identity is conceived as one’s selfhood, individuals would generally have a decided personal 
interest in the continuation, and protection, of their identity from external, unwanted changes.  
Thus, an intervention that fundamentally alters an individual’s identity, in a way that is 
unanticipated, could be an affront on their selfhood.  By this, I am not arguing that individuals do 
not have aspects of their personal identities that are negative, nor that many individuals do not 
desire to change such problematic aspects.  I am also not claiming that identities are, or should be, 
fixed or enduring in nature.  If I happen to problematise my levels of empathy, for example, and 
opt to undergo an intervention in order to increase these levels, this may produce changes to my 
personal identity.  I may come to perceive myself as a caring person for whom the welfare of others 
is of fundamental importance and this may produce changes in my conduct which in turn affect my 
self-conception.  Furthermore, I would presumably welcome these changes as my having 
undergone such an intervention would have been motivated by a desire for such a change.   
 
                                                 
36 In their comprehensive literature review, Specker et al identify the potential threat to personal identity as one of the 
neglected areas in the moral bioenhancement literature that warrants further attention (2014:14).  
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The concern for personal identity, however, is not directed at cases such as this that produce 
expected, and thus, positive results.  Rather, in the context of moral bioenhancement, the concern 
is that the interventions utilised to morally bioenhance may produce unforeseen effects on personal 
identity, in the sense of negatively impacting upon “self-understanding, well-being, and social and 
familial relationships” (Specker et al., 2014:14).  In cases of the treatment of a debilitating 
neurological or psychological condition where an individual is subject to suffering, the moral 
justification for such procedures and their potential side effects is a more straightforward matter.  
Any negative side-effects of such procedures, such as the potential impact upon personal identity, 
would have to be balanced against the benefits associated with the alleviation of suffering that they 
produce.  However, when these procedures are proposed as a means of improving, rather than 
‘correcting’, psychological functioning, or in the case of moral bioenhancement, improving moral 
functioning, the matter becomes more ethically complex.   
 
Threats to personal identity are a prevalent focus in the area of neuroethics, and, more specifically, 
they feature in discussions related to the fields of psychopharmacology and neuroscience.  Thus, 
we can turn to some of the discussions in these areas to shed light on the problem of personal 
identity and moral bioenhancement.  Some of the areas that are investigated here are the ways in 
which the manipulation of neurotransmitters to regulate pathological emotional affect may affect 
personal identity, as well as the effects of more invasive procedures such as deep brain stimulation 
(DBS)37.  A discussion of the potential impact upon personal identity of DBS is warranted due to 
the fact that this is one of the potential mechanisms of moral bioenhancement that has been 
mentioned by its proponents (DeGrazia, 2014:362; Persson & Savulescu, 2013:125).  However, 
while both DBS and psychopharmacological interventions are discussed as future potential 
mechanisms of moral bioenhancement in the literature, their potential effects on personal identity 
are addressed in a rather perfunctory manner.  This matter will therefore be discussed in more detail 
below.  Furthermore, in order to investigate whether or not moral bioenhancement could affect 
personal identity, it is also necessary to examine the particular conception of identity that is at stake, 
                                                 
37 DBS has been described as akin to a pacemaker for the brain, as it involves the implantation of an electrode which 
discharges an electrical current in order to alter deviant brain activity.  It is generally used to alleviate the symptoms 
of conditions such as Parkinson’s disease, and other movement disorders, but it has also had success in treating 
debilitating and chronic affective disorders such as major depressive disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder (Deep 
Brain Stimulation for Movement Disorders, 2016).  Studies indicate that deep-brain stimulation of the amygdala has 
an effect on lowering levels of aggression in individuals (Franzini, Marras, Ferroli et al, 2005:83), which is why it has 
been considered as a potential mechanism of moral bioenhancement.  Thinkers, such as Douglas, who regard the goal 
of moral bioenhancement to be the amelioration of counter-moral emotions, would regard the reduction of aggression 
as a form of moral enhancement.   
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as the notion is itself notoriously complex and, as mentioned above, it may be interpreted in a 
variety of ways.   
 
4.2.1 Strong versus weak identity changes 
At the inception of the moral bioenhancement debate, in his seminal article on the subject, Douglas 
addressed how moral bioenhancement could potentially affect identity.  He draws attention to the 
fact that identity changes are frequently a concern associated with enhancement in general, and 
therefore argues that an investigation is warranted regarding how moral bioenhancement – 
particularly because it would entail brain interventions – could produce impacts upon identity 
(Douglas, 2008:239).  Rather than opting to identify a particular interpretation of identity that may 
be threatened by moral bioenhancement, Douglas simply distinguishes between strong versus weak 
identity changes, where the former would indicate that a change results in an entirely, or 
considerably, different person.  Whilst Douglas does not explicitly state it, he implies that if moral 
bioenhancement produced strong identity changes then this would be a negative and unacceptable 
consequence (2008:239).  However, he posits that it is not self-evident that the type of moral 
bioenhancement that he is suggesting, namely, the attenuation of counter-moral emotions, would 
in fact produce such strong identity changes.   
 
What is more likely, Douglas posits, is that moral bioenhancement would produce weak changes 
in identity where this could entail changes in “some of…[the] most fundamental psychological 
characteristics – characteristics that are…central to how…[a person] views [herself] and [her] 
relationships with others, or that pervade [her] personality” (2008:239).  Whilst changing identity, 
even in this weaker manner, would not be regarded as ethically unproblematic, particularly if such 
changes were unanticipated, Douglas does not perceive it as providing a conclusive enough reason 
for choosing to not morally bioenhance38.  This is because he posits that we generally “have reasons 
to preserve our fundamental psychological characteristics only where those characteristics have 
some positive value” (Douglas, 2008:239).  In other words, the argument is that changing aspects 
of one’s personality, such as attenuating certain counter-moral emotions, might be a good thing if 
such emotions impact negatively upon one’s life.  However, as Douglas points out, this may not 
necessarily be the case; an individual may regard the fact that he experiences counter-moral 
emotions, such as disproportionate aggression, as unproblematic, or even enjoyable.  On the other 
                                                 
38 The view that weak identity changes would be regarded as relatively ethically unproblematic is shared by a number 
of other thinkers (Specker et al. 2014, Focquaert and Schermer, 2015a, DeGrazia, 2005, Baylis, 2013; Schechtman, 
2009). 
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hand, if one holds the view that a heightened sense of moral depth and acumen will be beneficial 
for an individual, then this would support Douglas’ claim.   
 
4.2.2. Numerical identity versus narrative identity 
Specker et al. argue that whilst there are a variety of conceptions of identity, the type of identity in 
question in the moral bioenhancement debate is “narrative identity rather than numerical identity” 
(2014:14).  Narrative identity may be defined in various ways, however, in its most general 
interpretation, it implies the identity or self-conception that arises from the way in which 
individuals unify, integrate and organise all their past and present life experiences, beliefs and 
values, as well as their future aspirations, into a coherent account or story that is meaningful to 
them.  MacIntyre discusses a similar interpretation of personal identity as referring to “that identity 
presupposed by the unity of the character which the unity of a narrative requires” (2007:218).  By 
this he argues that a: 
narrative concept of selfhood requires…on the one hand [that] I am what I may justifiably be 
taken by others to be in the course of living out a story that runs from my birth to my death; I 
am the subject of a history that is my own and no one else’s, that has its own peculiar 
meaning…To be the subject of a narrative that runs from one’s birth to one’s death is…to be 
accountable for the actions and experiences which compose a narratable life.  It is, that is, to 
be open to being asked to give a certain kind of account of what one did or what happened to 
one or what one witnessed at any earlier point in one’s life than the time at which the question 
is posed (MacIntyre, 2007:217-218). 
 
Narrative identity may be distinguished from numerical identity.  Parfit distinguishes between 
numerical and qualitative identity in order to explicate an understanding of what we mean by 
‘sameness’.  Numerical identity refers to something that is “one and the same” thing (Parfit, 
1995:13).  Parfit gives the example of a white billiard ball that may appear identical to a second 
white billiard ball but is nevertheless not the same ball (ibid.).  We would say that the two balls are 
identical qualitatively but not numerically.  If we alter the second ball by painting it black, for 
example, this ball would then no longer be qualitatively identical to the first white ball, but it will 
remain numerically identical to its former self.  In other words, it is still the same ball, albeit, now 
a different colour.  Parfit then discusses this difference in terms of an individual who has suffered 
a brain trauma and has experienced irrevocable changes in personality.  Those close to the 
individual would then posit that since the accident, he is an entirely different person, based on the 
view that his personality or character has changed.  However, Parfit argues that what they mean 
here is that he is qualitatively different, rather than numerically different (1995:14).  Qualitative 
identity, defined by Parfit as referring to “the kind of person one is, or wants to be” (1995:14), is 
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associated with a psychological account of identity and is therefore similar in kind, but is not 
identical to narrative identity.   
 
DeGrazia also comments on the above distinctions in an article that precedes the moral 
bioenhancement debate, and aims to discuss the potential impact on personal identity of 
enhancement in general (2005).  He argues that identity discussions within the enhancement debate 
tend to conflate two different accounts of identity – numerical identity and narrative identity – 
which leads to much confusion (2005:264).  Analytic philosophy has tended to focus primarily on 
numerical identity, which DeGrazia defines as “the relationship an entity has to itself over time in 
being one and the same entity” (2005:254).  Such an interpretation is able to help elucidate 
philosophical puzzles and questions regarding how the existence of something is able to persist 
despite various transformations.  In the context of biological enhancement, accounts of numerical 
identity therefore focus on what changes, if any, would be so great as to result in an entirely 
different person in a numerical sense (DeGrazia, 2005:265).   
 
DeGrazia argues that numerical identity may be understood in terms of either a psychological or 
biological approach.  The more popular psychological approach can be interpreted in a variety of 
ways, but, in its most simple interpretation it associates the maintaining of numerical identity with 
“some sort of psychological continuity” (DeGrazia, 2005:265).  This continuity could refer to 
having uninterrupted memories of oneself, and of one’s former intentions and experiences, or it 
could be associated with maintaining basic “beliefs, desires, and character traits…[or] 
psychological capacities” (ibid.), even in the absence of memories of earlier selves.  At its most 
basic level, it could simply entail possessing “the capacity for conscious experience” (ibid.).   
 
The biological approach to numerical identity would argue that one maintains numerical identity 
as long as one occupies the same body.  Thus, while the biological approach to numerical identity 
would view a patient in a persistent vegetative state as the same person, on a psychological account 
the patient would potentially no longer be the same person, as their selfhood would have been 
eradicated.  While biological numerical identity would possibly be threatened by radical forms of 
bioenhancement39, it is virtually impossible to see how it could be threatened by moral 
                                                 
39 An example of radical bioenhancement that would threaten biological numerical identity, if it ever became possible, 
would be the uploading of the human mind.  This is a possibility explored by transhumanists and proponents of radical 
biological enhancement as a means of freeing humanity from the constraints of biological existence.  Uploading, simply 
put, “is the process of transferring an intellect from a biological brain to a computer” (Bostrom, 2003:17).  There are 
various means that are posited as potentially leading to such a possibility; however, most of them ultimately depend 
upon the creation of superintelligence, and the ability to reverse engineer the human brain.  It is posited, by thinkers 
involved in the field of Artificial Intelligence, that reverse engineering the human brain will provide us with a blueprint 
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bioenhancement.  Moreover, it would also be difficult to argue, on a psychological account of 
numerical identity, that enhancing an individual’s moral dispositions would threaten her numerical 
identity, thereby creating an entirely new individual (DeGrazia, 2005:267).  As DeGrazia points 
out, an individual would, of course, remember herself before her enhancement; thus, unless 
consciousness was eradicated, it seems that psychological numerical identity would remain intact.   
 
DeGrazia, however, argues that not only is there confusion between different types of identity, but 
in identity debates there is also a tendency to “overestimate[e] the strengths of a psychological 
approach to our numerical identity and underestimate[e] the strengths of a biological approach” 
(2005:264).  DeGrazia supports the biological approach to numerical identity as its materialist 
conception of the human being as an ‘organism’ assists us in avoiding conflating the quest to 
identify what confers human value or essence “with the metaphysical issue of numerical identity” 
(2005:266).  However, despite his views in this regard, DeGrazia posits that the form of identity 
that is actually at stake in discussions of enhancement is not numerical identity – whether 
psychological or biological.  Rather, what matters to individuals when they refer to a loss of, or 
impact upon, their identity, is narrative identity.  This, he posits, refers to individuals’ “self-
conception: [their] most central values, implicit autobiography, and identifications with particular 
people, activities, and roles” (ibid.).   
 
Narrative identity is, of course, seemingly strongly related to a psychological account of numerical 
identity.  However, DeGrazia argues that the two types of identity are nevertheless distinct as they 
have different foci and aim to answer different questions.  Numerical identity attempts to establish 
conditions for sameness in the same organism or entity in the face of changes.  In other words, it 
aims to decipher what conditions would have to be met for an organism or entity to become an 
entirely different one.  In this regard, DeGrazia identifies numerical identity as dealing with 
“metaphysical or conceptual” questions (2005:266).  Narrative identity, on the other hand, attempts 
to identify “what is most central and salient in a given person’s self-conception” (DeGrazia, 
2005:266) and in this regard, it is “value-laden and inherently psychological” in nature (ibid.).  In 
other words, it is an internal state that is based upon interpretations and beliefs – and evaluations 
                                                 
for intelligence and enable us to replicate its mechanisms.  Once the mechanisms of the brain are fully comprehended, 
the next step will be downloading the brain, which would entail “scan[ning the] brain to map the locations, 
interconnections and contents of all the…neural components and levels.  Its entire organisation…[could] then be re-
created on a neural computer of sufficient capacity, including the contents of its memory” (Kurzweil, 2001:26).  At the 
point at which we are able to scan the brain at the minute level required in order to fully understand its workings, the 
intricacies of the process of downloading or replicating it mechanically will supposedly be solvable, according to 
transhumanists.   
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thereof – regarding what is salient for a given individual about herself, how she perceives herself 
to be and how she thinks others perceive her.  
 
4.2.3 Narrative identity and self-conception  
It seems obvious that if narrative identity is strongly associated with an individual’s self-conception 
over time, then a discussion of how moral bioenhancement could impact upon personal identity 
would have to examine how it could affect the qualities that inform self-conception.  This would 
include investigating whether or not moral bioenhancement would affect how individuals view 
themselves, and, whether or not it would impinge on those qualities that they perceive as 
constituting their selfhood.  DeGrazia discusses an example of how the enhancement of physical 
capabilities or physical beauty could deeply impact a person’s self-conception.  However, he also 
draws attention to the fact that this would be true of any acute change, such as losing the use of a 
limb or suffering a stroke, for example.  This observation aside, however, he examines two specific 
objections to enhancement that are strongly associated with a concern for identity; namely, the 
argument that it is inauthentic and the concern that it will threaten “inviolable core characteristics” 
(DeGrazia, 2005:269).  Arguments that view enhancement as representing a threat to authenticity 
generally associate the latter with the ideal of “self-creation” through effort or “being true to 
oneself” (DeGrazia, 2005:268).  In terms of authenticity as self-creation however, freely utilising 
enhancement technologies to change oneself in some way could be interpreted as a form of self-
creation, rather than a threat to it.    
 
On the other hand, if authenticity rather refers to an acceptance of who one is – or being ‘true to 
oneself’ – including one’s identity, it would appear that using enhancement could result in distinct 
changes in this regard, which according to this interpretation would be inauthentic40.  As DeGrazia 
points out, however, one of the problems with such arguments is that they are characterised by 
confusion between numerical and narrative identity (2005:269).  Altering someone’s numerical 
identity clearly represents a strong identity change, to use Douglas’ distinction, as it would 
essentially destroy the person.  The consensus is that this would be a clearly negative, and ethically 
untenable, outcome.  However, it is clearly not numerical identity that would be at stake in cases 
                                                 
40 This type of criticism is frequently lodged by those with a bioconservative agenda.  Those who hold a bioconservative 
view are generally opposed to biological enhancement in general, as well as other biomedical interventions, such as 
stem cell research which destroys human embryos in the process; the destruction of embryos in general, including 
abortion, as well as practices such as euthanasia.  Bioconservatives do support the use of genetic technologies for the 
treatment of inheritable genetic disorders, however, they oppose any attempts to enhance human capacities due to their 
view that the human being in its present state should be left as is.  According to bioconservatives, attempting to alter or 
‘improve’ our genetic structure amounts to hubris, playing God or tampering with nature, and risks destroying our 
humanity (Kass, 2002; Sandel, 2007).   
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of enhancement, as the individual would remain the same person in a numerical sense.  What is 
rather at stake is narrative identity, the individual’s self-conception over time, which could be 
affected by enhancement.  However, it is accepted as relatively unproblematic that our narrative 
identities are continually transformed in diverse ways due to a variety of influences.  This is 
particularly true of changes that result from freely made choices, such as the decision to enhance 
oneself in some way.  Thus, an argument that opposes freely chosen enhancement on the basis that 
it may impact narrative identity would have to indicate how the supposed inauthenticity it produces 
is different in kind to the impact of general changes to identity experienced in everyday life, 
particularly those changes that occur as a result of factors over which we have no control.   
 
The second criticism, that bioenhancement will in some way threaten “inviolable core 
characteristics” (DeGrazia, 2005:269), is also a common bioconservative argument.  Such 
arguments are deeply problematic, however, due to the unsubstantiated assumptions that they 
make.  One such problem with this line of criticism is, how do we identify which of these 
supposedly core characteristics are inviolable and thereby should not be altered in any way; and 
why are they inviolable?  Furthermore, if an individual has made an autonomous, informed choice 
to alter what is viewed as a core characteristic, upon what basis could this be regarded as 
inauthentic?  In these kinds of ‘arguments’, identity, or the notion of “core characteristics” (ibid.), 
may serve as a placeholder for a variety of inchoate notions such as human essence, human nature 
or a metaphysical ‘true self’, the nature of which must simply be intuited.  Regardless of whether 
one supports the existence of the afore-mentioned notions, their supposed inviolability would 
nevertheless be constitutive of numerical identity, rather than narrative identity; which is the type 
of identity that would be more likely to be affected by bioenhancement.  Furthermore, those who 
hold the view that it is morally objectionable to alter these supposedly core characteristics must 
provide more substantial arguments as to why this is so, rather than offering unsubstantiated moral 
proclamations that, in the absence of supporting arguments, amount to distinctly circular claims.   
 
4.2.4 Narrative identity and moral identity  
While, as mentioned above, there seems to be nothing intrinsically wrong with altering aspects of 
our narrative identity, Faust makes an interesting observation that requires further investigation.  
She posits that moral identity is constituent of narrative identity and that we care about the former 
“as it relates to our moral integrity – we choose to act in ways that are consistent with our moral 
beliefs in order to maintain our moral integrity” (Faust, 2008:403).  Jotterand makes a similar point 
and alludes to the concern that moral bioenhancement is ethically problematic because it may 
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threaten “moral identities” (2014:2).  As mentioned in section 2.3.5, he distinguishes between the 
possession of “character traits…and having character” (Jotterand, 2011:8), where the former refers 
to a variety of behaviours that may, or may not, possess moral relevance.  I may have a particular 
character trait, such as conscientiousness, but only employ it, for example, in my workplace rather 
than in my attitude towards my personal relationships.  Thus, simply possessing that trait will not 
necessarily signify that I employ it in a morally relevant manner or context.  For Jotterand: 
having character implies having a moral identity; it implies a person’s moral strength to 
establish a set of behaviours deemed adequate in projected circumstances.  It qualifies one’s 
moral agency and presupposes one’s capacity of self-determination.  Agency (reasons, 
motives, intentions) and action constitute the two elements that refer to having character 
(2011:8).   
 
In other words, particular character traits may be necessary for possessing character but they are 
not sufficient.  Having character includes not only possessing the morally relevant character traits, 
but also the notions mentioned above; namely: “a moral identity…moral strength…[and] moral 
agency…[that inform or lead to] action” (ibid.). He posits that it is character traits and behaviour 
that are the target of moral bioenhancement, but it is having character that is, arguably, the basis of 
morality itself.  In other words, what the above thinkers are implying is that if our moral identity 
or integrity is associated with the coherence between our moral beliefs and our actions, then an 
intervention that produces behavioural changes without concomitant changes in our moral beliefs 
could be problematic.  Moral identity, so interpreted, presents us with a construal of identity that 
may be threatened by moral bioenhancement, and which is inextricably linked with the Harris 
concern for moral autonomy, where a requirement of the latter would be possessing adequate 
reasons and beliefs that can explain our behaviour.  Thus, where one’s personal identity or self-
conception is informed by one’s considered conception of what is true and good, any changes that 
would result in an identity that is incongruent with this previously considered conception could be 
ethically problematic, and, as I will argue in chapter 5 could also threaten personal or moral 
autonomy.   
 
4.2.5 Potential impacts on narrative identity: hidden changes 
Returning to Specker et al.’s discussion of identity, they provide a decidedly psychological 
interpretation of narrative identity as referring to “an individual’s most central and salient 
characteristics (e.g., motivations, beliefs, values, desires, character traits) that together comprise 
their self, and needs to be understood within the dynamics of psychological change” (2014:14).  Of 
course, as Specker et al. point out, our narrative identity, so construed, is not static throughout our 
lifetime; it is continually transformed and impinged upon as we react to particular occurrences and 
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interact with other individuals (Specker et al. 2014:14).  These changes are the basis of the kinds 
of observations that support the view that someone is now not the same person as they once were.  
However, what matters to individuals is that they are able to assimilate any life changes into their 
self-conception or identity – their life story – in an intelligible and meaningful way (ibid.).  One 
such way that this would be possible is to be able to link any personality changes with specific 
events.  In other words, an intelligible incorporation of a change to an individual’s identity would 
entail being able to provide reasons to explain the source of such a change.   
 
Most individuals are accustomed to experiencing changes to their personal identity and these are 
generally assimilated without major psychological upheaval.  As mentioned above, and in 
agreement with Douglas, a number of thinkers have argued that if moral bioenhancement, and 
bioenhancement in general, were to produce such smaller or weaker changes in identity, then, if 
this occurred in a similar manner to the kind of identity changes that individuals are confronted 
with in the normal course of events, this would be ethically unproblematic (Specker et al. 2014, 
Focquaert and Schermer, 2015a, DeGrazia, 2005, Baylis, 2013; Schechtman, 2009).  However, as 
pointed out by Specker et al., because moral bioenhancement would invariably impact upon core 
“moral dispositions or behaviour” (2014:14), this may result in unpredictable, and possibly major 
disruptions to narrative identity which would elicit acute ethical concern.   
 
Focquaert and Schermer discuss identity concerns in some depth and also identify narrative identity 
as the particular conception of identity that is vulnerable to potential impact from moral 
bioenhancement.  They utilise Schechtman’s interpretation of narrative identity, understood as 
referring to a person’s “actions, experiences, beliefs, values, desires and character traits” (in 
Focquaert & Schermer, 2015a:146).  Furthermore, they share the above-mentioned view that our 
narrative identity is subject to constant change and that minor changes are generally assimilated 
into one’s narrative in a relatively unproblematic manner, and in accordance with maintaining 
“one’s sense of self” (ibid.).  Major changes that severely interrupt or are at odds with narrative 
identity could pose ethical hurdles.  The extent to which moral bioenhancement could do this would 
vary according to the nature of the intervention; it is a particular type of intervention that would be 
more likely to produce severe impacts on identity.  Here, they distinguish between, active and 
passive moral enhancements and argue that this distinction is ethically meaningful (Focquaert & 
Schermer, 2015a:145).   
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Generally, enhancement is framed in terms of a distinction between direct and indirect 
enhancement, where the latter is associated with traditional moral enhancement via education and 
socialisation and the former with biological enhancement.  Focquaert and Schermer argue, 
however, that this distinction can be reformulated in terms of a deeper, and more relevant, 
foundational distinction between interventions that are active versus those that are passive.  
Traditional enhancement is ‘active’ because it is a process that requires individual effort and 
ongoing involvement.  However, it could also be described as indirect due to the fact that it results 
in changes in attitude which gradually affect mental states rather than acting directly, and 
immediately, on the brain (Focquaert & Schermer, 2015a:144)41.  Passive moral enhancement 
would include moral bioenhancement interventions which require no, or at least minimal, 
individual contribution or participation as they act directly on the brain (ibid.).  With this distinction 
in mind, Focquaert and Schermer examine potential interventions that could impact morality, as 
occurring on a spectrum that moves from active to passive mechanisms.  We can then visualise this 
spectrum, where traditional moral education lies on the extreme left, moving to talk-based 
interventions, such as cognitive behavioural therapy, through to the administering of psycho-
pharmaceuticals, and then, finally moving to interventions such as deep brain stimulation on the 
extreme right.  Focquaert and Schermer argue that it is the interventions that are passive on the far 
right of the spectrum, that pose the greatest threat to narrative identity.  However, they posit that 
even if such interventions do produce acute, and disruptive, identity changes, it is not self-evident 
that this would imply that such an outcome is unethical (Focquaert & Schermer, 2015a:147).  
Through various supportive mechanisms, such abrupt identity changes could be assimilated.  The 
type of narrative identity change that would pose a distinct ethical obstacle would be what 
Focquaert and Schermer describe as hidden changes to narrative identity (ibid.).  
 
Such hidden changes refer to smaller changes that are either not recognised by the individual in 
question, or, are perceived as being more minor by the individual than they are by those who are 
close to them (Focquaert & Schermer, 2015a:147).  Examples of such occurrences are drawn from 
patients who have undergone DBS which has produced subtle, long term changes that have deeply 
affected their personal relationships.  What was interesting in one particular case was that the 
changes in personality were not recognised by the patient in question when the brain implant was 
                                                 
41 However, in a later paper, Focquaert and Schermer explicitly point out that they “do not equate direct interventions 
with passive ones and indirect interventions with active ones” (2015c).  While they posit that “direct interventions are 
more likely to be passive and therefore more likely to be problematic” (ibid), this is not always the case.  In fact, due 
to various problems associated with the direct/indirect distinction, they argue that the distinction between active and 
passive interventions is more useful as a means of explicating the ethical status of interventions and should supplant 
the former distinction. 
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switched on.  Only when it was switched off, and his Parkinson’s symptoms returned, did he 
concede that he was exhibiting problematic behaviour.  However, even subtle changes, such as 
increased “irritability, impatience” (Focquaert & Schermer, 2015a:147) and concentration 
difficulties may have an erosive effect on relationships, particularly when not acknowledged by the 
patient.   
 
As Focquaert and Schermer point out, narrative identity may be evaluated from both the perspective 
of the person in question and from the perspective of others.  The individual evaluates her own 
narrative by whether or not she is able to assimilate any perceived changes and anomalous feelings 
or behaviours.  The primary way in which she is able to do this is by being able to provide 
explanations for any changes.  However, this presupposes a certain amount of self-insight and it is 
possible, as Schechtman notes, that there can be “a dissociation between one’s implicit narrative 
self and one’s explicit narrative self” akin to a type of “self-blindness” (in Focquaert & Schermer, 
2015a:148).  In the absence of actually noticing any subtle personality changes, the individual 
wouldn’t perceive any need to assimilate them into her narrative.  In other words, the individual 
would perceive no need to deliberate upon any such changes, and in this way, such a change would 
bypass her faculties of reasoning.  Focquaert and Schermer see passive interventions as the most 
likely source of such hidden changes.   
 
As mentioned above, such “self-blindness” (Focquaert & Schermer, 2015a:148) would be 
problematic not only in terms of the negative impact it may have on relationships, but, more 
importantly, it could be interpreted as a form of “inauthenticity that threatens the autonomy of the 
self” (ibid.).  Focquaert and Schermer concur with DeGrazia that to avoid identity inauthenticity 
and preserve autonomy, it is imperative that an individual be able discern which changes to 
assimilate and which to reject.  Being able to do this presupposes that the individual firstly can 
recognise the changes and relate to them, and, secondly, that she can pinpoint the source of the 
changes.  It is clear that hidden changes will not meet these criteria for authenticity.  However, it 
is difficult to see how interventions that produced such effects would ever be considered as viable 
candidates for moral bioenhancement.   
 
Caouette has responded to the threat to narrative identity, and thus authenticity, raised by hidden 
changes that Focquaert and Schermer discuss.  In particular, he looks at their claim that direct 
interventions could bypass individuals’ rational and reflective capacities which would enable them 
to adjudicate such changes (Caouette, 2015).  Caouette, however, is of the view that Focquaert and 
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Schermer have overstated this threat to authenticity.  Regarding explicit personality changes, he 
argues firstly that we often find ourselves experiencing inexplicable emotions or moods with no 
apparent origin or cause.  However, we always have a choice regarding how we will respond to 
such affective states.  In the same way, if we experienced such changes in emotion or disposition 
due to a direct or passive intervention, it would not be the case that the way in which we respond 
to this would be predetermined.  It does not follow that the specific nature of the source of such a 
change determines whether or not our autonomy regarding how we respond is eradicated.   
 
Regarding Focquaert and Schermer’s requirement that authenticity presupposes the ability to 
coherently explain such changes, Caouette argues that there is no reason why this ability would be 
threatened by a passive intervention.  For example, we are often unclear as to why our feelings 
regarding a certain matter, or person, change, however, we are nevertheless, generally able to 
assimilate these changes into our narrative identities.  What matters, he argues, is keeping intact 
the ability to choose to either act on these changes or not (Caouette, 2015)42.  Furthermore, he posits 
that even in cases where an intervention such as DBS is not voluntary, such as would be the case 
if it was utilised to treat psychopathologies in criminals, it would not rule out the individual being 
able to incorporate any changes in moral dispositions, for example, into his narrative.  He equates 
such involuntary changes with the changes in perspective that arise in one’s life due to external 
factors over which one has little control.  Some examples of events that could result in identity 
changes would be most traumatic experiences such as the loss of a loved one, divorce, loss of one’s 
employment, or the particular example that Caouette mentions of being bullied as a child.  After 
experiencing abrupt changes to one’s self-conception as a result of such an experience, one will 
presumably remember who one was before and utilise one’s ‘new’ moral dispositions to make 
sense of any new feelings and possibly welcome them.   
 
What is of particular interest in their discussion, however, is the way in which Focquaert and 
Schermer’s argument clearly illustrates the close relationship between personal identity and 
autonomy.  In this regard, their distinction is loosely aligned with the Harris line argumentation, 
                                                 
42 Focquaert and Schermer have responded to Caouette’s claims by arguing that he has not correctly understood the 
risk to identity, and thus to authenticity, posed by radical changes to identity (2015b).  They point out that in the case 
of slight, or isolated, identity changes, Caouette is correct in his claims that an individual may be able to assimilate 
such changes into her identity and choose whether or not to act upon them.  However, in the case of major identity 
changes, “if ‘we’ ourselves have changed considerably, it is not clear anymore that our choices will really be 
authentically ours” (Focquaert & Schermer, 2015b).  In other words, if an intervention drastically alters the “values, 
desires, propensities or…outlook” (ibid) of an individual, then one could argue that the person evaluating such changes 
and deciding whether or not to assimilate them and act upon them may no longer be the same person.  This would be 
even more pertinent in the case of hidden identity changes.   
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which is the claim that an intervention threatens moral autonomy – in their case narrative identity 
– if the changes it produces have no cognitive content.  Focquaert and Schermer discuss how an 
active, non-invasive intervention such as cognitive behavioural therapy may also result in major 
behavioural changes and thus changes to identity.  However, while the impact of such identity 
changes may be equally comparable in magnitude to passive, or direct, interventions, such as DBS, 
the difference between the two is that the effects of active interventions occur gradually and can 
therefore be reflected upon at length and either assimilated or discarded by the individual.  Direct, 
or passive, interventions that produce major and instantaneous disruptions to identity, on the other 
hand, leave little opportunity for gradual revision and cognitive consideration.  Furthermore, if such 
interventions were not reversible, this would be even more problematic.  In this way, there is 
congruence between the concern that moral bioenhancement could threaten something fundamental 
and intrinsically valuable, namely, narrative identity – understood as one’s self-conception or moral 
identity – and moral autonomy.  For Focquaert and Schermer, their concern for identity is that 
passive interventions, proposed as mechanisms of moral bioenhancement, could produce character 
changes and disruptions that could be enduring because they would be seemingly inaccessible to 
cognitive consideration.  Their concern for identity is therefore, in essence, a concern for autonomy 
where the latter is strongly associated with the ability to self-determine.  If their argument is correct, 
the question that needs to be investigated is whether or not moral bioenhancement could produce 
the kinds of irrevocable disruptions to narrative identity that they fear.  Answering this question, 
and resolving the matter, would require empirical investigation.  
 
4.2.6 Narrative Identity and deep brain stimulation  
A number of thinkers have explored the potential threat to identity posed specifically by deep brain 
stimulation (DBS).  As mentioned above, DBS is used to treat Parkinson’s disease and other 
movement disorders and has also been suggested as a potential mechanism of moral 
bioenhancement (DeGrazia, 2014:362; Persson & Savulescu, 2013:125).  However, a commonly 
noted side-effect of DBS is the impact that it has on personality and/or identity (Schechtman, 2010).  
As Schechtman points out, in cases where DBS is used to treat mood disorders, such as major 
depressive disorder, personality changes may be the explicit goal of such an intervention, however, 
more often, they are undesirable and “unintended side-effect[s]” (2010:133).  Such changes can 
occur rapidly as well as in a more gradual manner and may cause great personal distress for patients 
undergoing DBS.   
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Schechtman discusses some examples of acute changes in demeanour exhibited by patients after 
DBS.  She reports that patients have described changes in emotional response as sudden as if a 
switch had been flipped (2010:135).  One such patient had been experiencing long-term depression 
which completely disappeared, with such rapidity, that it elicited intense anxiety, despite the 
positive nature of the change.  The fact that such positive changes elicited anxiety is indicative that 
some fundamental challenge to the patient’s self-conception or identity could have been the source 
of his unease.  This is understandable, as an individual suffering from chronic depression would 
presumably have been required to assimilate his condition into his identity, and thus, any rapid 
changes in this regard could be experienced as a threat to his selfhood or identity.  Other patients 
describe how feelings can change instantly from happiness and laughter to sadness, and vice versa, 
during the testing and placement of the deep brain stimulator (Schechtman, 2010:134).   
 
However, it is not only in invasive interventions, such as DBS, that such acute changes have been 
noted.  Schechtman also discusses the ways in which the SSRI, Prozac, has produced similar 
extreme changes in emotion and personality (2010:134).  Schechtman explains how the reaction of 
unease to such changes is connected with “a perceived threat to conceptions of identity and agency 
that have been deep and long-standing parts of Western culture” (ibid.). These kinds of instant 
changes are disturbing because they undermine the perception of the extent of control that we have 
over ourselves and thus erode the view of the existence of a true or authentic self that we believe – 
correctly, or not –  is the product of our own volitions.  Furthermore, changes of this nature also 
undeniably confirm the immense role played by physiological processes on “personality, 
intellectual performance, and social success – that heretofore we as a society have resisted” (ibid.).  
As Schechtman points out, the fact “that one’s very psychological identity can be altered by 
chemical means raises questions regarding how it is then possible to think of oneself as an 
autonomous, self-directed being” (2010:135) and this, in turn, elicits great unease.  In other words, 
in the majority of individuals, who we can presume have not been exposed to philosophical 
discussions of freewill and determinism, there is a common perception that we are freer from causal 
influences than we, in fact, are, and when this perception is challenged, it may be deeply unsettling.   
 
Schechtman describes the various ways in which identity may be conceived and concurs with the 
prevalent view that, in terms of the potential threat to identity envisaged by DBS, it is narrative 
identity that risks being impacted upon.  She defines identity as not referring to stable individual 
characteristics or personality traits but rather our “selfhood…[as] tied…[to] our ability to 
understand ourselves and others in narrative terms.  We are selves – and construct identities – 
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insofar as we experience and live our lives as narratives” (Schechtman, 2010:137).  The 
construction of these narratives is not performed with explicit awareness but rather refers to the 
fact that we interpret ourselves as subjects who exist in time and space with personal and historical 
contexts that all play a role in who we are, and who we will be.  This ongoing story of our lives is, 
of course, impinged upon by random, and sometimes haphazard, events.   
 
Schechtman argues that in comparison, if we take an inanimate object, it is generally possible to 
acquire all the relevant facts regarding its history.  Namely, we can identify how the object came 
to exist and specifically trace and account for any changes in its form.  We cannot do this with 
human beings as their narratives are informed by a dynamic complexity that is an amalgamation of 
“purposes; goals and plans…emotions, beliefs, values, and desires that develop and change in 
response to circumstances and constrain action; and complex relationships with others” 
(Schechtman, 2010:137).  When an individual experiences a change in her emotions or 
dispositions, this may halt or impede the “narrative flow” (ibid.) of her identity, thus requiring that 
she assimilate this interruption in a coherent manner within her narrative.  This assimilation is 
achieved through seeking understanding and acquiring explanations for any such changes.  In the 
case of DBS, when this change occurs in a jarring and instantaneous manner, the only explanation 
that is available to the individual as a means of assimilating this interruption into her narrative is 
the kind of “mechanical explanation” (ibid.) that is associated with inanimate objects.  This may 
contribute towards the feelings of alienation that are described by patients after receiving DBS.   
 
However, in contradistinction to static, psychological accounts of identity, narrative identity is 
flexible and adapts and responds in a continual interplay between the individual and environment.  
Thus, as Schechtman points out, one’s identity may persist even in the face of major disruptions, 
particularly if one is able to interpret such changes as “self-expressive and self-directed” 
(2010:138).  What she means by this, is that whilst the most immediate or proximal cause of any 
changes may be identified as a mechanical one; namely the DBS one has received, if one takes a 
wider perspective and moves further back, the change may also be attributed to a distal cause, 
namely, the willingness and proactivity to address whatever condition, or state, caused the 
individual to seek treatment, or enhancement, in the first place.   
 
Baylis also explores the threat to identity posed by DBS, and correctly points out that whether DBS 
does, in fact, threaten identity, depends entirely on the particular conception of identity that one 
has (2013:520).  He interprets identity as relational and narrative in character (Baylis, 2013:513).  
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In contradistinction to psychological accounts of identity that associate it with stable “core 
inclinations or character traits” (Baylis, 2013:516) and biological accounts of identity that link it 
with occupying a particular corporeal form, Baylis regards identity as associated with “an 
individual’s lived experience as integrated into her autobiographical narrative” (ibid.).  By this he 
means that an individual’s identity is coherent if she is able to give plausible explanations or possess 
an interpretation of her “history…life situation…and…motivations” (Baylis, 2013:517) that is, 
more or less, a reflection of reality.  He defines relational identity, more fully, as “a dynamic, 
socially, culturally, politically and historically situated communicative activity (based in narrative 
and performance) that is informed by the interests, perspectives, and creative intentions of close 
and distant others” (Baylis, 2013:17).  This conception of identity is dynamic in that it is constituted 
by interplay between an individual’s self-conception and the way in which they are perceived by 
others.   
 
Baylis argues that while identity and personality are often conflated, the two are not the same 
(2013:516).  In distinction to relational or narrative accounts of identity, psychological and 
personality accounts of identity tend to be more static, and it is this latter –and outdated, Baylis 
argues – conception of identity that risks being impacted upon by DBS.  However, if one interprets 
identity in such static terms, then one must include, as threatening to identity, any life event that 
produces dramatic change to one’s identity, such as those traumatic events mentioned above, 
namely, divorce, death of a loved one or loss of employment, to name but a few examples.  If one 
takes Baylis’ two criteria that a coherent identity requires that changes can be explained and that 
they bear a relationship to reality, then there is no reason to believe that DBS couldn’t fulfil these 
requirements.  Presumably, a patient experiencing acknowledged personality changes as a result of 
DBS would be able to provide a plausible explanation regarding the source of any changes because 
his having consented to the intervention would be an event that would be assimilated into his 
personal narrative.  If one conceives of identity as something dynamic and subject to continual 
external and internal influences and changes that unfold throughout an individual’s life, an 
intervention such as DBS is merely one additional way in which identity is formed.  However, if 
one associates identity with static personality traits or the existence of a metaphysical, or given, 
‘true self’, then the former may be threatened by such interventions.   
 
Baylis does, however, very briefly, discuss a similar threat to that implicitly identified by Focquaert 
and Schermer; namely the threat to autonomy or agency that could be posed by an intervention 
such as DBS.  If DBS produced unwanted, or hidden, changes in behaviour and action which 
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resulted directly from the intervention, rather than the formation of “intentions or beliefs” (Baylis, 
2013:524), then this could be grounds for an argument that such an intervention compromises 
agency.  One such example of the way in which this does occur, is a heightened risk for the 
development of addictive gambling behaviours in patients treated with DBS for Parkinson’s disease 
(Lu et al., 2006; Smeding et al., 2007; Hälbig, 2009).  If an individual, post-DBS, engages in such 
behaviours, not as a result of having chosen to do so, but due to the intervention itself, then it would 
be difficult to interpret this as anything other than a subversion of his agency.   
 
In terms of its therapeutic usage, an invasive intervention such as DBS, used to treat debilitating 
symptoms such as those produced by Parkinson’s disease, could therefore produce side-effects that 
must be balanced against the advantages of alleviating such symptoms.  However, the fact that 
DBS is a relatively common form of treatment for Parkinson’s disease, despite such agency 
subverting side-effects, is evidence that it is viewed as ethically permissible to make such trade-
offs.  Furthermore, utilising DBS to treat severely debilitating mood disorders, where other forms 
of treatment have failed, would also be ethically permissible, even in the face of the afore-
mentioned side-effects.  However, it seems highly doubtful that individuals would utilise such 
interventions, in the absence of coercion or sufficient incentives, to enhance particular moral 
dispositions deemed in need of strengthening; even if it could be established that such interventions 
did not impact upon identity.   
 
In this regard, Riis et al. have conducted empirical research that has implications for the likelihood 
that people would willingly opt to morally bioenhance themselves (2008).  The research 
specifically investigates the likelihood of individuals freely choosing to take pharmaceuticals that 
will “enhance their own social, emotional, and cognitive traits” (2008:495).  Their findings indicate 
that, particularly in Western culture, there is an enduring belief that certain traits are closely 
associated with, and inform, a “fundamental, essential self” (Riis et al, 2008:495) or identity.  Thus, 
whether or not individuals would be willing to enhance themselves would seem to depend upon 
their beliefs regarding their “fundamental selves” (2008:496) or their identities.  In particular, 
emotional dispositions are viewed as constitutive of identity; thus, we could expect reluctance to 
alter such dispositions, unless, as Riis et al. point out, the enhancement of such dispositions was 
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4.3 Concluding remarks  
This first part of chapter 4 addressed an important argument against moral bioenhancement, the 
argument that moral bioenhancement is wrong, in principle, due to the possibly disruptive effects 
that it could have on personal identity.  However, an investigation of the literature revealed that 
there are numerous conceptions of personal identity.  Thus, this concern requires conceptual 
clarification in order to ascertain which interpretation of personal identity is, in fact, at stake.  
Secondly, it requires examining empirical evidence from areas in which some of the interventions 
proposed by the proponents of moral bioenhancement are currently used for therapeutic purposes, 
as different interventions could compromise identity to different degrees. 
 
While identity may be defined in various ways, it seems that it is generally associated with selfhood 
in some way.  Thus, this leads to the perception that individuals have a vested interest in protecting 
their identity, their self, from strong, unwanted changes.  On this account, if moral bioenhancement 
were to produce strong identity changes, to the extent that this would threaten self-conception, this 
would be cause for ethical concern.  Whether moral bioenhancement would result in such changes, 
however, would depend upon the nature of the intervention.  However, in cases of weaker identity 
changes, a strong argument may be made that altering negative aspects of an individual’s identity, 
such as certain counter-moral emotions, could be a positive outcome for individuals.  If the 
presence of such a disposition is rejected by an individual and produces inner conflict or has a 
negative impact on her life, such as compromising her ability to lead her life in a manner that is 
congruent with what she takes to be true and good, she would generally not regard such a 
disposition as part of her identity.  In such cases, identity changes could be regarded as increasing 
the agency or autonomy of individuals.  This is an argument that requires further substantiation and 
it will thus be developed further in chapter 5b.  
 
The contribution that a philosophical investigation may make in explicating the concern for 
personal identity posed by moral bioenhancement would be to provide conceptual clarification 
regarding the notion of personal identity that is at stake.  Here, in the most general sense, it is 
qualitative identity that is seemingly at stake.  Qualitative identity is both descriptive and 
aspirational in character as it is informed by how individuals conceive themselves – the self that 
they believe themselves to be – as well as the selves they aspire to be.  In particular, there seems to 
be considerable consensus in the moral bioenhancement literature that narrative identity is the 
particular type of qualitative identity that would be vulnerable to impacts from moral 
bioenhancement.  This account of identity may also be defined in various ways.  It includes not 
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only an individual’s self-conception, but also his interpretations of the ongoing events of his life 
and his relationship with others.  It is therefore not static as it is subject to impacts from continual 
influences and alterations due to interactions with others and with the world in general.   
 
However, I would argue that whether or not personal identity is interpreted in narrative terms, the 
core component of any conception of personal identity is the notion of selfhood.  Furthermore, I 
would argue that selfhood is deeply informed by moral attitudinal states, referring to what an 
individual values and identifies with, as well her conception of how consistent she is in acting in 
accordance with her moral beliefs.  This moral component of identity is more cognitive in nature.  
In other words, acting in accordance with one’s moral identity would require that we act upon 
specific intentions that we have formed, that are consistent with our beliefs, and, that we are 
therefore able to provide reasons or justifications for our actions.  We may not always do this in a 
conscious manner, but if pressed, components of our moral identities are those beliefs that we could 
provide explanations for and would be willing to defend if necessary.  Furthermore, I would argue 
that this moral aspect of one’s identity, while not fixed, is more enduring in nature.  It is closely 
linked with that part of an individual that enables others to recognise her as a particular individual 
through time and to observe, in cases of major change, that she has indeed changed.   
 
Regarding changes in identity, it is not change as such that is problematic, but rather, whether or 
not individuals are able to assimilate any changes into their self-conception and their personal 
narrative in a way that is acceptable to them.  When changes cannot be linked to events in one’s 
narrative or to any pre-existing beliefs, preferences or attitudinal states, then the source of such 
changes would warrant investigation.  However, it is most likely that only a specific type of 
intervention would warrant caution in this regard.  Any interventions that act directly upon 
physiology or brain states, and therefore do not require any individual involvement to ensure their 
efficacy, would be potentially problematic.  Furthermore, any interventions that produce hidden 
identity changes would require our utmost attention.  This is because hidden changes could produce 
impacts upon autonomy, where the latter is associated with one’s ability to self-determine in a 
manner that is free from undue internal and external constraints43.  Their unacceptability would not 
only be due to the fact that they could challenge our autonomy as such, but also due to the 
impossibility of addressing hidden, and thus unrecognised, changes, other than relying on the 
reports and interpretations of others.  In particular, hidden changes in identity could be at odds with 
                                                 
43 Of course, on a deterministic account of freedom – an account that I believe to be correct – our ability to self-
determine is not absolute, we are subject to causal constraints.  I will discuss this matter further in the second part of 
this chapter in section 4.10.  
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the requirements of true informed consent, in terms of the fact that consent could not be withdrawn, 
unless the intervention was reversible and the individual in question heeded the accounts of others 
and sought a reversal.   
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Chapter 4b – In-principle objections to moral bioenhancement: the concern for 
moral autonomy  
 
4.4 Introduction and overview 
The concern for moral autonomy forms part of a set of freedom-related concerns that are 
prevalently discussed within the moral bioenhancement debate.  For the purposes of this chapter, 
which will focus on how the concern is discussed in the literature, we can loosely distinguish 
between freedom concerns and autonomy concerns44.  On the one hand, as discussed in section 
3.3.1 of chapter 3, freedom concerns are often directed towards compulsory moral bioenhancement 
on the grounds that it would be an obvious violation of our freedom of choice.  Such a concern is, 
however, not specific to moral bioenhancement.  Rather, it typifies any situation in which the 
freedom of individuals to make reasonable personal, bodily choices is impinged upon by making 
something compulsory.  In the case of moral bioenhancement, thwarting the freedom of individuals 
– specifically their bodily freedom – to choose to refuse a physiological or neurobiological 
intervention would be clearly ethically problematic45.   
 
Critics also argue, however, that moral bioenhancement is wrong on a deeper level, and, in a way 
that would not be resolved by ensuring that it would only be administered on a voluntary basis.  
Critics argue that it is wrong, in principle, due to the fact that it will inevitably compromise or 
eradicate something that holds intrinsic value to humanity, namely, our moral autonomy or agency.  
As the discussion in this chapter will illustrate, in the debate, terms such as moral autonomy, 
agency, freedom, liberty, free will, moral responsibility and autonomy are often used 
interchangeably to emphasise different concerns elicited by moral bioenhancement.  Therefore, it 
                                                 
44 In chapter 5a I will provide a conceptual analysis of the notion of autonomy which will include an overview of 
traditional conceptions of autonomy as well as an explication of the distinction between freedom and autonomy in 
section 5.2.  My interpretation of this distinction is informed by Berlin’s distinction between negative and positive 
liberty, where the former refers to freedom from undue interferences and constraints and the latter refers to freedom to 
do a particular thing or be a particular person, where this is associated with an individual’s sense of self-determination 
(1969).  This distinction between freedom and autonomy, in the sense in which it is relevant to the moral 
bioenhancement problematic, also correlates with the contrast between external and internal freedom.  I will, of course, 
discuss the nature of this distinction in more detail in chapter 5, section 5.2, however, for the purposes of this chapter, 
it is important to note that a variety of terms are utilised in the literature.  Therefore, in this chapter, when I utilise 
terms such as, freedom, liberty, agency, autonomy and moral autonomy, this is not due to a lack of conceptual precision, 
but rather, because these are the particular terms utilised by various thinkers in their arguments.  
45 While this is the prevalent view in the literature, the truth of this claim may not be regarded as self-evident.  However, 
in this regard, I am not referring to extraordinary cases in which a medical intervention is performed without the 
consent of an individual, in order to save his life.  Rather, I am referring to a situation in which individuals are forced 
against their will, either through covert or compulsory administration, to undergo a bioenhancement.  Persson and 
Savulescu’s suggestion of putting oxytocin in the drinking water in order to ensure universal coverage of moral 
bioenhancement would be an example of the latter (2008:174).   
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is necessary to investigate whether some of the confusion and lack of consensus in the debate may 
be attributed to the fact that what is at stake is not always explicitly and clearly identified.  In this 
regard, some clarification would be a worthwhile endeavour.  However, despite this confusion and 
ambiguity, one nevertheless has an intuition of what it is that could be eradicated, should the worst 
fears regarding moral bioenhancement be realised.  In this second part of chapter 4, I will address 
the way in which the concern for moral autonomy has been formulated, discussed and debated in 
the literature.  I will then synthesise these insights, along with relevant findings from chapters 2 
and 3, and develop them in chapter 5 to reach a clear conclusion regarding the concern for moral 
autonomy that is posed by moral bioenhancement.    
 
While there is an abundance of input addressing the concern for moral autonomy, most of the 
commentary in the literature engages with the arguments of Persson and Savulescu and the 
responses of Harris.  In section 4.5 I will therefore largely focus on the ongoing debate between 
these authors.  In section 4.6 I will re-examine the issue of the role of reasoning versus emotions 
in morality, particularly in terms of how Harris’ claims regarding the dangers associated with 
emotional modulation have been challenged by insights from the field of neuroscience.  However, 
these latter findings could indirectly support the claims that Harris has made elsewhere; namely, 
that what is needed is cognitive, rather than moral, bioenhancement.   
 
The concern for the impact of moral bioenhancement on moral autonomy may be addressed in two 
ways: it may be refuted, or, it can be justified.  In other words, one can either construct arguments 
as to why moral bioenhancement will, in fact, not produce the threats to autonomy that are feared, 
or, one can provide justifications for any potential impacts that do occur by identifying some good 
that will be realised, or some harm avoided.  In section 4.7 I will therefore discuss how Persson 
and Savulescu take the first approach, and how they challenge the claims that moral 
bioenhancement will impact moral autonomy.  A frequent argument provided by supporters of 
moral bioenhancement is that we do not regard the most virtuous among us as less free on account 
of their tendency to mostly do the morally right thing.  The argument would then go on to claim 
that, in a similar manner, we shouldn’t regard morally bioenhanced individuals as less free on 
account of their being less likely to perform morally harmful acts.  This distinction will be discussed 
in detail in section 4.7, in order to illustrate that the matter is not as straightforward as the 
proponents imply.  
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In section 4.8 I will address Persson and Savulescu’s arguments regarding the second approach, 
mentioned above, namely, the moral justifiability of impacts on moral autonomy, should they 
occur.  Here, their claim that well-being and safety must be balanced with the requirements of 
autonomy will be briefly discussed.  This will be followed by a discussion of various thought 
experiments that have been presented by the proponents of moral bioenhancement, the responses 
of opponents, and some insights from commentators on the issue of moral responsibility in general.  
These thought experiments are designed to illustrate the view that freedom does not necessarily 
require that one possesses alternative possibilities regarding action, a view that if true, would 
undermine Harris’ view that morality requires freedom to fall.  In section 4.8, I will also discuss 
Ronald Dworkin’s interpretation of John Stuart Mill’s distinction between liberty as licence and 
liberty as independence.  Harris utilises this distinction to illustrate what is actually at stake in the 
moral bioenhancement debate.  This distinction also merits discussion as Mill’s ideas may be 
appropriated by both sides of the debate, depending upon how liberty is interpreted.  I will then 
conclude the section with Persson and Savulescu’s interpretation of autonomy, a distinction that 
they make between subjective and objective alternatives for action, and the relevance this has for 
their understanding of autonomy.   
 
Section 4.9 includes a debate between DeGrazia, a proponent of moral bioenhancement, and Harris.  
DeGrazia argues that moral bioenhancement would meet three conditions required for autonomous 
action, to which Harris responds by arguing that whilst it would seem to be the case, the conditions 
would only be met due to the changes wrought by moral bioenhancement to fundamental 
dispositions.  To conclude the chapter, in section 4.10, I will present some other interpretations of 
freedom that have been identified in the literature.  Bublitz has identified the freedom of action and 
freedom of will as the two types of freedom that are engaged with by both proponents and 
opponents of moral bioenhancement.  There is, however, a third type of freedom, namely, the 
freedom of mind.  Bublitz argues that this type of freedom may well be impacted upon by moral 
bioenhancement and thus further investigation is required.   
 
4.5 Overview of the autonomy debate  
While Persson and Savulescu are the dominant proponents of moral bioenhancement, Douglas was 
the first thinker to address the possibility of biologically enhancing our morality46.  In his seminal 
                                                 
46 In a later paper, Douglas points out that his discussions of moral bioenhancement are not of pragmatic value, as he 
is not of the view that many individuals would willingly consent to be morally bioenhanced (2013:161).  Rather, he 
engages with the problematic in order to emphasise his disagreement with arguments that view all forms of moral 
bioenhancement as ethically problematic, in principle.   
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article on the subject, Douglas anticipates potential concerns regarding the fact that the 
enhancement of motives – his interpretation of what moral bioenhancement should target – could 
remove the ability to have, and act from, morally bad motives (Douglas, 2008:239).  However, 
depending on the way in which freedom is interpreted, Douglas argues that moral bioenhancement 
could, in fact, result in increases of freedom.  Regarding the concern for freedom, he concedes that 
while we may not see much worth in acting from morally bad motives, “the freedom to hold and 
act upon them is valuable” (Douglas, 2008:239).  However, he argues that if an individual has 
freely consented to moral bioenhancement, then the loss of this freedom would not, necessarily, be 
morally problematic.  Furthermore, he points out that the concern that moral bioenhancement will 
lessen or remove the freedom to act in accordance with morally questionable motives is based upon 
a particular conception of freedom as requiring “the absence of [both] external…[and] internal 
psychological constraints” (Douglas, 2008:240).  The concern is that while the actions of 
individuals who have freely consented to moral bioenhancement may be free from external 
constraints, they would, nevertheless, be subject to internal restrictions.   
 
Douglas posits that such a conception is generally associated with the view that the self consists of 
a “true or authentic self, and a brute self that is external to this true self” (2008:240).  The brute 
self would presumably consist of instinctual and emotional drives and urges.  Thus, an increase in 
freedom would be associated with permitting the true self to be unhindered from the influences of 
the emotionally driven brute self.  The concern, according to this conception, however, is that moral 
bioenhancement in affecting emotional responses would alter not only the brute self, but would, in 
some way, impact or subdue the true self.  However, Douglas disagrees with this interpretation, 
arguing that his conception of moral bioenhancement which would be directed towards lessening 
the force of counter-moral emotions, such as racial aversion towards out-groups, would produce 
the opposite effect.  It would work to enlarge the freedom of the true self due to the fact that it 
would lessen the force of the emotions associated with the brute self.   
 
Thus, moral bioenhancement could be regarded as a means of enlarging the “freedom to have and 
to act upon good motives…[rather than interpreted as means of lessening] freedom to have and to 
act upon bad ones” (Douglas, 2008:240).  However, while Douglas’ response may be relevant for 
those who do make such distinctions between a true and brute self, it is not self-evident that those 
who have a concern for the way in which moral bioenhancement will produce internal 
psychological constraints base their concerns on such a distinction.  Furthermore, Douglas’ 
response aside, such a distinction would be a problematic basis upon which to launch an argument 
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against moral bioenhancement, in the absence of a convincing account of human psychology and 
selfhood.  I would argue however, that there is merit in a more substantial account of the intuition 
that this distinction captures and will therefore develop this line of argumentation in detail in 
chapter 5.   
 
In the same year as Douglas’ first publication on the subject, Persson and Savulescu presented their 
arguments for moral bioenhancement, introducing the ideas that would come to dominate the 
debate.  As mentioned in chapter 1, in their seminal article they argue that cognitive enhancement 
presents an enormous risk to humanity as it will equip individuals with greater capabilities to exact 
massive harms on a global scale, potentially leading to ultimate harm.  Due to this risk, they 
conclude that cognitive enhancement should only be permitted if it occurs alongside compulsory 
moral bioenhancement (Persson & Savulescu, 2008:162).  While cognitive abilities are, of course, 
essential for moral judgements, they posit that there is more to morality than rational deliberation.  
The most pertinent claim that Persson and Savulescu make in this first publication on the issue, is 
that, contra Socrates, and in agreement with Douglas, morality requires not only finding out or 
knowing what the good is, but more importantly, being sufficiently motivated to act upon it 
(2008:173).  In the absence of the will, or motivation, to do what is right, they argue that morality 
is empty.  They see this lack of motivation as the major moral problem of the 21st century.  
Addressing it, they posit, would ‘solve’ a variety of problems facing humanity.   
 
As mentioned in previous chapters, Harris is renowned as a stanch supporter of biotechnological 
enhancement, and, in particular, of cognitive enhancement.  He has, however, critiqued moral 
bioenhancement, as presented by its supporters, on the grounds that it would not amount to a form 
of moral enhancement due to the fact that it would negatively impact upon our moral autonomy, 
where the latter is interpreted in terms of our ability to perform truly moral actions, rather than 
acting in a way that simply has moral consequences.  In light of this, Harris argues that the most 
reliable, comprehensive and safest forms of moral enhancement are the stalwart techniques that 
have long served humanity.  These include traditional mechanisms such as “socialization, 
education and parental supervision” (Harris, 2011:102).  In his first critique of Persson and 
Savulescu’s position in 2011, Harris presents an interesting approach to the issue of moral 
autonomy and the impact that moral bioenhancement could have on it.  He utilises a description 
from John Milton’s majestic, extended narrative poem Paradise Lost in which God is described as 
having “made…[man] just and right, sufficient to have stood, though free to fall” (Milton, 1667, in 
Harris, 2011:103).  In other words, Milton argues that human beings were created in such a way 
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that when faced with a choice between right and wrong, they possess sufficient moral capabilities 
to make the right choice; but, because they have freedom of choice, they also possess the ability to 
make the wrong choice.   
 
One of the crucial points of dispute in the moral bioenhancement debate hinges on this supposed 
‘sufficiency of humankind to stand’.  Harris does concede that the Miltonian claim that human 
beings were made “just and right” (in Harris, 2011:103) is a “vainglorious” (ibid.) one.  However, 
he also subtly contradicts himself when he argues that if we think of ourselves as the products, not 
of divine creation, but rather, as the outcome of the process of evolution, then it is clear that “we 
have certainly evolved to have a vigorous sense of justice and right, that is, with a virtuous sense 
of morality” (Harris, 2011:103).  However, Persson and Savulescu would dispute this conclusion.  
As discussed in chapter 1, the argument that they put forward, in multiple publications, is that our 
evolved moral capacities are not up to the task of addressing the problems that currently face 
humanity.  Their arguments in this regard are particularly convincing and this issue is therefore 
clearly a major point of contention in the debate which warrants further discussion than Harris has 
provided.  In other words, if Harris thinks that our morality is up to the task of addressing the 
problems that Persson and Savulescu outline, then he must provide more of an argument to support 
this position.   
 
With his use of Milton’s creation story, Harris is not attempting to provide a religious justification 
for his argument against moral bioenhancement.  Rather, he refers to this formulation because in 
his view it encapsulates, in the pithiest form, just what is at stake in the moral bioenhancement 
debate (Harris, 2011:102).  Milton’s sentiment regarding this matter is, however, not novel.  It is a 
long-held intuition, commonly known in theology as the free will defence.  The free will defence 
is a theodicy that is offered as an answer to the problem of evil.  The problem of evil has long 
served as a form of argumentation, or ‘proof’, against belief in the theistic God.  It points to the 
immense evil and suffering perpetrated, and experienced, in the world, and argues that if God were 
truly omnipotent, he would be able to intervene and prevent, if not all, but some of the more severe 
atrocities; and, if he was truly good, he would have the desire to intervene and protect his creations 
from the worst forms of suffering.  The fact that evil persists in the world implies that either God 
is not omnipotent, or that he is not truly good.  This leads to the conclusion that it is likely that the 
theistic God does not exist.   
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A theodicy, such as the free will defence, is a form of argument that aims to protect religious belief, 
as its goal is to somehow explain or reconcile the presence of evil in the world with the existence 
of the theistic God.  The Free will defence posits that in order to create true human agents, rather 
than puppets, God had to create us with free will, with the capability of choosing how we will act.  
However, in doing so, there was the risk that we subsequently possessed the freedom to do wrong, 
thereby bringing suffering and evil into the world.  Evil, according to this view, thus originates due 
to the requirement that for human beings to be truly human, they must be free to do wrong.  The 
deeper intuition that supports this argument is the view that true moral agents are of more intrinsic 
value than non-agents who are compelled to act in a particular manner.  This intuition can also be 
reformulated as the view that the choice to act in a morally preferable manner has more value if it 
is made in the face of temptation and the possibility that one could equally choose to do the wrong 
thing.  These are deep-rooted, long-standing human intuitions regarding moral autonomy that are 
difficult to challenge and they provide impetus to Harris’ argument.  However, they also serve to 
obfuscate some of the relatively unsupported claims that Harris makes, such as whether or not 
moral bioenhancement would, in fact, subvert moral autonomy as decisively as he implies.   
 
Returning to Milton’s description of the requirements of moral autonomy, Harris argues that it 
perfectly encapsulates “the human condition and…the precious nature of freedom and in particular 
free will” (2011:103).  The nature of autonomy “requires not only the possibility of falling but the 
freedom to choose to fall” (ibid.).  Harris argues that the kinds of purported moral bioenhancements 
currently discussed in the literature are “unlikely to leave us…free to fall” (2011:104).  As 
mentioned in previous chapters, Harris is a rationalist, and this clearly informs his view on the 
nature of morality.  Contrary to Persson and Savulescu, he argues that moral acumen does not 
involve “‘being better at being good’, rather it is being better at knowing the good and 
understanding what is likely to conduce to the good” (ibid.).  Furthermore, Harris posits that 
freedom lies in “the space between knowing the good and doing the good” (ibid.).  While Persson 
and Savulescu’s focus is on how the biological enhancement of motivation could close this space, 
Harris implies that the traditional ways of attempting to close this space are preferable, due to the 
fact that because they involve rational deliberation, rather than compulsion, they are freedom-
preserving.  
 
While Harris associates doing good with knowing what is good, he doesn’t hold an entirely Socratic 
view regarding morality, as he acknowledges the existence of the above-mentioned, sometimes 
unpredictable, gap between knowing and doing what is good.  He briefly explores possible 
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explanations for why this gap exists, describing it as possibly indicative of the presence of a 
weakness of will, the term identified by the ancient Greeks as akrasia (Harris, 2011:104).  Akrasia 
occurs when one is fully cognisant of what the morally correct – or preferable, in a non-moral 
sense, as akrasia afflicts not only moral action – course of action would be; but, for various, 
seemingly inexplicable reasons, one refrains from enacting it.  As Akrasia is thus somewhat 
mysterious, as it cannot simply be attributed to the presence of competing options, temptations or 
simply a weak moral character; it may be rooted in complex aspects of human psychology47.  
However, the importance of attempting to more adequately understand this realm in which akrasia 
operates, which is one and the same space that Harris refers to above, is paramount for the moral 
bioenhancement problematic and thus cannot be glossed over.   
 
As recognised by Rakić, and mentioned in section 2.3.1, this “discrepancy between what we do 
and what we believe is right to do might be the greatest predicament of our existence as moral 
beings” (2012:120).  Clearly – and despite Harris’ optimism regarding the matter – there are many 
thinkers who are of the view that this area of our moral development remains lacking.  However, 
for Harris, regardless of whether or not we may fail miserably at closing this gap between knowing 
and doing the good, our moral freedom that lies in this gap is paramount as it is the prerequisite for 
morality itself.  Harris’ concern is that moral bioenhancement would be akin to moral compulsion.  
He argues that “without the freedom to fall, good cannot be a choice; and freedom disappears and 
along with it virtue.  There is no virtue in doing what you must” (Harris, 2011:204).   
 
4.6 The emotion/reason dichotomy revisited  
Harris reaffirms his rationalist proclivities in his discussion of Douglas’ argument for the mitigation 
of counter-moral emotions as a form of moral bioenhancement.  In particular, he examines the 
claim that a potential candidate for moral bioenhancement, in this regard, would be the impulse 
towards racial aversion.  Harris is of the view that beliefs, such as those that inform racial aversion, 
are not emotionally rooted but are rather cognitive in nature.  In other words, he regards such beliefs 
as based upon incorrect factual content regarding the groups in question.  Thus, directly modulating 
emotions would simply sidestep these false beliefs and biases, or the faulty process of deliberation 
that may have informed such beliefs, rather than correcting them.  In this regard, he argues that the 
most “obvious countermeasure to [such] false beliefs and prejudices is a combination of rationality 
                                                 
47 There are a variety of conflicting theories that attempt to explain the sources of akrasia.  See Mele, 1983; Davidson, 
1980; Ainslie, 2001.   
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and education” (Harris, 2011:105).  Here, he includes cognitive enhancement as a possibly helpful 
tool.   
 
For Harris, a moral action that occurs without any, or sufficient, rational deliberation – as he posits 
would be the case with an intervention that seemingly bypasses this process – is not a moral action 
at all.  Of course, a possible response to Harris’ concern that rational deliberation would be 
bypassed would be to point out that in the case of voluntary moral bioenhancement, the decision to 
undergo moral bioenhancement would presumably be due to having recognised that one is, in some 
way, in need of moral bioenhancement to begin with.  Thus, agreeing to moral bioenhancement in 
the first place would indicate that, in all likelihood, this decision would have been informed by a 
process of deliberation, namely, the realisation of the possible falsity or problematic nature of 
certain beliefs that one has, such as those informing any racial biases, despite the grip that they 
exert on the individual, and the desire to change these beliefs.   
 
This response aside, as mentioned in previous chapters, for Harris, mitigating counter-moral 
emotions does not constitute genuine moral enhancement.  His arguments elsewhere are interesting 
in pinpointing just how he thinks moral bioenhancement would erode human morality, by 
compromising our moral autonomy.  Chan and Harris discuss the work of the neuroscientist Molly 
Crockett who, as mentioned in section 2.4.2 of chapter 2, has investigated the effects of serotonin 
on moral judgement (2011).  Crockett’s experiments show that administering serotonin to subjects 
increases both “pro-social behaviour” (Chan & Harris, 2011:130) and their disinclination to effect 
harm upon others.  Ostensibly, an intervention that increases cooperation between individuals and 
results in them being less likely to wish to harm each other may appear to be an obvious moral 
enhancement.  However, while Chan and Harris view such an intervention as influencing 
behaviour, they do not see the resultant behaviour as “moral behaviour” (2011:130).  They argue 
that such behaviour may have moral consequences, however, this is not sufficient for it being moral 
itself.   
 
The primary problem that Chan and Harris have with viewing SSRIs as potential moral enhancers 
is that they argue that what SSRIs actually do is heighten the relevant feelings or emotions, such as 
empathy, associated with pro-sociability (2011:130).  The reasons provided for any behavioural 
changes brought about due to such interventions would then have little genuine cognitive content.  
Rather, they would track the intensity of feelings, or emotional response, to a possible course of 
action.  Although Chan and Harris do admit that research in the field of neuroscience indicates that 
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moral responses are a product of both affective and cognitive components, they nevertheless 
conclude that “of the two, it must be reasoning that pulls in the direction of morality” (2011:130).  
When an individual makes a moral judgement, she must generally adjudicate between competing 
options.  She may, of course, assess these options through examining her emotional responses to 
the various possible courses of action.  However, to actually make her final decision, she must be 
able to deliberate the reliability of her emotional responses in terms of how various potential 
courses of action support other important morally relevant factors.  Examples of such factors 
include whether or not the potential courses of action support “principles…values…and…moral 
objectives” (Chan & Harris, 2011:130) that she identifies with, her moral code in other words.  
Furthermore, she will then assess all of the above in terms of relevant contextual factors through 
the “use [of] moral reasoning” (ibid.)   
 
Chan and Harris then conclude by arguing that in cases where serotonin has been administered, 
with the effect of, for example, increasing pro-sociability or harm aversion, these increases will 
somehow thwart, or weaken, the cognitive components of the process.  In other words, they will 
interfere with the individual’s application of her pre-existing moral code to competing options as 
well as her ability to weigh up and assess the potential courses of action against relevant contextual 
factors.  Chan and Harris are of the view that in such cases, the individual will be compelled, 
presumably due to the strength of her emotional responses, to ignore the above-mentioned 
cognitive and deliberative component of the process.  Rather, they posit that under the influence of 
serotonin, the individual’s decision will be the product of a second check of her emotional 
responses, with the final choice based upon that decision which elicits the strongest emotional 
reaction.   
 
As mentioned in chapter 3, they argue that this is akin to Wittgenstein’s example of buying a second 
copy of the same newspaper to verify what one has read in the first newspaper.  While the individual 
may believe that she is making a free moral choice, the intensity of emotional reaction will render 
a truly freely made moral choice impossible.  Thus, the overriding of reason by emotion is 
something that Harris seems to think will be an inevitable result of moral bioenhancement.  In a 
later publication, he asks “if the good involves feeling the right way, how do we know that we are 
feeling the right way?” (Harris, 2013b:171).  To express this idea in a slightly different manner, 
Harris implies that the moral decisions that inform our actions must rely upon something other than 
our emotional states which are predominantly internal states.  There must be interplay between 
these internal states and an external reality, with relevant contextual factors taken into 
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consideration, otherwise decisions will be based upon a reinforcing internal loop of emotion, with 
no way of assessing the legitimacy of the latter.  
 
Harris is correct in his argument that morality should never be solely a matter of emotional 
response48 due to the fact that our emotions are frequently informed by prejudices, unquestioned 
assumptions and a variety of other arbitrary influences.  However, one must inquire as to whether 
serotonin, or any other SSRI, for that matter, would, in fact, produce the effects that Chan and 
Harris fear, if used for enhancement rather than therapeutic purposes.  It seems doubtful in light of 
the millions of individuals who currently take SSRIs to treat conditions such as depression and 
anxiety, without the seemingly obvious bypassing of their rational deliberative capacities.  
Furthermore, as discussed in section 3.2 of chapter 3, Harris has been criticised for not paying 
adequate attention to neuroscientific findings regarding the way in which moral decisions are 
actually made and the important role of affective components in this regard (Crockett et al., 
2010:E184).  As pointed out by Persson and Savulescu, findings in the field of neuroscience are 
beginning to shed light on long-held ethics disputes. One such dispute that has been debunked, was 
mentioned in section 2.4.2 of chapter 2, namely, the position that views Kantian ethics as primarily 
reason-based, while consequentialist judgements are viewed as predominantly driven by affective 
components.  Research has illustrated that the opposite is the case.  Experiments utilising functional 
magnetic resonance imagining (fMRI) of the brain, showed that brain areas associated with 
emotion were far more active when making deontological, supposedly reason-based, judgements 
than when making consequentialist or utilitarian ones, which elicit a more calculative or rational 
response (Greene et al., 2001:2106).   
 
Furthermore, as Singer discusses, generally when we provide what we think to be legitimate 
reasons for a morally relevant opinion that we hold, they are likely to be post hoc rationalisations 
for what is actually an “initial intuitive [or gut] response” (2005:350), that is, in all likelihood, 
informed by evolutionary origins.  Haidt has described this as a situation in which “the emotional 
dog…[is wagging its] rational tail” (2001:814).  One way in which this is illustrated is discussed 
by Singer who argues that when faced with a course of action we find morally abhorrent, such as 
an account of a once-off occurrence of incest involving mutually consenting adults, we are very 
skilled at providing practical and seemingly intelligible reasons to illustrate why it is wrong 
                                                 
48 But to be fair to Persson and Savulescu they have never argued for this position.  They have frequently mentioned 
that rational deliberation is a necessary component of moral decision-making.  However, presumably by identifying 
emotions as the target of moral bioenhancement, Harris views them as simply paying lip service to the importance of 
rational deliberation in moral decision-making.   
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(2005:337).  We may, for example, argue that it is wrong because a child might be conceived or 
one of the individuals may feel uncomfortable with the act.  However, even if each of these practical 
concerns are decisively debunked, we are told that contraception is being utilised and that there is 
genuine consent by both parties involved, we will generally persist with our opinion that a practice 
such as this is just simply wrong.  Here is a clear example of a strongly held belief that is based 
upon an intuition or taboo which has evolutionary origins.  The relevance of the above points for 
Harris’ argument, is, that he is, in all likelihood, underestimating the role that emotional responses 
already play in our moral decision-making and, in turn, overestimating the role played by 
rationality, or at least a detached Kantian type of rationality, in this process49.  Of course, if this is 
true, Harris could then respond by arguing that it supports his argument that what is actually needed 
is cognitive, rather than emotional or moral, bioenhancement. 
 
4.7 Will moral bioenhancement impair moral autonomy? 
Persson and Savulescu have responded in a number of publications to Harris’ initial critique of 
their argument, specifically his use of Milton’s conception of freedom.  They posit that Harris has 
exaggerated the effects that moral bioenhancement would have on moral decision-making, 
describing his concerns as “extreme, perhaps hyperbolic” (Savulescu & Persson, 2012:403).  They 
argue that this is specifically true of his fear that moral bioenhancement would somehow eradicate 
our moral autonomy, by rendering us simply unable to do wrong.  As alluded to above, there are 
two ways of responding to concerns such as those that Harris puts forward.  Firstly, one can 
investigate the nature of moral decision-making in order to work out whether the type of moral 
bioenhancement interventions that are proposed would, in fact, have the effects that Harris fears.  
Secondly, one can take an entirely different, albeit more controversial, approach and ask a different 
kind of question.  If moral bioenhancement did, in fact, produce the effects that Harris fears, would 
this “be a bad thing all things considered?” (Savulescu & Persson, 2012:402).  Savulescu and 
Persson investigate both options.   
 
In terms of the first way of responding to the concern for moral autonomy, Persson and Savulescu 
discuss the nature of moral action, pointing out that one’s view of what is considered a morally 
                                                 
49 This should not imply moral scepticism, as Singer points out.  In other words, it is not that we must accept the 
position that what we take to be our moral deliberations are simply the product of “emotionally based intuitive 
responses” (Singer, 2005:351) justified by reasons and arguments constructed after the fact.  Rather, it is to 
acknowledge the role play by emotions in our moral deliberations.  Furthermore, we could attempt to distinguish those 
“moral judgements that we owe to our evolutionary and cultural history, from those that have a rational basis” (ibid.).  
Singer argues that the “axioms” of utilitarianism would be an example of the latter as the admonishment to hold the 
happiness of all human beings as equally important would have been at odds with the evolutionary mechanism of 
natural selection to observe altruism towards only one’s kin.   
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good act is directly informed by the moral theory one espouses (Savulescu & Persson, 2012:403).  
For example, when faced with a decision that has moral relevance, a utilitarian would choose the 
action that produces the most favourable long-term consequences for all individuals affected.  This 
is decided by balancing the utility produced by an action over any potential suffering that may 
result.  Furthermore, utilitarianism operates from a foundation of absolute equality whereby each 
individual’s utility must be given commensurate weight.  With this interpretation of what is 
considered morally good, a utilitarian would approach a project of moral bioenhancement in a 
particular manner.  Such an enhancement would firstly include cognitive enhancement in order to 
be able to make a more reliable analysis of the potential consequences produced by an action.  
Secondly, it would require improvements in “impulse control” (ibid.) in order to ensure that one is 
sufficiently motivated to perform the act that is considered to be morally correct.  Thirdly, and most 
important for utilitarianism, an intervention would have to assist in boosting the disposition of 
selflessness, as the action considered to be the most morally optimal could be one that is less 
beneficial, and thus less desirable, for the individual concerned.   
 
As discussed in previous chapters, Savulescu and Persson associate this quality of selflessness, or 
ability to consider the interests of others, with a sense of altruism, one of the dispositions they target 
for moral bioenhancement.  Furthermore, as Savulescu and Persson point out, the requirement to 
set aside one’s own interests in order to consider the wellbeing of others is not specific to 
utilitarianism, but is rather a dictate of morality in general (2012:403).  Of course, moral theories 
do differ regarding the degree of observance they place on this requirement for selflessness or 
altruism; with utilitarianism being considered the most demanding moral theory in this regard 
(Savulescu and Persson, 2012:403)50.  Nevertheless, Savulescu and Persson argue that “increasing 
the willingness to sacrifice one’s own interests for the benefit of others is a moral enhancement, on 
any account of morality” (2012:404).  Focusing on a particular trait or moral disposition that is 
universal to all accounts of moral action, as a target for moral bioenhancement, in the way that 
Savulescu and Persson do, helps them avoid the thorny meta-ethical issue of having to justify a 
particular moral theory.   
 
They then look at the question of whether increasing our levels of altruism would somehow produce 
the effects that concern Harris.  In other words, if we were morally bioenhanced to, for example, 
be more selfless and compassionate towards others and to make sacrifices that may, to a certain 
                                                 
50 This point was discussed in the conclusion of chapter 2 when I provided a working definition for moral 
bioenhancement that includes a reference to empathy, interpreted as closely associated with the quality of selflessness.   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
129 
 
extent, impinge upon our own degree of comfort but would produce favourable aggregate level 
improvements, would this compromise something intrinsically valuable to us, namely, our 
morality?  To rephrase the question, would making ourselves more altruistic, than we otherwise 
would be if no intervention had taken place, somehow compromise our moral autonomy?  Would 
we still have the choice to decide whether or not to act in a particular manner; in other words, to 
choose not to be altruistic?   
 
It seems that for Harris to be satisfied that our moral autonomy remains intact, the choice to not be 
altruistic in any given situation would have to be preserved.  However, if this choice is truly 
preserved, and individuals could easily choose to do wrong after having been morally bioenhanced, 
or at least choose to not act upon their boosted altruism, we would have to ask if moral 
bioenhancement had actually taken place.  It seems that, at the very least, to be truly considered as 
a moral bioenhancement, an intervention would have to increase the probability that individuals 
will act upon the enhanced dispositions.  This problem lies at the heart of the matter.  As has already 
been mentioned in previous chapters, Persson and Savulescu are quick to use particular examples 
to counter these concerns.  They point out that we do not consider women less morally free than 
men because they are generally predisposed to exhibit more empathy than men (Persson & 
Savulescu, 2012:112)51.  Furthermore, we do not consider individuals who display high levels of 
altruism and compassion for others to be less morally free than the majority of individuals who 
place a premium upon their own levels of wellbeing over the wellbeing of others (Persson & 
Savulescu, 2012:112) 
 
Persson and Savulescu argue that in the case of the enhancement of empathy, it is unlikely that 
individuals would be overwhelmed with emotion, thereby being reduced to the status of automata 
(Persson & Savulescu, 2013:128).  Rather, it could be the case that after such an enhancement, they 
would simply be acting “for the same reasons as those of us who are most moral today do, and the 
sense in which it is ‘impossible’ that they do what they regard as immoral will be the same for the 
morally enhanced as for the garden-variety virtuous person: it is psychologically or motivationally 
‘impossible’” (Persson & Savulescu, 2013:128).  Thus, they are of the view that any loss of freedom 
produced by moral bioenhancement will be similar in kind to the supposed lack of freedom that 
truly virtuous individuals experience in their feelings that it would be impossible to commit certain 
                                                 
51 Whether or not the tendency to be more empathetic is a product of a biological predisposition or socialisation is 
beside the point.  Rather, what is important here is that given that we agree that women are in general more empathetic 
than men, do we regard them as less morally free in some way.   
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immoral acts.  However, they argue that we would never regard such individuals as lacking in 
freedom (Savulescu, Douglas & Persson, 2014:101).   
 
Harris has argued, however, that freedom to fall is not akin to possessing the “ability to act 
otherwise” (2014:373), as some of his critics imply.  He agrees with Persson and Savulescu (2014) 
and DeGrazia (2014) that I may consider myself unable to murder someone I love due to the fact 
that I have inculcated the belief that killing someone who is innocent and whom I love is wrong.  
In such a situation, I am incapable of acting otherwise, as killing an innocent or loved one is an 
impossibility for me; it is simply not an option for action.  Freedom to fall, on the other hand entails 
my possessing “the freedom to decide whether or not to fall for reasons, which have to do with 
what is best ‘all things considered’” (Harris, 2014:373).  For Harris, moral bioenhancement would 
threaten this ability to make all things considered judgements, and thus, would threaten moral 
autonomy.  What he means by this is that rather than acting upon reasons or a process of moral 
deliberation, we will act according to the intensity of our emotional responses, which are not always 
reliable, and more importantly, for Harris, are simply not the substance of morality.   
 
However, various examples have been discussed by the proponents of moral bioenhancement to 
illustrate why Harris is mistaken in this regard.  Savulescu and Persson discuss an individual who 
is concerned for how little he is moved by the plight of the poor, and in particular, a beggar he 
encounters on a daily basis (2012:407).  Upon taking a moral enhancement drug that boosts his 
altruism levels, he subsequently feels more compassion for others, which leads him to have a keener 
sense of how it would be to have nothing and to have to rely on others.  However, the individual 
has a pre-existing general belief that the best option is not to give money to people who beg as they 
may use it to purchase alcohol or drugs which would be detrimental to their health.  Therefore, 
based upon this belief, which is a product of his having morally deliberated, the individual rather 
decides to buy food for the beggar.   
 
Savulescu and Persson see this example as indicating that Harris’ fears are unfounded.  They posit 
that the moral enhancement drug that was taken, acted “like a pair of ‘moral spectacles’ clarifying 
his vision of the other” (2012:407).  Rather than acting mindlessly in the way that Harris fears, the 
individual has still employed his deliberative capacities and acted upon a previously held cognitive 
belief regarding the most effective way of helping those in need.  In other words, he has legitimate 
reasons for his action; what has changed, is that because he is now able to empathise more, this 
makes it harder for him to simply ignore the beggar and do nothing.  Another way of articulating 
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this point is that by boosting the feeling of sympathy, we are increasing “the probability that we do 
what we believe that we ought” (Persson & Savulescu, 2016:264).  Persson and Savulescu see an 
increase in the likelihood of individuals doing what they morally should do as an obvious example 
of a moral enhancement (2016:264)52.   
 
While it is true that we wouldn’t necessarily regard the individual in Persson and Savulescu’s 
example as lacking in freedom, their claim is only true for this kind of example.  In other words, it 
is true only for cases in which individuals have pre-existing beliefs that may not be strong enough 
to motivate action, but are nevertheless present.  In their example, Persson and Savulescu describe 
the individual as being concerned by the lack of empathy he feels for the poor.  Thus, he is acting 
upon a belief that he already has, albeit one that possesses insufficient motivational force.  He has 
problematised his lack of empathy enough to undergo moral bioenhancement, thus implying that 
he regards experiencing empathy for the poor as a good and worthwhile disposition to have.  There 
is, however, a different scenario that Persson and Savulescu have not accounted for.  If, before 
being morally bioenhanced, an individual did not regard helping the poor as a moral obligation, or 
simply as a good and worthwhile thing to do, but then, after being morally bioenhanced, for 
unrelated reasons, and on the basis of increases in empathy, felt compelled to assist them, the 
process of reasoning would be entirely different in comparison to an individual who assists the 
poor due to a weak, but pre-existing belief.  Thus, Persson and Savulescu’s argument that Harris’ 
fears regarding compulsion are unfounded, holds for those who have a weak belief that helping the 
poor is a worthwhile endeavour, where such a belief is not strong enough to motivate them.   
However, in the case of an enhanced individual who has never possessed such a belief, and who 
then comes to the realisation that it is right to help others who are less fortunate, purely as a result 
of an intervention, this would be a different matter.  This is an important point that I will develop 
further in chapter 5b.   
 
Returning to the point that Harris makes regarding the ability to make all things considered 
judgements, Savulescu and Persson’s discussion of their example glosses over another important 
point that may be made regarding sympathy.  Harris argues that a feeling of sympathy for the poor 
                                                 
52 Of course, whether this would be true would depend on contextual factors.  History is littered with examples of 
atrocities committed by individuals who believe that they are doing what they morally ought to do.  Therefore, this 
interpretation of moral enhancement requires further substantive content.  For example, to be considered as a moral 
enhancement, an intervention would have to increase the likelihood that individuals will do what they morally ought 
to do, in accordance with those moral principles most likely to have universal support.  As mentioned in chapter 2, 
they do qualify their definition in a later publication, by adding that acting “morally…[occurs] when one does the right 
thing, and for the right reason(s).” (Savulescu, Douglas & Persson, 2014:95).  They also admit that this qualification 
would be dependent on what one’s interpretation is regarding “right action and right motivation” (ibid.) 
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should not be the source of my deliberating that I should thus assist them in some way (Harris, 
2013b:172).  Rather, it is my considered judgement that the poor require assistance, and, that 
regardless of my feelings on the subject, it is the right thing to provide assistance to them, that 
should elicit feelings of sympathy (2013b:172).  In other words, sympathy comes after the fact.   
 
Furthermore, Savulescu and Persson’s example fails to adequately engage with some other 
important points that should be addressed.  Firstly, it seems that reason-responsiveness is only part 
of what makes an action morally autonomous.  In the case of an individual who was opposed to 
giving help to the poor before his enhancement, he would presumably be able to come up with 
reasons to explain his changed behaviour after the enhancement.  However, whereas before the 
enhancement, his reasons would have explained his opposition to giving help to the poor, he would 
now have different reasons.  Furthermore, this change in his reasons would be entirely due to the 
enhancement and would therefore be a case of post hoc rationalisation.  Before the enhancement, 
the individual may have justified his decision to ignore the beggar in a variety of ways.  He could, 
for example, argue that giving help is pointless as it would make no discernible difference in the 
life of the beggar who will always require more help.  Or, he could argue that his lack of empathy 
for the beggar is rational, as she could, in all likelihood, alleviate her situation and will be less 
likely to do so if she receives regular help from strangers.  The important point here is that the 
enhanced individual in this example would never have possessed the belief, or come to the 
realisation, that it is right, to help others who are less fortunate and this is perhaps what perturbs 
Harris.  It is not simply the presence of some, or any, cognitive content that is required for an action 
to be moral in the sense that Harris interprets it, but rather, an action should be motivated by the 
‘correct’, or appropriate, moral belief, where correct and appropriate imply the most reasonable 
belief.   
 
While it could be argued that whichever belief the individual possesses, and uses to justify his lack 
of giving help to the beggar, is already the product of an emotional response, this is not the entire 
story.  On the one hand, beliefs are not entirely socially constructed; they are also influenced by 
temperament or psychological dispositions in general.  In our story, the individual could have low 
levels of empathy.  On the other hand, and as highlighted in the discussion of narrative identity, 
given knowledge of the individual’s life story – and absent of any psychopathology – we would be 
able to provide a narrative that would explain his beliefs and link them to discernible sources, even 
if this could not be done perfectly.  Possible contenders for the sources of such beliefs would be 
vast and complex.  An obvious example would be the nature of the moral education that he had 
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received, including the behaviour of role models in his upbringing, and the extent to which he 
internalised this behaviour.  The important point, as stated above, is that after the moral 
enhancement, he would now possess new reasons for his change in behaviour.  These may be 
entirely legitimate reasons, such as a new belief that it is good to help those who are less fortunate, 
or, that one would want to receive similar help if one was in such a position.  However, the actual 
reason for any change in his beliefs would be the administering of the moral enhancement.   
 
It must be noted that the fact that the individual has experienced a change in the reasons he uses to 
justify his behaviour is not problematic in itself.  Whilst changes in deeper and more enduring 
moral beliefs53 are rarer, individuals are inured to frequent changes in their interpretations of 
phenomena.  The latter generally occurs when more information is acquired, thus leading to the 
individual possessing a more comprehensive overview of a situation or phenomenon.  However, 
along with any new beliefs and concomitant reasons for these beliefs, regarding one’s new stance 
towards assisting those who are less fortunate, one would have to admit an additional reason 
regarding why one’s beliefs have changed.  This additional reason would be associated with the 
knowledge that one has undergone a moral bioenhancement.   
 
Thus, Harris seems to be getting at something with his concern that moral bioenhancement would 
impact or alter morality, as we conceive it, in some way.  It is not that that moral bioenhancements 
would result in compulsive behaviour that is devoid of rational explanations.  Rather, the concern 
is for the way in which moral bioenhancement would influence how we come to change our beliefs 
regarding right or wrong, that motivate subsequent behaviour, that seems to be an important matter.  
There does seem to be a non-trivial difference between a change in beliefs due to having acquired 
additional contextual information, or, having experienced a paradigm shifting event, and a change 
in belief due to a biological intervention.  However, I would argue that where there is a weak pre-
existing belief that is strengthened by moral bioenhancement, this would not necessarily be 
problematic, whereas in cases in which the process of moral bioenhancement supplanted one belief 
with an opposing one, this would be cause for concern.  I will elucidate this matter further in chapter 
5b.   
 
 
                                                 
53 By deeper and more enduring beliefs, I mean beliefs that are considered important to an individual, regarding what 
she considers to be right and wrong, and that are relatively impervious to major change without a vast upheaval in 
personal identity.   
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4.8 Are impacts on moral autonomy morally justifiable? 
As mentioned at the beginning of section 4.7, there is a second possible way of responding to the 
claim that moral bioenhancement will threaten moral autonomy.  One could argue that even if 
moral bioenhancement did, in fact, produce the effects that Harris fears, this could be morally 
justifiable.  Here, Savulescu and Persson introduce their well-known, and highly controversial, 
hypothesis, the God machine.  This hypothesis merits discussion, not on practical grounds, but due 
to the theoretical insights it affords into the issue of moral bioenhancement and moral autonomy.  
In other words, while it is a highly implausible idea that would be more appropriate in a dystopic 
novel, it is useful as it makes explicit the ideas underlying Savulescu and Persson’s position.   
 
4.8.1 The God machine  
Savulescu and Persson imagine a futuristic “bioquantum computer” (2012:408) that is connected 
to the consciousness of all human beings and is able to somehow track “the thoughts, beliefs, 
desires and intentions of every human being” (2012:408).  In the event that the machine perceives 
an intention to cause a serious harm to another individual, it is able to intervene instantly and alter 
this intention, unbeknown to the individual in question.  In this way, the machine has eradicated 
serious interpersonal harms such as murder, rape and grievous bodily harm.  While the machine 
does not intervene for smaller crimes or misdemeanours, there is subsequently less need for 
incarceration as greater harms simply cannot be perpetrated.  Savulescu and Persson argue that in 
this futuristic hypothesis, morality is still possible, because if individuals opt to do good, or refrain 
from committing harm, they are doing so entirely freely as the machine only intervenes in the event 
that a decision has been made to commit a serious harm.  They point out at that before the advent 
of the machine, punitive laws deterred people from performing harmful acts, and, in this regard, 
their freedom was not absolute.  In fact, they posit that freedom has been increased due to the fact 
that fewer people languish in prison for extended periods of times.  The difference between 
deterrence via punishment and the world of the God machine, is that it is now “literally impossible 
to do…[certain] things” (Savulescu & Persson, 2012:408).  A person experiences the intervention 
as simply “chang[ing their] mind[s]” (Savulescu & Persson, 2012:408).  Savulescu and Persson 
concede that the God machine wouldn’t be a true moral enhancement as people could still have an 
intention to do wrong; their intention would simply be changed as soon as it was formed.  However, 
they argue that so long as individuals had voluntarily signed up to the machine, autonomy would 
be preserved.  In other words, voluntarily connecting to the machine would be a kind of 
“precommitment contract” (2012:409)  
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To explain the idea of a precommitment contract and illustrate how such a contract would be 
freedom preserving, Savulescu and Persson utilise the tale of Ulysses and the Sirens from Homer’s 
Odyssey (Homer, 2004, in 2012:409-410).  Ulysses was preparing to sail past the legendary region 
of the Sirens, whose voices were so bewitchingly beautiful that they hypnotised all men to go 
willingly to their deaths.  He desired to hear this exquisite sound but wished to do so safely, and 
therefore, instructed his men to block their ears with wax to ensure that they wouldn’t be able to 
hear the compelling, but deathly, siren songs.  Ulysses, his ears unblocked, was bound to the mast, 
having given his men strict instructions to ignore his commands to release him.  Once he heard the 
sirens, he predictably begged for his freedom.  However, his men held steadfast to his first 
command to ignore him should he beg to be untied and he passed safely through the area.   
 
Savulescu and Persson view this anecdote as effectively illustrating a situation in which an 
individual – after assessing the relevant factual information – makes a fully autonomous decision 
that will be binding, regarding a future state of affairs, in which he may later decide otherwise.  
Another example of such a scenario would be in individual who has recently ceased smoking and 
asks a friend to ensure that she refrains from smoking at a party.  Here, the individual has 
formulated a considered desire to continue her abstinence from smoking, however, she foresees 
that her resolve may weaken in a future situation and puts a mechanism in place to ensure that her 
freedom will be curtailed should this happen.  In other words, should she desire to smoke at the 
party, she recognises this will be a temporary desire that is at odds with her overarching desire to 
stop smoking.  Both of these examples are indicative of what Savulescu and Persson describe as 
having an “obstructive or irrational desire which goes against…[a person’s] best judgement” 
(2012:409).  If we use these insights in terms of Savulescu and Persson’s God machine example, 
the implication is that agreeing to connect to the God machine is congruent with having an 
overriding desire to not commit an act of interpersonal harm, and thus, being willing to surrender 
a portion of one’s freedom to harm, should that desire arise later.   
 
Harris argues, however, that the analogy is an inappropriate one to explicate their God Machine 
hypothesis.  He argues that agreeing to hook yourself up to the God Machine would be akin to 
being free “to sell yourself into slavery” (Harris, 2016:106).  Freely selling yourself into slavery is 
generally considered to be paradoxical.  For Harris, freely hooking yourself up to the God Machine 
would be a similar paradox.  Sparrow has also discussed this concern.  He argues that freedom can 
be interpreted, as Philip Pettit has done, as requiring “non-domination” (1997:21 in Sparrow, 
2014a:27).  To illustrate this claim, he describes a slave who is under the dominion of a master, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
136 
 
who happens to be good-hearted.  At any moment, the master may wield his power and thus 
interfere and control any, and every, aspect of the slave’s life.  The fact that the master refrains 
from doing so is merely a happy coincidence, as he could just as easily not have been good-hearted.  
As Pettit argues, most would agree that such a slave is not free; he only appears to be free.  While, 
in the case of the example, he is able to lead his life as he sees fit, he nevertheless remains in the 
power of his master.  He is, at all times, “subject to his [master’s] power – regardless of whether 
or not he exercises it” (in Sparrow, 2014a:27).  In a similar manner, and regardless of the fact that 
the God machine would only intervene in cases where serious harms are about to be committed, 
any individual hooked up to the machine would be under its power.   
 
4.8.2 First and second-order desires   
Harris and Sparrow’s concerns aside, Savulescu and Persson’s discussion of the possibility of 
having conflicting desires merits further discussion.  In fact, this notion of conflicting desires was 
first discussed by Harry Frankfurt in his account of autonomy that has since come to be known as 
a hierarchical account of autonomy (1971).  In attempting to define what confers autonomy, and 
thus, personhood, Frankfurt distinguishes between “first…[and] second-order desires” (1971:5-7).  
All sentient creatures have some form of will that drives them and can be understood as being 
constituted by their “desires and motives” (Frankfurt, 1971:6) which inform, or drive, the decisions 
that they make.  These desires can be described as first-order desires, that, in their simplest 
description, are indicative of wanting “to do or not to do one thing or another” (Frankfurt, 1971:7).  
Humans, however, are unique in that they are seemingly the only creatures who, in addition to these 
first-order desires, are able to form opinions about their desires.  This is by way of the uniquely 
human ability for self-reflection.  Frankfurt calls these second-order desires or volitions (1971:7).   
 
In other words, human beings are able to have desires, but, through self-awareness, they are also 
able to form preferences about their desires.  They can realise that some of their desires are desires 
that they would rather not have.  As Frankfurt succinctly puts it, human beings are “capable of 
wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes from what they are” (1971:7).  In terms 
of the above examples, the identifiable second order desires would be the desire to act morally and 
not harm others, to not succumb to the Sirens’ call and thus to certain death, and to refrain from 
smoking.  The more primal, first order desires or drives would be the momentary desire to commit 
harm or do wrong, to hear and act upon the Siren’s song and to smoke at the party.   
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If we are to agree with Frankfurt and take second-order desires as constitutive of personhood, then, 
by implication, altering these desires would be problematic and inimical to autonomy, as self-
determination, whereas altering first-order desires could be viewed as an enlargement of autonomy.  
In the case of moral bioenhancement, as pointed out by Hubbeling, we would have to ensure that 
it would not, in any way, alter second-order desires (2009:188).  While Frankfurt’s distinction 
makes intuitive sense, there are problems that plague such accounts.  I will discuss this matter fully 
in chapter 5a, as despite the above-mentioned problems his account has major relevance for the 
issue at hand. 
 
Returning to the God machine example, in the case of agreeing to hook oneself up to the machine, 
distinguishing between first and second-order desires would not be as straightforward a matter.  
This is because the second-order desire to hook yourself up to the machine, because you have a 
belief that it is wrong to cause harm, and thus, a desire to not commit harm, is not a straightforward 
matter.  As Harris has pointed out elsewhere, harm is not a definitive notion; it is determined by 
contextual factors (2016:66).  Thus, a seemingly fleeting first-order desire to commit a harm after 
one has been hooked up to the God machine would be deemed ethically permissible to be altered 
by the machine.  However, this supposed first-order desire may in fact be constitutive of a second-
order desire.  In other words, whilst I may have a second-order desire to never commit a violent 
harm to another, there are contexts in which it could be necessary to act in such a manner in order 
to avert a worse harm from occurring54.  In such situations, if the machine intervened and it became 
impossible to act and prevent the worse harm by performing a lesser harm, then my second-order 
desire would have been thwarted.  Furthermore, this would, in all likelihood, have occurred without 
my knowing that it had happened.   
 
4.8.3 Well-being and safety versus autonomy  
Savulescu and Persson do admit that there would be some kind of loss of freedom in cases where 
the God machine did intervene, as, in these cases the individual’s “moral identity” (2012:410) 
would have been subsumed into that of the God machine.  However, they opt to then take the 
second approach, mentioned above, and argue that this loss of freedom would be offset by the great 
advantages of eradicating the world of serious harms.  In other words, here they are contesting the 
                                                 
54 An example of such a situation was discussed in footnote 33.  I may be opposed to torture in-principle, however, 
when faced with the possibility of a bomb that will detonate imminently, killing thousands, I may condone torture to 
extract information from the individual who has planted the bomb and will not reveal its whereabouts.  In the case of 
the God machine such a possibility could, of course, only arise if the individual who had planted the bomb was not 
hooked up to the God machine and I, the would-be torturer, was.   
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view that freedom is a fundamental right that should never be impinged upon.  In support of this 
claim, Savulescu and Persson cite John Stuart Mill’s renowned posit that “the only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others.  His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant” 
(Mill, 1863:23).  In other words, according to this view, sometimes called the harm principle, self-
government is highly valuable, and individuals should be left to lead autonomous lives, but only 
insofar as their autonomy does not impact on the well-being of others.  As soon as the individual 
exercising of autonomy harms another, then it becomes illegitimate.  Well-being and safety are 
therefore more important than autonomy, thus indicating that the latter is not an absolute value.  
Douglas shares this view, as evidenced by his claim that even if the modulations of emotions did 
produce the effects that thinkers such as Harris fear – thus lessening our ability to do wrong – this 
would not necessarily be a decisive argument against moral bioenhancement.  He argues that “the 
freedom to do evil is less valuable than the evil is disvaluable” (Douglas 2013:166). His point is 
most certainly true, but it does not follow from its truth that moral bioenhancement is morally 
permissible!  
 
Savulescu and Persson do not see their above-mentioned view as controversial, and, in the way that 
it was formulated by Mill, most would agree.  Our freedom of action is not absolute; it is 
constrained by the very same freedom that others possess.  However, in their use of the harm 
principle as a justification for the kind of freedom that would be lost in the case of the God machine, 
Savulescu and Persson do seem to be taking creative licence a step too far.  The matter of the 
interpretation of the harm principle is also more complex than it prima facie seems.  What is 
contested regarding the harm principle, is its degree of application.  Depending upon the strength 
of one’s utilitarian preclusions, this position can either be taken as a minimal or stand-alone 
requirement for moral life in its entirety, or as a foundational precept upon which more complex 
moral principles and human rights may be built.  Savulescu and Persson are presumably of the 
opinion that Mill would support the former interpretation as he was of the view that the harm 
principle should govern, not because we have some right not to be harmed, but rather, because he 
would argue that a society in which the harm principle governs will be a preferable one – in terms 
of the maximization of utility – in comparison to a society in which it is absent.  I will return to this 
matter further in section 4.8.5. 
 
However, in terms of the relevance for the God machine, the matter is more complex than 
Savulescu and Persson’s dealings with it implies.  It may be true that an intervention which prevents 
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individuals from inflicting serious harms on others would be an unequivocally good thing.  
However, the crucial issue that they gloss over here, but are forced to address in a later publication 
in response to Harris, is the effect that the God machine would have on human morality itself.  In 
other words, the ensuing impact on human morality could itself be regarded as a more serious harm 
to humanity than any of the individual instances of harms prevented by the machine55.  The God 
machine is, of course, a scientific impossibility and Savulescu and Persson do not put it forward as 
a serious contender for moral bioenhancement.  Furthermore, its main purpose, as stated by 
Savulescu, is to illustrate their point that “freedom has a limited – not unlimited – value” (Harris 
& Savulescu, 2015:19).  However, it raises an important issue that must be addressed in order to 
explicate the concern for moral autonomy posed by moral bioenhancement in general.   
 
4.8.4 Some other thought experiments   
In a sense, the insights revealed by the God machine hypothesis are analogous to Robert Nozick’s 
Experience Machine hypothesis56.  The experience machine has frequently been utilised to show 
that utilitarianism fails to take cognisance of what truly matters to individuals.  If the feeling of 
happiness, or the actual maximization of happiness, is all that matters to us, then there would be no 
good reason to fail to connect ourselves to the experience machine.  However, Nozick is of the 
view that presumably most would not opt to connect themselves and this is because merely feeling 
a particular way is not all that matters to us.  Rather, we wish to actually “do certain things, and not 
just have the experience of doing them…[and] we want to be a certain way, to be a certain sort of 
person” (Nozick, 1974:43).  Nozick also draws the analogy between the experience machine and 
the imbibing of psychoactive drugs which produce effects of bliss and euphoria.  In both examples, 
the experiences are artificial and there is a “lack of contact with deeper reality” (Nozick, 1974:44).  
For this very reason, drugs are frequently viewed as a means of escaping reality.  These intuitions 
pinpoint something that is deeply important to most individuals, and thus, Nozick does not believe 
that many would connect themselves to the experience machine.  For similar reasons, it is most 
                                                 
55 Rakić, makes a similar point.  He argues that if subverting our freedom – through compulsory moral bioenhancement 
– were the only way in which the human race could avoid extinction, then it would be preferable that the human race 
not survive.  He argues that if we were to lose our moral freedom, we would risk losing “an essential element 
of…human existence, thus in a way getting already into the business of our self-annihilation” (Rakić, 2014:249).  As 
mentioned above, however, he makes this claim regarding compulsory moral bioenhancement, and is not, in theory, 
opposed to voluntary moral bioenhancement. 
56 Nozick asks us to imagine being able to connect ourselves to a hypothetical machine that would simulate a life, 
designed and chosen to our personal specifications.  Once connected, we would not know that the life we were living 
is a product of the machine, as it would appear entirely genuine.  After a specified length of time, we would be able to 
disconnect from the machine and change particulars to satisfy our personal desires.  The most important thing in the 
thought experiment is that the experience machine would be designed to maximise our happiness and would therefore 
be congruent with utilitarian precepts.   
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likely that most individuals would not endorse the God machine.  The intuition that experience is 
only authentic and truly meaningful if rooted in reality and genuine choice and action, is analogous 
to the intuition that morality is only truly moral if it is unencumbered by external or artificial 
interventions.  However, intuitions cannot, of course, be simply accepted; they require deeper 
investigation.   
 
In his book, Harris also investigates the God machine hypothesis.  He firstly discusses Savulescu 
and Persson’s description of a similar thought experiment devised by Frankfurt (1969).  This 
hypothesis entails an individual deliberating upon whether or not to do the morally correct thing 
by weighing up pertinent reasons in support of both options.  After having come up with conclusive 
reasons in support of the morally preferable course of action, he then performs the morally 
preferable action – or refrains from performing the harmful action.  It just so happens that if he had 
decided to commit the harm, what Savulescu and Persson describe as a freaky mechanism, based 
on Frankfurt’s thought experiment, would have been activated in his brain to prevent this 
(2012:114).  Savulescu and Persson argue that if the individual were to have chosen the morally 
correct course of action, thereby not requiring the freaky mechanism to intervene, his choice would 
hold equal moral value to a choice made in the absence of the presence of the freaky mechanism 
(ibid.).  In other words – and to use Milton’s phrase – despite the individual not being “free to fall” 
(ibid.), if he chose the morally correct course of action, there is no moral difference between his 
having done so in a context in which it would have been impossible not to do so, and one in which 
he had the option of ‘falling’.   
 
As mentioned above, Savulescu and Persson have based both their God machine and freaky 
mechanism thought experiments on the work of Frankfurt.  Frankfurt discusses the common 
intuition, that, in cases in which an individual lacks the capability to choose between different 
actions, there can be no moral responsibility (1969:829).  More specifically, he investigates the 
“principle of alternate possibilities” (ibid.) which outlines the claim that “a person is morally 
responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise” (Frankfurt, 1969:829).  
Frankfurt argues that while the principle of alternative possibilities is generally accepted in 
philosophy as a form of “a priori truth” (1969:829), it is in fact, false.  This is because he suggests 
that there could be contexts in which we would agree that an individual would bear moral 
responsibility for her actions, regardless of whether or not she had different choices available to 
her (Frankfurt, 1969:829-830).  In order to illustrate his argument, Frankfurt looks at the 
phenomenon of coercion (1969:830).  In contexts in which an individual is coerced to act in a 
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particular manner, we would generally agree that her freedom has been compromised in some way, 
thus impacting her moral responsibility regarding the action, and any outcomes produced by it.  
Frankfurt however, contests this intuition with an interesting thought experiment.   
 
Imagine an individual, person A, who must choose between two courses of action, action X and 
action Y.  Another individual, person B, strongly wishes that A choose to perform action Y; so 
much so, that he has decided to threaten A’s family with death, should A refuse.  However, B has 
decided to wait until A has made her decision.  Only if A happens to choose action X, will B reveal 
the terrible threat and thus use it to force A to perform action Y.  It just so happens, that A decides 
to choose action Y, thereby removing the necessity for B to reveal and exert his threat.  Whilst this 
is an instance in which there is a clear existence of a coercive threat, and thus, A does not have a 
true choice of action available to her, Frankfurt argues that it seems obvious that we would hold A 
morally responsible for her decision to perform action Y.  This is because A believed, even if 
falsely, that she had different possible actions available to her and freely decided to choose action 
Y.  In other words when she made her decision, A believed that she had the possibility to have 
acted otherwise.  Furthermore, as Frankfurt argues, if any praise was awarded as a result of the 
positive consequences of A performing action Y, it would be reasonable to award this to her, 
regardless of whether or not she genuinely could have acted otherwise.  In other words, if we found 
out afterwards, that A did not truly have a choice, as, if she had chosen action X, the revealed threat 
was such, that she would have most definitely changed her choice to option Y, this wouldn’t cause 
us to withdraw our esteem of her actions.  In this way, Frankfurt does not view A’s moral 
responsibility as having been eradicated purely due to the fact that she did not truly have a choice 
of action available to her.   
 
The contested point here, however, is the notion of freedom.  Person A may have believed that she 
was free to choose either action X or action Y, but in actual fact, she was not.  It was the mere 
coincidence of her decision that was able to uphold the illusion of freedom.  Simkulet makes a 
similar point when he engages with a slightly different version of this thought experiment.  It is 
useful to apply his insights to the above example.  In the above example, it is not the case that 
person A has no choices or alternative possibilities available to her, as Frankfurt implies.  A can 
choose to perform action X or action Y.  What A lacks is “alternate outcomes” (Simkulet, 2012:17).  
If A chooses action X, then B will intervene and prevent A from doing so, due to the nature of the 
threat.  Thus, the only possible outcome is action Y; however, in the absence of this knowledge, A 
is making a genuine choice and this is why we would hold A morally responsible for this choice if 
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we were to know that it was made in the absence of knowledge about the impending threat from 
B.  
 
Harris also wholeheartedly disagrees with Savulescu and Persson and Frankfurt’s position on this 
matter.  In order to elucidate his disagreement, he discusses Locke’s example of the locked house 
(Locke, 1975; Harris, 2016:93).  He asks us to imagine being locked inside a house, and thus, not 
being free to exit.  However, what if you were inside this locked house and did not know that you 
were locked in?  Furthermore – as implausible as this may sound – what if you never desired to 
leave the house?  The salient question here is whether or not you would be free.  It seems self-
evident that you would not be free, regardless of whether or not you wished to ever leave the house.  
In the same way, Harris’ claim implies that person A’s decision, in Frankfurt’s example, to choose 
option Y, was not truly a free decision. Rather, it was merely a coincidence that A happened to 
choose option Y.  Here, Harris points out that there is a difference “between being capable and not 
being thwarted or frustrated” (2016:93).  A person who is in a locked house and never decides to 
leave will not be thwarted in their actions in any way.  However, at the same time, he will not be 
capable of leaving.  Similarly, a person who has a freaky mechanism in their brain or is hooked up 
to the God machine and never forms the desire to commit harm will not be “thwarted or frustrated” 
(ibid) in their actions.  However, regardless of whether or not they ever form the desire to harm, 
they lack the capability to act in this way, and thus, there is an obvious sense in which they are 
lacking in freedom.  In other words, an individual who is not thwarted or frustrated in her choice 
to perform an action, but lacks awareness of important information such as the fact that if she 
happens to choose to perform a different action, she will be prevented from doing so, is not truly 
free.   
 
In addition, by emphasising their point that an individual who lacks the capability to do wrong is 
as laudable for doing the morally good thing, as someone who could have done wrong and yet 
chooses to do right, Harris posits that Savulescu and Persson are missing the point regarding what 
actually matters about morality (2016:94)57.  For Harris, what is important about morality is not 
                                                 
57  Walker, an enthusiastic supporter of moral bioenhancement, makes a similar point that can be used in support of 
Harris’ point, although he would not intend to do so I am sure!  To those who would argue that moral bioenhancement 
would impact upon morality, because morally good acts would be easy to perform, and morality requires effort, Walker 
responds by arguing that even if we could establish that we do regard individuals who have acted morally, despite 
temptations, as more praiseworthy than those for whom acting morally is ‘easier’, this would never result in us deciding 
against inculcating moral codes and virtuous behaviour in our children (2009:39).  In other words, the fear that our 
children would be less morally praiseworthy as a result of having internalised a sense of right and wrong, and thus, 
that they would be more likely to enact this in a relatively automatic manner, would not cause us to abstain from 
educating them in this manner.  The point is that morality is not predicated upon praiseworthiness.  The latter is 
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“praiseworthiness” (2016:94) for having performed good moral actions, it is freedom or agency.  
Furthermore, it is not sufficient to claim that moral agency remains intact so long as an individual 
is able to deliberate and have good reasons for his morally relevant actions or decisions.  If we 
separate the process of moral deliberation, or reasoning, that informs our decisions to act in a 
particular manner from the actual decisions or actions themselves, in order to ensure that no harmful 
decisions or actions can be performed, then the process of deliberation becomes merely 
hypothetical, and thus, meaningless.  As Harris has argued, freedom lies in the space between 
deliberation and decision-making and the action that it informs or leads to.  Furthermore, as Harris 
points out, Savulescu and Persson may have a case for their claim that the capability to do wrong 
is not vital for moral deliberation to be free, however, it is not true that it is not vital “for moral 
choice and action” (ibid.) to be free.  
 
However, Persson and Savulescu disagree with Harris in this regard, and they illustrate this by 
providing their own interpretation of the status of an individual in a locked house.  They argue that 
if you deliberated about leaving and then decided to act upon your deliberations and leave, only to 
discover that you could not leave, then you would, of course, not be free to perform the act of 
leaving (Persson & Savulescu, 2016:265).  However, if you deliberated about leaving – believing 
that you could leave – and then decided that your ensuing action would be to remain in the house, 
then both your decision and your act of staying would be freely made (ibid.).  In fact, they posit 
that your freedom to stay, in the case of the locked house, would be as free as if you had decided 
to stay in a house that was unlocked.  They therefore disagree with Harris regarding the fact that 
freedom requires not only freedom of deliberation, but also, the presence of alternative possibilities 
regarding action.  Their argument here seems counter-intuitive, however.  It seems that what Harris 
is getting at is that freedom must bear some genuine relation to reality.  If an individual in a locked 
house, who does not know that he is locked in, then decides to stay in the house, believing that he 
is free, he is simply mistaken.  His beliefs regarding reality, and thus, the fact that he is free to go, 
are false.   
 
Ultimately, however, as Harris points out, Savulescu and Persson’s God machine hypothesis 
reveals a fundamental clash in values (2016:106).  As mentioned above, it is possible to defend the 
God machine hypothesis, and essentially, softer forms of moral bioenhancement, by arguing that 
they do not threaten moral autonomy.  Or, one can take an alternative approach of defence, and 
                                                 
something we may bestow on moral acts when evaluating them, but it has nothing to do with the nature of morality 
itself.   
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argue that if moral bioenhancement did threaten our moral autonomy, this may not be a bad thing, 
all things considered.  In other words, there may be certain things that are worth trading a portion 
of our moral autonomy for.  Savulescu and Persson hold such a view and argue that “the value of 
human well-being and respect for the most basic rights outweighs the value of autonomy” 
(2012:411).  Harris, however, disagrees with this position, arguing that “autonomy is a basic right 
quite as much as is freedom from violence or certain levels of well-being.  Indeed, for him, 
autonomy (not just the illusion of autonomy) is part of well-being” (2016:107).  
 
4.8.5 Liberty as Licence versus Liberty as Independence 
Regarding Persson and Savulescu’s use of Mill to support their views concerning the ultimate 
importance of well-being over autonomy, Harris argues that they are conflating two different types 
of liberty and thus failing to recognize the form that is truly important, and at stake, in the case of 
moral bioenhancement.  Savulescu and Persson have argued, in various publications, that we are 
inured to impacts on our freedom due to various societal laws that regulate our behaviour, with 
various threats, including the loss of freedom, for any infringements (2012:411; 2014a:251; 
2015b54; 2016:267).  This distinction is important as it is used to provide impetus to their claim 
that the God machine’s – and other forms of moral bioenhancement – prevention of serious harms, 
by making them impossible, would not be that different from other accepted mechanisms that aim 
to deter harmful behaviour.  Thus, the argument would be that if we accept traditional restrictions 
on our freedom, we should also accept restrictions on our freedom caused by moral 
bioenhancement.   
 
Harris disagrees with these claims, however, and discusses Dworkin’s distinction between Liberty 
as Licence and Liberty as Independence to illustrate his point (Dworkin, 1977:262).  Liberty as 
licence refers to the ways in which individual freedom is constrained by societal laws and 
restrictions.  Without doubt, such laws do impinge upon liberty, however this impact is generally 
permitted due to the fact that it protects or supports “some competing value, like equality, or safety, 
or public amenity” (Dworkin, 1977:262).  Liberty as independence, on the other hand, is a more 
fundamental kind of freedom.  Dworkin describes it as referring to “the status of a person as 
independent and equal rather than subservient” (1977:262.).  In other words, respect for this more 
existential type of liberty, would entail recognising the right of individuals to decide how best to 
live their lives, and to choose what they hold to be of value, including which morals, values, ideals 
and principles they espouse.  As Dworkin points out, the two kinds of freedom may sometimes 
coincide.  For example, onerous restrictions on liberty as licence may be employed to marginalise 
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or disempower certain groups within society, which may then impact upon their liberty as 
independence (1977:262.).  Dworkin however, sees the two types of liberty as different in kind.   
 
Persson and Savulescu seem to prevaricate regarding the particular conception of liberty they are 
addressing in their responses to Harris and other opponents of moral bioenhancement.  With their 
argument that moral bioenhancement, and even the God machine, would be no different in kind to 
the societal restrictions on our liberty that we readily accept, Persson and Savulescu are clearly 
engaging with liberty as licence.  That this is so, is clear in one of their papers where they explicitly 
argue that while the God machine would impinge upon our “agency and freedom, it would do so 
to a lesser extent than does the current penitentiary system, with such measures as imprisonment” 
(Persson & Savulescu, 2015b:54).  However, elsewhere Persson and Savulescu concede that the 
God machine would “go further than law and its enforcement: it removes not merely the freedom 
to perform gravely immoral acts, but even the ability to do so” (2016:267).  Where we have the 
option of breaking laws, and must therefore accept the relevant punishment if caught, in the case 
of the God machine, this option is non-existent.  
 
In addition, in another publication with Douglas, Persson and Savulescu concede that there are 
different ways, and levels, in which autonomy may be constrained.  One can constrain autonomy 
“externally (say through incarceration)…[or] internally” (Savulescu, Douglas & Persson, 
2014:107), as would be the case with the manipulation of brain states via moral bioenhancement.  
Imprisonment prevents us freely moving around in the world, but moral bioenhancement may alter 
“bodily (brain) and mental states…[and in this regard] we have a stronger claim to bodily and 
mental non-interference than we do to freedom of movement.  Thus…[moral bioenhancement] 
might seem to be a more serious restriction on autonomy than incarceration” (Savulescu, Douglas 
& Persson, 2014:107).  However, while they make this concession, they argue that it is not self-
evident that the differentiation between “external and internal” (Savulescu, Douglas & Persson, 
2014:107) constraint has ethical relevance due to the fact that long term restrictions on movement, 
as experienced with imprisonment, do impact upon inner, mental states (ibid.).  In addition, in the 
case of criminal offenders, constraints on internal autonomy may be justified in terms of the utility 
to society arising from the avoidance of serious harms that arise due to criminal acts.   
 
Returning to Dworkin’s distinction between liberty as licence and liberty as independence, for 
Harris, it is clearly the deeper, more existential, liberty as independence that would be threatened 
by moral bioenhancement, as Persson and Savulescu present it (Harris, 2016:108).  Furthermore, 
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he argues that Persson and Savulescu’s use of Mill’s harm principle to support their view that well-
being – where well-being is synonymous with harm prevention which moral bioenhancement 
would supposedly aim to support – is unequivocally more fundamental in value than autonomy, is 
a misconstrual of Mill’s thought on the matter (Harris, 2016:107).  Here, Harris draws support from 
Dworkins’ reading of Mill.  Mill, as discussed above, argues that “the only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is 
to prevent harm to others” (Mill, 1863:23).  Persson and Savulescu take this to imply that the 
prevention of harm supersedes all other endeavours.  However, in stating this, Dworkin posits that 
Mill is not advocating that all other forms of the exercising of power in society are illegitimate.  In 
other words, he is not arguing that we do away with all restrictions on liberty as licence.  This is 
because, along with protection from harm, liberty as licence may also serve to protect liberty as 
independence.  Dworkin argues that Mill’s harm principle is in fact concerned with liberty as 
independence and with the recognition of the equality of all individuals (1977:263).  Dworkin 
argues that for Mill: 
an individual’s independence is threatened, not simply by a political process that denies him 
equal voice, but by political decisions that deny him equal respect.  Laws that recognize and 
protect common interests, like laws against violence and monopoly, offer no insult to class or 
individual; but laws that constrain one man, on the sole ground that he is incompetent to decide 
what is right for himself, are profoundly insulting to him.  They make him intellectually and 
morally subservient to the conformists who form the majority, and deny him the independence 
to which he is entitled.  Mill insisted on the political importance of these moral concepts of 
dignity, personality, and insult.  It was these complex ideas, not the simpler idea of licence, 
that he tried to make available for political theory, and to use as the basic vocabulary of 
liberalism (1977:263).  
 
With this interpretation in mind, Harris posits that Persson and Savulescu’s claim that “the 
paternalism” (2016:107) of the God machine would receive justification from a reading of Mill, is, 
in fact, incorrect.   
 
Regarding the God machine hypothesis, however, as I have stated above, Savulescu and Persson 
are not proposing that such a machine would ever be a real possibility (2016:267).  Rather, they 
use it as an intuition pump in order to elucidate “whether there is anything that could rationally 
justify the negative gut reaction most of us are prone to have to it” (Persson and Savulescu, 
2016:267-268).  It seems that in the case of the God machine, the threat to moral autonomy is 
blatantly evident and cannot be argued away.  This is perhaps why Persson and Savulescu focus on 
justifying their claim that autonomy should not be regarded as an absolute or fundamental value.   
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However, the God machine example also illustrates the point that restrictions to moral autonomy 
occur on a spectrum, with indeterminism – or absolute freedom from constraint – at one end, and 
determinism – or absolute constraint on freedom – at the other58.  A compatibilist interpretation of 
freedom would regard our moral autonomy – as the product of traditional moral enhancement 
which includes internalised norms, cultural codes and general socialization – as lying somewhere 
in the middle of the spectrum.  Such an interpretation acknowledges the power of causal influence 
– both physiological and social – on our actions, but sees these influences as compatible with our 
having freedom, or free will, to make choices.  Being hooked up to the God machine, would, in all 
likelihood, move the status of our moral autonomy close to the determinist end of the spectrum.  
As mentioned above, Persson and Savulescu do freely admit that the God machine would not 
constitute a form of moral bioenhancement as it would “not enhance your motivation to do what is 
morally right” (2016:265).  Rather, through entirely removing the ability to perform certain harms, 
it would be a form of behaviour control.  The task remains however, to investigate exactly where 
along this spectrum of moral autonomy the softer forms of moral bioenhancement that are 
discussed in the literature, would lie.   
 
Persson and Savulescu’s various discussions of the God machine are interesting, however, as they 
make explicit their rejection of the truth of the principle of alternative possibilities (2016:265).  
This principle, coined by Frankfurt, and mentioned in section 4.8.4, posits that “moral obligation, 
responsibility and freedom presupposes that you can act otherwise than you in fact do” (Persson & 
Savulescu, 2016:265); or, as formulated by Frankfurt, “that a person is morally responsible for 
what he has done only if he could have done otherwise” (1969:829).  Frankfurt, as discussed above, 
has argued for the falsity of the principle of alternative possibilities by providing examples of 
situations in which a choice rendered with no alternative possibilities could still be a choice that 
one could be held morally responsible for.  The implications of this for our conception of freedom, 
if true, would be major.  If it could be established that we hold individuals morally responsible for 
their actions despite their having no choices in certain situations, then it would imply that freedom 
does not solely depend on having alternative choices available.  This, in turn, would have major 
implications for moral bioenhancement, and perhaps even the God machine.  Frankfurt’s example 
was not entirely convincing however, as was illustrated by Simkulet and Harris’ responses.   
 
 
                                                 
58 See footnote 60 for an explanation of determinism, indeterminism, compatibilism and incompatibilism.  
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4.8.6 Subjective versus objective alternatives 
Due to the speculative nature of the subject, Persson and Savulescu make extensive use of thought 
experiments and analogies that serve as intuition pumps in their arguments and responses to Harris 
and other thinkers concerned with the threat to moral autonomy posed by moral bioenhancement.  
They have, however, provided a “theoretical backing” (Savulescu, Douglas & Persson, 2014:105) 
to their claims regarding autonomy, that is based upon a Kantian account of autonomy.  They firstly 
point out that there is more to the notion of autonomy than simply referring to being able to choose 
between options (ibid.).  While autonomy is generally understood as referring to the ability to steer 
or govern one’s own life, they argue that autonomy is not simply “intentional” (Savulescu, Douglas 
& Persson, 2014:105).  It also has an “evaluative…[and] normative” (ibid.) component.  In order 
to fulfil this latter component, an individual must have knowledge of the possible choices available 
to her, as well as any information that is relevant to these different choices.  Furthermore, autonomy 
requires that an individual must be able to “rational[ly] deliberat[e and] form rational beliefs” 
(ibid.).  By using the term ‘rational beliefs’, they mean that autonomy presupposes that no “errors 
of logic” (ibid.) have been made and that the individual has a correct grasp of all accurate and 
relevant information.  Furthermore, an individual must utilise her imaginative faculties in order to 
consider all the possibilities and outcomes associated with different available options.  In addition, 
rational beliefs are the source, and impetus, of rational preferences and desires.  This interpretation 
implies that preventing an individual from performing an immoral act that arises from an 
“irrational” or aberrant desire would not impact upon her autonomy (Savulescu, Douglas & 
Persson, 2014:105).   
 
While having a choice implies having at least two options to choose from, Savulescu, Douglas and 
Persson distinguish between having “subjectively and objectively available alternatives” 
(2014:106).  This distinction is particularly relevant for the position they take regarding the locked 
house example.  Subjective choices refer to the choices that the individual regards as being 
available to him.  Objective choices are the actual choices available to him.  The two do not always 
coincide as an individual may regard himself as having no subjective choices in a particular 
situation in which he possesses objective choices.  To illustrate with an example; I could find 
myself in a situation in which I have a choice between protecting myself from a terrible harm, or 
passing the threat onto a loved one to save myself.  In this situation, I may have two objective 
choices available – to be harmed myself or to let my loved one be harmed – but no available 
subjective choices, due to my unwillingness to inflict harm on a loved one.  Savulescu, Douglas 
and Persson argue that individuals are only autonomous, in the sense of self-governing, if they have 
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subjective choices available, from which they can then decide which option is best-suited to them 
(2014:106).  Therefore, it isn’t sufficient to posit that autonomy is present simply because an 
individual has objective alternatives available to him.  In the case of the locked house, if an 
individual falsely believes that he is in a locked house, he would have no subjective options 
available, other than passively staying; whereas he would have two objective options available, to 
leave or stay.  Conversely, an individual who chooses to stay in a house that is locked, not knowing 
that this is the case, will have two subjective options available, but only one objective option 
available.   
 
As mentioned above, a Kantian account of autonomy requires that the individual possesses accurate 
information and beliefs, the absence of logical errors and the presence of imaginative faculties.  If 
this is correct, however, then it undermines their argument in the preceding paragraph, as according 
to this conception of autonomy, an individual who has a belief that he is free to leave a house that 
is actually locked, has predicated his belief on false information. In other words, he may believe 
that he has two subjective choices available; however, this belief is false.  It seems that for the 
distinction between subjective and objective choices to adequately describe the conditions for 
autonomy one would have to rather posit that individuals are autonomous when they possess both 
subjective and objective alternatives for action.   
 
Savulescu, Douglas and Persson, however, argue that moral bioenhancement, if used in support of 
the above-mentioned requirements of autonomy, could possibly support, or enhance autonomy 
(2014:107).  In other words, if a combination of moral education and moral bioenhancement is able 
to correct, or enhance, decision-making, then there is an argument that this will increase autonomy 
rather than compromise it.  They posit that “even in cases of competent adults who have not 
consented to its use…[this] may not offend autonomy” (ibid.) if it produces improvements in the 
above faculties.  It is possible to see how Savulescu, Douglas and Persson could come to the 
conclusion that enhancing the mechanisms associated with the conditions for autonomy would be 
supportive of autonomy, rather than inimical to it.  It is, however, a long stretch for them to then 
argue that even in cases in which no consent has been given, that autonomy would not be impaired.  
 
4.9 Three conditions for autonomy 
DeGrazia, another noted supporter of moral bioenhancement, has also engaged with the potential 
threat to autonomy posed by moral bioenhancement (2014).  He points out that it is seemingly the 
purported target of moral bioenhancement, suggested by its proponents, that Harris has a problem 
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with, rather than the idea of moral bioenhancement itself (DeGrazia, 2014:365).  This target is, of 
course, the enhancement of motivation.  As is evident from discussions in preceding chapters, 
morality is a notoriously complex and multifarious notion.  It requires interplay between an abstract 
understanding of right and wrong and the ability to reason and infer from relevant contextual 
information, as well as the motivation or will to act upon this, thus resulting in moral behaviour.  
For Harris, what is pertinent in assessing morality is not motivation, but rather, the quality of moral 
judgements, the latter of which, for him, lie at the heart of morality.   
 
However, in his response to DeGrazia, Harris argues that he does not lodge his critique of moral 
bioenhancement specifically against the enhancement of motivation.  Rather, his argument is that 
moral bioenhancement, in the rudimentary and imperfect way in which it is currently possible, and 
the ways in which it is speculated to work in the future, would not “operate on anything so 
sophisticated and complex as ‘motivation’” (Harris, 2014:372).  Rather, the enhancement of so-
called motivation will heighten emotion, making it more likely that an individual acts in a particular 
way due to the intensity of the felt emotion.  This may, of course, happen to lead to morally 
desirable outcomes in some, or even most, situations; however, the resulting behaviour would not 
be moral behaviour.  Harris argues that “one can do good accidentally but one cannot be moral 
accidentally” (2013:118).  In other words, one may act in a way that has moral relevance in terms 
of the consequences it produces, but this does not make the action or behaviour “moral behaviour” 
(ibid.).  For Harris, to qualify as moral behaviour, an act must be performed with moral intentions 
and this will only be the case if the behaviour is the product of a “moral judgement” (2014:372).   
 
In terms of his concern that moral bioenhancement, or at least the administering of 
psychopharmaceuticals such as SSRIs or oxytocin, would impair our ability to make reasoned, “all 
things considered” (2014:372) moral judgements, Harris’ concern is that such drugs clearly do 
produce behavioural changes and effects in those who take them.  That this is so is evidenced by 
the fact that they are so widely prescribed for this express purpose.  Of course, Harris is not lodging 
an argument against the correctly prescribed therapeutic usage of such drugs to treat 
psychopathologies; rather, his point is that calling them a moral bioenhancer is problematic and 
inaccurate.  He points out that there is truth in the fact that: 
the presence of these molecules in particular doses is indeed ‘freedom-subverting’ if it were 
not, it is unlikely they would have the effects vaunted by their advocates, that is, effects that 
operate independently of the will or of judgement; unlike education, for example, that provides 
the basis for voluntary choices” (Harris, 2014:372)59. 
                                                 
59 Harris’ argument that the administration of such ‘molecules’ is freedom-subverting is strange as it implies a 
bioconservative view that is not present in his work as an advocate of bioenhancement in general.  In fact, the opposite 




DeGrazia outlines his conception of “free action” (2014:366) as requiring three conditions.  Firstly, 
an individual is only autonomous if her action is the product of having a clear preference to act in 
that way.  Secondly, this preference must have been knowingly and thoughtfully assimilated by the 
individual.  Thirdly, this preference must not arise, or be influenced by sources that she would 
reject, or take to be “alienating” (ibid.), after consideration.  DeGrazia argues that it is not definitive 
that actions which are a product of freely chosen moral bioenhancement would fail to meet these 
conditions (2014:366).  His delineation of the requirements for autonomy is seemingly sufficiently 
stringent, and in particular the third stipulation, so much so, that it is not obvious that many of us 
would be considered autonomous in our actions if the basis for truly free autonomous action is that 
our preferences must be free from alienating influences.  In addition, such a requirement 
presupposes that individuals have a modicum of emotional insight and awareness of their behaviour 
and of the complexity of causes that exert an influence on it.  However, while DeGrazia’s 
conditions would require an accompanying theory or justification to substantiate them, the notion 
of autonomy as connected with having a preference to act in a particular way is one that I take to 
be of crucial importance and will therefore investigate in detail in chapter 5.   
 
Harris also questions the third condition, arguing that it is characterised by potential “ambiguity 
and subjectivity” (2014:372).  His concern is that an individual may not consider his preferences 
alienating (ibid.).  The example Harris provides is of an individual with a racist disposition who 
may, in fact, see his beliefs regarding other races as justifiable and correct.  In such a situation, the 
individual’s racist beliefs may be a product of his upbringing and he may have internalised these 
beliefs as truths about the world, to such an extent that he is essentially unfree in his actions that 
arise from such false beliefs.  Here, Harris is once again implicitly making the point that many 
immoral actions are the product of incorrect beliefs.  Furthermore, Harris disagrees with another 
example provided by DeGrazia.  DeGrazia discusses an individual who has been morally 
bioenhanced and who then acts according to the dictates of morality by providing assistance to 
someone in need, despite the fact that it would be less troublesome to refrain from providing such 
assistance (2014:366).  In this situation, he posits that after consideration of her reasons for doing 
                                                 
claim could be made.  For an individual suffering from a condition such as generalised anxiety, a psychopharmaceutical 
that reduces his anxiety levels would possibly enable him to deliberate more rationally and objectively.  This is because 
the subjective experience of high levels of anxiety is akin to the experience of a strong emotion of fear, worry or general 
unease.  Constantly experiencing such feelings would, most likely, compromise an individual’s ability to correctly 
assess different situations and phenomena.  This is a similar argument to the one Douglas makes when he posits that 
the reduction of counter-moral emotions would increase, rather than diminish, our freedom.  It must be remembered 
however, that we are extrapolating from the effects produced by the therapeutic usage of such drugs.  Using 
psychopharmaceuticals for enhancement purposes would be a different matter.   
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so, she would possibly recognise that her preferences have changed, that she has become more 
altruistic.  She would possibly also realise that this change was due to the moral bioenhancement 
she had chosen to take.  In this way, DeGrazia posits that there is no reason to assume that this 
individual would then consider this source alienating, thereby rendering her unfree (2014:366). 
 
Harris disagrees with DeGrazia’s claims here, regarding them as “disingenuous” (2014:372).  He 
points out that the individual may well recognise her moral bioenhancement as the source of her 
changed desire to offer assistance and she may accept it and not regard it as alienating.  However, 
her acceptance could very well be as a result of “the influence of the influence, not because it is the 
right thing to do” (ibid.).  In other words, we, and the individual in question, would have no way 
of knowing whether her consideration and judgement of whether or not the influence of her 
changed behaviour is alienating, would be a true and free consideration.  This consideration and 
acceptance of the source of her changed behaviour could be entirely a product of the intervention.  
Targeting motivation, in the way outlined by the proponents of moral bioenhancement, amounts to 
changing “attitudes” or preferences, in a way that individuals are more likely to act in accordance 
with this changed attitude or preference.  In this way, for Harris, manipulating “motivation[s] does 
not meet standards of moral reasoning for the simple and sufficient reason that it does not meet 
standards of reasoning at all” (2014:372.).  Furthermore, it is not only deliberation and moral 
reasoning that would be circumvented in such interventions, but morality itself, that would 
ultimately be removed from the process, he argues.   
 
In terms of the definition of morality offered at the beginning of this section, DeGrazia concedes 
to Harris that if we are to define what makes moral behaviour moral, it is not only the presence of 
moral understanding and the ability to reason and infer from relevant contextual information, as 
well as the motivation or will to act upon this that are required; but also, freedom, or at least, 
“sufficient freedom” (2014:367) is a necessity.  However, he only envisages a threat to freedom 
posed by certain exceptional cases of moral bioenhancement, and not in those interventions 
discussed in the literature.  Furthermore, while DeGrazia concedes the point regarding the 
importance of freedom for morality, he agrees with the claims made by Persson and Savulescu 
regarding the need to balance the value of freedom against other goods, or at least the avoidance 
of harms.  In support of this point, that he admittedly asserts rather than providing an argument for, 
DeGrazia suggests that while morality requires sufficient freedom to be truly moral, morality is 
valuable not only for intrinsic reasons but also for instrumental reasons (2014:367).  In other words, 
we value moral behaviour not only as an end in itself, but also as a means of providing “a better 
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world with better lives for human beings and other sentient creatures” (DeGrazia, 2014:367).  
While intuition supports the truth of DeGrazia’s assertion, Harris disputes whether morally 
bioenhancing individuals in the service of harm reduction would, in fact, constitute an improvement 
of the world and human lives (2014:373).    
 
4.10 Other conceptions of freedom and autonomy 
Bublitz argues that the way in which emotional enhancement is defined is crucial as it has direct 
implications for human autonomy (2016:89).  Furthermore, there are also different ways in which 
freedom, itself, may be conceived.  The advocates of moral bioenhancement engage with “freedom 
of action and freedom of will” (Bublitz, 2016:89), presenting arguments outlining why, and how, 
these freedoms will not be impacted by moral bioenhancement.  Bublitz argues however, that there 
is a third conception of freedom, namely, “freedom of mind” which would be impacted by moral 
bioenhancement, and, which its supporters fail to engage with (ibid.).  Freedom of action may also 
be understood, as Harris does, as freedom to fall or, at its most simplistic level, as the freedom to 
do wrong (2016:92).  However, Bublitz agrees with the response of supporters of moral 
bioenhancement who frequently point out that this kind of freedom is limited due to the harm that 
may befall those who are affected by the actions of others who use this freedom for misdeeds.  
Thus, he argues, in a similar manner to Persson and Savulescu, that this conception of freedom has 
no normative force as it is accepted that “the freedom of one is inherently limited by the freedom 
of others” (Bublitz, 2016:92).  It seems, therefore, that this conception of freedom is not what is at 
stake in the case of moral bioenhancement.   
 
Beck also critiques the view that autonomy requires freedom of action (2015:237).  In support of 
her claim, she draws upon Schmidt-Salomon’s discussion, agreeing with his dismissal of the 
freedom of action due the fact that it is supported by a libertarian conception of freedom which 
requires metaphysical justification (2007)60.  Schmidt-Salomon prefers a compatibilist 
                                                 
60 A radical Libertarian conception of free will argues that our freedom is undetermined by any causal factors.  In other 
words, such a view would support radical indeterminism, the view that human beings possess unfettered free will, due 
to the belief that choices, and thus actions and events, are not causally determined.  Determinism, on the other hand, 
posits that all choices, and thus actions and events, are causally determined.  A compatibilist is one who argues that 
free will exists despite the truth of determinism.  In other words, such a view would argue that free will and determinism 
are compatible.  Due to the fact that, generally, libertarians regard compatibilism as impossible, in other words they 
are of the view that determinism of any form invalidates our freedom, they would support indeterminism.  However, 
there are a variety of differing libertarian interpretations of free will.  In particular, a modern interpretation known as 
agent-causal libertarianism is perhaps what Schmidt-Salomon is referring to.  This conception of free will would 
require metaphysical justification as it posits that an agent’s actions are caused, not by any preceding or external events, 
but entirely, and inexplicably, by the agent in question.  Schmidt-Salomon describes this conception of free will as a 
“hopelessly incoherent concept which should be dismissed for good reasons” (in Beck, 2015:237).  The good reasons 
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interpretation and argues that the “freedom [that is] worth having is to be explained in terms of 
personal autonomy…[which refers to an] inner freedom of action (in Beck, 2015:237).  This 
conception of freedom is similar to DeGrazia’s conception of freedom in that Schmidt-Salomon 
describes it requiring “the absence of insurmountable internal compulsions with which the person 
is not able to identify positively” (ibid.).  In other words, this conception of freedom is predicated 
upon having a preference to act in a particular way, and this preference must have been consciously 
formulated, rather than having arisen from coercive, compulsive or alienating sources.   
 
While the first freedom that Bublitz discusses focuses specifically on action, freedom may also be 
conceived as entailing the ability to have and make choices between different possible actions, 
namely, the freedom of will (Bublitz, 2016:93).  Faust has also discussed the freedom of will.  She 
defines it as associated with being able to “independently assess circumstances (and all that make 
up circumstances), and autonomously choose action” (Faust, 2008:404).  The part of this process 
that is not fully understood is how we move from our observations and deliberations to actually 
acting on them.  Faust posits that this unknown area is akin to what Searle has called “the gaps in 
rationality” (2008:405).  Searle has argued that rational acts are mostly characterised by a gap 
between motives and desires, and the decisions that they lead to.  This gap would generally be 
associated with the “freedom of will” (Searle, 2001).  As Faust points out, if we observe two 
individuals who are presented with identical facts regarding a situation, they will invariably not 
interpret these facts in the same way, and therefore, they will not necessarily act in the same way.  
However, as Searle posits, this is “exactly what makes us rational—what happens in the gaps 
between observation and assessment, assessment and judgment, judgment and action” (in Faust, 
2008:405).  Regardless of whether or not we understand the nature of this gap, we are able to impact 
it and this elicits concern regarding our free will.  In the case of moral bioenhancement, it is not 
necessarily that an individual would be compelled to act in particular manner, rather, it could work 
akin to a reflex, or as Faust describes it, “an instinctual reaction to duck when an object is thrown 
at one’s head” (2008:405).  However, as she points out, despite our having certain reflexes, we are 
able to overcome them when we need to in specific contexts, for example, in certain sports like 
soccer when one is required to ‘head’ the ball rather than kicking it.  If moral bioenhancement 
worked in a similar manner to such reflexes, then it wouldn’t necessarily eradicate our free will.   
 
                                                 
he refers to here would presumably be the difficulty of explaining how such an agent entirely avoids the influences of 
causality, due to some mysterious internal component.   
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Returning to Bublitz’ discussion of the freedom of will, he engages with Persson and Savulescu’s 
arguments regarding the relevance of moral bioenhancement for the issue of determinism and 
indeterminism.  Persson and Savulescu have argued that if one is a compatibilist, then moral 
bioenhancement will pose no threat to our autonomy (2013:128).  In other words, if one believes 
that free will remains intact despite the constraints of causality – in this case being “determined 
whether or not we shall do what we take to be good” (Persson & Savulescu, 2013:128) – then our 
freedom would not be affected by moral bioenhancement.  We would simply enhance ourselves to 
be more like those who generally always act in a moral manner.  If, however, one supports the view 
of indeterminism, then one will most likely not regard moral bioenhancement as a means of 
improving the likelihood of choosing to do right more often.  This is because the success of moral 
bioenhancement would be “limited by our freedom in this indeterministic sense” (ibid.).  Thus, 
Persson and Savulescu conclude that on both accounts of freedom, moral bioenhancement will be 
exempt from impact.   
 
Blackford has also addressed the above points made by Persson and Savulescu, arguing that to a 
certain extent, the concern that moral bioenhancement may undermine our autonomy will depend 
on whether one is a compatibilist or a non-compatibilist.  In this regard, he argues that “we should 
be careful not to attribute to ourselves (and other ordinary people) a spooky kind of ‘autonomy all 
the way down’ that does not exist in the real world” (2010:83).  In other words, we should not 
overestimate the extent to which we actually are autonomous, or possess free will, to begin with.  
Here, Blackford is seemingly supporting a determinist – and possibly an incompatibilist – account 
of freedom.  To explicate his point, he discusses Galen Strawson’s work regarding the issue of 
moral responsibility (1994).  Strawson has argued that moral responsibility is an illusion due to the 
fact that the kind of person that we are, is a product of a complex entanglement of “our heredity 
and early experience…[as well as other] indeterministic or random factors” (in Blackford, 
2010:83), the nature of which we have had no control over.  Thus, all ensuing decisions taken when 
we reach maturity, including any attempts to transform ourselves, will be strongly influenced “by 
how we already are” (in Blackford, 2010:84).  Therefore, if one agrees that autonomy implies 
“ultimate self-causation” (ibid.) and that the latter is an illusion, for the reasons provided by 
Strawson, then one will agree that autonomy is an illusion.  However, a compatibilist would, of 
course, respond by disagreeing with this radical conception of autonomy, arguing that autonomy, 
and thus moral responsibility, does not require that we have absolute control over how we came to 
be who we are (ibid.).  This latter view is the more prevalent one within contemporary free will 
debates in philosophy.   




On the other hand, as Bublitz points out, empirical research in the field of neuroscience gives us 
grounds to also dismiss the possibility of an indeterministic conception of freedom.  In terms of the 
compatibilist conception of freedom, however, it is not such a straightforward matter.  There are 
other variants of compatibilism that are more nuanced than the interpretation presented by 
supporters of moral bioenhancement, such as Persson and Savulescu and DeGrazia (Bublitz, 
2016:94).  Here, Bublitz specifically alludes to DeGrazia’s conception of freedom, discussed in 
section 4.9, to illustrate his point.  DeGrazia argues that freedom requires that an individual’s action 
be the product of having a clear preference to act in that way and this preference, in turn, must have 
been knowingly and thoughtfully assimilated by the individual, rather than having arisen from 
sources that the individual would reject, or take to be “alienating” (2014:366), after consideration.  
Thus, even if an individual’s preferences were altered due to having undergone moral 
bioenhancement, this would not impact upon freedom if these changes were accepted and not 
regarded as alienating.  
 
This may make prima facie sense, however, Bublitz points out that it fails to engage with an 
interpretation of compatibilism in which individuals would be exempt from moral responsibility if 
their preferences have been subject to “manipulation” (2016:94) in any way.  Here, Bublitz cites 
the work of Fischer and Ravizza who have discussed examples in which ill-intentioned 
neurosurgeons have altered the preferences of individuals in order to cause them to perform morally 
dubious acts (1998:182 in Bublitz, 2016:94).  In such cases, the individuals in question would not 
be held morally responsible for these acts and their consequences.  The reason we wouldn’t hold 
an individual who commits a harmful act morally responsible, upon acquiring knowledge that she 
had been neurobiologically manipulated in this way, is because we would regard her autonomy as 
having been impaired by the intervention.  We would believe that she was compelled to act in this 
way, through no choice of her own, and that the intervention would have overwhelmed the 
possibility of her rationally considering her action.   As argued by Fischer and Ravizza, autonomy 
cannot, thus, be viewed in an a-historical manner; the origins of how we come to have particular 
preferences are significant in assessing the preferences themselves, and the acts they lead to 
(1998:182 in Bublitz, 2016:94).  Neurobiological manipulation would therefore be a clear example 
of a way in which autonomy would be impaired.  Thus, there is a difference between a change in 
preferences due to a “direct brain intervention”61 (Bublitz, 2016:94) and the examples that 
                                                 
61 Here, Bublitz includes other mechanisms such as “hypnosis..[and] subliminal advertisement” (2016:94) as 
interventions that would thwart moral responsibility if they impacted upon individuals’ preferences, and thus, their 
actions.   
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Savulescu and Persson give regarding women not being less free due to possessing more empathy.  
In such an example, “feminised men and women may have the same mental and moral properties, 
yet women are responsible, whereas manipulated men are not, not because of gender but because 
of their diverging histories” (Bublitz, 2016:94)62.  This point is crucial for the line of argumentation 
that I will present in chapter 5 and will therefore be developed further.   
 
While the afore-mentioned, conventional conceptions of freedom are engaged with by the 
supporters of moral bioenhancement, Bublitz argues that there is another, somewhat neglected, 
conception of freedom that holds great value for human beings.  This freedom is one that may be 
threatened by moral bioenhancement (2016:94).  Bublitz identifies it as the “freedom of mind, 
[which] is the freedom of a person to use her mental capacities as she pleases, free from external 
interferences and internal impediments” (ibid.).  In comparison to freedom of will, freedom of mind 
includes a wider array of “mental states” (ibid.).  As Bublitz points out, interpretations of free will 
are regarded as having relevance for stipulating the criteria under which individuals can be regarded 
as morally responsible for their actions.  One of the criteria generally considered relevant in terms 
of ascribing moral responsibility is: could an individual have acted otherwise?  This is the 
conception of moral responsibility supported by the principle of alternative possibilities that was 
mentioned in section 4.8.4, and which Frankfurt argues is false.  Other important aspects of the will 
that must be present in order to be held morally responsible are: possessing sufficient cognitive 
capabilities in order to provide reasons for one’s actions and not being impeded by “overwhelming 
inner constraints such as irresistible impulses” (Bublitz, 2016:95).  Generally, if individuals can be 
shown to meet these criteria, we would regard them as morally responsible for the outcomes of 
their choices and actions.  Bublitz posits that it would be possible to argue that this conception of 
freedom will not be threatened by moral bioenhancement.   
 
However, freedom of mind differs from this conception in that it is not so much connected with the 
attribution of responsibility, but rather, it is concerned with attributes and capabilities in which 
individuals have a vested interest.  The administration of psychopharmaceuticals, discussed by 
supporters of moral bioenhancement in the literature, would not necessarily have large scale, 
deleterious effects on individual freedom; rather, it is possible that they could “subtly alter 
perception, mood, emotional patterns or the style of thinking.  They may subdue or increase the 
intensity of emotions, enhance or decrease mental skills or alter mental background conditions” 
                                                 
62 This is a similar argument to that made by Harris, discussed in section 4.9, who argues that an individual who has 
been morally bioenhanced would not necessarily regard her preferences as alienating because her preferences would, 
themself, have been altered by moral bioenhancement.  Thus, DeGrazia’s conception of freedom is not sufficient.   
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(Bublitz, 2016:95).  Thus, while what is at stake in the case of freedom of mind is not a decisive 
loss of autonomy, Bublitz posits that there are nevertheless ethical concerns that require 
investigation.    
 
To provide more substance to his conception of freedom of mind, Bublitz discusses what he regards 
as its key components.  The first component is “conscious control over one’s mind” (Bublitz, 
2016:95), referring to the extent to which one’s mental capabilities are free from internally 
constraining elements, such as excessive emotional responses, which is, of course, the same 
concern that Harris has against moral bioenhancement.  While Bublitz concedes that both 
emotional and cognitive responses are vital for moral judgements, he nevertheless argues that any 
intervention that intensifies emotional responses would be problematic if it overwhelms our ability 
to consciously control our minds (2016:96).   
 
Focquaert and Schermer hold a similar view of autonomy, agreeing with Harris that moral 
autonomy requires that one’s actions are motivated by reasons (2015a:142).  Without 
“responsiveness to moral reasons…[an] intervention should be understood as a form of behaviour 
control” (Focquaert & Schermer, 2015a:143).  Focquaert and Schermer’s understanding of 
autonomy entails “leading one’s life in accordance with one’s own choices, that is, choices that are 
based on the values and goals we endorse after deliberation” (2015a:145).  In the case of moral 
bioenhancement, and with this understanding, preserving one’s autonomy would require that if one 
agrees to an intervention there must be the possibility of being able to change one’s mind and opt 
out if one so wishes.  This would presumably include being able to reverse the effects of the 
intervention if one so desires.   
 
In accordance with their concern, discussed in section 4.2.5, the types of interventions that could 
risk impacting upon personal identity would pose the same risks for our autonomy.  In particular, 
passive interventions could pose a distinct threat to autonomy, even if consent has been given prior 
to undergoing such interventions.  If interventions produce the kinds of hidden changes in 
personality, discussed in section 4.2.5, then an individual who has been morally bioenhanced could 
be less likely to withdraw consent.  If the changes in personality were such that they caused the 
individual to accept the intervention, whereas consent would have been withdrawn if the ‘original’ 
personality were intact, then this would be a subversion of autonomy.    
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Returning to the second component of freedom of mind that Bublitz identifies which is “peace of 
mind and mental integrity” (2016:97), this refers to the entirety of those aspects of our mental life 
that we are not consciously aware, or in control, of.  As their functioning occurs unconsciously, 
and thus automatically, these aspects are notoriously ephemeral and difficult to define or identify 
precisely.  Bublitz explains them, however, as the way in which “our conscious states such as 
thoughts and feelings are processed, prepared, triggered and realised by unconscious mechanisms 
on several levels, from single neurons to networks of brain areas to supposedly higher-level 
psychological operations” (2016:97).  Here, he draws on some of the findings of Crockett’s 
research which indicates that certain interventions, targeting “emotional propensities, behaviour 
dispositions and preferences” (ibid.) result in changed behaviour in the absence of any 
accompanying changes in “judgements or preferences” (ibid.; Crockett et al. 2008; Crockett et al. 
2010a; Crockett et al. 2010c).  In other words, despite the fact that the subjects act differently, these 
changes can only be explained as having been the product of “an alteration of unconscious 
dispositions” (Bublitz, 2016:97), as these subjects were not aware of any conscious, cognitive 
changes that could explain their changed behaviour.   
 
Bublitz admits that even in the absence of any interventions, we do not have control over our 
unconscious mental states.  However, interventions that produce the kinds of changes described 
above would possibly threaten something that we have an interest in protecting: our peace of mind.  
He understands the latter idea as encompassing a “negative sense of mental freedom: to remain 
untouched from interventions tampering with consciously uncontrollable mental elements” 
(Bublitz, 2016:97).  Bublitz explains this concern with an analogy regarding the automatic nature 
of our physiological systems, such as our hormone levels.  Despite the fact that we have no 
conscious control over these systems, if one of them was inadvertently altered, without our 
awareness or consent, this would generally be regarded as “an “illegitimate violation…or more 
precisely…[a violation of one’s] right to bodily integrity” (ibid.).  In the same way, interfering with 
one’s “self-regulatory mental system” (ibid.) would be similarly problematic, and thus, 
interventions that produce such effects require further ethical investigation.   
 
The third component of freedom of mind is one that resembles the preceding components, namely, 
“the freedom to hold beliefs and opinions without interference” (Bublitz, 2016:98).  As Bublitz 
points out, however, it merits discussion in its own right due to the fact that it is a freedom that is 
afforded protection in human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
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(1948)63.  Bublitz posits that due to the fact that it is widely accepted that freedom of belief and 
opinion are of absolute value, we should be wary of any intervention that would result in changes 
to our beliefs and opinions, particularly if such changes are not the result of “argument and 
persuasion” (2016:98).  Here, Bublitz draws attention to Persson and Savulescu’s arguments that 
subjects undergoing moral bioenhancement would not have their cognitive capacities subverted as 
they would still be acting in a reason-responsive manner.  What will have changed post-moral 
bioenhancement, according to Persson and Savulescu, is that such individuals would now “act for 
the same reasons as those of us who are most moral today do” (2013:129).  It is, however, this very 
“replac[ement of] moral reasons, motives, insights, beliefs and opinions” (2016:98) that concerns 
Bublitz.  For Bublitz, like Harris, altering or intensifying emotional responses would be an example 
of an intervention that would directly change the afore-mentioned qualities while bypassing 
acceptable and ethically justifiable mechanisms of change such as rational argumentation and 
persuasion (2016:99).   
 
Bublitz does point out, however, that one has the right to freely consent to interventions that would 
impact on the above-mentioned freedoms and that this would not be self-evidently problematic, 
providing such consent was genuinely free from coercive forces.  Examples of coercive forces 
would not only be the obvious contenders, such as compulsory, state-sanctioned moral 
bioenhancement, but also less obvious forms of coercion, such as providing incentives to opt for 
moral bioenhancement that are difficult to refuse.  The value of Bublitz’s discussion is that it 
illustrates the need to give further clarification to the notion of freedom and autonomy and to 
organise the many interpretations that have been discussed in this chapter.  This is a task that will 
be addressed in the following chapter.   
 
4.11 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I have presented a comprehensive overview of the way in which the concern for the 
impact of moral bioenhancement on moral autonomy has been addressed in the literature.  A 
synthesis of the discussions and insights of this chapter reveals the following important questions 
and issues that must be addressed.  The first question is the issue of whether or not – and if so, to 
what extent – moral bioenhancement would, in fact, threaten our moral autonomy.  The answer to 
this question depends upon a number of factors.  Firstly, it is dependent upon how moral autonomy, 
itself, is defined.  On some interpretations, moral bioenhancement could arguably increase our 
                                                 
63 See article 18 and 19 of the UDHR.  
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autonomy, whilst on other conceptions it could decrease or eradicate it.  Thus, it is vital that the 
type of autonomy that is at stake is clarified.   
 
Secondly, it is dependent upon the type of intervention that would be employed.  This issue is, to 
a certain extent, connected with the problem of what the target of moral bioenhancement would be, 
and thus, with the problem of moral content, discussed in chapter 2.  The interventions that have 
been proposed in the literature are diverse, and range from those that are less invasive, such as 
pharmacological interventions, to those that are highly invasive, such as genetic or neurological 
interventions, like DBS.  In addition, because the science that would enable moral bioenhancement 
is not yet, and may never be, possible, this area is largely speculative in nature.  As mentioned in 
section 4.2.5, if we view freedom as occurring on a spectrum, then interventions that are passive – 
requiring little or no cognitive input from the individual – or, possibly, those that act directly upon 
the brain or mental states producing behaviour changes in the absence of cognitive reflection, 
would be the most problematic.  If such interventions were to produce decisive behavioural changes 
or excessively heighten emotional responses, they could be more accurately described as forms of 
compulsion or behaviour control.  Furthermore, other problematic interventions would be those 
that produce hidden identity or personality changes, those that change core beliefs, those that alter 
the mechanisms by which we are able to assess any changes, and those whose effects would be 
irreversible, thus thwarting the ability to withdraw consent.  In addition, interventions producing 
subtle changes, such as those associated with the freedom of mind could be problematic.   
 
Thirdly, the answer is dependent upon how moral bioenhancement would be administered.  While 
compulsory moral bioenhancement would be a clear violation of our autonomy, it isn’t necessarily 
the case that voluntary moral bioenhancement would leave our autonomy entirely intact.  Moral 
bioenhancement producing the above-mentioned effects and lying at the far end of the spectrum of 
freedom could be problematic regardless of whether or not it was administered voluntarily. 
 
The second question is whether or not it would be a decisively negative thing, all things considered, 
if moral bioenhancement were to impact autonomy.  The answer to this question is also dependent 
upon other factors such as the value that one ascribes to the freedom to do wrong and to autonomy 
in general.  One’s opinion regarding the latter will be influenced by how one ascribes value to 
autonomy.  If autonomy is regarded as intrinsically valuable, then any impacts upon it would be 
regarded as impermissible; whereas if it is valued primarily for instrumental reasons, then such 
impacts would be acceptable if they were associated with positive outcomes.  Of course, this 
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distinction is an over-simplification of how we ascribe value, the two conceptions inform one 
another and it is likely that if we value autonomy, we do so for both instrumental and intrinsic 
reasons.   
 
However, this point aside, regarding the question posed above, it is likely that one would only 
pursue this line of inquiry further if one regards moral autonomy as either entirely, or partially, 
instrumental in value.  If this were the case, then whether or not one would view impacts upon our 
moral autonomy as justifiable would depend upon the nature of the good that would be produced 
by moral bioenhancement, where good would be commensurate with the avoidance of harm that 
moral bioenhancement would avert.  In other words, impacts on autonomy would have to be 
justified by means of a utilitarian calculus that would have to indicate, as reliably as possible, why 
a trade-off between safety or well-being and autonomy would be a worthwhile justification for a 
programme of moral bioenhancement.  Due to the speculative nature of this matter, I will not pursue 
it further, as I wish to rather focus on the first question posed above which I take to be more 
philosophically interesting.  I will therefore address this concern in detail in chapter 5.   
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Chapter 5a – Autonomy as authentic self-determination  
5.1 Introduction and overview 
There are a variety of ways in which one may approach the task of elucidating the concern for 
autonomy voiced by the opponents of moral bioenhancement.  One could approach the concern 
from a neuroscientific paradigm in order to argue that the issue is a moot one, as neuroscientific 
knowledge of the brain is such that we now have evidence that we do not, in fact, possess the kind 
of autonomy that we assume we do.  The philosophical equivalent of this approach would be to 
argue for incompatibilism.  This is the position which argues that, to the extent that our actions are 
causally determined by physiological antecedents, we cannot possess free will, and thus, autonomy, 
in the sense of our ability to fully determine our lives, is an illusion.  I will not take either of these 
approaches; rather, I will assume a compatibilist interpretation of free will, in order to be able to 
engage coherently with the autonomy concerns that have been lodged in the moral bioenhancement 
literature.  The opponents of moral bioenhancement who argue that it will threaten autonomy 
clearly assume a compatibilist interpretation.  In other words, if they supported incompatibilism, 
they would not fear any threats to our autonomy posed by moral bioenhancement, as autonomy 
would not be something that we possessed to begin with.  One cannot lose something that one does 
not have.   
 
The autonomy concerns in the literature take the form of philosophical arguments.  Therefore, I 
have chosen to engage with them in an immanent manner.  In other words, I will approach the 
matter in the same manner, from within, and with the same criteria, as these arguments utilise, to 
try and ascertain if the concerns are valid.  In order to do so, I will need to provide an account of 
what is at stake, namely, an account of autonomy itself.  Furthermore, this account of autonomy 
must be one that is suitably rigorous, if it is to be taken seriously as a means of resolving the concern 
for moral autonomy posed by moral bioenhancement.  There are certain accounts of autonomy that 
have been extremely influential, but are nevertheless associated with various problems.  In fact, 
there are three specific problems that have plagued theories of autonomy.  If a theory of autonomy 
could be shown to have the ability to overcome these problems, it could be of immense help in 
achieving the above aim.   
 
In other words, to be able to coherently assess the concerns put forward by Harris and other 
thinkers, one must do so by way of choosing a particular account of autonomy.  One must also be 
able to provide evidence of the legitimacy of this particular account of autonomy by way of some 
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mechanism or tool that can be used to assess it.  A theory of autonomy that is able to pass the test 
of the three problems of autonomy would be one such potential candidate.  More specifically, for 
the purposes of an assessment of moral bioenhancement, one of the three problems, in particular, 
would be most relevant.  Any theory of autonomy that is to be accepted as a legitimate means of 
assessing the concern for moral autonomy posed by moral bioenhancement would have to be one 
that did not fall foul to The problem of manipulation.  This is because the problem of manipulation 
bears many resemblances to the processes by which moral bioenhancement would work, as alleged 
by its opponents.   
 
If a theory of autonomy fails the test of the problem of manipulation, what this means is that it is 
unable to clearly indicate why external interference or manipulation would be a compromise to 
autonomy.  In other words, if such a theory provides specific conditions for an action to be 
considered autonomous, and we are able to show that these conditions would be met even when 
some form of external interference has taken place, then it would be said to have failed the test for 
the problem of manipulation.  A theory that passes this test would be one in which the conditions 
for autonomy are formulated in such a way that they exclude the possibility of external interference 
or manipulation.  Furthermore, excluding manipulation simply by fiat is not sufficient; a theory of 
autonomy that is to be taken seriously as a potential tool for resolving ethical disputes must be able 
to give clear grounds as to why such external interference would compromise autonomy.  
Therefore, any moral bioenhancement intervention that can be shown to pass the test for autonomy 
when assessed by means of a theory of autonomy that has itself been shown to overcome the 
problem of manipulation, could possibly be ethically permissible.   
 
I will therefore begin this chapter with a brief discussion, in section 5.2, of the concept of autonomy 
itself.  This will be followed by an investigation of hierarchical theories of autonomy in section 
5.3, focusing specifically on Harry Frankfurt’s theory of autonomy.  Such an investigation is 
necessary, as, since its inception in the 1970s, virtually all contemporary accounts of autonomy 
have been informed by, or have reacted to, Frankfurt’s account.  In particular, the theory that I have 
selected as the most effective means of addressing the concern for the threat posed by moral 
bioenhancement to autonomy – the coherence theory of autonomy – is founded upon insights 
original to Frankfurt’s theory, while managing to avoid the pitfalls that have plagued his account.  
Thus, it is only possible to adequately grasp the coherence theory that I will utilise, if one possesses 
a full understanding of its predecessors.  Furthermore, the strength of this coherence theory of 
autonomy, and its legitimacy in being able to assess the concern for autonomy posed by moral 
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bioenhancement, will only be evident if one understands just how challenging it is for a theory to 
overcome the three problems.  In section 5.4 I will therefore discuss the three problems associated 
with hierarchical theories of autonomy, and the way that these problems have compelled thinkers 
to both adapt these theories, and to come up with new theories of autonomy.  This will be followed 
by a discussion of Gerald Dworkin’s “criteria for a satisfactory theory of autonomy” (1988) in 
section 5.5, which are a useful means of assessing and justifying a potential theory of autonomy.   
 
In section 5.6 I will then introduce Laura Ekstrom’s coherence theory of autonomy (1993, 1999, 
2005a, 2005b).  This theory, not only avoids the problems that plague earlier hierarchical theories 
of autonomy, but most importantly, it avoids the problem of manipulation.  Furthermore, it is a 
theory of autonomy that is predicated on the assumption that one’s personal or psychological 
identity is a determining factor in autonomy.  Therefore, it illustrates the argument that was 
discussed in chapter 4a, namely, the concern that major impacts or changes to core aspects of 
personal identity could be problematic for autonomy.  Once I have presented and discussed 
Ekstrom’s theory, I will then assess it in general, as well as by means of Dworkin’s criteria for an 
adequate account of autonomy in section 5.7.  In the second part of this chapter I will then use the 
above insights to analyse the way in which different moral bioenhancement interventions could 
impact this particular conception of autonomy.   
 
5.2 A brief discussion of autonomy 
The concept of autonomy is wide enough in scope to be the subject of an entire volume.  This is 
evidenced by the fact that the since the publication of several papers seeking to investigate the 
concept on a deeper level in the 1970s, there have, in fact, been several volumes specifically 
dedicated to the subject, which have had great subsequent influence.  In this section, however; I 
will provide only the briefest discussion of some background information that I regard as relevant 
for understanding the concept in general, as well as salient for the argument that I will make in the 
second part of this chapter.   
 
In the moral bioenhancement literature, there is very little in-depth engagement with the notion of 
autonomy itself.  Most of the arguments that discuss the concern for moral autonomy are conducted 
at a somewhat superficial level, due to the fact that they proceed with their investigations after 
implicitly assuming consensus regarding the meaning of autonomy as something along the lines of 
moral self-determination in a Kantian sense.  This tends to frame these arguments in such a way 
that the debate has become somewhat stultified.  It is, of course, understandable that there is a 
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tendency to think that what is at stake in the moral bioenhancement debate is Kantian moral 
autonomy.  This is because the argument is so frequently framed as the concern that moral 
bioenhancement, by way of intensifying our emotive responses, and thus, increasing our motivation 
to act in a particular manner, deemed moral, will cause morality to become infected by contingent 
factors rather than being predicated upon the dictates of the rational will.  This outcome would be 
the antithesis of the Kantian notion of what it means to act morally.  However, while it has enjoyed 
enduring influence, this Kantian conception is but one interpretation of moral autonomy.   
 
Moral autonomy may also be framed in terms of moral authenticity (Feinberg, 1989:36).  This 
interpretation is closely related to what I take to be at stake in the moral bioenhancement debate.  
Such an interpretation argues that the autonomous individual is not only one who is moved by his 
own general attitudinal states, but also one whose “moral convictions and principles (if he has any) 
are genuinely his own, rooted in his own character, and not merely inherited” (Feinberg, 1989:36).  
Using the requirement that value systems must be the individual’s ‘own’, does not imply that we 
choose, or are able to choose, our moral value system ex nihilio, as this would be an impossibility 
due to the fact that our value systems are deeply influenced by the context in which we reach moral 
maturity.  Furthermore, while this interpretation is similar to the Kantian interpretation, in terms of 
morality requiring that we act from autonomous rather than heteronomous reasons, it doesn’t give 
substantive requirements regarding how this must be done, simply, that to be considered 
autonomous, an action may not be mindlessly performed or be caused by undue external impacts.  
Thus, what is meant by this interpretation is that a morally authentic person is one who is aware of, 
and has examined her attitudinal states, including her value system, in the light of rationality, and 
who makes any changes on the basis of good reasons that are hers (Feinberg, 1989;32).  The notion 
of rational examination is therefore a thread that runs through most accounts of morality and is also 
regarded as a necessary component for the possibility of being able to exercise both morality and 
autonomy.  However, an account of moral autonomy as authenticity differs from a Kantian account 
in that acting from one’s own moral convictions and principles would include the role that 
emotional and attitudinal states play in this process.   
 
Historically, the etymology of the concept of autonomy, auto-nomos, is Greek in derivation and its 
meaning can be traced back to the ancient context in which it signified the independence or self-
governance of Greek city-states.  The connation of the concept has not changed fundamentally 
since this initial use, as it is still understood to imply self-governance or self-determination.  Rather, 
it is the denotation of the concept that has changed, as it now refers to the autonomy of individual 
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human beings rather than city-states.  Autonomy is frequently used interchangeably with notions 
that belong to the same conceptual family such as freedom and liberty.  However, while these 
concepts are related, they are characterised by subtle differences.  As Christman succinctly 
formulates it, autonomy at its most fundamental “level of application…is more properly seen as a 
property of preference or desire formation than a property of whole persons or of person’s whole 
lives” (1989:13).  Here, the notion of preference can be taken to signify a variety of mental states 
such as attitudes of value and beliefs.  This is contrasted with the notions of freedom or liberty 
which are “a property of human action – a characteristic of the relation among desires, bodily 
movements, and restraints that may be facing the agent” (ibid.).   
 
Christman provides a formula for freedom, arguing that being “free (in a given context) means 
there is an absence of restraints (positive or negative, internal or external) standing between a 
person and the carrying out of that person’s autonomous desires” (1989:13).  This formula also 
clearly indicates the closeness of the relationship between freedom and autonomy.  However, they 
are related in a complex manner as one may be free but not autonomous, and one may, possibly, 
be autonomous but not free.  An example of the former situation would be an individual who 
possesses freedom of action, but, whose preference to live his life in a particular manner is thwarted 
by a strong addiction to use drugs.  Examples of the latter are more challenging to find; however, 
one such example was discussed in the previous chapter in section 4.8.1: at the moment that he was 
tied to the mast, Odysseus was not free to move closer to the sirens as his will desired in that 
particular moment.  However, he was autonomous with respect to his original desire and request to 
be bound to the mast and ignored should he ask to be freed.  Another example would be an 
individual who is the slave of a benevolent master and has limits on his freedom of action, but is 
autonomous regarding his ability to form and act on most preferences.  However, such examples 
are open to contestation, and whether or not an individual in such a situation would be regarded as 
possessing autonomy would depend entirely upon the particular theory of autonomy that is being 
utilised as a means of analysis.  What is clear, however; is that autonomy is a more demanding 
phenomenon than freedom and it is a decidedly internal state.   
 
Another useful interpretation that must be mentioned, due to its relevance in pinpointing the 
meaning of autonomy, is Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between positive and negative liberty (1969).  
The notions of liberty and freedom are generally regarded as synonymous, and Berlin explicitly 
states that he regards them as interchangeable (1969:121).  In its most simplistic formulation, 
negative liberty refers to freedom from constraints whereas positive liberty refers to the freedom to 
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do a particular thing.  Another way of formulating the difference between the two is to conceive of 
negative liberty in relational terms, as it pertains to the way in which freedom may be impacted 
upon in the interpersonal realm, whereas positive liberty is an intrapersonal notion as it is 
concerned with the extent to which the individual is able to determine her life’s course.  However, 
these interpretations are over-simplifications to a certain extent, as the internal freedom to act in a 
particular way is affected by the extent to which one is subject to external constraints.   
 
While Berlin remarks on the fact that the two notions are seemingly similar prima facie, he points 
out that their historical development was tangential and at times directly at odds with one another.  
Regarding negative liberty, Berlin posits that: 
I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my 
activity…If I am prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree 
unfree; and if this area is contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be 
described as being coerced or, it may be, enslaved (1969:122). 
 
By including the phrase “what I could otherwise do” (ibid.), it is obvious that Berlin is not speaking 
of absolute freedom, as there are things that one simply cannot do, due to the fact that we are limited 
by our materiality.  As a human being, I cannot fly with only the aid of my arms; I cannot hear if I 
have been born deaf; and, I cannot perform certain mathematical equations in the absence of a 
certain level of mathematical acumen.  The type of liberty that Berlin is therefore engaging with 
here is specifically that freedom that can be threatened through human interference.   
 
Berlin defines positive liberty in terms of: 
the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master.  I wish my life and decisions to 
depend on myself, not external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, 
not of other men’s, act of will.  I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by 
conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. 
I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer – deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and 
not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave 
incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and 
realizing them…I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, 
bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to my own ideas 
and purposes. I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree 
that I am made to realize that it is not (own emphasis, 1969:131).  
 
From the above quote, it is evident why Christman describes Berlin’s conception of positive liberty 
as the “identical twin” (1989:3) of autonomy.  Berlin’s conception captures what is regarded as 
valuable about autonomy, and, what is therefore at stake when it is threatened.  In addition, the last 
sentence of the quote is particularly important for the discussions of autonomy that will follow.  
This conception of autonomy is a deeply personal one as it is linked to the subject’s perception of 
the extent to which she is free to be moved by her own desires, beliefs and attitudes.    




With the above comments in mind, it is my contention that only if a richer theory of autonomy – 
one that contains specific criteria against which interventions may be assessed – is utilised, will the 
moral bioenhancement debate be able to move beyond the current impasse.  Furthermore, a more 
rigorous approach has major implications for other areas in bioethics that utilise a thin 
interpretation of autonomy.  An approach that I regard as more useful – and one that I will take – 
will be to reframe the concern for moral autonomy posed by moral bioenhancement as an issue 
specifically of personal autonomy, and, to utilise insights from contemporary theories of autonomy 
to assess it on a deeper level.  
 
5.3 Hierarchical accounts of autonomy 
Contemporary accounts of autonomy have tended to associate the concept with the notion of 
authenticity.  As mentioned above, this interpretation may be distinguished from the previously 
dominant Kantian conception of autonomy which posits that individuals are autonomous to the 
extent that their actions are motivated by a rationally driven will that is free from all contingent 
influences such as personal feelings, emotions, desires and inclinations.  In contradistinction to this 
interpretation, contemporary interpretations of autonomy are more individualistic or 
phenomenological in their approach, as they acknowledge the importance of the first-person 
experience of autonomy.  In other words, such a conception would regard individuals as 
autonomous to the extent that their “desires, actions, or character…originate in some way from 
[within, or from their] motivational set” (Stacey-Taylor, 2005:1).  This conception of autonomy 
may also be conceived of as a type of “psychological property, the possession of which enables 
agents to reflect critically on their natures, preferences and ends, to locate their most authentic 
commitments, and to live consistently in accordance with these in the face of various forms of 
internal and external interference” (Piper, undated).  In addition, most contemporary theories of 
autonomy are also deeply influenced by hierarchical accounts of autonomy, such as the 
independent theories of Harry Frankfurt (1971), Gerald Dworkin (1970), and Wright Neely (1974).  
Frankfurt’s account of autonomy, which was briefly discussed in section 4.8.2, is informed by his 
interpretation of what confers personhood, where the latter is associated with those uniquely human 
qualities that human beings regard as not only the most salient aspects of who they are, but that 
may also pose potential challenges to their self-conception (1971:6).   
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Frankfurt’s hierarchical account of autonomy64 – first outlined in the 1970s – has had the strongest 
influence on subsequent theories of autonomy.  The ability to form mental states such as desires 
and beliefs, and to act upon them, is, of course, not unique to human beings, as there is clearly the 
presence of such capabilities in other sentient creatures.  Animals may not be able to form complex 
mental states such as beliefs, but they clearly exhibit states of desire.  However, what is seemingly 
uniquely human, is the ability to assess and form opinions about our desires, beliefs and 
preferences, and, to therefore either endorse or reject them.  In other words, we are able to distance 
ourselves from our seemingly lower or fundamental desires, which Frankfurt describes as first-
order desires, and have higher or second-order desires about them, in a way that will either lead to 
us accepting and thus acting upon them, or will result in us rejecting them and wishing that we did 
not have such desires, even in cases in which we still act upon them.  To use different terminology: 
I am able to want something (a first-order desire), and, I am able to want to want it (a second-order 
desire), or, I am able to not want to want it.   
 
First-order desires encompass inclinations or intentions that one may possess but not be compelled 
to act upon.  Such first-order desires are “mere impulses – pulls or temptations towards performing 
some action or other…[they may] be voluntarily adopted, but normally they simply arise unbidden 
in response to stimuli” (Ekstrom, 2005b:48).  However, a subset of first-order desires is those 
desires that have sufficient motivational force to compel action.  Frankfurt also uses the term will 
to refer to such first-order desires that are “effective…[in that they] move (or will or would move) 
a person all the way to action” (1971:8).  In other words, a first-order desire that is strong enough 
to motivate one to act would be regarded as one’s will65.  Frankfurt uses the term second-order 
volitions, to refer to those second-order desires that individuals strongly desire to be their will, and 
thus, to motivate them to act.  (Frankfurt, 1971:10).  According to Frankfurt, true personhood 
requires that an individual must possess second-order volitions and not simply second-order 
desires.  In other words, an individual must have the desire that one or another of his desires be his 
will, otherwise Frankfurt would regard him not as a ‘person’ but as a ‘wanton’ (1971:12).  This 
will be explained further below.   
 
Examples that illustrate the above distinction are abundant and several such examples were briefly 
discussed in section 4.8.2 of chapter 4b.  However, now that a detailed investigation of Frankfurt’s 
                                                 
64 Frankfurt does not use the term autonomy himself, but rather refers to the freedom of the will (1971).  However, his 
theory is taken as the foundation of most contemporary accounts of autonomy, and ‘will’, as he describes it, is 
synonymous with contemporary understandings of autonomy.   
65 From hereon I will therefore use the term will to refer to first-order desires that have sufficient motivational force to 
compel an individual to act upon them.  
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theory is being conducted, some additional examples may be discussed to illustrate the nuanced 
nature of his approach, and ultimately the relevance of his approach for the theory of autonomy 
that I will use to assess moral bioenhancement.  An individual may have a will to regularly consume 
fattening foods, but at the same time, she may wish that her will was not effective in moving her 
to act, as she would like to be thinner and healthier.  In other words, she may, despite her love of 
fattening foods, yearn to have a different will.  She may wish to have a will that motivates her to 
be enticed by, and to consume, healthy rather than fattening food.  In this regard, she rejects her 
will to consume fattening food, as it is at odds with her second-order volition that her will be to eat 
healthy food so that she can be slim.  Another way of expressing this would be to say that while 
she has a strong desire to eat fattening food, she doesn’t want to want to eat such food.  She doesn’t 
want her desire for fattening food to be the dominant will that motivates her to act, she wants her 
will to be different.  Thus, when she acts upon her will to consume fattening food, she experiences 
distress, and in this regard her autonomy is compromised in some way.   
 
We can also conceive of examples that have moral relevance.  An individual may experience a 
strong emotional reaction of jealousy to his partner’s interactions with others.  This may elicit an 
overwhelming and effective will to control and restrict her interactions, in order to assuage his 
feelings of insecurity.  When acting upon this will, it could then cause distress for both him and his 
partner, thus bringing conflict into the relationship.  However, despite his strong will to keep his 
partner away from perceived threats to their relationship, he may at the same time wish that his will 
was different, that he was not this way and that he did not have such feelings.  As was the case with 
the previous example, the individual rejects his will to control his relationship, as it conflicts with 
his second-order volition which is that he would rather act upon a will that is associated with being 
a trusting and caring partner.  In other words, he doesn’t want to want to control his partner, even 
though he wants to control her and finds himself constantly trying to.  His will is at odds with his 
second-order volition; therefore, when he then acts in accordance with his will, he will experience 
distress, and once again, we could argue that his autonomy is compromised in some way.   
 
A slightly different example would be an individual who recognises that she has a will to engage 
in extra-marital affairs.  She is quick to experience boredom and enjoys the excitement of such 
illicit engagements; however, she wishes to keep the convenience of her marriage and enjoy its 
ensuing benefits.  When critically assessing this desire, the individual may come to realise that any 
negative feelings she has towards her desires are not feelings of guilt, but are rather feelings of 
concern for any potentially negative consequences, such as being caught.  In other words, she has 
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formed an opinion through consulting and reflecting upon her moral beliefs and has come to the 
conclusion that her will to engage in such affairs is morally acceptable to her.  In this situation, her 
will is endorsed by a second-order volition to act upon her desires. She enjoys the desire that she 
experiences for her extra-marital endeavours and wants to want to experience such things.  Thus, 
because there is congruence between her will and her second-order volition, regardless of the moral 
status of her desire, we could regard her illicit engagements as autonomous.   
 
From the last example, it is therefore clear that, as is the case with most contemporary theories of 
autonomy, Frankfurt’s account is content-neutral.  In other words, on his account, an individual’s 
autonomy is not predicated upon any particular conception of the good, but rather, upon what the 
individual regards as good.  Content-neutral theories of autonomy may also be described as value-
neutral.  They specify procedures, processes or even particular structural aspects of an attitudinal 
state or action that must be present for an individual to be considered autonomous; however, they 
do not specify the nature of the actions or goals that individuals must enact or pursue in order to be 
considered autonomous66.  Thus, an individual may have a will that motivates him to act in a way 
that is seemingly self-defeating, immoral or restrictive of his freedom; however, so long as he 
accepts or endorses his will with a second-order volition that is a product of critical reflection, then 
Frankfurt would regard him as autonomous.  Describing second-order volitions as higher-order 
volitions, thus simply means that they are more closely aligned with the core self of the individual, 
or that the individual identifies more emphatically with such volitions67.   
 
Thus, we can revisit the example, discussed in section 4.8.2 of chapter 4b, of the unwilling drug 
addict.  In such a case, the unwilling drug addict has a strong will to use drugs, but at the same 
time, she has an equally compelling and conflicting desire to not use them due to their deleterious 
effects on her life.  However, she may find that her will possesses sufficient motivational force to 
compel her to use drugs, despite the fact that she has a second-order volition to abstain from drug 
use.  In such a situation, because her will to use drugs is at odds with her second-order volition to 
                                                 
66 Content-neutral theories may be contrasted with substantive theories of autonomy, which specify certain 
requirements for a decision or an action to be considered autonomous, where these requirements are informed by an 
underlying conception of the good.  Kant’s notion of autonomy would be an example of a substantive account.  This 
is because it is informed by the underlying value system that he subscribes to.  To be considered autonomous on a 
Kantian account, one has to act, or refrain from acting, in a particular way, that would only be regarded as autonomous 
if you agree with his conception of what is true and good.  Content-neutral accounts, on the other hand, are attractive, 
as they have more universal applicability than substantive accounts.  In other words, they are appropriate for use in 
societies characterised by value-pluralism and they are also, therefore, flexible enough to be used for contexts which 
require applied ethics approaches.   
67 In his hierarchical account, Dworkin describes this as being in a position to do one’s “own thing” (1976:276), 
implying that one acts in an ‘authentic’ manner when one can form motivations to act, in a way that is informed and 
approved by one’s own mental states, preferences and desires.   
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not use drugs, she would be regarded as having compromised levels of autonomy.  We can also 
contrast this example with that of an individual who has a will to use drugs and simply acts on this 
will without reflecting upon the nature of his desire, such as whether or not he wishes his will to 
be effective in compelling him to use drugs or refrain from using them.  As mentioned above, 
Frankfurt would describe such an individual as a ‘wanton’ (1971:12).  Such an individual may even 
have conflicting first-order desires or inclinations, he may both desire and not desire to use drugs.  
However, in the absence of a second-order volition that one or the other of his desires be effective 
in compelling action, he would not possess personhood in the way that Frankfurt defines it.  He 
would also be considered lacking in autonomy on Frankfurt’s account.  The unwilling addict, on 
the other hand, would, be considered to possess personhood on Frankfurt’s account, due to the fact 
that he possesses a second-order volition to not use drugs.  However, despite this, he would be 
accurate in considering himself to be lacking in autonomy in some way, as he will feel that he is 
being compelled to act against what is his will68   
 
Thus, for Frankfurt, personhood is strongly associated with possessing the capability and the desire 
to form second-order volitions.  Frankfurt argues that:  
it is only because a person has volitions of the second order that he is capable both of enjoying, 
and of lacking, freedom of the will…[Furthermore, personhood is not only constituted by 
possessing] both first-order desires and volitions of the second order.  It can also be construed 
as the concept of a type of entity for whom the freedom of its will may be a problem (1971:14).   
 
In the case of the wanton described above, without the presence of a will to want to want to use 
drugs or to not want to want to use drugs, the individual does not problematise the issue of whether 
or not his will is free, and thus, he is akin to an animal.  Furthermore, as Frankfurt argues, an animal 
in the wild may roam freely; however, we would not regard it as having a will that is free in the 
sense that he describes.  Thus, for Frankfurt, freedom of the will is different from freedom to act in 
one way or another, as he correctly points out that the latter can be restricted while the former 
remains intact69.  Freedom of the will is being “free to will what [one] wants to will, or to have the 
will [one] wants” (1971:15).  Thus, Frankfurt separates actions from the will that leads to them.  
Frankfurt argues that when there is congruence between second-order volitions and an individual’s 
                                                 
68 Frankfurt also considers those who have conflicting second-order desires to be on shaky ground – i.e. wanting to 
want something and not wanting to want something – as, in such a situation of conflict there will be no definitive 
second-order volition regarding precisely which first-order desire is favoured by an individual as her will.  In such a 
situation, an individual will feel immobilised and unable to act (1971:16). 
69 This distinction between freedom of the will and freedom of action is, of course, the basis of Frankfurt’s attempted 
refutation of the principle of alternate possibilities as a precondition for free will, discussed in section 4.8.4 of chapter 
4b.  In the example of the individual in the locked house, if she were to form a second-order volition that was congruent 
with her will to remain in the house – of which she is unaware is actually locked – then she would possess freedom of 
the will despite not possessing freedom of action.     
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will then her will is free, she is autonomous; when there is conflict between the two, then her will 
or autonomy is compromised to a degree70.   
 
These examples also illustrate the way in which hierarchical accounts of autonomy are strongly 
associated with authenticity.  This is due to the stipulation that to be autonomous, an individual’s 
will must be congruent with higher-level, second-order volitions, as the endorsement or rejection 
that is produced by the latter originates from the self.  In other words, while we may feel that at 
times we are the captives of our first-order desires, due to their having the character of impulses, 
drives or instincts, because we are able to reflect upon and choose our second-order volitions, they 
seem to be more a part of our selves.  Thus, second-order volitions give us hope that we have more 
control over our lives and our impulses than our first-order desires would imply; because of this, 
they feel more authentically ours than first-order desires.  However, it must be noted that in terms 
of this process of reflection and selection, this would refer more to situations that are characterised 
by some form of overt conflict between different orders of desires, or by some aspect of the 
situation which draws attention to the need to reflect on second-order volitions.  Frankfurt argues 
that, in general, congruence, or lack of congruence, between an individual’s will and her second-
order volitions occurs mostly in an unconscious manner (1971:17).   
 
Frankfurt’s theory, and hierarchical theories in general, are powerful for many reasons, one of 
which is the fact that they are easily able to justify the value that autonomy holds for us.  In answer 
to the question of why we should value autonomy in an absolute sense, such a theory would be able 
to reply that autonomy is valuable due to the fact that it enables us to realise those desires that truly 
matter to us and are connected in a deeper way with who we take ourselves to be.  On the other 
hand, if one’s autonomy is thwarted, then one is impeded from realising these desires, and thus; 
from self-realisation.  Furthermore, for Frankfurt, possessing both freedom of action and freedom 
of will represent complete freedom.  He posits that where both are present, an individual “is not 
only free to do what he wants to do; he is also free to want what he wants to want” (1971:17).   
 
                                                 
70 It must be noted that while Frankfurt has relatively stringent criteria for the presence of autonomy or freedom of the 
will, he most certainly does not argue that moral responsibility requires autonomy or freedom of the will.  One of the 
purposes of autonomy theories is, of course, to serve as a means of articulating moral responsibility.  In his attempted 
refutation of the principle of alternate possibilities as a precondition for free will, Frankfurt aims to contest the 
necessary link between autonomy and moral responsibility, thus arguing that an individual may be morally responsible 
for her actions even in cases in which her freedom of will was compromised or non-existent.  I discussed this briefly 
in section 4.8.4 and will not address this area as it is unrelated to my area of focus in this dissertation.  However, it is 
necessary to point out that Frankfurt has provided an extensive account of the subject of moral responsibility.  See 
Frankfurt (1969). 
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Thus, by distinguishing between freedom of action and freedom of will, Frankfurt’s theory gives 
credence to the intuition that what is important regarding autonomy is not simply captured by being 
free to act or do as one desires.  This is because one’s desires, and thus, the actions that they lead 
to, may be the product of manipulation or undue external influences, or they may be desires that 
we would rather not have.  Furthermore, his theory – and hierarchical accounts in general –  takes 
cognisance of the fact that autonomy is constituted not only by freedom from external coercion, 
but also by freedom from inner compulsions such as “phobias and addictions” (Ekstrom, 
1993:600).  In fact, inner compulsions and psychological disorders may constrain autonomy as 
acutely as external impediments71.  While it will be shown below that Frankfurt’s theory is 
vulnerable to the problem of manipulation, it is nevertheless a more comprehensive account of 
autonomy than preceding accounts.   
 
5.4 Three problems with hierarchical accounts of autonomy 
While hierarchical accounts of autonomy have laid the foundations for most subsequent autonomy 
theories, they are nevertheless subject to three problems.  For an autonomy theory to be considered 
as a serious contender in the arena of applied ethics – and, in particular, to be useful as a means of 
addressing complex ethical situations that may arise in a biomedical context – it must be able to 
address and overcome these problems.  Frankfurt has adapted his original theory slightly, in 
recognition of these problems, and subsequent theories of autonomy have employed different 
solutions to the problems, with varying levels of success.  I will discuss the three problems, in order 
to illustrate how Ekstrom’s approach successfully overcomes them, and thus, may be considered 
as a reliable and effective means of settling the concern for moral autonomy posed by moral 
bioenhancement.  The first two problems are closely related but will be discussed separately as 
they are formulated somewhat differently and bring different matters of importance to the fore.  
The third problem has the most relevance for the concern for autonomy posed by moral 
bioenhancement.   
 
5.4.1 The problem of infinite regress 
On Frankfurt’s hierarchical account, autonomy is secured when an individual’s will is endorsed by 
a second-order volition.  As mentioned above, the latter is regarded as having more authority than 
                                                 
71 The way that one might be constrained by various addictions such as to a particular substance, to a toxic relationship, 
or by compulsive behaviour, has been described as “the internal problem” by Lehrer due to the fact that such internal 
constraints are as inhibiting as external constraints (Lehrer, 1997 in Ekstrom, 1999:1058).  Hierarchical theories of 
autonomy are, of course, a recognition and response to the specific nature of this problem.   
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the former, and is thus regarded as more closely associated with the self.  However, one could, of 
course, question the validity of second-order volitions.  In particular, one may ask why an action 
that has been endorsed by a second-order volition is more autonomous or authentic than one that 
hasn’t been.  In other words, one can question the source of the supposed reliability or authority of 
volitions of the second-order and ask from whence this originates.  In order to answer this question, 
one would have to move backwards and possibly affirm the reliability of one’s second-order 
volition by pointing out that one has a positive disposition towards it.  This positive disposition 
then becomes akin to a third-order volition.  However, the problem persists; requiring one to move 
further backwards in an infinite regress of justification. 
 
To illustrate with an example, I may be a person who has no desire to be generous and assist those 
in need.  My will is such that I never donate to charities or provide any form of charitable assistance.  
When assessing my will, I experience feelings of guilt and wish that I had a strong desire to be 
generous, that would motivate me to act accordingly.  In other words, I wish that I wanted to be 
generous, or, I want to want to be generous.  This second-order volition would be regarded as 
indicative of what I truly want, as I have clearly thought about the matter, and it would thus possess 
authority to ‘speak’ for me.  However, I could also assess this second-order volition by means of a 
third-order volition to be more accepting of my shortcomings and not so ready to feel guilt for my 
lack of generosity.  In other words, I could wish that I didn’t want to want to give and were not 
plagued by guilt.  I could then assess this third-order volition by wishing that I didn’t wish to be 
more accepting of my shortcomings: I don’t want to not want to want to want to give.  This regress 
could then continue backwards ad infinitum.  In this example, there is conflict between different 
levels of desire, however, we could also come up with more straightforward examples.  I could 
have a desire to do something and this could be endorsed by wanting to want it, which could be 
further endorsed by wanting to want to want it and then by wanting to want to want to want it, and 
so forth.   
 
Frankfurt does recognise that there is a potential problem of regress, particularly in the case of 
conflicting levels of desires, as described above.  He admits that “[t]here is no theoretical limit to 
the length of the series of desires of higher and higher orders; nothing except common sense and, 
perhaps, a saving fatigue prevents an individual from obsessively refusing to identify himself with 
any of his desires until he forms a desire of the next higher order” (Frankfurt, 1971:16).  In other 
words, while Frankfurt recognises that we could relentlessly reflect on our desires, he believes that 
doing this would be a decidedly negative thing.  Furthermore, he posits that the solution to the 
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problem of infinite regress would be to halt this process in a non-arbitrary manner by decisively or 
resoundingly committing to one’s will.  This may be possible in cases characterised by minimal 
conflict between levels of desire, such as a single-minded desire regarding an endeavour for which 
there is no presence of self-doubt.  However, in a great deal of cases, such as the example of the 
ungenerous individual discussed above, it is not self-evident that halting the process of reflection 
at a particular point would escape a charge of arbitrariness.  Critics therefore regard Frankfurt as 
having failed to adequately address the problem of infinite regress72.  
 
5.4.2 The problem of authority  
The second problem has been referred to by different terms but it encapsulates the issue of how 
second-order volitions are deemed to be higher or more authoritative.  In this regard, it is closely 
related to the problem of infinite regress.  In other words, while occurring on seemingly different 
levels, desires are nevertheless the same phenomena, they are all desires (Watson, 1975:218).  How 
then, may we argue that one desire should assume primacy over another?  Another way of 
formulating this problem is to frame it as one of identification.  In other words, one may ask why 
an individual identifies more strongly with a second-order volition than with a first-order desire73.  
As discussed above, the solution to this problem would generally be to posit that second-order 
volitions are more authentic in their closer association with the self because they are more 
considered than first-order desires; but how do we know that one desire is more one’s own than 
another?  One could reject a first-order desire that is at odds with a second-order volition because 
one is in a state of self-denial about what one really wants.  In other words, one could be in denial 
regarding one’s true second-order volition.  Because Frankfurt stipulates no substantive conditions 
                                                 
72 It is interesting to note that it is not only in the area of volitional justification that we find this problem of infinite 
regress.  This is, strictly speaking, also an epistemological problem that characterises any knowledge claim, grounded 
in a classical model of rationality (Van Niekerk, 1980 & 1983).  Albert (1968) describes this problem as the 
Münchhausen trilemma, referring to Baron Münchhausen who was required to drag himself out of a swamp by his 
very own hair in a classic example of bootstrapping.  More specifically, the Münchhausen trilemma refers to the 
problem of how we ground the truth of our knowledge claims in accordance with the classical model of rationality.  
Cambier (2006) describes this as Albert’s identification of “the problem that rationalist philosophy cannot itself 
establish its own foundations” (2006:145).  Generally, the condition for a proposition to be regarded as a knowledge 
claim is its ability to be grounded through sufficient reason, or by way of some form of proof.  However, one could 
then enquire as to the veracity of this grounding or proof, which according to this model, requires grounding or proof 
itself, and so forth.  In response to this problem of seemingly infinite regress of justification, Albert argues that we are 
faced with a trilemma: we can accept and engage in this infinite regress of justification, we can employ a circular form 
of deduction whereby we use proof that itself requires justification, or we can simply halt the process in an arbitrary 
and dogmatic manner (Van Niekerk, 1983:14-29). 
73 The problem of authority is also sometimes referred to as the problem of identification for this reason.  The issue at 
hand is: what does it mean to identify oneself with a desire that one has, so that in doing so, any act that ensues is self-
determined.   
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for the way in which second-order volitions should arise or be formed, his theory is not able to 
adequately address this problem.   
 
As mentioned above, Frankfurt’s account is content-neutral, therefore, when an individual assesses 
her will she does not necessarily do so by taking a “moral stance” (1971:13) towards it.  Frankfurt 
argues that: 
a person may be capricious and irresponsible in forming [her] second-order volitions and give 
no serious consideration to what is at stake.  Second-order volitions express evaluations only 
in the sense that they are preferences.  There is no essential restriction on the kind of basis, if 
any, upon which they are formed. (ibid.) 
 
The problem, however, is not the fact that second-order volitions must be assessed in terms of some 
moral position, or that desires must be ‘pure’ in some way, rather than informed by internal 
volitions; rather, what is problematic, is that in his lack of restrictions regarding how desires may 
be formed to be taken as higher-order or authentic, Frankfurt’s account is once again plagued by 
arbitrariness.   
 
As discussed above, in his initial paper on freedom of the will, Frankfurt attempted to pre-empt this 
concern to a certain extent by positing that second-order volitions are higher, and thus, able to halt 
the regress backwards, due to the individual’s decisive commitment to them (1971:16).  However, 
as mentioned above, this response was not regarded as having successfully addressed the problem 
(Watson, 1975:219).  In a later chapter, Frankfurt addresses the problem further, arguing that 
decisive commitment to a second-order volition does not represent an arbitrary drawing of the line.  
Here, he draws an analogy with the calculation of a mathematical problem.  An individual makes a 
calculation and then checks her calculation for accuracy.  She can continue to check her calculation 
again and again, but at some point, she will stop her checks for the reason that she is “unequivocally 
confident” (Frankfurt, 1988:168) that they are, in fact, accurate, and that no further checks are 
necessary.  In this situation, the individual believes that the answer to the mathematical problem 
will remain the same with each future check, and thus, her “commitment resounds endlessly…[and 
is therefore] made without reservation” (ibid).  In a similar manner, a person will check his second-
order volitions, and, in cases where there is conflict will check until he has eliminated any self-
doubt.  Frankfurt’s argument is that stopping the process due to having eradicated all self-doubt, 
and thus, trusting in the fact that one’s higher-order volition is truly reflective of one’s desires is 
not an arbitrary halt of the process.  The person will have no valid reasons to continue the process.  
When reaching a position where there is an absence of conflict in the accuracy and authority of a 
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higher-order volition, the individual can then be said to be wholehearted in his commitment to it 
(1988:175).  
 
However, despite Frankfurt’s response to this problem, critics have remained unconvinced.  While 
one can wholeheartedly commit to a desire and stop the process implying an authority of sorts, the 
problem of arbitrariness nevertheless remains.  This is because without any criteria by means of 
which one can defend one’s second-order volitions, in terms of indicating why they are higher, they 
simply become desires that one happens to have (Ekstrom, 1993:602).  If one frames this problem 
in terms of being one of identification and argues that second-order volitions are of a higher-order 
because the individual identifies more strongly with them, and thus, that they are constitutive of her 
true self, then this implies that first-order desires that are at odds with second-order volitions are 
distinct from, or not a part of, the true self.  However, because Frankfurt has provided no account 
of the self, in terms of constructing a theory regarding two important requirements, namely, 
identifying “[w]hat is essential to a self…[and secondly w]hat is it for a self to identify with some 
desire, course, of action, or belief, deeming it as one’s own” (ibid. 603) he cannot evade the charge 
of arbitrariness74.   
 
In terms of determining the essential nature of the self that identifies with a particular second-order 
volition, and thus gives it its authority, this is not a subjective matter that is left up to the individual 
in question.  In other words, the individual does not simply decide what characteristics are integral 
to selfhood; rather, this must be supported by a theory of selfhood.  It is only in the case of the 
second requirement, the act of identifying or not identifying with a desire as one’s own that the 
matter is left up to the individual.  To explain the difference between the two, Piper refers to the 
distinction between “self-conception and conception of the self” (1985:174), where the former 
refers to subjective components and the later to the objective components.  On this distinction, if I 
have a belief that I am a morally upstanding individual, this would form part of my self-conception, 
whereas the question of whether or not an ability to act in accordance with moral beliefs is essential 
to selfhood, would form part of the conception of the self, and thus, would not be a matter that is 
left up to me.  Therefore, we require a more substantial or definitive way of clarifying whether my 
seemingly higher, second-order volitions that motivate me to act are truly my own, and are thus 
autonomous, in terms of the latter implying that they are self-determined (Ekstrom, 1993:603).  
                                                 
74 Because the concept of autonomy is generally taken, at its most fundamental level, to signify the notion of self-
determination, this means that a coherent autonomy theory – particularly one that wishes to avoid the problems 
discussed here – must provide some theory on the self so that it can clearly stipulate what it means to act in accordance, 
and thus freely, with the self.  This is a point that Dworkin has also raised (1976:23).  




5.4.3 The problem of manipulation 
Even if hierarchical accounts of autonomy, such as Frankfurt’s, are able to address and successfully 
overcome the two afore-mentioned problems, there is a third and more serious problem that 
remains, which also happens to be of crucial importance for the matter of the concern for autonomy 
posed by moral bioenhancement.  Of course, if autonomy is predicated upon the ability of the self 
to determine its own course, subject to specific criteria depending on the nature of the theory, then 
a prerequisite would be ensuring the absence of undue external constraints or influences which 
could thwart this ability.  External constraints include not only obvious instances of constraint such 
as overt coercion or force utilised to compel an individual to act in a particular manner, but also 
include more subtle forms of manipulation and coercion that could impact upon the formation of 
desires, preferences, beliefs and other mental states.  This would include impacts on the above 
mental states produced by neurobiological interventions.  To be regarded as a serious contender, 
therefore, an autonomy theory cannot simply provide content regarding the relationship between 
the will, or motivation, and second order volitions.  It must be equipped to deal with cases in which 
this relationship may happen to be in harmony purely as a result of undue external influences.   
 
Hierarchical accounts of autonomy, such as Frankfurt’s, are particularly vulnerable to the problem 
of manipulation, due to the fact that they are ahistorical or purely structural accounts of autonomy.  
In the case of Frankfurt’s account, he examines the relationship between the will and higher-order 
volitions and argues that this relationship must possess a particular structure for the individual in 
question to be considered autonomous.  However, there are no stipulated requirements outside of 
this structure, in terms of how an individual has come to acquire his desires and second-order 
volitions, that preclude them from having been imposed by external sources.  In other words, in 
situations in which an individual’s higher, second-order volitions have been manipulated by a 
hypnotist, through behavioural modification techniques, subliminal suggestion or through a 
neurobiological intervention, Frankfurt’s account of autonomy would not be able to elucidate why 
this would be problematic for autonomy as he gives no suggestions regarding the process by which 
second-order volitions must be formed75.   
 
                                                 
75 For this reason, certain theorists have developed explicitly historical approaches to autonomy, a noted example being 
the theory of John Christman (1989) who argues that an individual must accept the historical process by which she 
came to have particular desires and preferences (in Stacey Taylor, 2005:2).  
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Dworkin’s earlier hierarchical account gives more substance to the notion of autonomy than 
Frankfurt’s but is also vulnerable to the problem of manipulation.  His formula for autonomy is: 
“autonomy = authenticity + independence” (Dworkin, 1976:24).  Furthermore, he is also of the 
view that autonomy is present on the second-order level rather than on the first-order level.  There 
is very little autonomy at the first-order level due to the fact that as individuals, we are shaped and 
influenced to a major extent by socio-economic, cultural, environmental, psychological and other 
biological factors, over which we have minimal control.  Thus, Dworkin argues that our will, or our 
“beliefs, desires, emotions, principles, and so forth” (ibid.), cannot be accurately described as 
having been freely chosen or adopted.  However, as he points out, while we have little autonomy 
in choosing the above-mentioned mental states, we do have autonomy in our ability to assess and 
adjudicate them.   
 
Dworkin has refined his views, in subsequent publications, to ensure that they are even less 
susceptible to the problem of manipulation.  He had originally used the notion of identification of 
second-order volitions with first-order desires as a criterion for authenticity and thus autonomy.  
However, he abandoned the term identification in favour of the requirement that autonomy is 
secured by having the capability “to raise the question of whether I will identify with or reject the 
reasons for which I now act” (1988:15).  His change of heart in this regard was motivated by his 
belief that autonomy is a concept that must be measured over a substantial period of time, rather 
than localized at a particular point in time.  In other words, desires, and identification with them, 
must be looked at over time and autonomy lies in an enduring congruence between the two.  
Furthermore, because an individual’s identification with her first-order desires may be the product 
of manipulation, what is more relevant, is thus whether or not the individual possesses the capability 
to identify with, or, to renounce a first-order desire.  If she has been manipulated in some way she 
would not truly possess such a capability.   
 
Reframing the problem in this way gives a definitive solution to certain counter-intuitive examples.  
One such example is that of a willing drug addict; an individual who is accepting of his addiction 
and desires it to be no different from what it is.  On Frankfurt and Dworkin’s earlier account, 
because the willing drug addict has a second-order volition that identifies with his first-order desire 
to use drugs, he would be regarded as autonomous.  Dworkin’s reformulation enables him to 
identify why the willing addict should not, in fact, be regarded as autonomous.  This is because the 
addict may have deliberated on his desire to use drugs and come to identify with it, but in reality, 
his addiction is such that he lacks the genuine capability to change his desire.  Thus, Dworkin comes 
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to the conclusion that the notion of autonomy does not simply require that one adjudicate or judge 
one’s preferences, but should also require that one be able to change one’s preferences and act upon 
them (1988:17) 
 
Dworkin also adds a further condition for autonomy; he stipulates that the process by which an 
individual comes to acquire his desires or preferences must have procedural independence.  That 
is, an individual cannot have come to acquire his desires or preferences in such a way, or through 
such a process, that would be regarded as having been unduly imposed on him (Dworkin, 1976:25).  
Dworkin distinguishes between procedural independence and substantive independence.  
Procedural independence is characteristic of a content or value neutral approach to autonomy, as 
discussed earlier, as this account looks at the process or structure of the forming of desires and other 
motivational states in order to determine whether they are the individual’s own.  It also distinguishes 
between acceptable or unavoidable influences, and problematic or avoidable influences on our 
independence.  Substantive independence, on the other hand, is characteristic of a substantive 
approach to autonomy and would thus place restrictions on which acts would be deemed to be 
autonomous.  To maintain substantive independence, an individual must have been acting in an 
autonomous way when her motivations were formed.  In other words, as he argues, an individual 
cannot have “renounce[d her] independence of thought and action” (Dworkin, 1976:25) before she 
formed her motivations.  She may authentically give away her autonomy on a procedural account; 
however, on a substantive account this would be paradoxical76.   
 
The problem of manipulation is, therefore, an issue of authenticity.  In this regard, some autonomy 
theorists have stipulated that to be autonomous, two basic requirements must be fulfilled: actions 
are subject to “authenticity conditions and competency conditions” (Christman and Anderson 
2005:3).  Authenticity conditions, refer to a conception of autonomy that is espoused in hierarchical 
theories such as those of Frankfurt (1971) and Dworkin (1970), where authenticity is predicated 
upon the extent to which one’s desires, preferences, beliefs, etc., are a product of one’s own 
deliberation and are accepted as one’s own.  Competency conditions, on the other hand, are specific 
capabilities that must be present for an individual to be autonomous.  These include the capability 
for “rational thought, self-control, self-understanding, and so on” (Christman & Anderson, 
                                                 
76 This account is fraught with difficulties however, as it would argue that one gives up one’s substantive independence 
by wanting to do what one is told to do, or by being overly concerned with the dictates of peer pressure, for example.  
However, if this is accurate, then we are forced to admit that “the compassionate or loyal or moral man is one whose 
actions are to some extent determined by the needs and predicaments of others” (Dworkin, 1976:26), and thus, that he 
lacks self-determination.  Elsewhere, Dworkin posits that this view of autonomy “seems in conflict with emotional ties 
to others, with commitments to causes, with authority, tradition, expertise, leadership and so forth” (1988:7).   This is 
because one’s commitment to these factors impact upon one’s ability to self-determine. 
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2005:3)77.  Furthermore, and relevant for the problem of manipulation, individuals must not only 
possess these capabilities, they must also be able and “free to exercise…[them], without internal or 
external coercion” (ibid.).  However, while authenticity and competency conditions may be 
necessary for autonomy, they are not sufficient, as an individual could meet both conditions but not 
be truly autonomous, for a number of reasons.  An individual may have formed her desires and 
preferences in an authentic manner, without possessing the relevant facts due to having been 
manipulated in some way, or, she may have been hypnotised or ‘brainwashed’.  Or, most 
importantly for the purposes of moral bioenhancement, she may have undergone some 
neurobiological intervention that alters the means by which she identifies her desires and 
preferences, so that she now identifies with desires and preferences that she had previously rejected 
before the intervention.   
 
This is the same concern that Dworkin has, which was mentioned on the previous page.  He argues 
that autonomy is not realised simply due to being able to form an opinion regarding one’s 
preferences.  Rather, a precondition for autonomy should be the possibility that one be able to 
change one’s preferences and act upon them (1988:17).  This is also the specific concern that is 
voiced by Harris in response to the claims of proponents of moral bioenhancement who insist that 
rational or deliberative capacities will not be circumvented by moral bioenhancement interventions 
as Harris fears.  What Harris is specifically concerned about, is not the ability of these capacities to 
function, as it seems obvious that receiving moral bioenhancement would not render an individual 
incapable of deliberation and the ability to employ rational capacities; rather, it is the possibility 
that moral bioenhancement could alter the specific conclusions that these capabilities would be 
likely to enable individuals to come to, due to altering their desires and preferences.  This is 
essentially, the nature of the problem of manipulation.   
 
The relevance, then, of procedural independence, and thus, of the problem of manipulation, for 
moral bioenhancement, is to identify which external forces and influences alter an individual’s 
judgements and ability to assess her desires, preferences, beliefs, choices and actions to the extent 
that we would no longer describe her assessments and judgements as being her own.  This is not an 
easy task due to the fact that, as alluded to by Dworkin, in assessing when procedural independence 
has been impacted upon we must distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable influences on 
“higher order judgements” (1976:26).  In other words, we must be able to explain why some 
                                                 
77 Feinberg has also discussed the notion of competency conditions which he refers to as “autonomy as capacity” 
(1989:28). 
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influences, such as socialisation, peers, upbringing, education, cultural background etc. are regarded 
as acceptable influences on our ability to assess our mental states, while other influences, such as 
moral bioenhancement, would be problematic.   
 
5.5 Criteria for an adequate theory of autonomy 
In this section, I will present six criteria that have been devised by Dworkin to assess the efficacy 
of a potential theory of autonomy (1988).  Dworkin does not posit that all these criteria could 
necessarily be met by a theory; however, a theory that could meet as many of these criteria as 
possible would warrant serious attention in terms of its ability to be utilised to navigate difficult 
cases in the arena of applied ethics, for example.  In the following section, I will present Ekstrom’s 
coherence theory of autonomy, which I argue is up to the task of navigating the concern for 
autonomy posed by moral bioenhancement.  After this, I will provide a justification for this 
argument by illustrating how Ekstrom’s theory meets Dworkin’s criteria as well as how it 
overcomes the three above-mentioned problems.   
 
Dworkin argues that to be considered as an adequate account of autonomy, which may then be 
utilised as an effective tool of assessment, a theory must meet certain requirements.  The first 
requirement is that a theory of autonomy cannot contain any logical inconsistencies in its particular 
interpretation of autonomy or its use of related concepts (Dworkin, 1988:7).  The example given to 
elucidate this requirement is the notion of “an uncaused cause” (Dworkin, 1988:7).  If a theory were 
to stipulate that autonomy is predicated on this kind of radical indeterminism, where such a 
phenomenon is regarded as logically incoherent, then the theory in question would fail to meet the 
requirement of logical consistency.    
 
Secondly, an account of autonomy cannot interpret the notion in such a way that autonomy becomes 
impossible to possess in a practical sense (ibid.).  In other words, if a theory has overly strict 
requirements that result in it being impossible for anyone to be, or ever have been, autonomous, it 
would fail to meet this requirement.  An example of such a theory would be one that stipulates that 
autonomy requires that one’s moral code be entirely the product of one’s own volitions, and not 
have been influenced in any way by external sources such as upbringing and socialisation, socio-
economic position, and so forth.  The influence of such sources is generally regarded as inevitable, 
and thus, a theory that seeks to exclude such impacts would be impractical.  On this interpretation, 
autonomy would be impossible to achieve.  
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Thirdly, a prospective theory must be able to indicate why autonomy is regarded as a good thing, 
or as something that is worth having (Dworkin, 1988:8).  A theory could do this in various degrees 
of strength.  It could argue that autonomy is of absolute or ultimate worth, more valuable than any 
other good, or it could make a weaker claim that it is one, amongst many, goods.  To this 
requirement, Dworkin adds that a theory should not imply that autonomy may only be achieved at 
the expense of other ‘goods’ regarded as valuable, such as justice, loyalty or equality.  This latter 
point is important because substantive accounts of autonomy have been criticised on the basis that 
they are incompatible with certain values, as mentioned in footnote 76.  While Dworkin does not 
allude to this, elsewhere he has criticised and rejected substantive accounts for various reasons, 
arguing rather for the desirability of content-free accounts of autonomy (1988:21-25).  Presumably 
this criterion is included to address this issue.   
 
The fourth requirement is that a theory of autonomy should be one that can be utilised regardless 
of the value system in question.  In other words, it should have ideological neutrality (Dworkin, 
1988:8).  While Dworkin stipulates that this is not a strong requirement, what he means by this is 
that a prospective theory should frame autonomy in such a way that it has broad appeal across a 
variety of world-views and belief systems.  As he points out, a conception of autonomy should be 
applicable to a diversity of outlooks ranging from those that espouse strong individualism to those 
that balance autonomy with other values.   
 
The fifth requirement is that a prospective theory of autonomy must have practical and normative 
applicability.  In other words, it must be possible to use it in a philosophical context as a means of 
arguing for or against phenomena that are associated with different freedoms or regarded as inimical 
to them.  An example here, would be using a particular theory of autonomy to critique an overly 
strong interpretation of autonomy that rejects any form of state intervention as a violation of 
autonomy, thus supporting anarchy.  Another example would be using a theory of autonomy to 
illustrate why paternalism in medicine is problematic.   
 
The final requirement is that of judgemental relevance (Dworkin, 1988:9).  What is meant by this 
stipulation is that an account of autonomy must be congruent with generally accepted claims 
regarding autonomy.  One such claim would be to interpret autonomy either as a threshold concept 
or one that admits of degrees.  Another such claim would be to associate autonomy with an 
opposition to paternalism, while yet another would be the view that to inculcate the value of 
autonomy, one must introduce children to the notion in increasing incremental stages.  These claims 
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are examples of “judgements that are conceptual…normative…[and] empirical” (Dworkin, 1988:9) 
respectively.  I will return to these criteria in section 5.7, once I have presented Ekstrom’s theory 
and utilise them to assess her theory.   
 
5.6 Ekstrom’s coherence theory of autonomy78 
5.6.1 Background information  
Ekstrom’s coherence theory of autonomy is also based upon the canonical interpretation of 
autonomy as implying self-determination, where this latter interpretation means acting in 
accordance with one’s “own reasons” (1993:599).  However, as she explains, to build a 
comprehensive theory out of these insights, an account must firstly provide conditions for how the 
reasons that one acts upon, in the case of autonomous acts, are one’s own, or not, in the case of 
non-autonomous acts.  Secondly an account must explain what is meant by the notion of one’s own, 
by providing a theory or account of the self that can explain what is internal and external to the self 
(Ekstrom, 2005b:52).  
 
Ekstrom’s approach is strongly influenced by hierarchical accounts of autonomy as she builds her 
theory upon the view that individuals not only have desires, attitudes, beliefs and other mental 
states, they also have the ability to have opinions and preferences about the afore-mentioned.  The 
enduring significance of the hierarchical approach is due to its many strengths and intuitive appeal, 
one of which is that it clearly explains why, and how, conflicts between these two levels impact 
upon the autonomy of the individual.  Thus, it indicates why autonomy is not only vulnerable due 
to external sources or threats, but also due to internal conflicts (Ekstrom, 2005a:143).  These 
internal conflicts can produce such distress for individuals, that they result in feelings of self-
alienation (2005a:146).  In certain cases, an individual may feel disconnected from his own desires 
or actions and experience feelings of repugnance towards them.  While different hierarchical 
approaches would explain the nature of these conflicts in different ways, their value lies in having 
actually identified this additional internal source of conflict as an impact on autonomy, one that 
may be equal in force to external impacts on autonomy.   
 
Furthermore, a theory such as Frankfurt’s is attractive due to the fact that the identification of a 
second-order level of judgement, as a means of assessing our impulses and drives, gives us the 
                                                 
78 The explication in this section is based upon an amalgamation of Ekstrom’s position as outlined in several of her 
publications (1993, 2005a, 2005b).   
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sense that we are not purely at the mercy of the latter.  Through some ability that is internal to the 
self, and thus perceived as authentic, we may exert control over our baser impulses and drives.  As 
Ekstrom posits, this is a valuable capacity because “[i]f one is able to get oneself to want what one 
wants to want, and one is able to get oneself to act as one wants to want to act, then it seems that 
one has achieved some control over both one’s mental life and one’s actions in the outer realm” 
(2005b:49).   
 
However, what Ekstrom takes to be important for autonomy, is not the view that autonomous action 
is solely predicated upon acting in accordance with our second-order volitions, or acting “from a 
desire for another desire” (2005a:147).  Rather, for her, what matters for autonomy is how higher, 
second-order volitions are formed, namely, through the process of reflective endorsement 
(2005a:147)79.  Through this ability, we can critically analyse our mental states and actions in terms 
of how valuable they are for us to have and to act upon, and this assessment is not only performed 
by the self but is also instrumental in forming the self (ibid. 148).  However, simply framing the 
issue of autonomy in terms of a distinction between high and low-order desires and volitions, as 
Frankfurt does, produces problems of the sort described in section 5.4 which require that more 
substance be added to such an account.  Ekstrom’s theory, which specifically avoids the notion of 
higher, second-order volitions, aims to avoid the problems that plague such accounts, and I would 
argue that it does so successfully.   
 
5.6.2. Preferences  
Ekstrom’s account of autonomy diverges from the traditional hierarchical approach at the outset 
by utilising the notion of preference rather than desire, as a basis for her theory.  She defines the 
theoretical approach of coherence theories of autonomy as requiring “that the preference on which 
a person acts must cohere with other attitudes, in order for the act to be autonomously performed” 
(Ekstrom, 2005a:144).  A preference is a specific type of desire that bears similarities to a 
Frankfurtian second-order volition in that it is a desire for a desire on the first-level to be “effective 
in action” (1993:603).  However, Ekstrom adds the qualification that a preference is directed 
towards achieving ‘the good’, for the individual in question, in some way.  In other words, an 
individual forms a preference to act on one of the first-level desires that she has because she has 
assessed her first-level desire against a conception of what she takes to be “true and good” 
                                                 
79 As Ekstrom points out, Frankfurt does not include the requirement of reflective endorsement as integral to the process 
of adjudicating our desires as he would regard such a criterion as “excessively rationalistic” (Frankfurt, 2002:89).  He 
would simply stipulate that our desires must be accepted wholeheartedly to count as second-order volitions.   
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(2005b:55).  This process may or may not be consciously performed, however, the important point 
is that, on her account, there is some form of process that is required to form a preference 
(2005a:148).  By the term preference, Ekstrom does not refer to a comparison, whereby an 
individual prefers one thing to another; rather, she uses the term “stipulatively…[to refer to] a 
desire that has survived a process of critical evaluation…with respect to an individual’s conception 
of the good” (2005a:148).  A preference, so defined, is “an evaluated desire” (Ekstrom, 2005b:54).   
 
As human beings, we are constantly forming and acting upon different desires for various reasons 
that are informed by the kind of person we are.  We also find ourselves having momentary desires, 
akin to whims, that we are not be able to explain with reference to the kind of person we are.  These 
may be short-lived desires that suit us to have at a specific time, or they may be desires for 
something, or some course of action, that arise due to internal pressures such guilt, or external 
pressures such as peer pressure.  They may even be the product of instincts.  For Ekstrom, however, 
preferences refer only to those desires that are informed by the kind of person that we are – our 
character – and not the fleeting kind of desires.   
 
As mentioned above, while Ekstrom’s notion of a preference is similar to Frankfurt’s notion of a 
second-order volition, it is more rigorous due to her stipulation that preferences are formed due to 
an individual’s consideration that a first-order desire is good or will bring about ‘the good’ in some 
way.  A Frankfurtian desire is considered a desire simply because an individual has it; there are no 
requirements regarding how it may be formed, thus leaving his account open to the threat of 
external manipulation.  Furthermore, Ekstrom doesn’t describe preferences as being of a higher 
level themselves; rather, she posits that they are the products of “higher-order mental states” 
(1993:604), due to the fact that they are produced through a process of critical reflection “with 
respect to the standard of goodness” (605).  There is strong empirical evidence for the existence of 
such higher-order mental states.  An example would be an individual who has a wish to give to the 
poor but also wishes to do so because it is the right thing to do and wants it to give him pleasure to 
do so, rather than doing so reluctantly or simply to assuage feelings of guilt.  In other words, he 
wants to give to the poor but he wishes to do so for reasons that are considered worthy or good.  
This latter ability to assess and to come to such conclusions is indicative of a higher-order mental 
capacity80.   
 
                                                 
80 It must be noted that this should not be taken to indicate that a higher-order mental capacity implies that the individual 
acts upon reasons that are more morally worthwhile in an objective sense.  Worthwhile here, simply implies valuable 
for the individual in question.  This matter will be explained further below.   
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5.6.3 A theory of the self 
As alluded to above, to give an account of autonomy as self-determination that avoids both the 
problems of infinite regress and authority, an autonomy theory must be able to adequately explain 
what it means for preferences to be one’s own or to come from one’s self.  This, in turn, requires a 
theory of the self.  There are many ways in which the matter of defining ‘the self’ can be 
approached. As Ekstrom posits, one may approach the issue from a “metaphysical, semantic…[or] 
epistemological” (2005b:45) paradigm.  She is careful to point out, however, that by providing 
such a theory, she is not attempting to give a “metaphysical account of personal identity” 
(1993:600) or a Cartesian notion of the self.  She is engaging, rather, with a “a moral or 
psychological self” (Ekstrom, 2005a:149).  The popular understanding of the notion of self is 
generally encapsulated by a reference to what is mine: my thoughts, my beliefs, my preferences, my 
actions, and my physical body. However, there are frequent occasions in which we feel alienated 
from our own thoughts, beliefs, preferences, actions and even our own bodies.  In such instances, 
it makes sense to describe them as not mine.  It is this psychological or moral account of the self 
that is relevant for the issue at hand. 
 
While Frankfurt does not provide a specific theory of the self, the implicit understanding that 
informs his account is that the self simply is the higher, second-order volitions or desires of the 
individual.  In this regard, he gives no importance to the role of rationality – or any other factor, 
for that matter – in the formation of desires, and thus, as part of the self.  Ekstrom concurs with 
Frankfurt that autonomy is informed by the extent to which one can act upon desires and other 
attitudinal states that one has, rather than upon “judgements” (2005b:53); however, she regards the 
role of “evaluative reasoning” (2005b:53) as pivotal in this process of desire formation.  This is 
because she argues that in deciding which desires will move an individual to act, the autonomous 
individual forms his choices through evaluating them in accordance with some standard that is 
internal to him.   
 
Ekstrom’s interpretation of the self is, therefore, a broader conception, where the self refers to a 
“particular character” (1993:606) as well as the uniquely human evaluative ability to form, mould 
and continually adapt that character.  A character, or character system, refers to the “aggregate of 
preference and acceptance states” (2005b:54), or attitudinal states, that have come to be acquired 
by an individual through a process of evaluation and deliberation.  In other words, by being part of 
her character, these preference and acceptance states have been measured by the individual against 
her standard of what she takes to be good and true, and endorsed as being acceptable in moving her 
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to action.  Ekstrom does not regard the sum total of all desires and beliefs that individuals have as 
part of their character, however; her conception is narrower than this.   
 
As we live our lives through time, our desires and beliefs are subject to various changes and 
vagaries, some of which we are willing to accept and others that we are not.  In this sense, our 
character refers to our delimitation as a particular self that is recognisable through time to others 
and can be distinguished from others.  While any fleeting and rejected desires and beliefs are mine 
in the sense that I am aware of them as I experience them, they are not an integral part of my 
character if I have not accepted them.  Lack of acceptance in this regard would indicate that they 
do not measure up to a conception of the good that I have, and thus, that I would not wish them to 
be the basis by which I am moved to action.  In other words, if I were to give an account of my 
character, I would not include such beliefs and desires in my account of who I take myself to be.  
The critical assessment by which this endorsement or rejection is conducted, is internal to me.  
Thus, while I cannot control the fleeting first-order desires that arise within me, and that I do not 
identify with, I am able to control which desires and beliefs become preference states that I would 
wish to move me to action.  This is what Ekstrom means by a self, or, a “moral or psychological 
identity” (2005b:55).  It is not only the preferences – understood in her stipulated interpretation as 
desires that have been critically evaluated against a conception of what is true and good – that have 
come to be accepted by the individual that constitute her self, character or identity, it is also her 
ability to actually form these preferences and thus, her ability to form her character.   
 
One could respond to the above claim by arguing that it is an idealised account of character in that 
an individual’s unwanted first-order desires and beliefs are as much a part of his integral character 
as his higher-order aspirations.  Such first-order desires could, in fact, be more indicative of his 
character than the latter.  Ekstrom’s account of character could rather be a case of wishful thinking; 
it could be more indicative of the character one would prefer to consider oneself to have than the 
one that one actually has.  However, Ekstrom foresees such a response and points out that the way 
we speak about ourselves in everyday life lends support to her claim.  We often find ourselves 
having a belief or desire, or behaving in such a way “in spite of ourselves” (1993:607).  In other 
words, while our characters inform what we take to be true and good, we sometimes have a desire 
that causes us to behave in a way that is at odds with our conception of the good81.  Such an 
                                                 
81 Ekstrom’s conception of what is true and good is, of course, a personal conception of the good, thus, it is important 
to bear in mind that the nature of desires and beliefs that are considered anomalous could be positive or negative.  In 
other words, an individual who has an objectionable character and is considered to have selfish preferences by others, 
could find himself having “an objectively noble impulse in spite of [himself]” (1993:608).  
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occurrence may cause us to comment that we are not ourselves, or it may result in others observing 
that we are behaving ‘out of character’.  If such behaviour is enduring enough, it may then be the 
basis upon which others notice that we have changed and are now not the person we once were.  In 
the case of anomalous desires and beliefs, we may believe that these alternate states are part of us 
in some way, but on Ekstrom’s account, if we don’t identify with them we will not endorse them, 
and, most importantly, we wouldn’t be prepared to defend them (1993:608).  For a preference state 
to be a component of an individual’s character, an individual must be able to explain or give reasons 
for this preference.  
 
5.6.4 Coherence, personal authorisation and the integral-self 
Thus, Ekstrom has described the self or the character, as informed by the ability of the individual 
to deliberate upon and endorse certain enduring preferences that accord with her conception of the 
good.  However, to avoid giving an account of autonomy as self-determination that avoids the 
problems of regress and authority, what remains is for Ekstrom to indicate why the process whereby 
a desire becomes a preference has sufficient authority “to stand for the perspective of the agent – 
to indicate what ‘she really wants’ or to count as the desire with which she identifies” (2005b:58).  
In order to achieve this aim, she deepens her account further to include the notion of a “true or most 
central self” (1993:608) which is a component of an individual’s character82.  This integral self 
consists of the evaluative character forming ability that individuals possess, along with only those 
“acceptances and preferences…that cohere together” (ibid.), where coherence refers to the way in 
which these different attitudinal states work in conjunction with one another and are connected in 
a way that is stable, harmonious and able to be explained with reference to one another.  In other 
words, cohering preference states form an interrelated “structural arrangement” (2005a:149).  
Ekstrom also introduces the additional requirement that preferences must be authorized by the 
individual, if they are going to be the basis upon which she acts in an autonomous manner, and 
argues that this occurs when the individual has critically examined a particular preference and 
found it to be coherent “with [her] other preferences and acceptances” (ibid.).  Having a cohering 
network of preferences, therefore, serves to provide an individual with good reasons as to why he 
accepts or rejects a particular preference and thus chooses to act upon it or not.   
 
Thus, in terms of the problem of infinite regress, we do not need to turn to a higher-order desire to 
endorse a preference we have; rather, we need to have critically assessed a preference’s worth in 
                                                 
82 I will refer to this notion of the true or most central self as the integral self from hereon.   
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terms of whether or not it is defensible by means of the set of cohering preferences that form our 
integral self.  In other words, examining a preference to assess and justify it as one’s own would 
require that one be able to defend it with reference to the fact that it is coherent with one’s integral 
self, and that it can be explained by the other interrelated preferences that we have come to endorse.  
In this way, we authorize a preference as part of our integral self and reject preferences that do not 
cohere with it.  As mentioned above, an anomalous or alienating preference that is rejected would 
be considered part of the individual in some way; however, it would not be part of his authentic or 
integral self.  This would then lead to the conclusion that autonomous action requires that an 
individual act on the basis of preferences that are authorised and cohere, in the way that has been 
described above, and that are not the product of any form of compulsion or force.   
 
Of course, an objection may be made that the division of a character into two selves, an integral 
and a secondary or peripheral self is highly problematic.  However, Ekstrom is careful to point out 
that she is not attempting to provide “an ontological thesis” (2005a:152) regarding the existence of 
some immaterial Cartesian entity.  Rather, she is once again drawing upon a popular conception of 
the understanding of the self, in which such statements would make utter sense.  In other words, 
there is clearly a basis for distinguishing one individual from another in terms of differences in 
their attitudes, values, preferences and behaviour.  More specifically, as individuals, we regard 
certain preferences as more characteristic of who we ‘truly’ are than others.   
 
For example, an individual may describe herself as being the kind of person who has a strong 
aversion to risk-taking endeavours.  This could be an integral part of her character, so much so that 
her friends would know not to include her in plans to sky dive, for example.  On Ekstrom’s account, 
this could be further unpacked.  We could then ascertain that risk-taking endeavours do not cohere 
with her other accepted preferences, some of which could be the fact that she is a mother and has 
a strong preference to be what she considers to be a responsible parent, and a further preference for 
feeling safe and avoiding danger.  There could be a number of other cohering preferences that form 
an integral part of her character, and, if risk-taking is not supported by this network, then she would 
reject it as a possible motive for action.  On the other hand, if she happens to not have a network 
of preferences that would either support or reject risk-taking, it would be regarded as peripheral to 
her character and she would therefore find herself having a lack of strong preferences either way 
for sky diving, and thus, may feel neutral regarding whether or not she would engage in such an 
activity.  
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To provide further strength to her claim, Ekstrom gives three justifications for her argument that 
those preferences that cohere with one another, along with the evaluative character forming ability, 
comprise the integral self that gives substance to the notion of self in self-determination, rather than 
those preferences that fail to cohere or are peripheral to the self.  Firstly, the cohering network of 
preferences imply an integral self because they are enduring in character.  In other words, 
preferences that are integral to an individual’s character have generally persisted through time, and 
have thus been recognised as integral to her character with the result that reasons or explanations 
can be given for them.  It is not that they are fixed in perpetuity, but rather, that they are not subject 
to incessant change.  Secondly, as alluded to above, the cohering network of preferences can be 
defended or justified by the individual with sound reasons if they are disputed.  In other words, 
preferences that are part of this integral self would be preferences that an individual would be 
willing to recognise as his own and he would do so by referring to other preference states that he 
has which would be able to support and justify them.  Even in the case of self-doubt, an individual 
could come to a position of self-acceptance, and thus, could provide a self-justification if he were 
to ascertain that a preference that has elicited doubt is congruent with his cohering network of 
preferences and is thus indicative of his integral self.  Ekstrom discusses some examples here.   
 
The first example would be an individual with an unwanted gambling addiction whose preference 
to gamble would be described as enduring and would thus meet the first requirement for it to be 
considered part of her integral self (1993:608).  However, if someone were to identify her unwanted 
addictive desire to gamble as part of her core self, if she is an unwilling gambler, she would, in all 
likelihood, go to great pains to explain to them why they are mistaken and would do so by 
describing other integral aspects of who she is.  She would, however, be willing to defend her 
preference for the opposite desire, namely that the desire to not gamble, be effective in compelling 
her to act, where acting is refraining from gambling.  Thus, the unwilling gambler’s preference for 
compulsive gambling would not meet the second requirement to be considered as part of her 
integral self, as she would not be willing to accept her destructive preference as part of who she 
truly is, and thus, to defend it.  To the extent that she continued to gamble, thus acting against her 
core network of preferences or integral self, her autonomy would be compromised in some way.    
 
The second example is a particularly interesting one.  We can imagine an individual who purchases 
a lottery ticket, despite the fact that he has a variety of attitudinal states that do not support doing 
so.  In such a situation, one could say that in purchasing the ticket, and thus acting upon a preference 
that is not part of his cohering network of preferences, or integral self, his purchase of the ticket 
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has nevertheless been a free act.  He has not been compelled to buy it.  Ekstrom posits that while 
this may be true in terms of “free action” (2005b:59) it is not necessarily true of autonomy which 
she argues is possibly a “thicker notion” (ibid.) than freedom.  Thus, if the individual finds himself 
acting upon a preference that is anomalous in terms of his cohering network of preferences, it would 
make sense for a friend to ponder “what has come over him” (Ekstrom, 2005b:59).  If the individual 
experiences a sense of internal discord, this could be “sufficient to undermine [his] autonomy” 
(ibid.).  
 
Finally, the third justification Ekstrom provides is that a preference that has been authorised by the 
cohering network of preferences is associated with the integral self, more so than an anomalous 
preference, if the individual endorses or approves of this preference as hers.  In other words, it must 
be a preference that the individual is “comfortable owning” (Ekstrom, 2005b:60).  Because such 
preferences are coherent with her character, and more specifically, her integral self, they would be 
supported by the network of cohering preferences, and thus, when she acts upon such a preference, 
she would be said to be “wholeheartedly behind what [she] does…acting…without higher-level 
reservation” (Ekstrom, 1993:609)  If a preference causes internal consternation or anxiety for the 
individual this is indicative that it may not be supported by her network of cohering preferences, 
and would thus not be authorised by her. 
 
Thus, if I have a network of cohering preferences that would be described as self-serving, when I 
find myself with a selfish preference this would elicit no discomfort, as there would be no conflict 
between such a preference and my network of cohering preferences.  I would therefore easily be 
able to justify such a preference as acceptable to myself.  On the other hand, if my network of 
cohering preferences is predominantly other-centred, a selfish preference would come into conflict 
with this network, and potentially cause me discomfort and shame, with the result that I would not 
wish others to know about it and would not seek to defend it.  Because Ekstrom’s account is 
content-free with regard to the good, it therefore includes the possibility that one could have a bad 
character, and thus act autonomously upon preferences that are congruent with this character, but 
are nevertheless immoral.  
 
Ekstrom posits that one could respond by pointing out that individuals frequently experience a 
sense of inner discord regarding certain preferences, and this does not always imply that their 
autonomy has been compromised.  However, her point is that while the self comprises the sum 
total of preferences, beliefs and attitudes, along with the ability to deliberate about these mental 
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states, the true or integral self would be only those “preferences and acceptances that cohere 
together” (Ekstrom, 2005b:60), and thus, that discern the individual as an individual.  Thus, I may 
have conflicting preferences, such as a desire to both eat cake because it tastes delicious and to not 
eat cake because I believe that it will make me fat, and both these conflicting preferences would, 
of course, be mine, or part of my self.  However, if one of these preferences coheres more with my 
other preferences then it could be said to be part of my integral self rather than my peripheral self.   
 
As Ekstrom admits, this specification – that to be considered one’s own, and thus autonomous, a 
preference must cohere with an individual’s network of mutually supported preferences – delivers 
a rigorous theory of autonomy.  However, as a rich account of autonomy, I argue that it would have 
more use-value, particularly in an applied ethics context, than a thin account of autonomy which 
stipulates the term as referring purely to an undeveloped notion of self-determination.  An 
additional response to Ekstrom’s coherence requirement could be that it is akin to a self-reinforcing 
loop, and is thus an extremely subjective interpretation of autonomy.  However, this would be a 
misguided response as while Ekstrom’s interpretation is rigorous, it is not controversial.  As 
Ekstrom points out, there is widespread consensus that “autonomy is to be understood as self-
direction, self-command, or self-rule.  It is opposed to rule-from-without enslavement, and 
victimisation” (2005a:155) – and I would add – rule-from-within enslavement and compulsion.  
Furthermore, as Korsgaard argues, “autonomy is commanding yourself to do what you think it 
would be a good idea to do, but that in turn depends on who you think you are” (1996:107).  In 
other words, autonomy is, to a certain extent, informed by “practical identity” (Ekstrom, 
2005a:161).  However, while its content is subjective, its parameters must be defined in objective 
terms, if it is to carry weight.  What Ekstrom has attempted with her theory of autonomy is to 
support her account of authorisation with a further account that satisfies the second component of 
Korsgaard’s definition.  Namely, she has given content to what it means to perceive oneself as a 
specific entity that acts freely.  Ekstrom also argues that when autonomy is investigated in such 




5.6.5 Autonomy  
What remains in giving an account of Ekstrom’s theory, is to explain more fully how a cohering 
preference, and the ensuing action that it supports, receives the status of being considered 
autonomous.  For the purposes of this dissertation, and the way in which I will use Ekstrom’s theory 
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to address the concern for moral autonomy posed by moral bioenhancement, this can be conversely 
formulated as explaining how her theory is able to deal with threats to autonomy.   
 
It could be said that a preference coheres with my integral self when I come to the conclusion that 
this preference is more valuable for me to have than a competing preference, or, more valuable in 
conjunction with a preference that together neutralises a competing desire, when assessed against 
my network of cohering preferences or my integral self.  A preference that I consider to be more 
valuable would be one that I would wish to be the basis upon which I act, given my conception of 
what is true and good.  Only when I have come to this conclusion will this preference be personally 
authorised for me.  The notion of personal authorisation is a prerequisite for autonomy as its 
purpose is to provide an adequate response to conflicting preferences and to work out which 
preferences are truly, or more, one’s own.  When I am faced with competing preferences, both 
preferences will generally be perceived, prima facie, to be true and good, as, if this were not the 
case then there would be no conflict regarding which preference I wish to be the basis upon which 
I act.  When faced with such a situation of competing preferences that are both considered true and 
good, a resolution can only be achieved if one of the preferences is defeated.  This occurs when I 
come to the conclusion that one of my preferences is unequivocally more valuable for me as a 
preference.  As mentioned above, in situations that are more complex, it may be the case that 
resolution is achieved through adding a neutralising preference to one of my preferences, which 
then acts together with that preference to defeat the competing preference.  The preferences that 
are rejected will be those that, after having been deliberated upon, have not received personal 
authorisation, in terms of the fact that I would not wish them to be the basis upon which I act due 
to their being unsupported by my integral self.   
 
Some examples will be helpful in elucidating the above stipulations.  I could be faced with a desire 
to spend the evening working on revisions for a journal article that is due imminently.  This desire 
is regarded as a valuable one for me to have, as I wish to finish the article to enjoy the feeling of 
fulfilment of having done so on time, and to have made an active contribution towards my 
publication record.  As I regard all of these factors to be worthwhile outcomes, I am therefore in 
no doubt that my preference to complete the article is one that I endorse.  On the other hand, I may 
have a good friend who has invited me to dinner that same night, at a restaurant I happen to love.  
I may have a strong desire to go to dinner with my friend, as I know it will be more enjoyable than 
sitting alone and working, and it will be valuable to spend time with my friend whom I have not 
seen for a considerable length of time.  




I am thus faced with the decision of which preference I would like to be the one that would be the 
basis upon which I act.  This is a deliberation that will be informed – either explicitly and 
consciously, or implicitly and unconsciously – by the cohering preferences and attitudes that 
comprise my integral self83.  When deciding what I should do, I may then decide that my preference 
to stay at home and work on the article is a more valuable one for me to have than my desire to go 
out with my friend, and thus, that I would prefer that this be the desire that is the basis upon which 
I act.  The reason for this could be that while I value friendship, and enjoy the experience of eating 
at good restaurants, there are other elements of my integral self that may be more closely related to 
the preference to work on the article, and thus, more supportive of it.  Such elements could be that 
I have a strong sense of ambition, and thus, that I place a high premium upon achieving success in 
my chosen work.  I could also regard having a strong and reliable work ethic as highly favourable, 
have a distaste for failing to meet my deadlines, a compelling desire for job security, and so on.  
Thus, the qualities that comprise my integral self are extreme conscientiousness, a strong sense of 
responsibility, high levels of ambition and a need for security.  As mentioned above, I may value 
friendship, good food and relaxation, but these preferences may be more part of my peripheral 
character than my integral self.  Thus, if I then go ahead and meet my friend at the restaurant, it 
may elicit feelings of guilt and anxiety, which may cause me to wonder why I have acted out of 
character and what has come over me in choosing to do so.   
 
The second example would aim to address situations in which I am faced with two competing 
preferences that are both supported by my integral self.  In such a case, I could use a neutralising 
preference as a means of resolving the issue.  In the example discussed above, my integral self 
could comprise the above elements as well as a strong regard for friendship which would make the 
decision more challenging for me.  I could then decide to both work on my article and see my 
friend, by suggesting that we meet later in the evening for drinks rather than for a lengthy dinner.  
I would end up having a late night, and thus some sacrifice would be required on my part, but my 
preference to spend an entire evening with my friend will have then been neutralised by the addition 
of rather simply seeing her at the end of the evening, thus enabling me to finish writing the article.  
In this situation, I am unable to authorise either of the initial preferences as the basis upon which I 
would act; however, my preference to work on my article and see my friend later, but for less time, 
                                                 
83 In the case where this process occurs in an implicit or unconscious manner, this does not imply mindlessness, as the 
individual would still be able to provide an explanation for which preference she takes to be more indicative of her 
integral self, if pressed to do so.    
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is a preference that I am willing to authorise as the basis upon which I will act as it coheres more 
with my integral self than either preferences do on their own.   
 
Thus, with the above definitions and examples in mind, Ekstrom defines her coherence account of 
autonomy in the following way: 
An act is autonomous [if and only if] it is nondeviantly caused by an uncoercively formed, 
personally authorized preference.  A preference that is personally authorised for an individual 
has authority for speaking for her, for representing what she truly wants in being well 
supported by a network of her considered attitudes; it is an attitude with respect to which she 
is wholehearted.  Thus, action on such a preference is self-directed or self-ruled, rather than 
heteronomous (own emphasis, 2005b:64)84.   
 
In terms of the problem of authority, also known as the problem of identification, the source of 
authority that would identify one preference as being more my own than another, and thus, part of 
my integral self rather than my peripheral or secondary self, would be the process that leads to my 
authorising it.  Thus:  
To identify oneself with some desire is to have a personally authorised preference for that 
particular desire to be the one that leads one to act, when or if one acts.  To identify oneself 
with some belief is to have an acceptance regarding the content of the belief that is coherent 
with one’s character system.  And to identify oneself with some course of action is to perform 
that act because one has a personally authorised preference in its favour (Ekstrom, 2005b:64) 
 
5.6.6 Alienation 
For the purposes of using Ekstrom’s account to assess the concern for autonomy posed by moral 
bioenhancement, the matter that is of particular relevance, is what her theory may tell us of desire-
formation and action that would not be considered autonomous.  One way of understanding a lack 
of autonomy would be to distinguish between two different kinds of desires.  On the one hand, an 
individual may find himself having a desire that he considers incongruous to whom he considers 
himself to be.  This desire may elicit considerable distress and be rejected by the individual in 
question as a legitimate basis upon which to act.  Such desires may be described as “ego-dystonic” 
(Ekstrom, 2005a:157), referring to various mental states such as beliefs and attitudes, that an 
individual possesses, but considers to be at odds with his self-conception.  On the other hand, “ego-
syntonic” desires would be those desires that one identifies with in some way, either in a strong 
sense whereby they are personally authorised as preferences, or in a weaker sense in which they 
are part of one’s secondary or peripheral self.  On a Frankfurtian account, an ego-dystonic desire 
would be a desire that is “excluded entirely as an outlaw” (1988:170) by the individual in question.   
                                                 
84 By including the term caused, Ekstrom is emphasising the fact that a prerequisite of autonomous action is that a 
preference and an action must be “causally related” (1993:614).  She includes this term to avoid the problem of 
manipulation.  




However, just because a desire is perceived by the individual to be an outlaw desire, this does not 
always indicate that the desire is not a component of the individual’s peripheral or integral self.  
There are different reasons for this.  An individual who finds herself faced with an outlaw desire 
may refuse to recognise such a desire as part of who she is due to having a distorted self-conception, 
or she may be “in denial” (Ekstrom, 2005a:157) about the fact that this desire is informed by her 
integral self.  There are many examples of individuals who reject their desires as anomalous for 
various reasons.  An individual growing up in a homophobic context and finding himself with a 
strong attraction to the same sex may reject this desire, at the expense of his authenticity and 
personal happiness, as a survival mechanism.  A woman who has had an extremely religious or 
puritanical upbringing may reject any strong feelings of sexual desire as inappropriate, and thus, 
may identify them as incongruous or the product of some malevolent force, rather than recognising 
that they are, in fact, normal human desires that she has.  Another individual, raised in a family that 
rejects materialism and values human connection, could possess a strong ambition to achieve 
financial success and reap the material rewards thereof.  While this desire could form part of his 
character or integral self, he could nevertheless reject it as not indicative of who he truly is and 
label it as superficial due to feelings of guilt and denial associated with his upbringing.  In the above 
examples, the rejection of desires that are, in fact, part of the individuals’ integral selves may be 
explained by the fact that contextual factors are influencing their rejection of their desires.  They 
may feel shame for their desires, or utilise self-denial as a means of maintaining a coherent self-
conception.   
 
However, regardless of the reasons for the denial of such desires, if such desires are, in fact, 
preferences, in the sense that Ekstrom stipulates, that cohere with the network of preferences that 
comprise the integral self of the individual, then they would be desires that are part of the integral 
self, whether or not this is something that an individual will admit to85.  Feeling a sense of 
identification with, or estrangement towards, a desire is not sufficient for categorising a desire as 
definitively part, or not part, of the integral self.  Ekstrom posits that for this reason both personal 
                                                 
85 This produces a problem that plagues any account of autonomy as self-determination.  This problem is discussed by 
Berlin in his account of negative and positive liberty, where the latter accords with the interpretation of autonomy as 
self-determination (1969).  Positive accounts of liberty lend themselves to exploitation at the hands of tyrannical 
regimes that support particular ideologies, for the very reason described in the text to which this footnote is attached.  
If we take the position that an individual is constituted by an integral self and a peripheral self, where the former is 
regarded as higher and the latter as lower, and combine this with the assumption that individuals may be mistaken 
regarding the elements that comprise their higher, integral selves, it is a short step to the position that individuals 
require ‘help’ in being able to know and act in accordance with their true selves.  As Berlin points out “[o]nce I take 
this view, I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, 
and on behalf, of their ‘real’ selves” (1969:133) and their freedom.   
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and third-person accounts regarding accepted or rejected desires may be mistaken (2005a:158).  In 
the case of the former, individuals may not recognise desires as integral to their self, for the reasons 
described in the previous paragraph, and in the case of the latter, individuals may be incorrect in 
their assessment of what is integral to the character of others.  In this regard, Ekstrom’s theory, and 
any theory that associates autonomy with the notion of self-determination must act with the 
presupposition that one knows oneself and others sufficiently to make an accurate assessment.   
 
However, despite the possibility of such cases of denial, for the concept of autonomy as self-
determination to be coherent we have to operate with the assumption that individuals generally 
know what they truly want, and are able to recognise what the core components are that comprise 
their characters.  This point aside, Ekstrom’s theory is of specific importance in cases where 
individuals are led to action by desires that have not been authorised by their cohering network of 
preferences or integral self.  In other words, when I find myself acting on a desire that is contrary 
to what I wish to be the desire that is the basis upon which I act.  In such cases, Ekstrom argues 
that I act in a way that is not autonomous in terms of the fact that my action has not been determined 
by my self (1993:614).  This would be because in doing so, I am acting without motivation, I do 
not have a preference that has informed my action, and thus, my action is not motivated by a 
conception of what I take to be true and good.   
 
Once again, there are many examples that may be illustrative of such cases.  Some such examples 
were discussed in earlier sections, namely, those cases of individuals who act upon addictions or 
compulsions that produce desires that are opposed to their preferences.  We would describe such 
unwilling drug-users, gamblers or purchasers of lottery tickets as having acted in a way that is at 
odds with how they would prefer to act, and thus, as not acting in a self-determined manner.  
However, it is not only cases of possible psychopathology or addiction in which autonomy would 
be vulnerable, we can conceive of more quotidian examples that produce threats to autonomy.   
 
One can think of an individual whose integral self is characterised by a particular network of 
cohering preferences.  She has high esteem for values such as integrity, privacy, and respect for 
others and this manifests as various preferences that she has: to act in a sensitive manner towards 
others, to always treat others as ends in themselves, to never take pleasure or overt interest in the 
misfortune of others, and so on.  These preferences would be the ones that she desires to be the 
basis upon which she acts and how she conducts herself.  She may then hear about a particularly 
horrifying case of terrorism, involving the decapitation of a prisoner, and subsequently learn that 
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there is video evidence on the internet depicting the actual event.  This may then elicit a strong 
desire to watch the video, one which consumes her attention so fully that it causes her to act upon 
it.  This desire produces feelings of inner turmoil and conflict due to the fact that it appears to arrive 
in a wholly unbidden manner.  The individual has never been one who is motivated by morbid 
desires, she never slows down when driving past motor-vehicle accidents, and she has never 
enjoyed watching violent depictions, or hearing about violent acts, for that matter.  Thus, her desire 
to watch the video feels entirely ‘out of character’ or ‘at odds with everything she feels she stands 
for’.   
 
In terms of Ekstrom’s criteria for identifying a preference as constitutive of the integral self, the 
individual’s desire is strong, but it is not an enduring one, in the sense that she has not experienced 
similar desires in the past.  Furthermore, the desire is not defensible with regard to the other 
preferences and attitudinal states that comprise her integral self, and she is most certainly not 
comfortable having the desire.  If pressed to give an explanation for this desire she would either 
find this extremely difficult or impossible.  However, despite all of this, she may feel driven to 
watch the video, and upon doing so, may experience a feeling of morbid fascination that is 
compelling in a way that is abhorrent to her.  In this situation, by watching the video, the individual 
has acted upon a desire that she does not have an authorised preference for.  Rather, her authorised 
preference would be that the desire to not watch the video be the one that moves her to act, and 
thus to refrain from watching the video.  Thus, there is no motivation on her part that is connected 
with an evaluated conception of what is true and good, and no support from her cohering network 
of preferences and attitudinal states that would support watching the video.  Her act of watching 
the video has the feeling of a compulsion for her, and to this extent it is not indicative of her integral 
self.  In this instance, her ability to determine her ‘self’ has been compromised, and thus, it would 
be correct to regard her action of watching the video as lacking in autonomy in some way.   
 
Ekstrom’s account is thus able to elucidate the source of such feelings of alienation and inner 
turmoil that are produced by certain desires and actions.  Thus,   
a person acts autonomously only when acting from motivation of a certain sort: one that (1) 
has undergone critical evaluation with respect to his conception of the good, (2) was 
uncoercively formed, and (3) coheres with his other acceptance and preference states 
(2005a:154).  
 
While there may be many occasions in which we experience a sense of inner discord, this will 
generally be informed by the fact that our character, construed in a wider sense, comprises a plethora 
of preferences and attitudinal states, some of which may be at odds with one another at certain 
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times.  However, an action is only truly autonomous, in the sense of being truly determined by the 
self, when it is caused by, motivated by or justified with regard to, the integral self.  
 
5.7 An assessment of Ekstrom’s coherence theory of autonomy  
As mentioned above, Ekstrom’s account of autonomy is content-neutral and largely structural.  
Firstly, it is content-neutral as preferences and the acts that they motivate are determined by the 
individual’s conception of what is true and good, not by some stipulated account of what is good.  
This leaves room for individuals to form immoral preferences and perform immoral acts in an 
autonomous manner, for which they would then be held morally responsible.  This also accords 
with the fact that autonomy is not a normative notion; an individual may use their autonomy for 
moral or immoral ends.  Secondly, Ekstrom’s theory is a partly structural account of autonomy, as 
the latter is a product of how a set of relationships between different components are constituted 
and function together in a specific way.  However, it avoids the problem of manipulation that 
plagues purely structural accounts of autonomy, such as Frankfurt’s, due to containing a procedural 
requirement which introduces historicity into the account.  This procedural requirement is evident 
in the stipulation that a preference must be formed through a deliberative and evaluative process in 
accordance with the individual’s conception of what is true and good, where this conception will 
have been formed over time.  Thus, it is not simply that I have preferences, but the way in which I 
came to have them that is important on this account.  Furthermore, as the ability to deliberate and 
evaluate one’s preferences is deeply informed by “one’s moral or psychological identity, one’s 
exercises of this capacity are ‘one’s own’, barring external manipulation via coercive mechanisms” 
(Ekstrom, 2005b:57).  Thus, a further procedural requirement is added that to be considered 
autonomous, the formation of preferences may not have been the product of manipulation or 
coercion.   
 
Ekstrom recognises that her approach could be considered to be an overly “rationalistic” 
(2005b:57) account of autonomy due to its requirement that preferences must have been the product 
of some form of deliberation or assessment with regard to a conception of the good.  However, her 
response is that individuals do generally seek to understand their motives for acting and attempt to 
provide self-explanations for preferences and beliefs.  In other words, individuals do not generally 
act in a purely instinctive or mindless manner, they seek to make sense of themselves and their 
place in the world, and this includes having adequate and sufficient reasons to act.  This is 
evidenced by the fact that when we witness others acting in a seemingly mindless manner or 
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perceive ourselves to be acting in such a manner, we generally consider this to be a highly 
undesirable state of affairs.   
 
Mostly importantly however; Ekstrom’s account of autonomy manages to avoid the three problems 
discussed in section 5.4.  I have already alluded to the way in which she does so, in my discussion 
of her theory in section 5.6 and will therefore not repeat this discussion.  However, to reiterate, 
what is most important for the research focus of this dissertation is the way in which her theory 
manages to avoid the problem of manipulation, which seems to be the problem that most autonomy 
theories struggle with.  She avoids this problem not simply by stipulating that preferences may not 
have been formed through manipulation or other forms of external coercion to be considered 
autonomous, as some other theorists do, but rather, by giving an adequate account as to why this 
would be problematic.  In other words, a preference may only be described as autonomous if it can 
be explained with reference to the integral self.  This is because the preferences and attitudinal 
states that comprise the integral self “are constitutive of the agent” (Stacy Taylor, 2005:15).  Thus, 
if they are manipulated in any way, the concern becomes not simply for the autonomy of the agent, 
but for the possibility that manipulation could result in an altered, and perhaps entirely different, 
agent.  
 
We can then assess Ekstrom’s account against Dworkin’s criteria for an adequate account of 
autonomy.  Firstly, her account easily satisfies the first requirement as it contains no logical 
inconsistencies, and is not premised upon any controversial or incoherent assumptions regarding 
autonomy.  Secondly, despite the fact that her theory is formulated in a rigorous manner, it does 
not issue excessively demanding requirements for the possibility of autonomous action.  In fact, on 
her account, understood in the most simplistic or colloquial terms as ‘being true to oneself’, 
autonomy is a relatively achievable empirical possibility.  Regardless of the moral status of an 
individual’s preferences and the actions that they lead to, so long as she acts upon an evaluated 
preference that has been authorised with regard to the cohering network of preferences and 
attitudinal states that comprise her integral self, and, that reflect a conception of what she takes to 
be true and good, her preference and action would be autonomous.  Autonomy in this sense is 
achievable. 
 
On the other hand, one could argue the opposite and posit that Ekstrom’s theory is a too stringent 
account of autonomy.  This is because her theory would posit that in situations in which an 
individual has felt compelled to act upon an unauthorised preference, he has acted with limited 
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autonomy.  One could then use her theory to argue that if this is the case, such an individual cannot 
be held morally responsible for his actions86.  However, one could respond to this claim in similar 
manner to the way in which Frankfurt has, by providing a theory of moral responsibility that is not 
predicated on the principle of alternate possibilities in its ascription of moral responsibility (1969)87.  
In other words, Frankfurt argues that even in cases in which no alternatives were available, the 
individual is nevertheless morally responsible for their actions due to his distinction between 
freedom of the will and freedom of action.  In other words, my autonomy or freedom of will may 
be compromised to the extent that I have a conflict between my will and my second-order volition, 
but my freedom to act or not act upon that will remains intact.  The question of moral responsibility 
is, however, an entirely different and extensive area in its own right, and is, therefore, beyond the 
scope of this chapter which is concerned specifically with presenting an account of what it means 
to act upon one’s own volitions, and the relevance of this for the concern for moral autonomy posed 
by moral bioenhancement.  Furthermore, for my purposes, a stringent account of autonomy is 
preferable as if a moral bioenhancement intervention could be shown to not impact autonomy on 
Ekstrom’s account, then there is a good chance that it would be an ethically permissible 
intervention.   
 
Thirdly, Ekstrom’s theory is able to provide a clear account of why autonomy is valuable.  On her 
account, the value of autonomy is predicated upon the goodness of being able to form preferences 
that lead to actions that are a reflection of who one is, and what one takes to be true and good.  
Because this latter stipulation is built into her account, acting in this way would be considered to 
be good, for the individual, by definition.  Her account does not aim to address the issue of whether 
the notion is of comparable value to other principles or values that we take to be good; however, 
due to the fact that it is content-neutral it would be compatible with achieving other goods, if these 
are associated with the individual’s particular conception of what is true and good.  As mentioned 
above, due to the fact that Ekstrom’s account is neutral regarding what an individual takes to be 
true and good, it does not rule out the possibility that an individual may form immoral, but 
authorised, preferences that lead her to act in an immoral, but nevertheless autonomous, manner.  
However, this is the case with any content-neutral account of autonomy.  Furthermore, while 
autonomy is determined objectively by the subjective formation of preferences in the stipulated 
                                                 
86 This would be considered an undesirable outcome, as it runs counter to the strongly held intuition that individuals 
should be morally accountable for their actions, and that claims of compulsion are not satisfactory justifications for 
evading this accountability 
87 This was discussed in section 4.8.4 of the previous chapter.   
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manner, the objective assessment of preferences and actions in terms of their moral worth, and thus, 
the moral responsibility of the individual, would be a separate matter.   
 
Ekstrom’s theory would clearly meet Dworkin’s fourth criterion as it is fully compatible with most 
value systems, due to the fact that it is content-neutral.  While it could possibly run into trouble with 
highly communitarian societies in which value is ascribed to the role of interrelational contributions 
in the formation of attitudinal states, preferences and values, Ekstrom’s theory does not rule out the 
role that one’s context plays in forming one’s integral self.  Rather, she argues that the integral self 
consists of the individual’s evaluated preferences and attitudinal states that are informed by his 
conception of what is true and good.  Of course, an individual’s conception of what is true and good 
will have been influenced by societal and cultural factors, amongst others; however, if his 
preferences and attitudinal states have survived a process of reflection, are enduring, defensible and 
he is comfortable with them then when he acts upon one of them that is authorised, he will be acting 
autonomously.  The theory also meets the fifth requirement, as it has both practical and normative 
applicability.  In particular, Ekstrom’s account may be used to illustrate why external interferences 
with an individual’s ability to act upon their authorised preferences, and thus their conception of 
the good, would be a negative thing.  In fact, I will use her theory in the next section to support a 
similar argument; namely, that in certain cases, the concern for moral autonomy posed by moral 
bioenhancement could, itself, be regarded as paternalistic, to the extent that it seeks to thwart an 
individual’s desire to act only upon authorised preferences, rather than unauthorised preferences.  
This will be fully explained in the second part of this chapter.   
 
In terms of the final requirement, namely, judgemental relevance, Ekstrom’s account would also 
seem to meet this criterion as it does not contain assumptions that are incongruent with generally 
accepted claims regarding autonomy.  Her account looks at the formation of specific preferences 
and the acts that are authorised, or not, by these preferences, and thus, it implies a conception of 
autonomy that admits of degrees but is also localised, although she does not explicitly state this.  In 
other words, if an individual lacks autonomy regarding her ability to stop smoking, due to the fact 
that she has an authorised preference that her desire to not smoke be the one upon which she acts 
upon and not her desire to smoke, she would lack autonomy in that particular area of her life.  Her 
global autonomy, as such, would not necessarily be impaired, as she may be autonomous with 
regard to other preferences that are authorised.  However, one could either argue that an impact on 
autonomy in one area of an individual’s life erodes their autonomy to a degree, or, that any impact 
on autonomy produces effects on an individual’s global autonomy.  The latter conception would be 
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founded on the view that autonomy is a threshold concept; an individual either possesses it fully, 
and in all areas, or not at all, whereas the former is congruent with the view that autonomy admits 
of degrees, an individual may have more or less of it.  Ekstrom does not state which view she 
supports but both conceptions are generally regarded as acceptable. 
 
5.8 Concluding remarks  
In this first part of chapter 5, I have presented the theoretical underpinnings that will inform my 
analysis of moral bioenhancement that will follow in the second part of the chapter.  My main aim 
has been to justify the selection of Ekstrom’s coherence theory of autonomy as a suitable means of 
assessing the concern for moral autonomy posed by moral bioenhancement.  I approached this task 
of justification, firstly, by discussing a hierarchical approach to autonomy, as I posit that the 
insights that such approaches contain, capture a conception of autonomy that has great relevance 
for elucidating the problem at hand.  The important insight that the hierarchical approach brought 
to awareness, is that autonomy is not secured simply by being free to do what one desires to do.  
Firstly, this is because what one desires to do may not only be the product of undue external 
manipulation, but may also be due to some inner compulsion, phobia or addiction.  Secondly, for 
various reasons, despite having a strong desire to do something, one may reject this desire and wish 
that one didn’t have it, and in particular, not wish to act upon it.  However, despite its appeal, the 
hierarchical approach requires more substance which is evidenced by the fact that it falls foul to 
several problems, the most serious one being the problem of manipulation.  In other words, despite 
the appeal of such approaches, the conditions they provide for autonomy are not sufficient to 
indicate how or why cases of external interference or manipulation would be problematic.  
Ekstrom’s coherence account is able to address the three problems, and in particular, it is able to 
indicate why external interferences and cases of manipulation would be inimical to autonomy.   
 
On Ekstrom’s account, autonomy is achieved when a desire that I have, that motivates me to act, 
is informed by a preference to act upon that desire, rather than another, where that preference has 
been authorised by the fact that it coheres with my integral self.  My integral self is informed by a 
network of preferences and attitudinal states that are in coherence with one another, in that each 
preference may be explained with reference to the others.  Furthermore, coherence is achieved 
through the fact that such preferences are an enduring part of my character, and, because I am both 
able and prepared to defend them, due to the fact that I am comfortable admitting that these 
preferences are part of my character.  The process by which I come to have this network of cohering 
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attitudinal states and preferences is informed by my ability to critically reflect upon these states in 
terms of the value I ascribe to them in being able to realise what I take to be true and good.   
 
While Ekstrom explicitly states that one’s ability to reflect upon and evaluate one’s preferences, 
and the actual preferences and attitudinal states that comprise one’s integral self, would be regarded 
as one’s own if they haven’t been subject to manipulation or coercion, her theory is able to indicate 
why the latter would be problematic.  This is due to the fact that the formation of the integral self 
is a product of the individual’s value system.  In other words, what I take to be true and valuable 
has directly informed the kind of person that I am, and most importantly, the kind of person I wish 
to be.  Therefore, an intervention that would be problematic on Ekstrom’s account, would be one 
that resulted in changes to my value system by introducing values that were previously not held, 
or, an intervention that compromised my ability to deliberate upon such changes.  In such cases, 
the changes to my value system would, in all likelihood, cause me to have new preferences that 
were previously not held, or that would not have been authorised by myself before the intervention.  
Conversely, because of the strength of Ekstrom’s account of autonomy and its ability to overcome 
the problem of manipulation, I would argue that any moral bioenhancement intervention that may 
be shown to pass Ekstrom’s conditions for autonomy would potentially be ethically permissible in 
terms of the concern for autonomy.  Furthermore, I will make a stronger argument in the second 
part of this chapter and posit that in cases where an intervention passes Ekstrom’s conditions, there 
is a strong likelihood that it could increase the autonomy of the individual concerned.   
 
In terms of other general insights regarding autonomy that I take to be relevant for my analysis in 
the second part of this chapter, I would argue that autonomy should not be framed in terms of a 
Kantian ability to act upon an entirely rational will that is devoid of emotional interference, as I 
would argue that this type of autonomy is impossible to achieve practically.  Furthermore, arguing 
that autonomy is only achieved through being able to overcome contingent factors, such as how an 
individual ‘feels’ about something or what is personally and idiosyncratically valuable to him – as 
these factors may interfere with his ability to act from a sense of duty, where the latter is associated 
with the dictates of the rational will – seems to imply autonomy’s opposite.   
 
Rather, I posit that what is at stake in the moral bioenhancement debate is autonomy as moral 
authenticity.  Moral authenticity would refer to an individual’s ability to perform morally relevant 
acts that may be explained with reference to the beliefs, values, preferences and attitudes that form 
part of her recognisable and enduring character.  This conception is very much a personal account 
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of autonomy as it is informed by the subject’s perception of the extent to which she is free to be 
moved by her own desires, preferences beliefs and attitudes.  However, because an individual may 
consider herself to be freely moved to act upon a desire that she has, even in cases where that desire 
has been implanted in her through some form of external manipulation or intervention, an account 
of autonomy must have adequate conditions that equip it to address such situations.   Thus, 
autonomy is not only adjudicated in an internal or subjective manner but must have objective 
conditions.  I would argue that Ekstrom’s theory has sufficient conditions, and in the second part 
of this chapter I will therefore use her theory to analyse the concern for moral autonomy posed by 
moral bioenhancement.  
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Chapter 5b – Assessing moral bioenhancement interventions in terms of a 
coherence theory of autonomy 
5.9 Introduction and overview 
In chapter 4, after a survey of the literature, a number of moral bioenhancement interventions 
were identified as potentially inimical to autonomy.  They include:  
1) Any intervention that is compulsory or covertly administered 
2) Interventions that excessively heighten emotional responses, if this were to result in 
compulsive behaviour (where compulsive behaviour may be understood as acting without 
any cognitive reflection or reasons for one’s action).  
3) Interventions that produce hidden identity or personality changes  
4) Interventions that substantially alter the identity, core beliefs or value system of the 
individual 
5) Interventions that alter the means by which an individual is able to assess and accept any 
of these changes (this concern is related to the previous concern) 
6) Interventions with irreversible effects  
 
However, while the arguments given in the literature as to why these interventions would be 
problematic are predominantly valid regarding what their concerns attempt to capture, they are 
somewhat superficial.  I would argue that this is because they use a thin interpretation of autonomy 
or interpret the concept of autonomy, and thus, what is at stake in the debate, as self-evident.  For 
this reason, I have presented what I take to be a comprehensive theoretical foundation in the first 
part of this chapter that I will now use to assess, on a deeper level, what the above concerns attempt 
to capture, in order to illustrate more adequately, if and why such interventions would be 
problematic.   
 
In this second part of chapter 5, I will therefore use Ekstrom’s coherence theory of autonomy to 
assess the status of the concern for moral autonomy posed by moral bioenhancement.  I will do this 
firstly, in section 5.10, by utilising her account, along with various insights from the first part of 
the chapter, to assess the way in which Harris, as the dominant opponent of moral bioenhancement, 
interprets and applies the notion of autonomy to argue against moral bioenhancement.  In section 
5.11 I will then use Ekstrom’s theory of autonomy to analyse the specific interventions and 
outcomes of moral bioenhancement that would be the most likely to impact upon autonomy.  
Finally, in section 5.12 I will argue that in a certain type of case, moral bioenhancement could 
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produce an increase in the degree of autonomy experienced by individuals, and therefore, 
conversely, that preventing individuals from undergoing moral bioenhancement in such cases 
would be a violation of their autonomy in the Ekstromian sense and would thus be paternalistic.  
 
5.10 An assessment of Harris’ argument  
Harris raises many valuable and relevant concerns in the moral bioenhancement debate.  I would 
argue, however, that the most important issue that he has raised pertains to the potential 
consequences of excessively heightening emotional response.  Generally, when an individual is 
faced with a morally relevant decision for which competing options exist, she will make her 
decision based upon composite cognitive, contextual and affective factors, along with the value 
system that she endorses which will have been informed by the afore-mentioned factors along with 
the sum total of her life experiences.  This conglomeration of factors will have existed in a particular 
structural relationship, which will have informed the moral decisions she has, heretofore, made.  If 
moral bioenhancement excessively heightened one component of this structure, namely, the 
affective component, producing changes that impacted the individual’s ability to assess her 
changed motivations, this would give cause for concern regarding the authenticity of her ensuing 
decisions.  In other words, we could question the extent to which her ensuing moral decisions and 
behaviour were actually hers.  The response to this concern has typically been to point out that the 
proponents of moral bioenhancement are not suggesting that emotionally relevant dispositions such 
as empathy, be excessively heightened.  However, despite the fact that they would not be aiming at 
such radical enhancement, the concern is nevertheless a valid one.  The above-mentioned structure 
is a complex system with interrelated components, and, changes in such systems may produce 
unforeseen consequences with large-scale effects.  This is therefore a concern that merits being 
taken seriously and will be discussed further in section 5.11.3.  
 
In terms of a point that is related to this concern, what the investigation of hierarchical accounts of 
autonomy has illustrated is that in cases in which there is congruence between an individual’s will 
and his second-order volitions, this does not rule out the possibility that such congruence is the 
product of some form of external manipulation.  It is for this very reason, that hierarchical accounts 
are vulnerable to the problem of manipulation; congruence is not sufficient for autonomy.  
Therefore, as Harris has correctly pointed out, but in a different formulation, in cases of moral 
bioenhancement where an individual accepts her new will or motivation to act, we cannot assume 
that her autonomy remains intact simply because of this acceptance or congruence between the two 
levels.  This is because her state of acceptance may, itself, have been a product of the intervention.  
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Thus, if a moral bioenhancement intervention were to heighten affective components to the extent 
that it altered second-order volitions, thus impacting upon the individual’s ability to assess her will 
or motivations by means of judgements and preferences that are truly hers, in the stipulated sense, 
then this would be ethically unacceptable in terms of the concern for autonomy.  However, I would 
argue that not all interventions currently discussed in the literature would necessarily do this.  I will 
address this matter in the course of this chapter.   
 
The above issues aside, there are entirely different points that may be made regarding Harris’ 
position.  His argument that moral bioenhancement would be inimical to moral autonomy is wholly 
informed by his interpretation of morality and its requirements.  He pays considerable attention to 
the necessary and sufficient conditions of morality, and, as such, his interpretation can strictly be 
identified as a concern for the autonomy of morality itself, rather than a concern for the personal 
autonomy of individuals to be moral, although the two issues are, of course, not unrelated.  
However, while the universal human capacity for morality may be regarded as an intrinsically good 
thing, the same argument may be made for the individual capacity to determine one’s own life-
course in accordance with one’s conception of the good.  Problems arise, however, when the two 
goods come into conflict with each another, which is essentially the crux of the ethical concern for 
moral bioenhancement.  In other words, reframed in this way, the concern is that moral 
bioenhancement, due to the fact that it will impact on human moral autonomy as such, should not 
be permitted as this will signify an erosion or destruction of something that is a valuable 
characteristic of humanity as a whole.  Therefore, the conclusion is that regardless of whether or 
not individuals would wish to exercise the choice to morally bioenhance themselves, they should 
not be permitted to do so.  Many of the arguments in the literature, and I would argue Harris’ 
argument in particular, operate with this implicit assumption, therefore, it would be more accurate 
to describe their concern as one for human morality as such, or for universal human moral 
autonomy.   
 
Another problem with the Harris line of argumentation is that, by framing his argument in terms of 
the stipulation that moral autonomy requires the freedom to fall, he is implicitly employing a 
substantive account of autonomy.  This is because his conception of autonomy has a condition – 
albeit a subtle one – regarding what an individual may take to be true and good.  The matter is 
difficult to explicate, as, in the case of an investigation of moral bioenhancement, we are not simply 
assessing the autonomy of general preferences and actions, we are narrowing the focus to assess 
the autonomy of moral preferences and moral acts.  With this latter focus, the matter risks becoming 
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clouded by normative implications rather than remaining focused on the conditions of autonomy.  
However, the same conditions should apply when judging preferences and acts in terms of their 
autonomy; this should not change because of the content of these preferences and acts.  In other 
words, the moral status of an action is a separate matter to the autonomy of an action.   
 
Harris’ approach does not produce problems for cases of compulsory moral bioenhancement, nor 
for cases in which there is genuine congruence between an individual’s authorised preferences and 
their actions.  I would argue that this is because moral bioenhancement in the former instance would 
be an unacceptable violation of negative liberty, and therefore, would be ethically impermissible 
on any account.  Thus, Harris’ conception of moral autonomy would not be required to add impetus 
to the argument or to do any additional ‘work’ in this regard.  In the latter instance, on the grounds 
of autonomy as self-determination, and as something intrinsically valuable for individuals, 
biologically altering a desire that an individual has an authorised preference for, regardless of the 
moral status of either the preference or the desire, would be morally problematic in terms of its 
impact on his autonomy.  In other words, if there is congruence between an individual’s authorised 
moral preferences and his actions, the individual would presumably not experience any inner 
conflict in this regard, and would thus see no need for moral bioenhancement.  In such a case, 
forcing him to undergo moral bioenhancement would be an undue violation, not only of his 
freedom, but also of the dictates of personal autonomy, regardless of whether his authorised 
preferences and actions were considered by others to be morally praiseworthy or immoral in 
character88.  However, once again, to illustrate why this would be problematic, we do not need to 
utilise Harris’ argument that morality requires the freedom to fall.  
 
In a particular type of case, however, Harris’ argument that moral autonomy, or morality itself, 
requires the freedom to fall, and thus, that moral bioenhancement – to the extent that it lessens the 
possibility of choosing to fall – is absolutely wrong, disregards the possibility that an individual 
may have a desire that not falling – where this is associated with avoiding doing something that 
she perceives to be morally problematic or abhorrent – might be the preference upon which she 
wishes to act.  In this regard, Harris is adding subtle content to the notion of autonomy by ruling 
out a possible conception of the good that an individual may have.  This would be the specific 
preference that not being able to act upon particular desires that she might have, may, for that 
                                                 
88 I emphasise the term ‘undue’ because an individual would, of course, be held morally responsible for his preferences 
and actions, to the extent that if he illegally violated the freedom of others, resulting in his incarceration, then his 
freedom would be curtailed.  However, as discussed in chapter 4, I agree with the prevalent view in the literature that 
the loss of freedom of action from imprisonment is different in kind to the loss of freedom that would occur from being 
forced to undergo a biological intervention such as moral bioenhancement.   
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individual, be part of her conception of the good89.  In this regard, Harris’ account falls foul to the 
criticisms that plague substantive accounts of autonomy in general.  In other words, by stipulating 
a particular conception of the good as a determinant for moral autonomy, his account would be 
guilty of subtle paternalism and logical inconsistences. 
 
By this, I am not arguing for the absolute value of autonomy as self-determination.  Regarding the 
ability to self-determine as valuable in an absolute sense is highly problematic, I would argue, as 
this would support the ability to perform self-determined actions that are both good and evil.  In 
this regard, I agree with Persson and Savulescu that the world would be preferable without certain 
decidedly immoral, but self-determined, acts.  Thus, in certain cases, a strong consequentialist 
argument may be made that an intervention that prevents individuals from performing certain acts 
would be justifiable regardless of any loss of autonomy.  However, this is not a line of 
argumentation that I have chosen to investigate in this dissertation.  Rather, I have specifically 
attempted to investigate whether moral bioenhancement, as I defined it at the end of chapter 2, 
would be likely to impact moral autonomy in the way that critics fear it would.  In this regard, I am 
positing that if the critics are lodging their arguments against moral bioenhancement on the basis 
of the concern that it will negatively impact autonomy and we agree that autonomy implies self-
determination, then, by definition, it cannot be logically coherent to also agree that it is acceptable 
to place restrictions on the content of self-determination in order to protect autonomy as self-
determination.   
 
The incoherence of this position indicates that although the debate is framed in terms of a concern 
for autonomy, the concern is rather for human morality, as such, which is regarded as intrinsically 
valuable and which should therefore not be altered.  In this regard, I am not arguing that autonomy 
theories are not subject to restrictions in terms of procedural and structural requirements, as this is 
a condition for something to be considered a theory rather than a collection of claims.  Rather, I am 
arguing that as soon as there are restrictions placed upon the content of self-determination, 
particularly in terms of moral content, then we can question whether it is still the concept of self-
determination that we are referring to.  Of course, I fully acknowledge that with the right to self-
determination, if there is such a thing, comes the obligation or duty to be held morally responsible 
                                                 
89 Examples of pathological desires that may have been rejected by the individual are, of course, easy to provide.  
However, in terms of moral bioenhancement, rather than the treatment of pathological functioning, an example would 
be an individual who has problematised her levels of empathy, where this leads her to have desires that she regards as 
causing her to act in a selfish or immoral manner.  If she rejects such desires on the basis of who she takes herself to 
be and what she regards as good, and she is able to undergo an intervention that would increase her levels of empathy, 
it would be problematic to prevent this on the grounds of protecting her autonomy.   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
214 
 
for one’s actions.  However, I take this to be an area of investigation that is distinct from the issue 
regarding the conditions for autonomy, and one that therefore, requires its own arguments.   
 
5.11 Interventions that would violate freedom and/or autonomy  
5.11.1 Compulsory Interventions  
As mentioned above, and discussed in chapter 3, the most ethically problematic type of moral 
bioenhancement intervention would be any intervention that is forced on individuals against their 
will or without their knowledge.  In other words, any intervention that is compulsory or covertly 
administered.  Such interventions would clearly violate both freedom and autonomy due to 
considering neither.  As discussed in previous chapters, in order to justify compulsory 
interventions, one would have to do so on utilitarian grounds.  One could do so by arguing that the 
value of autonomy is overstated, that there are some ‘goods’ that we value more in terms of their 
utility, and thus, that a trade-off between autonomy and other goods is worthwhile.  This is the 
approach that Persson and Savulescu take, although they formulate their argument by framing the 
avoidance of harm as a good.  Such an approach requires providing strong grounds for the claim 
that the harm associated with compulsory moral bioenhancement would avert a greater harm, such 
as existential risk.  However, even in such cases, the response may be that the former would be a 
greater harm than the latter.  In this regard, Harris has explicitly posited that he “like so many others 
would not wish to sacrifice freedom for survival” (2016. 74-75).  I will return to this point in the 
conclusion of this dissertation.  These kinds of arguments, which have characterised the moral 
bioenhancement debate, have reached a point of deadlock as they represent clashes between 
opposing value systems that are fundamentally irresolvable.  If one agrees that existential risk is a 
distinct possibility, then, fundamentally, the issue becomes what one would and would not be 
willing to advocate and do, in order to ensure the survival of the human species.   
 
However, these points aside, it is generally accepted in the literature that compulsory moral 
bioenhancement would be an undue violation of negative liberty or freedom, and thus, any 
argument that is utilised to illustrate why any such violations are morally indefensible could be 
used to argue the same for compulsory moral bioenhancement.  Furthermore, in terms of Ekstrom’s 
account, compulsory moral bioenhancement would clearly violate her conditions for autonomy.  
This is because it would essentially amount to a form of unwanted external manipulation of desires 
and possibly preferences, the possibility of which her theory explicitly seeks to exclude.  However, 
while in the case of an argument against compulsory moral bioenhancement, an account of personal 
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autonomy would not be required to do any extra ‘work’ that could not be done by arguments that 
are able to illustrate why undue violations of freedom are themselves wrong, we could still use 
Ekstrom’s theory to illustrate further, why moral bioenhancement would be a violation of autonomy 
both in cases of compulsory moral bioenhancement and in certain voluntary cases.  
 
5.11.2 Creating unsupported preferences  
Assuming compulsory moral bioenhancement to be an undue violation of liberty, and thus, to be 
morally indefensible, we can then turn to other possibly problematic interventions.  This 
investigation would include only voluntary moral bioenhancement interventions, thus, there would 
be no violation of freedom or negative liberty in such cases90.  In other words, the concern would 
be that despite being voluntary, moral bioenhancement may still impact upon personal autonomy 
or the ability to truly determine the self.  The threats to autonomy in this realm would admit of 
degrees in that there would some outcomes that would more severely impact autonomy than others.  
Using Ekstrom’s requirements, the first level of threat to autonomy would be the introduction of 
anomalous desires or the heightening of weak desires.  In other words, such desires could be desires 
that the individual had previously not possessed, or, they could be desires that had been part of the 
peripheral self, which, due to being strengthened via a moral bioenhancement intervention, would 
now claim the attention of the individual, thus becoming preferences.  On Frankfurt’s account, this 
would be a process whereby moral bioenhancement caused an existing first-order desire to become 
the will of the individual or created a new first-order desire that became the will of the individual.   
 
To illustrate by way of an example, we can imagine an individual who focuses her attention on 
matters that are deemed to be of relevance in light of her cohering network of preferences and 
attitudinal states.  When encountering poor or needy individuals, she may experience a fleeting 
sense of empathy for their plight but not have a strong preference in terms of the way in which she 
would wish to be moved to act in this regard.  Rather, her existing levels of empathy could manifest 
as a concern for the welfare of animals rather than human beings, and thus, as a desire to rather 
help the former than the latter.  Thus, empathy for the poor would be part of her peripheral self: 
she may think about it at times and consider it to be unfortunate, but not consider it important 
enough to motivate her to act in any way.    
 
                                                 
90 However, the arguments in this section would also serve as a means of explaining, by way of an argument from 
autonomy rather than an argument from freedom, why compulsory moral bioenhancement would be morally 
problematic.  In other words, the argument would be that it is wrong on account of freedom-related arguments and 
autonomy-related arguments.     
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On the other hand, we can imagine an individual who has a cohering network of preferences and 
attitudinal states that include among others, a belief in the goodness of being highly ambitious and 
self-sufficient through hard work as well as preferences to be a person who is extremely successful, 
professional and clear-minded.  This individual may have deliberated upon the plight of the poor 
and come to the conclusion that one should not give ‘handouts’ to such individuals due to the 
possibility that it may increase their dependence on such acts of charity occurring, and thus, make 
it less likely that they could achieve self-sufficiency.  This belief may be informed by the fact that 
she has low levels of empathy in general.  Regardless of the moral status of her preferences and 
beliefs, these attitudinal states would be a reflection of what she takes to be true and good, so that 
she would wish that the preference upon which she is moved to act be a preference to not 
disempower the poor by making them more dependent.  In this second case, we would say that 
there is congruence between her preferences and desires regarding this matter.  When she refrains 
from giving money to the poor she is acting upon a preference that has been authorised by her 
integral self.   
 
In terms of the first example, if the individual were to then choose to undergo an intervention – due 
perhaps to being offered an incentive to do so, or for some other reason – that strengthened her 
empathy levels, in the case where she once only had fleeting concerns for the plight of the poor, 
she may now have a stronger desire to help them, one which is now sufficiently strong to move her 
to act upon it91.  In such a case where a weak, but pre-existing, desire has been strengthened, I 
would argue that while this would not be wholly unproblematic, it would be less so than in the case 
of the second individual who had no such desire before the interventions.  This is because the 
individual in the first example already had an other-focused desire to assist those in need which 
was motivated by the presence of existing levels of empathy.  It just so happened that her empathy 
moved her to be concerned for, and to act upon, the plight of animals rather than human beings.  
After the intervention, her empathy would now have been strengthened sufficiently to include both 
human beings and animals as targets of her concern.  Thus, it would not necessarily be the content 
of her attitudinal states that would have been changed; rather, it would be the focus or scope of her 
attitudinal states that would have been widened.   
 
                                                 
91 In the case of an individual voluntarily agreeing to undergo moral bioenhancement, despite the fact that she has 
congruence between her desires and preferences, and thus, experiences no sense of conflict, we could argue that this 
implies that on some level there isn’t really congruence between the two.  In the case of the first example, the individual 
could have experienced some form of guilt regarding her attitude towards the poor and felt a desire to change this 
attitude.  This would then indicate that her careless attitude towards the poor is not genuinely part of her integral self 
and that she has problematised this attitude in some way because it is odds with her integral self.  I will discuss this 
matter further in section 5.7.3  
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On the other hand, in the second case, the individual may now have an entirely new desire to help, 
that could have replaced her old desire and her belief that would not regard such assistance as truly 
helping.  To the extent that the strength of her new desire caused her to now have a new preference 
to assist the poor, and in particular, that this preference be the one upon which she would want to 
act, this would have impacted her autonomy in some way.  In other words, the new preference 
would not have been authorised by way of its coherence with her network of preferences and 
attitudinal states, that, in turn, is informed by her conception of what is true and good; it would be 
an anomalous or ‘rogue’ preference.  In fact, to the extent that the new preference would be at odds 
with her integral self, this would be a serious impact upon her autonomy.  Furthermore, to 
assimilate such a change into her integral self, she would have to come up with post hoc 
rationalisations to do so.  These reasons would not be an accurate reflection of what she takes to be 
true and good, and thus, would be inauthentic.  This second category, therefore, refers to any 
intervention that creates a new desire which is strong enough to become a preference and is 
sufficiently compelling to cause action, despite not having been authorised by the integral self in 
the stipulated manner.  Interventions that strengthen an existing but weak desire to the extent that 
it becomes a new preference that is now sufficiently compelling to cause action would require 
attention, but I would argue that the former would be a far more serious impact on autonomy as 
self-determination than the latter.   
 
5.11.3 Changes to the integral self  
There is, however, a potential concern that is even more serious in its implications for autonomy 
than the above-mentioned, which I will now investigate by means of the second example discussed 
in the previous section.  As mentioned above, in the second example, the individual’s integral self 
is characterised by a cohering network of preferences and attitudinal states that include among 
others, a belief in the goodness of being highly ambitious and self-sufficient through hard work, as 
well as the preference to be a person who is extremely successful, professional and motivated by 
rational rather than emotive factors.  She may also be an individual who has lower levels of 
empathy, and thus, she may have no definitive desires or preferences to help others.  To formulate 
this in Ekstrom’s parlance, a preference to help others is simply not regarded as one that is valuable 
for her to have in light of what she takes to be true and good.   
 
Imagine then, that this individual decides to undergo an intervention that enhances her empathy 
levels.  Her decision to do so may have been informed by a strong incentive that appeals in some 
way to her ambitious nature.  The concern that this third category attempts to capture would be if 
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the increase in her empathy levels were to produce significant changes to the above-mentioned 
cohering network of preferences and attitudinal states.  In other words, if she came to realise, due 
to new feelings of empathy and sensitivity, that ambition and personal success were relatively 
trivial goals, that self-sufficiency is meaningless in the face of the suffering of others, and that 
seemingly rational clear-mindedness is cold-hearted, such changes would have substantially altered 
her integral self.  While it could be argued that the changes produced by the invention in this case 
were decidedly positive and that post-enhancement her new dispositions were morally preferable, 
or even that she is now a much better and nicer person in general, I would argue that this response 
misses the point of what is actually being addressed here which is the question of whether or not 
all moral bioenhancement interventions would produce impacts on autonomy.  I will return to this 
point below.   
 
On Ekstrom’s account, the most serious concern posed by moral bioenhancement would be that in 
strengthening a particular disposition, such as empathy, this may produce more far-reaching effects.  
As discussed in section 2.4.2 of chapter 2, a number of critics of moral bioenhancement have 
discussed the dangers posed by moral bioenhancement due to the nature of human moral 
psychology which exhibits “ontogenetic and neuropsychological” (Zarpentine, 2013:145) 
complexity, and, is further complicated by the fact that cognition is domain-general, rather than 
located in a specific area of the brain (Young & Duncan, 2012:1).  Agar lodges a similar concern 
that isolating and strengthening one disposition may produce imbalances in other areas leading us 
to support moral judgements that we have previously not approved of (2015a:344), or, it may 
impact upon the mental flexibility required to balance other important factors that are integral to 
morally appropriate outcomes (Barilan, 2015:79)  The example discussed above happened to be a 
case with an outcome that would be regarded as positive by most, however, there is no certainty 
that all cases would produce such outcomes.   
 
The above possible outcomes would be associated with the concerns discussed in chapter 4a, 
namely, impacts upon personal identity.  In the parlance of Ekstrom’s theory, this would potentially 
be an impact upon the individual’s ability to assess his desires in terms of the cohering network of 
preferences that comprise his integral self and his conception of the good, due to a sufficient 
number of changes in this cohering network of preferences itself.  In other words, the enhancement 
of empathy, for example, rather than simply strengthening a specific desire, and thus, a particular 
preference, could alter the moral cognition and moral psychology of the individual in general.  
Thus, the concern is that change in one area could alter the preference structure as a whole, and 
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this would be the same as altering the integral self.  On the continuum of potential impacts to 
autonomy this would be the most undesirable outcome as major changes to the integral self could 
produce a qualitatively different self, thereby eradicating the means for moral self-determination 
entirely.    
 
As discussed in chapter 4a, certain neurological interventions, could pose distinct risks to personal 
identity.  In particular, there is empirical evidence of individuals exhibiting strong identity changes 
after having received deep brain stimulation for various movement and affective disorders.  In the 
case of what are regarded as extreme personality changes, the individual may be described by those 
close to him as being an entirely different person, in a qualitative sense, after such interventions.  
While there is not absolute consensus regarding what is implied by the kind of identity that is 
potentially vulnerable in such cases, qualitative identity has been identified in the literature as the 
most likely contender.  This type of identity is descriptive and aspirational in that it is informed by 
how individuals conceive themselves – the self that they believe themselves to be – as well as the 
selves they aspire to be.  More specifically, narrative identity has also been identified as the 
particular type of qualitative identity that would be vulnerable to impacts from moral 
bioenhancement.  This account of identity includes not only an individual’s self-conception, but 
also his interpretations of the events of his life, which would include the way in which he 
assimilates any changes to his self-conception, his relationship with others, as well as what he 
values and identifies with.   
 
The similarities between these descriptions of identity and the notion of Ekstrom’s integral self, 
comprising the enduring preferences and attitudinal states that form a cohering network and are 
informed by the individual’s conception of what is true and good, are obvious.  In fact, she uses 
the terms moral or “psychological identity” (Ekstrom, 2005a:154; 2005b:55) a number of times, to 
capture what is implied by the integral self.  While the notion of an integral self is not 
unproblematic, Ekstrom’s psychological or moral conception of the self largely avoids 
metaphysical claims and is premised on the first-person experience of a distinct self that is the locus 
around which desires, preferences and other attitudinal and belief states can be understood, and 
most importantly, explained or justified.  In this regard, I would argue that personal identity, as 
explicated in chapter 4a, and Ekstrom’s integral self are one and the same thing.   
 
Ekstrom’s theory also provides us with a way of responding to Douglas’ argument in section 4.2.1 
of chapter 4a.  Douglas has responded to the concern for identity by arguing that even if moral 
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bioenhancement did produce identity changes, in the case of negative aspects of an individual’s 
identity, such as certain counter-moral emotions, if such emotions had a negative impact on the 
individual, change in this regard would be a decidedly positive outcome.  Furthermore, one could 
add that identity changes in the case of those individuals whose identities contain obviously 
negative dispositions, such as certain counter-moral emotions, would be a good thing for society, 
in so far as the latter is affected by the consequences of such counter-moral emotions.   
 
This is an obvious and powerful response to the concern for identity as it is difficult to understand 
the value of holding onto desires and preferences – or, an identity for that matter – that are ill-
serving for the individual or determinantal for others, in terms of negative societal impacts they 
may produce.  However, while this may be true for cases in which there is a lack of congruence 
between desires and cohering preferences or attitudinal states that produce inner conflict and 
distress for the individual, if autonomy, understood as the ability to determine one’s self, is truly 
regarded as a desirable good then this argument would not hold for cases in which there is 
congruence between desires and preferences.  In other words, while an individual may possess a 
particular counter-moral desire, if she authorises this desire to be the one upon which she acts, due 
to its coherence with her network of preferences or integral self, then this signifies her self-
determination.  Formulated slightly differently, if the preferences that form part of an individual’s 
cohering network, and thus her integral self, are enduring and she is comfortable possessing and 
defending them to herself and others, as well as able to explain them with reference to her other 
preferences, beliefs and attitudes, then these preferences and the actions that they authorise, as well 
as her integral self or identity are self-determined92.  
 
Nevertheless, one could persist with this line of argumentation and provide numerous claims as to 
why it would be desirable to change those aspects of individuals’ identities, or their identities in 
their entirety, that we do not approve of.  However, in the case of those individuals that truly accept 
their desires and identities as reflective of their conception of what is true and good, regardless of 
the moral status thereof, all such arguments would be set to collide with the dictates of autonomy93.  
                                                 
92 Because the discussion in my dissertation engages with the possible enhancement of morally relevant dispositions, 
such as empathy, to the levels displayed by moral exemplars within society, rather than the treatment of pathological 
dispositions or functioning, it must be remembered that when I refer to an intervention that disrupts a pre-existing 
congruence between a counter-moral desire and an authorised preference as problematic from the point of a respect 
for autonomy, I am not condoning such congruence that would support criminal or immoral actions that would be 
considered pathological.  There are arguments that can be made regarding why, in cases of criminal and pathological 
congruence, a ‘corrective treatment’ could be a good thing, all things considered.  This is, however, not the area that I 
am focusing on in my investigation.   
93 Once again, I wish to emphasise the point that I am specifically investigating the status of the concern for autonomy 
as discussed in the literature.  One could provide a powerful consequentialist argument as to why it would be a 
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In addition, where there is a strong regard for self-determination as something intrinsically 
valuable, this has additional value in serving to act as a protective mechanism against the possibility 
of moral eugenics agendas that would seek to identify which identities are acceptable and which 
are not, and should therefore be altered.  This would be of particular relevance in cases where those 
driving a moral eugenics agenda justify their aims with ideologies that are erroneous or morally 
problematic in nature.  It must always be remembered that the interpretation of what would be 
considered an unacceptable or acceptable identity is a product of cultural and historical context to 
a large extent.  It is not only identities containing components regarded as definitively immoral – 
such as those consisting of preferences to rape, abuse, exploit and murder – that are regarded as 
problematic.  In the past, there were identities, considered to be problematic, that were 
characterised by preferences that are now considered not only legitimate but morally valuable.  A 
desire to be in a loving relationship with someone of the same sex; a desire, as a woman, to vote, 
work, and achieve self-sufficiency and power; and a desire to be considered politically and morally 
equal, regardless of one’s race, would be just three examples of identities that would have been 
considered problematic in the past, and, in certain areas of the world, are still regarded as highly 
problematic.  The point here is that in addition to the possibility of biologically altering identities 
that would be regarded as uncontroversially problematic, there is also enormous potential for 
exploitation and abuse.    
 
The discussion in this section, as based upon certain insights from chapter 2 and chapter 4a, and 
interpreted in terms of Ekstrom’s theory of autonomy, indicates that moral bioenhancement 
interventions that would produce major impacts to identity, where there is congruence between 
identity, desires and behaviour would be potentially inimical to autonomy as self-determination.  
This would be the case even if an individual, for whatever reason, has agreed to voluntarily undergo 
a moral bioenhancement intervention.  In other words, the discussion in this section provides us 
with more substance as to why the concern for identity, as presented in the literature, would not be 




                                                 
worthwhile trade-off to impact upon the autonomy of individuals who have congruence between morally problematic 
desires and their identities by forcing such individuals to undergo moral bioenhancement.  This, of course, is the 
argument that Persson and Savulescu make.  However, such an argument will hold no weight with thinkers, such as 
Harris, who respond from a non-consequentialist position and would regard this as an undue violation of autonomy 
despite any positive consequences it would produce.   
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5.12 Interventions that would not violate autonomy  
While the interventions discussed in sections 5.11.2 and 5.11.3 represent ever-increasing degrees 
of magnitude in terms of their potential impact upon autonomy, Ekstrom’s theory may also be used 
to argue for a special kind of case in which moral bioenhancement interventions could be regarded 
as not only morally permissible, but as morally desirable in terms of their impact upon autonomy.  
This would be in cases characterised by a lack of congruence between an individual’s desires and 
preferences, and, more specifically, in cases in which an individual habitually and compulsively 
acts upon desires that have not been authorised, in the sense in which Ekstrom uses the term.   
 
However, it must be pointed out that a lack of congruence between desires and preferences is not 
necessarily, on its own, an indication of inauthenticity or compromised autonomy as we are 
frequently faced with such instances.  Frankfurt’s theory eloquently elucidates the insight, that to 
be human is to experience a degree of conflict between one’s instinctual feelings, desires, beliefs 
and attitudes and the feelings, desires, beliefs and attitudes one would rather have.  However, when 
an individual is continually faced with a desire of such an intensity that she frequently acts upon it, 
or feels in danger of acting upon it, despite the fact that it is not an authorised preference, and thus, 
would not be the desire upon which she would wish to act, then, if there is a safe and available 
intervention and the individual freely chooses to undergo such an intervention, I would argue that 
this would be morally permissible.  In such a case, and on Ekstrom’s account, if an individual is 
frequently acting upon an unauthorised preference, then her self-determination, and thus her 
autonomy, may be said to be compromised.  Therefore, to the extent that a moral bioenhancement 
intervention would result in congruence between her preferences and desires, by having changed 
her desire rather than an authorised preference, it would arguably strengthen her ability to act in a 
self-determined manner.  Conversely, refusing such an intervention to her, on the grounds that it is 
inimical to her autonomy, would be a double affront as it would not only maintain her state of 
compromised autonomy but would do so by using a paternalistic justification of protecting her 
moral autonomy as well as – in the case of Harris’ line of argumentation –  protecting the autonomy 
of morality in the more universal sense.   
 
Some examples illustrating cases in which there is conflict between desires and preferences have 
already been discussed in the first part of this chapter.  Here, I am referring specifically to cases in 
which individuals find themselves acting regularly on an unauthorised preference, when their 
preference would rather be that an opposing desire be the one upon which they act.  Some of the 
examples mentioned were cases of addiction and compulsion, such as unwilling drug-users and 
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gamblers who feel determined by their compulsive desire to engage in the very habit that destroys 
their ability to determine their own lives.  In such cases, their preference is that their desire to not 
use drugs or gamble should be the one upon which they act, rather than their desire to use drugs or 
gamble.  However, it is not only in cases of pathological behaviour, addiction and compulsion that 
individuals could experience an impact upon their ability to self-determine.  The category of moral 
bioenhancement interventions that could produce increases in autonomy may also be extended to 
the moral realm where individuals find themselves regularly acting in a way that they perceive to 
be morally problematic or in a way that is in conflict with how they would prefer to act, and which 
therefore produces a sense of conflict and inner turmoil.   
 
The problematic aspects of human moral psychology that Persson and Savulescu have identified 
as a means of justifying the project of moral bioenhancement would be examples of dispositions 
that, if biomedically altered, could potentially produce incongruences between desires and 
preferences (2012:3-4).  Of course, in terms of a respect for a content-neutral account of autonomy, 
the identification of those desires that would be considered to be potential contenders for moral 
bioenhancement would be left up to the individual in question.  However, any dispositions that 
have been identified would, of course, have to be amenable to biological alteration.  In addition, 
such interventions could also only be ethically justified on the grounds of enlarging an individual’s 
sense of autonomy to the extent that his behaviour is distressing for him due to its conflict with a 
preference to act upon an opposing desire where that preference is authorised by his integral self.  
The major proponents of moral bioenhancement, such as Persson and Savulescu and Douglas, 
frame the problem in terms of the bioenhancement of morally relevant dispositions that may also 
be understood as morally relevant emotions.  Ekstrom’s theory is nevertheless able to account for 
the role of such dispositions.  On her account, a disposition or emotion would inform, or be the 
basis of, a particular desire to act, or not act, in a specific manner.  In other words, as the proponents 
formulate it, a disposition would motivate a desire to act in a particular manner.   
 
To illustrate by way of two examples, an individual could have a desire to cheat in an exam that is 
informed by the fact that he has a lazy disposition.  His laziness would be both a cause, and thus, 
an explanation for his desire to cheat.  His network of cohering preferences may include, among 
others, a preference to succeed in life with minimal effort, a belief that cunning attributes rather 
than educational qualifications are important, and a preference to pursue activities that are 
enjoyable rather than activities that are simply a means to an end.  Thus, the individual’s desire to 
cheat would be authorised by his network of cohering preferences and his conception of what is 
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true and good.  He would not problematise his behaviour, and would therefore see no need to 
change it.  While his behaviour would be clearly morally problematic, it would, nevertheless, be 
autonomous on Ekstrom’s account.  Therefore, one could not avoid the fact that if he underwent a 
moral bioenhancement intervention, a cause for concern regarding the authenticity of any 
behavioural improvements after such an intervention would not be unfounded.  On the other hand, 
another individual may have a desire to regularly cheat in exams due to an anxious disposition and 
a lack of confidence in her ability to pass without doing so.  However, she could also have a 
preference to not cheat in exams as she may have related preferences such as a preference to pass 
on her own merits as well as a preference to be honest and act in a manner characterised by integrity.  
To the extent that her anxiety motivates her self-doubt and compels her to then cheat, thus acting 
upon her desire to cheat and against her preference to rather desire not to cheat and pass her exam 
with integrity and in an honest manner, she would be acting in a manner that is product of 
compulsion rather than self-determination.  In this case, an enhancement that would counteract her 
desire to cheat could be regarded as also producing an increase in her autonomy94.  
 
An example of a problematic, morally relevant behaviour that Persson and Savulescu have 
identified, which has been discussed at length in previous chapters, is our lack of empathy for those 
not closely connected to us which manifests as selfishness and an unwillingness to make small 
sacrifices that would produce major collective benefits for those living in extreme poverty.  This 
unwillingness to make relatively small sacrifices also has implications for materialistic 
consumption which, in turn, negatively impacts the environment and exacerbates climate change.  
A heightened sense of empathy would enable individuals to consider the perspective and position 
of others and take these matters into consideration when acting.  To the extent that an individual is 
distressed by the low levels of empathy she feels for others, so that she acts in a manner that she 
perceives to be selfish and wishes that she would not act in such a way, she would be a contender 
for a moral bioenhancement intervention to increase her empathy levels.  In cases in which an 
                                                 
94 Regarding this example, one could also construct an argument that is informed by the same terms that Harris utilises.  
In other words, one could argue that an individual, such as the one in the example, could be in a state – pre-enhancement 
– that is seemingly akin to the state that Harris fears individuals would be in after a moral bioenhancement!  In other 
words, Harris is concerned that moral bioenhancement could excessively heighten emotional responses, thus producing 
compulsive behaviour. One could then respond to him by pointing out that in certain cases individuals are already 
acting in a seemingly compulsive manner, which may be informed by a pre-existing level of emotional response that 
is excessive.  Therefore, if a moral bioenhancement were able to safely and effectively address this, in such cases, it 
would produce a result that is the opposite of that which is feared by Harris.  However, one could respond to such 
examples by pointing out that when behaviour is motivated by an excessive emotional response, this indicates some 
form of pathology, and it is therefore not correct to regard the solution as an enhancement; rather, what is required is 
treatment.  In this regard, the difficulty of providing clear cut examples of cases whose solution would be regarded as 
an enhancement rather than a treatment, indicates the tenuous nature of the treatment/enhancement distinction, as 
alluded to in chapter 2.   
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individual experiences distress regarding her behaviour, to the extent that she wishes to utilise an 
intervention to alter it, this would indicate that the desire that motivates her action, when she acts 
selfishly, is at odds with her integral self, as well as the likelihood that her preference to not act in 
such a manner is a genuine one.  In such cases, I would argue that a moral bioenhancement would 
enlarge, rather than compromise, the individual’s autonomy.   
 
Douglas’ identification of counter-moral emotions as possible targets of moral bioenhancement 
would have even more relevance for this category of intervention.  Rather than increasing the levels 
of a disposition that an individual perceives himself to possess in insufficient levels, where this 
intensifies a desire to act upon this disposition, the targeting of counter-moral emotions would seek 
to mitigate such emotions.  This category would therefore include any morally relevant emotion 
that an individual perceives to be the cause of her desire to act in a way that is odds with a desire 
that she would prefer to have, and to act upon.  Douglas suggests moral bioenhancement as a means 
of reducing the tendency for aggression as well as the mitigation of racial bias.  There are, however, 
many possibilities that could be explored and their inclusion as possible contenders for moral 
bioenhancement would, of course, depend upon whether these dispositions are susceptible to safe 
biological alteration.   
 
We may then construct a check list of requirements by utilising insights from Ekstrom’s theory to 
assess a particular desire as a potential contender for some form of moral bioenhancement 
intervention95.  I would argue that any moral bioenhancement intervention that meets the following 
requirements could be regarded as an enhancement of self-determination, rather than a threat to the 
latter.  To formulate this slightly differently, in the case of an individual considering undergoing a 
moral bioenhancement intervention, to avoid impacting on the individual’s autonomy, an 
intervention would have to avoid the outcomes listed below.   
 
1) The intervention must not result in any changes to any of the authorised preferences that 
form part of an individual’s cohering network, where this network is the means by which 
he has identified a particular desire as problematic to him.  In other words, an intervention 
must not produce any changes to the integral self or the core identity of the individual as 
this is the source of the self in self-determination.   
                                                 
95 The safety and efficacy of the intervention would have to be established, of course.  This would be a requirement of 
any intervention that acts upon human physiological processes.  Establishing efficacy would include being able to 
ensure that interventions are able to target specific dispositions, thus producing localised rather than global changes.   
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2)  In connection with the above requirement, the intervention must not change any of the 
components that characterise an individual’s conception of what is true and good, as this 
too forms part of her integral self and is the basis upon which she has identified a particular 
desire as problematic to her.   
3) An intervention may not serve to bring about congruence between a desire and a preference 
where doing so would more easily support actions that would impact upon the negative 
liberty and autonomy of others.  This is a protective addition informed by moral libertarian 
ideals96, that would be a necessary stipulation for relatively unusual cases in which an 
individual has a desire that is at odds with a network of cohering preferences that could be 
identified as pathological.  For example, an individual may have a desire to commit certain 
acts such as killing, maiming or raping another, and this desire may be informed by his 
cohering network of preferences.  However, at times, he may experience an anomalous 
preference that he not have such desires to act in this way.  This could then produce 
unwanted feelings of guilt and inner conflict that could be eradicated by an intervention that 
would increase his desire to act in accordance with his network of cohering preferences, 
with the result that the individual acts without further reservation in terms of his desire to 
kill, maim or rape.  Thus, a certain normative component would be required in cases of 
moral bioenhancement interventions that aim to bring about congruence between desires 
and preferences.  This would be premised upon the normative, but uncontroversial, 
assumption that certain actions committed upon unwilling subjects are undesirable, and 
therefore, the possibility of their occurring should be minimised.  This component would, 
however, be a minimal one in order to avoid charges of paternalism and uphold respect for 
self-determination.  However, if we operate with an interpretation of moral bioenhancement 
akin to the formulation provided at the end of chapter 2, then such a possibility would be 
excluded by definition.   
4) An intervention may not change a desire that is supported by a preference that is enduring, 
defensible, or, that the individual is comfortable with.  This is because any desire that meets 
these characteristics would, in-all-likelihood, be a component of the individual’s integral 
self.  While it seems highly unlikely that an individual would seek to change a desire that 
meets these three requirements, there could be cases in which an individual lacks adequate 
self-insight or is in denial about their integral self.  This requirement would therefore 
                                                 
96 By moral libertarianism, I propose a particular interpretation of libertarianism, referring to the acts that a thinker 
such as Mill would argue justify state intervention and thus impacts upon the freedom of individuals.  In other words, 
acts that impact upon the liberty of others due to the fact that they are characterised by force, threat, manipulation or 
coercion.  Thus, any intervention that would strengthen a desire to act in a way that that is forceful, threatening, 
manipulative, or coercive would be excluded as an option from which to choose.   
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presuppose the presence of a minimum level of rationality, self-insight and honesty on the 
part of the individual, qualities generally associated with the capability or conditions for 
being able to exercise autonomy in the first place.  Furthermore, this requirement could 
only be fulfilled through the self-reporting of the individual and not a third party, as this 
would introduce the possibility of abuse and exploitation akin to the dangers associated 
with positive accounts of liberty discussed in section 5.2 of the first part of this chapter.  
5) On the grounds of producing an increase in her autonomy, an intervention may only be 
utilised to alter a desire that has produced ongoing distress for an individual due to its 
persistence, its conflict with her cohering network of preferences, and its strength in causing 
her to frequently act upon it.  Regarding the latter, this would refer to cases in which the 
individual regularly acts upon an unauthorised preference when her preference is rather for 
an opposing desire to be the basis upon which she acts.  This is the most stringent 
requirement due to the fact that a desire may only be considered to be a suitable contender 
for moral bioenhancement, on the grounds of increasing her autonomy, if it is one that 
regularly compels her to act.   
 
It must be remembered that what I am attempting to provide with the above list, is a set of 
requirements or conditions for an intervention to be considered as an enhancement of autonomy.  
An individual could, of course, voluntarily choose to undergo moral bioenhancement – if it were 
safe, effective, and available as an option in a future where the ethical concerns had been addressed 
– and not meet all of these requirements.  However, I would argue that without meeting the above 
requirements there would be cause for concern regarding the authenticity of her decisions after 
such an intervention, and therefore, possible consequences for her autonomy.   
 
I posit that, despite all of the above considerations, very few individuals would avail themselves of 
moral bioenhancement interventions as a means of addressing perceived moral deficits.  It would 
be far more likely that such interventions would be most relevant for those with pathological 
behaviours and addictions that have moral consequences for the individual, where such behaviour 
is the product of a desire that an individual would prefer to not act upon, or for the treatment of 
cases of moral psychopathy.  However, one of the aims of this analysis has been to investigate 
whether moral bioenhancement would be a violation of autonomy in toto.  My finding is that whilst 
certain interventions would result in obvious threats to autonomy, a specific type of case would 
produce the opposite outcome and would, in fact, increase the autonomy of the individual, where 
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the latter is associated with the individual’s ability to determine themselves in as authentic manner 
as possible.   
 
5.13 Concluding remarks  
My main aim with this analysis has been to show that moral bioenhancement would not, 
necessarily, produce global impacts upon human moral autonomy.  In other words, contrary to how 
it is sometimes presented in the literature, what is at stake is neither an absolute loss of autonomy, 
nor a matter of no loss of autonomy, whatsoever.  The matter is more complex than this binary 
would suggest.  Rather, the impact upon autonomy, and thus morality, would depend on a variety 
of factors.  It would primarily be informed by the specific nature of the intervention, where this 
refers to what is being targeted and how it is being targeted.  These matters are entirely empirical 
in nature and their explication – were moral bioenhancement to ever become a possibility in the 
way that it has been envisaged in the literature – would depend upon the relevant scientific 
expertise.   
 
Thus, while the term moral bioenhancement, in the sense that I defined it at the end of chapter 2, 
is used to refer to any intervention that would result in discernible improvements in moral conduct, 
if this were ever to become a possibility there would presumably be multiple mechanisms by which 
this would be achieved, ranging from less to more biologically invasive.  The term, therefore, 
encompasses a host of interventions whose effects on autonomy would represent a continuum 
ranging from less problematic to more problematic.  However, the term is used as if it were 
referring to singular interventions, rather than collections of highly diverse potential interventions, 
in order to facilitate coherent discussion and be able to engage with the philosophical ramifications.  
Thus, the moral bioenhancement debate is characterised by an ephemeral quality: it is a 
philosophical inquiry regarding the ethical status of a practical endeavour that may or may not ever 
be scientifically possible and must, therefore, be discussed in somewhat over-simplified terms.  
Furthermore, because of this speculative nature of the debate and the interventions that have been 
proposed, one is required to sidestep the scientific or practical parts of the ‘problem’ and investigate 
the ethical status of the concern for autonomy in terms of possible outcomes, as I have done, whilst 
still attempting to do so in a coherent manner.  For this reason, I have grouped interventions in 
terms of the potential outcomes or impacts upon autonomy that they could be expected to produce, 
rather than focussing upon interventions grouped by type.   
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In the introduction to this second half of chapter 5, I presented a list of those outcomes that have 
been identified in the literature as problematic for autonomy.  What I aimed to do in the rest of this 
chapter was to provide more substantial arguments as to why these outcomes would be problematic.  
Specific freedom-related arguments may be made for why the first and last items on the list – 
compulsory or covertly administered interventions and those interventions that would produce 
irreversible effects – would be morally problematic.  However, in terms of the middle four 
outcomes, these are concerns that must be explicated by means of autonomy arguments, and thus, 
autonomy theories.  I have, therefore, attempted to give more substance to these four potential 
outcomes by means of Ekstrom’s theory of autonomy.   
 
The concern that an intervention could excessively heighten an emotional response, thus producing 
compulsive behaviour, where the latter may be understood as acting without any cognitive 
reflection, is akin to the concern that an intervention could produce unsupported preferences, as 
discussed in section 5.11.2.  In other words, this concern is directed at any intervention that creates 
a new desire which then becomes a preference that is sufficiently compelling to cause action, 
despite not having been authorised by the integral self in the stipulated manner.  The third, fourth 
and fifth concerns listed in the introduction are different formulations of the same concern that is 
investigated in section 5.11.3, namely, the concern that interventions could change the integral self 
or psycho-moral identity of the individual.  An intervention that substantially altered the identity, 
core beliefs or value system of an individual would, in turn, impact the means by which the 
individual is able to assess and accept any of these changes, with hidden changes doing so in a 
more decisive manner.  When explicated in Ekstrom’s terminology, this refers to any intervention 
that substantially alters the cohering network of preferences that has been critically evaluated 
against the individual’s conception of what is true and good, because this network is the means by 
which she either authorises or rejects her desires and preferences, and is therefore the condition for 
her ability to exercise self-determination.  Interventions that produced the kinds of outcomes 
described in sections 5.11.2 and 5.11.3 would be particularly problematic where there is pre-
existing congruence between the desires and preferences of the individual, and thus, a lack of inner 
conflict experienced by him, because this would indicate that he has been acting in a way that is 
self-determined.  Thus, such an intervention would thwart his self-determination in some way.   
 
On the other hand, situations in which an individual’s desires and preferences are not in 
congruence, and, more specifically, when she finds herself acting regularly upon unauthorised 
preferences, are an entirely different matter.  An example of such a situation would be an individual 
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who feels gripped by compulsive desires that are alienating and distressing to her and that produce 
negative effects when she acts upon them, thus interfering with both who she takes herself to be 
and who she aspires to be.  In such cases, if the individual then freely chose to undergo an 
intervention that would ameliorate such desires, to the level that she no longer felt motivated to act 
upon them, but was rather able to act upon those preferences that were authorised by her, I would 
argue that this would be a positive outcome for her and would represent an increase in the level of 
autonomy that she experiences.  I would also argue that the entirely different issue of whether or 
not her post-enhanced actions would possess equal moral worth in comparison to their pre-morally 
bioenhanced state, would not be as urgent for her as her lack of self-determination.     
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion  
6.1 Introduction and overview 
In this dissertation, my aim has been to provide a comprehensive philosophical and ethical 
investigation of moral bioenhancement with a particular focus on the concern for moral autonomy 
that is allegedly posed by moral bioenhancement.  My research has indicated that a coherent 
explication of the above aims and concern is both an empirical and a speculative matter.  In other 
words, the nature of the phenomenon of moral bioenhancement is such that we must extrapolate 
from existing knowledge to make predictions regarding the safety and efficacy of moral 
bioenhancement, its social and political consequences, and its implications for both personal 
autonomy and universal moral autonomy.  In addition, making sense of moral bioenhancement 
from a philosophical and ethical perspective requires conceptual clarification and analysis, an 
explication of the implicit meta-ethical assumptions and the challenging task of trying to pinpoint 
both the nature of morality itself and the conditions for its exercise.   
 
At heart, arguments in favour of moral bioenhancement and opposing arguments that focus on the 
concern for moral autonomy represent a fundamental clash in value systems that is irresolvable.  If 
the concern regarding the threat of ultimate harm raised by Persson and Savulescu is valid, and 
their attribution of this threat to problematic human moral dispositions and behaviour is correct, 
then, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the fundamental disagreement pertains to what one 
would be willing to sacrifice to ensure, or at least increase, our chances of survival.  The fact that 
Harris has clearly argued that he “like so many others would not wish to sacrifice freedom for 
survival” (2016:74-75), indicates both where he stands on the matter as well as the irresolvable 
nature of this disagreement.  His statement here clearly indicates that he regards freedom97, in terms 
of the role that it plays in morality, as more important than survival which would indicate that 
freedom/autonomy comes close to enjoying the status of being absolutely and intrinsically valuable 
in his eyes.  Such a perspective is difficult to substantiate with argumentation as it lies at the 
foundational level of an individual’s belief or value system.  In other words, we cannot delve deeper 
or below such a belief to justify it, one either subscribes to such a belief or one doesn’t, which is 
why I take the moral bioenhancement debate, as it is currently approached and framed, to be 
irresolvable.   
 
                                                 
97 Used in the sense of internal freedom, positive liberty or autonomy, as explicated in chapter 5.  
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For this reason, I have not attempted to develop Persson and Savulescu’s explicitly consequentialist 
argument in support of moral bioenhancement as such an argument would hold no sway with those 
whose arguments and responses in the literature aim to protect ‘goods’ that are non-consequentialist 
in nature.  While I am not positing that thinkers such as Harris, and those who share his concern 
for moral autonomy, disregard the importance of consequences in assessing the ethical status of 
proposed interventions, Harris’ statement above clearly indicates that he attributes more value to 
the non-consequentialist, or intrinsic, ‘good’ of freedom, where this forms the conditions for 
morality, than to the consequentialist or instrumental good of survival.  This is why I have chosen 
to engage with the concern for moral autonomy on its own terms, and from within, rather than 
simply responding with a consequentialist counter-argument which would be summarily rejected 
on the basis of the above-mentioned fundamentally held belief regarding the importance of freedom 
and the role it plays in morality.  Responding in this way required an in-depth discussion and 
explication of the nature of autonomy itself, in order to ascertain whether the concern for moral 
autonomy posed by moral bioenhancement, is, in fact, a legitimate one.   
 
In this brief conclusion to my dissertation I will discuss, in section 6.2, how my research has 
contributed to the moral bioenhancement debate.  In section 6.3 I will then discuss what I posit will 
be the most likely application of moral bioenhancement as well as my suggestions for future 
research in this field.  I will then conclude in section 6.4 with a final comment on the relationship 
between morality and autonomy.    
 
6.2 Contributions and findings 
My dissertation is the product of an extensive exploration of the literature which included all 
articles, chapters and books that have been published on the subject since 2008, up until the current 
time of writing.  From this exploration, I synthesised the insights of these publications into a 
discussion of the subject that may now serve as a comprehensive ethical and philosophical 
overview that is contained within once source.  This will serve as a resource to researchers who 
wish to investigate the area without having to expend the time required to peruse the vast and 
disparate literature on the subject.   
 
In my synthesis of the literature I have aimed to bring clarity to the debate in several ways.  Firstly, 
in the introduction to this dissertation I delineated various ways in which an investigation of moral 
bioenhancement could be approached.  While I have approached the problem from a particular 
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perspective, this delineation serves to indicate alternative approaches that could be taken by other 
researchers interested in the field.   
 
Secondly, I have tried to bring further clarity to the debate in terms of how I have organised the 
different problems that would have to be resolved for moral bioenhancement to become a coherent 
possibility.  In this regard, my discussion in chapter 2 identified the most salient conceptual and 
practical problems associated with moral bioenhancement.  Both definitional problems and 
disagreements regarding the content of morality were shown to be conceptual in nature while 
addressing the question of whether or not moral bioenhancement could ever be scientifically 
feasible requires empirical research.  However, for this to commence in a coherent manner, the 
above-mentioned conceptual problems must be resolved as we would have to agree on what it is 
that should be targeted, and, we would have to be correct in our identification of these targets for 
moral bioenhancement to actually achieve its aims.  Thus, the problem of the science of moral 
bioenhancement is also conceptual in nature.  I also aimed to further the debate by providing a 
definition at the end of chapter 2 that was sufficiently rigorous and comprehensive to encompass a 
variety of concerns.   
 
Thirdly, I have attempted to bring further clarity to the debate through the way in which I have 
grouped the various ethical concerns that have been lodged in the literature.  Although categorising 
the ethical concerns into those that are practical or consequentialist in nature and those that are non-
consequentialist belies the overlap between the two, it is nevertheless a coherent and helpful 
distinction as it clearly illustrates the varying levels of threat and risk that moral bioenhancement 
poses.  In this regard, my research indicates that practically, there are risks at both individual and 
societal levels, while the concern for moral autonomy is a concern for something that is decidedly 
abstract and ephemeral in nature.  What is captured by this latter concern is a related set of 
phenomena that I refer to as moral autonomy, where this term refers to one’s sense of self as a 
moral being, one’s personal moral identity or moral authenticity and one’s perception of universal 
human morality as such.   
 
In terms of this latter concern, my aim was to use the larger scope of a dissertation to explore this 
area in greater depth than the somewhat cursory way in which it has been discussed in the literature.  
In chapter 4b I provided a detailed discussion of the concern for moral autonomy, as voiced in the 
literature, while both parts of chapter 5 represent my unique contribution to explicating and 
providing depth to this concern.  Ekstrom’s coherence theory of autonomy has great potential for 
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use in areas of bioethics that require a richer account of the notion, despite the fact that, to my 
knowledge, her work has not yet been used in this field.  I will discuss this matter further in section 
6.3.  In particular, Ekstrom’s theory provides an interpretation of autonomy that predicates the 
notion on an authenticity that is justified by a structural relationship between preferences and 
attitudinal states that are internal to the self, which is particularly relevant for the issue at hand.  In 
addition, I was able to utilise her account to illustrate the connection between threats to personal 
identity and moral autonomy.  Through my application of the coherence theory of autonomy in 
combination with insights from hierarchical accounts, I came to the conclusion that the threat posed 
to autonomy by moral bioenhancement is not absolute, despite being presented this way in the 
literature; rather, it depends on a number of factors of which the nature of the intervention and the 
interpretation of autonomy are the most salient.  My argument in this regard was that while a 
number of outcomes of moral bioenhancement interventions could pose a distinct threat to moral 
autonomy, certain outcomes could actually achieve the opposite, resulting in an increase in the 
level of autonomy experienced by individuals.   
 
6.3 Probable applications and suggestions for future research 
In both the literature and my dissertation, the discussion has addressed the possibility of the 
enhancement or improvement of psycho-moral dispositions, rather than the treatment of 
pathological functioning.  In other words, the focus has been on the ethical problems associated 
with heightening dispositions such as empathy or altruism and a sense of justice that exist within a 
range of normalcy, where normalcy would be associated with those levels that fall within a 
particular distribution found in the population.  Of course, the division between what is deemed to 
be a normal level of empathy, for example, and a low or pathological level of empathy, is not self-
evident or given in some way.  This is one of the problems with the issue regarding when treatment 
becomes enhancement.  However, the nature of Persson and Savulescu’s argument is such that they 
do not need to engage with the coherence of the treatment/enhancement distinction.  This is because 
they do not argue that we must only seek to treat the psycho-moral dispositions of those with low 
or pathological levels; rather, they have suggested that everyone should be subject to an 
improvement of their levels of these dispositions in order to raise them to the levels of those 
members of society that are regarded as displaying the highest levels thereof.   
 
However, if we agree with the prevailing view in the literature that the kind of compulsory or 
universal moral bioenhancement interventions suggested by Persson and Savulescu are ethically 
problematic then we can enquire as to what the real-world prospects of the moral bioenhancement 
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project would be.  It seems that even if it became possible to safely and effectively elevate the 
levels of the above-mentioned psycho-moral dispositions or to mitigate counter-moral emotions, 
as discussed by Douglas, the application of such interventions would, in all likelihood, be limited 
to certain cases.  In particular, it is my contention that such interventions would be limited to two 
kinds of possible contexts.   
 
Firstly, individuals who have problematised their lower levels of such dispositions or high levels 
of counter-moral emotions, due to the fact that their existing levels have negatively impacted their 
lives or dealings with others producing negative overall consequences, may seek to avail 
themselves of such interventions, if it has been established that improving these levels will bring 
about general improvements in their lives.  In other words, in the same way that individuals freely 
choose to avail themselves of pharmacological medications for conditions such as depression and 
anxiety, to improve the quality of their lives, they may also choose to heighten their levels, of 
empathy, for example, if they believe that doing so would achieve the same end.  If the safety and 
efficacy of such interventions had been established, it is possible that the number of individuals 
opting to undergo such interventions may be substantial.  Furthermore, in cases where individuals 
had problematised their existing levels of these dispositions to the extent that they freely chose to 
undergo a moral bioenhancement intervention as a means of improving their lives, it is likely that 
doing so would achieve congruence between their preferences and integral self as discussed in 
section 5.12 of chapter 5b.  Therefore, in such cases, undergoing such an intervention would 
possibly increase their autonomy as self-determination for the reasons presented in section 5.12 of 
chapter 5b.   
 
I would argue that the second most likely application of moral bioenhancement would be to make 
such interventions available to those individuals who possess pathological or low levels of such 
dispositions where this has led them to engage in criminal behaviour for which they have been 
incarcerated.  This matter was briefly discussed in section 3.3.1 of chapter 3.  The volume of 
discussion in the literature regarding this possible application of moral bioenhancement has grown 
considerably in recent years98.  While the potential for abuse of such interventions is vast, what has 
actually been suggested, in this regard, is less controversial than one would suppose upon first 
consideration.  The most prevalent possibility suggested in the literature would be to offer criminals 
a choice between incarceration or a moral bioenhancement intervention if their behaviour could be 
                                                 
98 References here are too numerous to list due to the rapid expansion of this research area; however, for some examples 
see Shook, 2012; Selgelid, 2014; Douglas, 2014; Curtis, 2012; Horstkötter et al., 2012; Wiseman, 2014; Beck, 2015, 
Caouette, 2015; Barn, 2016. 
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attributed to a deficiency for which there was an available treatment.  As pointed out by Douglas, 
we already do this in certain cases when we offer chemical castration to individuals found guilty 
of paedophilia in exchange for early release or parole (2014:103).  One of the objections to this 
possible application, however, has been the argument that a choice between incarceration and a 
biomedical intervention is not a genuine choice.  As mentioned in section 3.3.1 of chapter 3, in 
terms of Selgelid’s continuum of freedom that includes degrees of encouragement and 
discouragement for undergoing moral bioenhancement: the more compelling the discouragement 
of failing to partake in moral bioenhancement, and thus, the more individuals feel they will be 
disadvantaged by punitive measures, the more their freedom will be compromised (2014:216).  I 
would argue, however, that this second application of moral bioenhancement would be the most 
probable application of the types of interventions that have been discussed in this dissertation and 
that it therefore warrants further ethical investigation and empirical research.    
 
An entirely different suggestion for further research of other themes discussed in this dissertation 
would be to develop the checklist of intervention outcomes associated with the protection of 
autonomy presented in section 5.12 of chapter 5b into a more practical set of guidelines that may 
be utilised in bioethics contexts that require a richer account of autonomy.  In bioethics, autonomy 
is generally important in terms of its role in securing patient rights, particularly their right to 
informed consent.  In terms of its role in such contexts, a richer account of autonomy is not relevant 
as the concept serves as tool of protection or empowerment for patients, rather than as some abstract 
quality or capability of individuals that requires protection itself.  In terms of this distinction, a 
richer account of autonomy would be of use predominantly in the case of any interventions that 
threaten this quality or capability of individuals to be autonomous on a deeper or global level, or 
where patients are incapacitated and unable to make decisions pertaining to their health.  Regarding 
the former possible application, this would most likely be applicable in cases of more invasive 
neurobiological interventions where there is concern that the intervention may produce unwanted 
impacts and changes to the identity of individuals.   
 
6.4 A final comment on the relationship between morality and autonomy  
The concern for moral autonomy in the literature is a difficult one to make sense of as it fluctuates 
between two formulations that are seemingly distinct.  On the one hand, it is sometimes framed as 
the argument that moral bioenhancement, by making it more likely that we would act in a particular 
manner – more moral, in this case – would lessen our autonomy in a general sense.  In other words, 
post-moral bioenhancement, we would be less autonomous than we were before the intervention; 
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our behaviour would have become predetermined in some way.  This would be the concern that 
moral bioenhancement could amount to a form of behaviour control, or, even in cases of voluntary 
moral bioenhancement, that it will be a form of moral compulsion.  On the other hand, the concern 
is also framed as an argument that moral bioenhancement would erode morality as such.  The 
underlying argument here, is that if authentic morality requires that our behaviour be unpredictable, 
so that it is unclear what moral choices we will make in any given situation, an intervention that 
reduces this unpredictability, will also reduce or erode our morality.   
 
When formulated in this way, it is clear that the two formulations are related, and that the second 
formulation follows on from the first one, or that the first formulation is a justification of the 
second.  They are, nevertheless, concerns pertaining to two different phenomena.  The first 
formulation of the concern could be levelled at any intervention that would make it more likely that 
an individual acts in a particular manner, or is directed towards a particular behaviour or choice.  
Thus, the first formulation could be an argument that may also be levelled at interventions with 
non-moral outcomes; it is not specific to moral bioenhancement.  In other words, if the concern is 
that behaviour becomes more determined in some way after an intervention, and, in keeping with 
the nature and aim of a particular intervention, the concern for autonomy could be levelled at 
interventions that increase an individual’s sense of cooperation or compliance in general, or even 
those interventions that introduce a new or improved ability in individuals, thus making it more 
likely that they will direct their lives towards utilising this ability.  In terms of the latter, having a 
particular talent or ability may produce a sense of determination in some way.  If I ‘find’ myself to 
be a talented singer I am more likely to feel ‘compelled’ to make something of this talent, such as 
attempting to have a career in music despite the sacrifices this may entail.  If I possess mathematic 
acumen, I will be more likely to choose certain careers, and thus, an important portion of my life 
will have been determined in some sense by my abilities.   
 
However, despite this, we never encounter such autonomy concerns in the literature.  In other 
words, while there are a variety of ethical concerns that have been raised towards, for example, 
cognitive bioenhancement or the bioenhancement of personal abilities such as musicianship or 
athletic ability, these bioenhancements do not elicit concern for the autonomy of the individuals if 
they freely choose to undergo such interventions.  Therefore, the prevalence of the concern for 
autonomy in the moral bioenhancement literature and its absolute lack of presence in the 
bioenhancement literature in general indicates that we are, indeed, dealing with something entirely 
different in kind.   




In my dissertation, I have chosen to focus predominantly on the first formulation of the concern by 
arguing that thinkers such as Harris overestimate the extent to which certain individuals possess 
autonomy to begin with.  Simply put, I have argued that where there is a lack of congruence 
between how an individual acts and how she would wish to act, then she is in a state of 
compromised autonomy to begin with.  Formulated differently, the extent to which an individual 
has problematised his morally relevant behaviour is an indication that an intervention that mitigates 
this should not be regarded as eroding his autonomy; it is rather, an affirmation of the latter.  If one 
accepts these arguments then there is not necessarily a need to engage with the second formulation 
of the concern.  However, the matter is complicated by the nature of the second formulation and 
the fact that, as mentioned above, in the case of moral bioenhancement we are dealing with 
something different in kind.  For this reason, the second formulation is more challenging and 
possibly irresolvable, as, if one delves down to its foundations, it becomes evident, once more, that 
it represents a fundamental value clash.  
 
Harris’ argument that moral bioenhancement would eradicate our ‘freedom to fall’ which is a 
precondition for morality, is clearly a version of the second formulation of the concern for moral 
autonomy.  As mentioned above, in my dissertation I have largely chosen to engage with the first 
formulation of the concern as it is the justification or argument that supports the second 
formulation.  However, turning briefly now to the second formulation, if we explore what lies at 
the heart of Harris’ argument, it is his concern for morality as such.  In fact, as mentioned in section 
6.1, for Harris, the value of morality is absolute.  His statement regarding the fact he wouldn’t 
“wish to sacrifice freedom for survival” (Harris, 2016:74-75) should rather be reformulated as not 
wishing to sacrifice morality or moral freedom for survival.  The fact that he persists with this 
proposition, arguing that it would stand even in cases where individuals had freely chosen to 
undergo moral bioenhancement, indicates that this is his deepest concern.   
 
The matter of whether or not moral bioenhancements would decidedly alter human morality as 
such, in the way that thinkers such as Harris fear, is not possible to definitively ascertain.  However, 
for the reasons discussed at various points in this dissertation, it is my contention that the concerns 
in this regard are exaggerated.  However, to take an entirely different approach to this matter, and 
in conclusion, I would argue that if one engages directly with the second formulation of the concern, 
then both the relevance and strength of Harris’ argument – or the concern for morality in general – 
is dependent upon how we ascribe value to the phenomenon of morality.  If we view morality only, 
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or primarily, in terms of its intrinsic value, as Harris’ statement above clearly indicates he does, 
then it is something to be protected at all costs, as if it were an item of such value that we should 
seek to preserve it even at the cost of our survival as a species.  In other words, it would be better 
not to survive if we do so at the expense of our morality.  However, if one holds the view that a 
considerable part of why we value morality lies in its instrumental value – it enables harmonious 
coexistence and societal functioning, it is a protective mechanism against potential harms that 
others could inflict on us, and a world with the presence of morality will be more pleasant, and thus 
preferable to a world without it – then one will rather support the view that morality should serve 
the ends of human beings, rather than human beings serving the ends of morality.  In other words, 
the argument here would be that if we can improve upon morality then it will better serve the 
instrumental ends required of it.  Why should morality, therefore, be reified or treated as something 
that should remain unchanged?  This argument, however, is indicative of a consequentialist 
perspective.  Thus, we are once again faced with the impasse between consequentialism and non-
consequentialism.  This fundamental disagreement aside, the problem with framing the debate in 
terms of the protection of morality, as such, is that in doing so, one elevates an abstract 
phenomenon, such as morality, to a status that, I would argue, occurs at the expense of the concrete 
individual whose freedom to choose not to fall so often, or to be a more moral person, is 
disregarded.   
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